The principle of staffing the Armed Forces of the South of Russia as the reason for their victories and defeats

A poster advertising the "Chronicles of the Russian Revolution," which provided an opportunity to revisit the topic of the Civil War.
Where the capital is, there is power
"The Chronicles of the Russian Revolution" is another unique look at the Russian history A.S. Konchalovsky, which drew well-reasoned criticism from experts, including historian Yury V. Yemelyanov. Yet the master had every opportunity to produce a solid historical series.
However, but - this is a reason to once again touch upon the topic of the Civil War, which, as the remarkable and, alas, now deceased historian A. N. Bokhanov told me: “Relevant forever.”
This article will discuss one of the reasons for the Bolshevik victory, some of which have already been discussed in previous materials. Let me recap the main ones: the Reds controlled both capitals and, accordingly, were perceived as the legitimate government by the majority of the population, regardless of their attitude toward Bolshevik ideology and its proponents.
Therefore, Admiral A.V. Kolchak could proclaim himself Supreme Ruler of Russia three times over, but his capital was Omsk, whose location was only vaguely known to a significant portion of the illiterate peasantry. This is not the least of the reasons why Kolchak, if we consider the peasant worldview, was not seen as a true tsar.

A.V. Kolchak is one of the most tragic figures of the White movement.
The admiral's legitimate authority was contested even in his rear, which was largely Socialist Revolutionary. The military, having placed the burden of power on Kolchak's weak shoulders, short-sightedly fell out with the Socialist Revolutionaries, thereby digging the grave of their protege.
Even his subordinates were in no hurry to carry out his orders – the well-known conflict between the admiral and the ataman G.M. Semenov, not to mention the Czechs and other “brothers”.
But let's not talk about squabbles within the government. They're typical: the conflict between L.D. Trotsky and I.V. Stalin in 1918; or Lieutenant Generals A.I. Denikin and P.N. Wrangel.
However, the allies were also in no hurry to see Kolchak and his Council of Ministers as the legal successors of the Provisional Government, although three days after the November coup, the admiral acknowledged Russia's foreign debts, which, according to historian V. G. Khandorin, exceeded 12 billion rubles by the end of 1917.

N.D. Avksentyev is one of the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the head of the Provisional All-Russian Government, in which Kolchak held the post of Minister of War before the coup.
Even the experienced diplomat S.D. Sazonov's advocacy of White interests abroad was of no avail. However, official recognition by the Allies of Kolchak or Denikin—I note that the admiral did not transfer the position of Supreme Ruler to Anton Ivanovich—would not have changed the outcome of the Civil War for a more important reason.
The Whites created a military, with a touch of statehood, education, with weak central authority in the regions.

A special meeting under the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia, which performed the functions of a government, but it is difficult to call this body a government in the full sense of the word.
The Bolsheviks, however, were building a full-fledged state with the corresponding institutions and, above all, with an apparatus of violence capable of suppressing any anti-government uprising.
Learn martial arts the real way
Yes, the Civil War left its mark on its functioning, including the development of the Red Army. But even a poorly organized regular army would sooner or later crush any rebel forces, even if they were initially successful.
However, if the rebels don't begin to build their armed forces on a regular basis, they will lose. They can only be saved by the excessive corruption and weakness of the official authorities fighting them—a scenario like Afghanistan in 2022 or last year's Syrian one. In both cases, it wasn't so much the rebels who won, but rather the authorities, rotten to the core, who self-destructed.
The Bolsheviks weren't corrupt, and their will was in perfect order. And already in the winter of 1918, they began creating a regular army. True, the process didn't go smoothly.
Twenty years ago, the Independent Military Review published my article, “My hut is on the edge, I don’t know anything...” written based on documents I introduced into scientific circulation from the headquarters of the Southern Front of the Red Army for the autumn of 1918, stored in the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA).
The article cites materials from the Operations Department (correspondence on the combat readiness of units, cases of failure to comply with combat orders), the Intelligence Department (captured enemy papers, White Guard newspapers, etc., questionnaires of Red Army soldiers who escaped from captivity), the Political Department, the Special Department, and the Revolutionary Tribunal of the aforementioned headquarters. These are highly interesting documents. The article is available online.
Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties, the Bolsheviks built a regular army, attracting, and even conscripting, military specialists. It's no secret that the Red Army's senior command staff was better trained than the White Army's.

P.P. Lebedev
For example, Major General P.P. Lebedev, Chief of the Republic's Field Headquarters, began World War I as the head of the Quartermaster General's office at the Southwestern Front headquarters. Incidentally, Lebedev, like the Svechins and Makhrovs, also had a classic background: his brother, Sergei Pavlovich, a major general, served with the Whites.
In this sense, the combat experience of the most successful White Guard commander, Denikin, looked more modest: he showed himself brilliantly as a division commander – perhaps the best in the Imperial Army on the fields of the First World War – and deservedly received a corps, but commanded it for only six months.
This was insufficient time to gain full combat experience. His subsequent career advancement was determined by political factors: Anton Ivanovich nominally commanded the Western and Southwestern Fronts amid the army's collapse.

A.I. Denikin
In the summer of 1919, Denikin had to command, in essence, a front, coordinating the offensive of three armies, not counting the operation of the troops of the Trans-Caspian region.
But there was another component to the Whites' defeat: the principle of volunteerism, which formed the basis for the formation of the Volunteer Army, incidentally, in April 1919, after the death of Infantry General L.G. Kornilov, literally saved from annihilation by Denikin. Anton Ivanovich, I repeat, was a brilliant tactician.
After the unification of the Volunteer and Don armies and the creation of the Armed Forces of South Russia in January 1919, volunteerism as the principle underlying the formation of the armed forces was formally abandoned; more precisely, Denikin did so earlier:
His political opponent, Cavalry General P.N. Krasnov, having become the ataman of the Great Don Army by order No. 4 of May 5, announced the formation of the Young Army.
However, the common truth is that any decree issued requires a mechanism for its implementation. Taganrog and Novocherkassk have encountered problems with this. We'll discuss Novocherkassk next time; this article will focus on the Armed Forces of South Russia.
When mobilization fails
In a civil war, a key component of any army's victory is a well-functioning mobilization mechanism capable of quickly replacing losses. The Bolsheviks, as noted above, solved this problem; their opponents did not.
Historian R.G. Gagkuev cites the following reasons why, even during the days of military success, Denikin's forces experienced disruptions in recruiting their army:
I note that the problem of unreliability among some and the deviation of others were addressed by strict, and if necessary, brutal, measures to control those mobilized. Such measures require an appropriate apparatus, primarily commissars. The Whites did not create such an institution.

Officers of the Armed Forces of South Russia
Accordingly, the Volunteer Army commanders had no choice but to replace the high losses in their ranks with prisoners—a practice common on both sides. But for the Whites, facing a shortage of volunteers, this was more pressing due to the smaller numbers of their troops, who were forced to operate across a broad front with extremely limited reserves, which were also being diverted to the domestic front against N.I. Makhno.
The deployment of prisoners yielded varying results. For example, the Samur Regiment, formed from former Red Army rank-and-file soldiers, performed well in battle, as did Captain P. Ivanov's company, composed of rank-and-file prisoners, vividly described by Major General A. V. Turkul in his book "The Drozdovites on Fire."
It should be taken into account that prisoners were, as a rule, natives of the regions where they were mobilized and, consequently, captured. And since the bulk of the rank and file consisted of peasants, their horizons did not extend beyond their native village, or at most, the province.

Red Army soldiers
They often fought bravely, but, as Wrangel recalled when he took command of the 1st Cavalry Division of the Volunteer Army in August 1918:
According to V. Zh. Tsvetkov, one of the categories of prisoners of war:
From Lords to Comrades and Back, or the Fate of Captured Officers
As for officers who had previously served in the Red Army—either captured or defected to the Whites—their treatment depended directly on the commanders of the Volunteer Army's regiments and battalions. After all, they were essentially akin to field commanders and enjoyed extensive autonomy, including the de facto right to judge and pardon.
It is enough to recall the story of the execution by the Kornilovites of the commander of the 55th Division of the 13th Army, Major General A. V. Stankevich, whom they captured near Mtsensk – a story that is spiced up to this day with the tale that is circulated about his refusal to shake hands with Denikin, who was not in Orel.

A.V. Stankevich
But Stankevich, who voluntarily joined the Red Army, was a high-ranking officer. A significant portion of junior and mid-level officers were mobilized into the Red Army and, at times, experienced negative attitudes from the soldier masses or excessive patronage from commissars.
Finding themselves in the ranks of the Whites, many of them fought not out of fear, but out of conscience. Here's an example from the memoirs of Major General (in 1919, Colonel) B.A. Shteifon, commander of the Belozersk Regiment of the Volunteer Army:
"What's your last name?" "Lieutenant Trokhimchuk." "Where did you serve before?" "In peacetime, I was an extended-enlistment soldier in the N-th regiment, and during the war, I was promoted to officer." "How could you not be ashamed to fight against us?" "That's just the way things worked out, Colonel." Trokhimchuk's voice wavered at these words. Something good and honest was heard in the prisoner's answers.
"Would you like to serve with us?" "Yes, indeed, I do." Lieutenant Trokhimchuk was assigned to one of the companies, but not the one that had captured him. During the two weeks of fighting, I inquired several times about Trokhimchuk's conduct, and the company commander always described him as an exemplary officer.
One day, I had to hold a crossing leading to the flank of our position at all costs. By then, the regiment had suffered heavy losses. Almost all the company commanders and many officers were killed. It was yet another crisis, when the lack of manpower and the shortcomings of the army's organization were compensated for with bloodshed. Only half a company, extremely weak in numbers and equipped with machine guns, could be allocated to the crossing. An officer reliable in every way was needed. I remembered Lieutenant Trokhimchuk and, upon learning that he was unharmed, summoned him.
"Lieutenant Trokhimchuk, I need to hold such-and-such a crossing, and only a half-company with two machine guns can be allocated for its defense. I wish to appoint you commander of this half-company." "Thank you very much, Colonel." "Keep in mind that if the Bolsheviks defeat you, the regiment's position will be grave." "I understand." "Look, Lieutenant Trokhimchuk, hold on. I trust you." "Of course, I served with the Bolsheviks... And I can't tell you anything, but you'll see for yourself, Colonel..."
Lieutenant Trokhimchuk truly fulfilled his promise. Despite the difficult situation, he held the crossing, losing more than half of his detachment killed and wounded. At the end of the battle, when the situation had already been consolidated, he was killed. Many years have passed since then, but I always remember this honorable officer with emotion.
I turned to such an extensive quote, including to illustrate a problem that was essential for the Whites: the lack of normal organization of troops cost them a lot of blood, and sometimes the situation was saved by the tactical skill and fortitude of individual officers.
Incidentally, Shteifon described P.V. Makarov, His Excellency's adjutant, in detail in his memoirs. The image he painted contrasts with that created by Yu.V. Solomin.
Plus there was another problem, directly related to the recruitment of troops and the quality of their composition, caused by the Whites themselves.

Drozdovtsy
Let me once again refer to Shteifon’s memoirs:
Note that Bolkhovitinov himself defected to the Whites, yet he was distrusted, although Denikin saw this incident as an exception to the rule, emphasizing the White Guard officers' equanimity toward the Red commanders who had defected. According to him, those captured by the Drozdovites "were mostly pardoned, while some were subjected to a worse fate—execution. There were cases of captured officers defecting back to the Reds."
Turkul also wrote about the leniency towards prisoners, which was denied only to commissars.
I noted above: the captured Red Army commanders who found themselves among the volunteers fought not out of fear, but out of conscience. This is also confirmed by the data cited by V. Zh. Tsvetkov:
However, as they fell out of action by the autumn of 1919, the situation for the Whites took a turn for the worse. And the enemy grew stronger.
Markov captain V. Larionov recalled the battles of the second half of October and early November:
By the late autumn of 1919, the scales were tipping in favor of the Reds, and fewer and fewer people were willing to serve the Whites. Desertion among captured Red Army soldiers who had been placed in line was on the rise, and their capture rates were also falling.
But the Whites never created a more or less well-functioning mechanism for replenishing troops.
The First Hikers, or the Whites' Requiem for a Dream
In conclusion, I consider it important to draw attention to another problem that some of the White officers faced, and not only the prisoners who were put into service.
We are talking about the role played in the Volunteer Army by the officers who led the first expedition, that is, the participants of the 1st Kuban – Ice – expedition.
They were the first to oppose the Bolsheviks in the South of Russia in what seemed to be a hopeless situation at the end of February 1918; they fought without a rearguard, against a numerically superior, albeit poorly organized, enemy.

Kornilovites, probably the 1st Kuban Ice March
M. Tsvetaeva wrote about them in 1918 with the pathos characteristic of her “White Guard Cycle,” but accurately conveying the atmosphere of the Ice March:
The Don has moved. We are perishing. We are drowning.
We trust the wind of centuries to carry away
Bad news for the grandchildren:
Yes! The Don block has broken through!
The White Guard – yes! – perished.
But, leaving children and wives,
But leaving for the Don,
Flying in a white flock to the chopping block,
We were dying for one thing: huts!
Having crossed myself at the last temple,
The White Guard army – for centuries.
Young and not so young, selfless, brave and uncompromising, including those who joined the army when it began to win.
It was precisely the pioneers of the campaign who were promoted to key positions, sometimes regardless of rank or ability. Even Wrangel, who had joined Denikin during the Second Kuban Campaign, was initially distrusted:
Denikin understood the abnormality of this situation, but he could do nothing about it. This principle of advance, beginning sometime in May 1919—the beginning of the Armed Forces of South Russia's counteroffensive in the Tsaritsyn and Kharkov directions—had a negative impact on the command staff.
As an example: the pioneer of the campaign, Lieutenant General A.P. Kutepov, commanding the 1st Army Corps of the Volunteer Army advancing in the main Oryol direction, failed to cope with the tasks assigned to him in October-November 1919.
The pioneers' peculiar ideas about subordination—and not only theirs: in their relations with Denikin, Wrangel went beyond it—also had a negative impact on discipline in the army.
The same Kutepov in February 1920 – Tsaritsyn and Rostov-on-Don had already been abandoned, the Whites were rolling back to Yekaterinodar – allowed himself to actually issue an ultimatum to the Commander-in-Chief, which was impossible in a regular army.
I won't recount the content, what's important is Denikin's reaction to it:
But the psychological possibility of such treatment existed in the Volunteer Army from the first day of its existence; it found expression in the aforementioned promotion of pioneers to command positions and in the attitude towards prisoners, determined not by unquestioning adherence to the order of the Commander-in-Chief on this matter, but by the will of the commanders on the ground.
Already in the silence of emigration, Denikin, analyzing the reasons for the defeat of the White cause, wrote:
In fact, democracy was partly the foundation of the army's formation and its treatment of prisoners. This had its advantages in the initial stages of the White movement and its disadvantages when, as Anton Ivanovich wrote, it entered "the broad Moscow road."

A.I. Denikin was among the last to leave Novorossiysk, March 1920
References
Venkov A.V. Ataman Krasnov and the Don Army. 1918 – Moscow, Veche, 2008
Volkov S.V. The tragedy of Russian officers. – M., 1993
Wrangel P.N. Notes. (November 1916 - November 1920) Book 1 - Mn., Harvest, 2002
Gagkuev R. G. The White Movement in the South of Russia. Military Development, Recruitment Sources, Social Composition. 1917–1920. Moscow: Posev Commonwealth, 2012
Denikin A.I. Campaign on Moscow ("Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles") - M.: Voenzidat, 1989
Historian Yuri Yemelyanov in Pravda on the series "Chronicles of the Russian Revolution": another act of sabotage against Russian history
"Historical forgery!" What does Spitsyn have to do with Konchalovsky's series "Chronicles of the Russian Revolution"??
Larionov V. The Last Junkers Frankfurt am Main. Sowing. 1984
Khandorin, V. G., Admiral Kolchak. Truth and Myths. — Tomsk: Tomsk University Publishing House, 2007
Khodakov I.M. Civil War: Forgotten Victors
Tsvetaeva M. Don (White Guard, your path is high...)
Tsvetkov V.Zh. White armies of the South of Russia. (Recruitment, social composition of the Volunteer Armed Forces of the South of Russia, the Russian army). Moscow: Posev, 2000
Tsvetkov V.Zh. Agriculture in the White South of Russia. Implementation of legislative acts of the White Guard governments. Cooperation and zemstvo self-government in the White South of Russia in 1919–20.
Shteifon B.A. The Crisis of Volunteering. – Belgrade, 1928
Ilya Shevchenko. Chronicles of the Russian Revolution, Episode 2. Comedy of Errors https://rutube.ru/video/384cbde0232df8bdce32746fe904ada7/?ysclid=miwvlww5535191641
Ilya Shevchenko. Chronicles of the Russian Revolution, Episode 3. Lenin's "Brigade" https://rutube.ru/video/efdf30d972ca2354db4fc41fddddaacd/?ysclid=miwvwvyicb330804545
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