A fleet of ghost ships disappears into oblivion.
Oh yes, as the unforgettable Popandopoulos used to say, although he's a completely fictional character, we're really on the brink of a major disaster. It's worth living in the era to see something like this, like a whole fleet ships under the proud American flag will sink into the abyss stories and will take with it to the bottom the chests... No, perhaps the containers with dollars.
Let's not drag out the you-know-why: the US Navy has announced the cancellation of the troubled Constellation-class frigate program due to delays and significant budget overruns.
The Constellation-class frigate program (FFG-62) was originally designed to build up to 20 ships, with the total cost of the program estimated at approximately $22 billion.
On November 24, US Navy Secretary John Phelan (a real man of steel, I must say!) announced that the department was officially terminating the Constellation program as part of a "strategic shift."
The cancellation of the contract is part of the Pentagon's efforts to improve spending efficiency, reduce the cost of purchased equipment and weapons, as well as the redistribution of resources across the armed forces with an emphasis on accelerating procurement.
"From Day One, I've made it clear: I won't spend a dollar unless it improves our readiness or ability to win," said Navy Secretary John Phelan. "To deliver on that promise, we're transforming the way we build and operate our fleet—working with industry to deliver a warfighting advantage, starting with the strategic exit of the Constellation program."
"The Navy and our shipbuilding industry partners have reached an agreement to cancel construction of the final four ships of this class, which has not yet begun, in the best interests of the Navy," Phelan said. "We greatly appreciate the contributions of shipbuilders in Wisconsin and Michigan. While work on the first two ships continues, they remain under consideration as part of this strategic shift."
"The Navy and our shipbuilding industry partners have reached an agreement to cancel construction of the final four ships of this class, which has not yet begun, in the best interests of the Navy," Phelan said. "We greatly appreciate the contributions of shipbuilders in Wisconsin and Michigan. While work on the first two ships continues, they remain under consideration as part of this strategic shift."
As a result, Fincantieri Marinette Marine's Wisconsin shipyard will continue building Constellation (FFG-62) and Congress (FFG-63), but will abandon the remaining four frigates.
In fact, the phrase "I won't spend a dollar unless it improves our readiness or ability to win" is a golden phrase that every defense minister in any country should, in theory, take up.
Secretary of the Navy John C. Phelan is a fascinating character. While he's not exactly a military man, he's a skilled economist with two degrees (including one from Harvard) and a former executive at Michael Dell's Dell Technologies who went freelance. He's known for throwing a party that netted Trump $38 million in campaign funds in a single evening. And when such a man starts stomping on those who profit from supplying the Navy, he does so with understanding.
A bit of history and money
After the last successful series of surface ships for the US Navy was built (and these, as you've guessed, were the Arleigh Burke destroyers), a certain... stupor set in. Everything designed and built for warships turned into a "black hole" into which millions of dollars were wasted.
It was very difficult to find exact numbers, but this is what we got:
- the LST project (littoral "Freedom" and "Independence", 32 instead of 60 pieces) consumed more than 31 billion dollars;
- $22,5 billion was spent on Zumwalt-class destroyers (3 units);
- $7,3 billion was spent on three Seawolf-class submarines.
That's "only" $60 billion. Something like Hungary's 2024 budget.
And then there's the Constellation frigate project, which has already spent $2,5 billion and wasted it all. And Phelan, who understands that adding the entire planned $7,6 billion to the $2,5 billion would result in even more expenses and fewer results. Saving $5 billion is still a significant amount.
Why did you decide to abandon frigates?
After all, the Constellation-class frigates, based on the Italian Navy's Fregata Europea Multi-Missione (FREMM) multi-purpose frigates, were supposed to replace the problematic Freedom and Independence-class littoral combat ships, which were being retired.
However, to meet the US Navy's more stringent survivability criteria, Marinette had to make significant design changes. The program has become, to put it mildly, a headache (a more appropriate term would be "brain cancer"), and the commissioning of the lead ship, Constellation, FFG-62, has been delayed by more than three years. Originally scheduled for commissioning in 2026, this will now not happen until 2029. If that happens.
Amazingly, this ship, the first in the series, is currently only 10-12% complete.
"Sometimes it's better to just design a new ship," former Navy acquisition chief Nicholas Guertin said in February, describing the difficulty of reconfiguring an existing design. "It turns out that changing someone else's design is much more difficult than it seems."
Here, of course, one can shrug one's shoulders and sympathize. Moreover, as of April 2025, when the ship was scheduled to be delivered, by a strange coincidence, the frigate had not yet been completed, even though construction was well underway and approximately 10% complete.
Earlier this year, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released an estimate that the US Navy's Constellation-class frigates will weigh at least 759 metric tons more, a 13% increase over previous projections. It's important to understand that increased displacement also increases cost, as there are a number of assumptions involved.
Unplanned weight gain during ship construction can negatively impact a ship's capabilities. The Navy strives to modify and improve the ship's initial characteristics during its planned service life. Such modifications can either improve or detract from the frigates' combat effectiveness, limit their ability to expand their capabilities to counter threats, and shorten their planned service life.
The question is what the Americans were hoping to achieve: FREMM or a completely new project based on the Italian design. Frankly, compared to the initial target of 85%, the similarity between the Constellation-class frigates and the FREMM designs ultimately amounts to only about 15%.
The future of the Constellation-class ships came under intense scrutiny this year when US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the military to develop plans to significantly cut defense spending over the next five years. The nonpartisan Project on Government Oversight then proposed canceling the frigate program.
The latest decision has sparked mixed reactions from experts. Some called it a long-overdue, bold move that would free up funds for other projects. Some even speculated about what alternatives the US Navy might consider.
Naval Lookout, a well-known British naval resource, wrote: "A Canadian variant of the T26 River-class would be an ideal alternative to Constellation, but there are doubts the US will turn to foreign manufacturers again—there's too much arrogance and corruption in US defense procurement. The US Navy's failure to develop a successful new surface combatant in 30 years is a very serious problem for the free world..."
And then there's China...
The United States has repeatedly expressed growing concern over the rapid expansion and modernization of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy), viewing it as the most serious long-term challenge to American maritime dominance since the end of the Cold War.
According to previous Pentagon estimates, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates approximately 400 ships. And what kind…
But the problem is that the threat of this challenge from China exists only in American minds, but it directly hits the American budget no more harshly than the Chinese ones. missilesThis is where the “Chinese threat” comes from, which has almost completely replaced the “Russian threat.”
Well, they can't live in America without a threat looming over the country. They just can't—that's all there is to it. It's a classic, though:
"How can this be? There's a threat hanging over me!"
And there is nothing more terrible than this threat!”
(Alexander Bashlachev, "The Feat of a Scout", 1984)
And, true to form, the American think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) stated in its March 2025 report, “Ship Warfare: Confronting China’s Dual-Custom Shipbuilding Empires,” that by 2030, China will have a fleet of 425 ships, compared to the US Navy’s 300.
For its part, the United States is more concerned about the pace of construction of these ships than their sophistication. Although the US Navy, according to (American) analysts, maintains a qualitative advantage—better-trained crews, more sophisticated systems—the country's leadership is alarmed by the scale of shipbuilding in China.
"I have no doubt about our ships and how we train and employ them. But the numbers? That's concerning," said Admiral James W. Kilby, acting Chief of Naval Operations. "Virtually all of our shipbuilding projects are behind schedule."
The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has approximately 50 frigates. These are primarily modern guided-missile frigates, such as the Type 054A class, which forms the backbone of the fleet, as well as the newer Type 054B class.
The Type 054A is a multi-role platform optimized for anti-submarine warfare, air defense, and surface attack. The Type 054B features improved stealth characteristics and advanced sensors.
Both are considered critical to securing China's "extensive maritime claims," particularly in the South China Sea. And in the event of a potential conflict with Taiwan, the frigates would form surface groups to provide blockade or support amphibious landings, shifting from "near-coast defense" to "off-coast defense."
In contrast, the United States has no operational frigates.
When it comes to guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, the United States still has the advantage. Destroyers, in particular, are considered the backbone of any navy due to their speed, range, and versatility.
However, frigates in the 4000- to 8000-ton range represent a cost-effective way to achieve numerical superiority, improve the effectiveness of distributed operations, and maintain a high tempo of combat operations.
China's advantage in frigates and corvettes could be offset by US dominance in cruisers and destroyers, according to a CSIS report titled "Analysis of China's Naval Buildup."
During World War II, these small ships played a vital role as radar picket vessels, fleet protection ships, and convoy escorts, the report states. It also notes that they could play a similar role in future conflicts.
In a modern conflict, they could serve similar roles: engaging enemy ships in the littoral waters of the Indo-Pacific region or performing other missions that naval planners haven't yet envisioned. The US Navy appears to realize that it may be overinvesting in larger cruisers and destroyers.
- the report says.This appears to be the case, especially given that, as USNI 1 reports, the Naval Service is currently conducting a fleet structure review that will impact the military's development of new systems. However, the publication added that the Navy requires 73 small surface combatants.
It's all very simple: three modern, small (compared to a destroyer) frigates carry more weapons and can fire them, creating a salvo so dense that a destroyer's crews might be unable to cope. Furthermore, even if one ship is destroyed, the other two remain combat-ready. Even a complete failure of a frigate would result in fewer human and material losses than a destroyer.
Yes, building a frigate fleet will require a slightly larger number of personnel, but for China, as you can imagine, this isn't a problem at all. Today, a destroyer and a frigate are roughly the same pair as a destroyer and a torpedo boat 80 years ago. That is, in principle, the torpedo boats that served in many countries played roughly the same roles as destroyers (minelaying, torpedo attacks, anti-submarine warfare, escort duty, and rescue), except, perhaps, Defense, which on these ships was weaker due to their size.
But size, oddly enough, doesn't always matter. German Type 39 destroyers (also called "torpedo ships," and even more obtuse authors call them "torpedo boats," although a boat with a displacement of 1300 tons is quite extraordinary) were quite advanced ships:
- displacement 1300 tons;
- speed - 39 knots;
- cruising range - 2400 miles;
- radar and sonar;
- armament: 4 x 105 mm guns, 2 x 2 x 37 mm machine guns, 1 x 4 x 20 mm machine gun, 2 x 1 x 20 mm machine guns, 2 triple-tube torpedo tubes, 4 anti-submarine mortars and 30-60 mines.
Not a destroyer, but one with ambitions. Five such ships, covering the blockade runner Münsterland, dispersed the British force under Captain Fisher, consisting of the light cruiser Charybdis and six destroyers, at the Battle of Saint-Île in October 1943. The Germans, clearly superior in training and technical mastery, sank the cruiser Charybdis with torpedoes and fired two shells into the destroyer Limbourne: one in the torpedo tube, the other in the powder magazine. After this, Limbourne ceased to exist as a ship and, after the crew was rescued, was finished off by her own forces.
Ultimately, more than 500 British sailors, including their commander, Fisher, perished. A good example of when size doesn't matter.
And it would seem that this is it—Constellation-class frigates to replace the aging Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (old in age, but actually quite capable)—the solution. But no, on November 25, US Navy Secretary John Phelan signed the frigates' death warrant. And the US Navy canceled the construction program for the new Constellation-class frigates, "to focus on new types of warships that the US Navy can build more quickly."
This, of course, requires a separate understanding, but we have what we have. First of all, I'd like to understand what these "new types of ships" are all about, which, moreover, will be built faster. But this is a matter of patience and time.
In the meantime, under the terms agreed upon with Fincantieri Marinette Marine in Marinette, Wisconsin, the shipyard will continue building the first two frigates, the FFG 62 Constellation and FFG 63 Congress, for the US Navy, but the next four frigates already under contract will be cancelled.
"The new 'framework,'" Secretary Phelan said, "allows the U.S. Navy to build new types of ships faster and deliver the warfighting capabilities our service members need in greater numbers and more quickly. This is critical, and I look forward to sharing more details soon."
It would be interesting, indeed, since not only money but also the prestige of the US Navy is at stake in this wild carnival. Canceling such an order is a powerful move, but it raises the question: what next?
A Fincantieri source said the cost of continuing work on the first two frigates, plus compensation payments agreed upon with the US government, would total $3 billion, and the US Navy had also agreed to award Fincantieri Marinette Marine $2 billion in new orders as compensation.
That's a savings of 4,6 billion and two ships, which they'll have to figure out where to put them. Apparently, they'll be assigned to the "Unlucky Fates" special squadron with the "Zumvolts."
The total cost of the 20-frigate design and construction program for the US Navy was expected to be $19,81 billion. But something went wrong.
While the initial idea of using a ready-made European design as the basis for the FFG(X) frigates was intended to reduce the cost of designing the ships, the subsequent constant introduction of new requirements by the US Navy and the requirement to meet American military standards led to a radical redesign of the FREMM project and, in essence, to the creation of a new type of frigate, which predictably led to an increase in the cost of both R&D and the ships themselves, and to a significant delay in the design and start of construction.
And then the chain continues: size increased, displacement increased, costs increased. There's no need to point fingers here: it's the US Navy, whose services produced 511 documents modifying the original ship design. And is it any wonder Constellation and FREMM only have 15% in common? Of course, it's all very complicated.
A silly, topical example: can a Vesta be turned into a car? Obviously, no, but let's say: a BMW engine, a Mercedes suspension, a Toyota automatic transmission... So, what about fast, smooth, and reliable? Sure, but wouldn't it be easier to go with something concrete, so as not to make a mess of things? A hodgepodge of wishlists only produces more ugliness. That's what the Americans are swooping in on. And that's why the Sozvezdie is still going strong.
The original FFG(X) program was based on the idea of the Navy acquiring frigates at a cost of $900 million per ship, with the cost of two frigates ultimately being less than that of one Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. However, improvements, refinements, and modifications meant that the price of a production frigate would eventually reach approximately $1,6 billion per ship, a ratio of three frigates for two destroyers. Perhaps someone predicted that the price would rise to $2 billion per ship as all Navy requirements were met. This, however, completely undermined the entire idea, as it would have been easier to continue building Arleigh Burkes without any fuss, and simply replace their aging equipment with new ones.
And here it is no longer surprising that the new leadership of the US Navy Department has eliminated this program.
Indeed, it is easier to first put the military in place, and have them first answer the question of what they need from a ship, and then design the ship itself to suit their wishes, than to try to shove all sorts of things into an existing ship.
And while the admirals are pondering this, they should be properly jailed for answering the question, "What's next for this junk?" While the Seawolfs are more or less serviceable, the Freedoms, Independences, Zumvolts, and Constellations—alas, their combat value is more than questionable.
Either it really is a fleet of ghost ships, whose place is in some half-abandoned naval base on a remote atoll (so as not to be an eyesore for taxpayers), or a "Squadron of Losers" that could be thrown into the forefront of an attack on China. Radio-controlled. Packed with explosives. If they make it, it'll be interesting. DroneA billion-dollar kamikaze—that's a lot. Although very stupid. However, it really is a headache for the US Navy.
The question is what the US Navy is left with in the face of the "Chinese threat." Aircraft carriers and Arleigh Burkes. The situation is, frankly, debatable.
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