The death of the "singing frigate"...
Komsomolets Ukrainy is the lead large anti-submarine ship of Project 61.
American sailors nicknamed the large Project 61 anti-submarine ships "singing frigates" for the melodic whistle of their first-ever gas turbines. They were also perhaps the most beautiful ships of all time—a sleek silhouette with a sharp, upturned bow, a steel lacework of antennas, slanted funnels, and a linear, elevated arrangement. artillery and anti-aircraft missile installations. I've even heard legends that the ship was designed by a woman...
Boris Izrailevich Kupensky, Chief Designer of Project 61
In fact, the project was developed at the Severnoye Design Bureau (then TsKB-53) by General Designer Boris Kupensky. Boris Izrailevich's team received the assignment in early 1957, the technical design was approved in 1958, and on September 15, 1959, the lead ship of the series, Komsomolets Ukrainy, was laid down at the Nikolaev Shipyard named after 61 Communards. A total of 20 large anti-submarine ships of Project 61 will be commissioned into the Soviet Navy. Otvazhny will be the seventh ship in the series and will be assigned to the Black Sea Fleet. fleet January 25, 1965. Over the course of its service, the large anti-submarine ship would be part of a group of Soviet ships that provided military presence during the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War. In 1970, it would be declared an excellent ship of the Black Sea Fleet, participate in the Yug-71 and Okean exercises, and carry out seven combat missions, during which it would conduct visits to Port Said, Alexandria, Split, Bissau, Taranto, and Messina.
The Brave in Taranto
The Project 61 ships were considered anti-submarine, but the Titan all-round sonar and Vychegda fire control station, located in the keel fairing, were... So-so: electronics were never a strong point of Soviet weapons systems. Therefore, the ship was more valuable as a battery. Defense: It was the first to be equipped with two M-1 "Volna" anti-aircraft missile systems (also somewhat outdated—the missiles were guided by a radar beam)—one in the bow and one in the stern. Each system included a ZIF-8 twin-boom launcher, a Yatagan guidance system, and two rotating reloading drums, each holding eight missiles. It's worth noting that the Otvazhny's bow mount was the primary one—it was regularly fired, the crew was well-trained, and the equipment was well maintained. The aft mount was last fired in 1970; it was manned on a residual basis, and therefore significantly less well maintained.
A fatal flaw of this system, as it turned out, was the location of the ammunition magazines above the waterline—in the event of a fire, they were impossible to flood. And the magazines of the anti-aircraft missile, aviationThe tanks housing the artillery, depth charges, and aviation kerosene were adjacent, not separated by cofferdams, and located close to the engine room. The ship's superstructure, funnels, and masts were made of aluminum-magnesium alloy. Overall, there were some concerns regarding the ship's survivability, although they were not fundamental.
In late summer 1974, the large anti-submarine ship Otvazhny underwent a significant officer turnover. Young lieutenants, fresh off their first officer's leave, arrived from naval academies. A new first mate, Lieutenant Commander Viktor Balashov, was also appointed to the ship. His independent command certification was scheduled for April 1975. This was a common occurrence, but considering that many experienced officers and warrant officers (primarily the BC-5 and BC-2 commanders, but also the forward control group and aft launch battery commanders, and many others), who could have trained the young men, were on leave, and their replacements were unfamiliar with Project 61 ships...
But the most unsuitable person, as if by Murphy's Law, found himself in the most important position: Midshipman Shuportyak, who hadn't even completed his mandatory naval service (he was a driver in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany). His professional qualities are best illustrated by the fact that during a celebratory ceremony in Nikolaev, he dressed in civilian clothes, mingled with the crowd, and escaped from the ship. He was later caught in the city, heavily intoxicated, brought back to the ship, and during a search of his cabin, 30 empty vodka bottles were found under his bunk. By the time of the accident, the midshipman hadn't received his pay for two months—he couldn't prove his qualifications (subsequently, replaying all the actions before the accident on the Reshitelny, he couldn't show where the camshaft rod of his combat station was located). How did such a man end up on the ship? Most likely, through connections—his service in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany could have provided him with useful connections. The political officer demanded that the midshipman be discharged from the ship, which could have saved the Otvazhny, but the decision was made to get off with a Komsomol penalty.
Vice Admiral Vladimir Saakyan, who was a rear admiral at the time of the disaster
On August 30, the ship was in a combat training area 25 miles from Sevastopol. From there, a group of admirals and officers from the Navy General Staff, led by Rear Admiral Vladimir Saakyan, Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, was to observe missile launches by ships of the Black Sea Fleet. Twenty-seven ships and vessels were stationed near the ship. At 9:58, the "Training and Combat Alert!" signal sounded, and reports were received from unit commanders and service chiefs. At this time, Warrant Officer Shuportyak, stationed at the missile control panel in aft magazine No. 8, followed instructions and ordered the sailors to connect external power, after which he flipped the power supply switches to the "on" position. He then observed a powerful burst of flame on the left drum—the engine of a V-601 anti-aircraft missile had spontaneously ignited.
The V-601 missile on the ZIF-8 launcher
What should the senior officer of the aft anti-aircraft gun crew have done in this situation? Report to the BC-2 anti-aircraft missile battalion commander and activate the missile magazine's sprinkler system. Shuportyak ordered everyone to abandon the PKS, then, shouting, "There's going to be an explosion!" he ran away. They weren't able to find him until two and a half hours later. At 10:01:35, the first explosion occurred—the sustainer engine of one of the missiles ignited. Fifteen to 20 seconds later, a second explosion occurred—the booster engine of the missile ignited. A fire quickly began to spread in the ship's stern. The ship's commander, Captain 2nd Rank Ivan Vinnik, made a mistake: he assumed that a high-pressure air cylinder in the aft engine room had exploded (Shupportyak neglected to inform him of the actual situation), which was then reported to the Black Sea Fleet duty officer.
Captain 3rd rank Ivan Vinnik, at the time of the disaster - captain 2nd rank
The very description of the Otvazhny's service suggests to anyone in the know: damage control issues on the ship were a last resort, with the constant need to polish the ship for the next visit or prepare for the next live-fire exercise to challenge someone. Firefighting drills (a daily event!) were conducted once a week, and training on this topic was conducted at best once a month. Combine this with the young officers newly assigned to the ship and the absence of the regular BC-5 commander (and the fact that the ship's commander, Captain 2nd Rank Vinnik, had been appointed brigade commander and was already mentally assuming completely different duties and responsibilities...), and it becomes clear that all the preconditions for an accident with serious consequences were present.
After the first rocket engine fired, cadets from quarters #4, who were undergoing practical training on the large anti-submarine ship (they hadn't been assigned to combat stations), and sailors from the aft quarters and combat stations began running onto the poop deck. They began to be enveloped in black smoke, and a sound like boulders being thrown came from the bulkhead of the missile magazine. At 10:01:40, a second explosion followed—more powerful than the first (it sent several sailors flying off the poop deck into the water); apparently, the cruise engine of another missile had ignited. The ship's commander and Rear Admiral Saakyan suspected nothing when the signalman reported thick black smoke and flames coming from the stack (they weren't coming from the stack, but from under the covers of missile magazine No. 8, but the signalman on the bridge hadn't seen it). The Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet said something like, "The mechanics are blackening the sky again." He had spent his entire career on steam-powered destroyers and wasn't surprised. The survivability control post (PEZh) was supposed to be in charge of the ship's survivability control, but no one was there, and then the post, located near the missile magazine, was enveloped in smoke.
The aftermath of the missile explosion in Cellar No. 8
Finally, at 10:02:00, unable to withstand such atrocities, the missiles detonated. It was impossible not to notice: the superstructure deck was ripped open like a tin can, the launcher, along with a chunk of deck, rose vertically and landed on the aft stack, and a column of flame erupted from the magazine. As it later turned out, the ship's underwater hull had been breached near the third cabin. Seven sailors and cadets standing on the quarterdeck were thrown overboard, and the engineers, unable to escape the aft engine room, perished. Sailor Vladimir Prochakovsky burned alive, trapped in the fire in the ship's compartment and suffering severe burns. He told his friends, who were trying to pull him out of the trap through the porthole, "Guys, I'm all set, save the ship!" In full view of the entire crew and the approaching ships, sailor Sergei Petrukhin, who had been trapped while trying to escape from the galley porthole, died—the ship had no gas cutting machine. He was given morphine injections by the ship's doctor, Senior Lieutenant Viktor Tsvelovsky.
Captain 2nd Rank Vinnik sounded the combat and emergency alarm and... went down to the command post, which on Project 61 was located in the ship's interior. This was a requirement of the ship's regulations, amended after the sinking of the battleship Novorossiysk, when all the commanding officers were gathered on the ship's deck and no one was at the command post, with obvious consequences for the survivability of the ship. But in this case, having the commander on the bridge would have been more useful—communication with the stern was lost, reports to the command post were not coming in, and from the bridge it was possible to at least roughly understand what was happening on the quarterdeck.
Admiral Vladimir Samoilov, at the time of the disaster, Rear Admiral and Acting Commander of the Black Sea Fleet
Two points are worth mentioning here: first, there were 27 Black Sea Fleet ships and vessels at sea nearby, so there was plenty of help available to the Otvazhny. And second... The fleet's chief of staff, the anti-submarine ship brigade commander, and several other admirals were on these ships. After the explosion was reported, an operations post with technical specialists was set up at Black Sea Fleet headquarters, and the acting commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Vladimir Samoilov, kept a close eye on the situation. Basically, the information was pouring out like water!
After the explosion, a battle for the ship's survival began. A fire raged in the stern, melting the aluminum-magnesium alloy of the large antisubmarine ship's superstructure. Foam supplies were quickly depleted, and its use was in vain: the weather was windy, with seas running at state 4, so foam could only be used internally. After the explosion, the missile magazine was no longer a closed space, and the foam was blown out. Fire hoses were deployed, and sailors tried to extinguish the fire with jets of water. To no avail: fuel was leaking from damaged tanks, and a film of diesel fuel was constantly burning on the surface of the water. Personnel not involved in the survival battle were lined up on the forecastle, while emergency crews from other ships, the large antisubmarine ships Bedovy and Smetlivy, and the destroyer Soznatelny, began arriving at the stern. Why? Passing from bow to stern was impossible due to the aftermath of the explosion!
Towing the Otvazhny, view from the stern of the Bedovoy
By 11:00, the order was received: "Tow the Otvazhny to Cape Khersones." Three tugboats were approaching the burning ship, but their speed was slower than that of warships, so the destroyer Soznatelny attached a towline to the Otvazhny. However, the large anti-submarine ship Bedovy was moored alongside the stricken ship. It received the order: "Cut the lines and withdraw from the Otvazhny," but the Soznatelny accepted the order and severed the towline. An hour passed while the line was being attached to the Bedovy. The rescue vessel Beshtau approached the scene with a powerful towing machine and a special winch, but the task of towing the Otvazhny by the bow was assigned to a ship considerably less suited to this large anti-submarine ship.
The ship's command was concerned about the possibility of the fire reaching the magazines containing the RBU depth charges, so they were flooded. However... Shortly before setting out to sea, the ship received six aviation depth charges for the onboard Ka-25 and aviation kerosene. This was forgotten in the frantic struggle for survival. The bombs were stored aft, in magazine No. 10, where quartermasters on the Project 61 large anti-submarine ship usually stored their supplies. Because of this, the deck hatch latch on the Otvazhny was "modernized" to prevent its opening from the deck.
The ship was perishing before the eyes of hundreds of people...
The ship perished before the eyes of hundreds of people: the crews of the large anti-submarine ships "Bedovyi," "Smetlivyi," and "Komsomolets Ukrainy," the destroyer "Soznatelny," the rescue vessel "Beshtau," several tugboats, Ka-25 helicopters, and Li-2 aircraft. At 12:55, "Bedovyi" began towing the "Otvazhny." They towed the ship at a speed of 5 knots: the explosion had jammed the large anti-submarine ship's rudder at 35 degrees, so towing quickly risked tearing off the stern. SB-15 was alongside the ship, extinguishing the fire in magazine #8. At 13:20 PM, PDS-123 arrived and began extinguishing the fire in corridor #11. Soon, an order came from the Black Sea Fleet Command Center to begin foam-filling the compartment of magazine No. 9, from frames 215 to 232. The fire was approaching magazine No. 10, which contained depth charges. But the Navy Command's primary concern was ensuring the ship's unsinkability. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov clearly didn't want to lose his new large anti-submarine ship. Orders to prioritize unsinkability, "everything else later," were repeated approximately every half hour, but story the ship was coming to an end...
PDS-123 is still in service!
At 2:47 PM, an explosion occurred in magazine #10, the stern deck bulged, flames shot up above the mainmast, several sailors died, and the body of Petty Officer 14nd Class Adam Achmiz was thrown onto the rescue vessel (he would be the only one of the Otvazhny's dead to be buried). The list sharply increased to 16 degrees, and the trim by the stern to 20 degrees. The list to starboard increased visibly: at 14:59 PM, it was already 19 degrees, at 15:00 PM, 25 degrees, at 15:02 PM, 26–28 degrees. At 15:10 PM, the lights and power to the instruments went out. At 15:11 PM, the captain gave the command "all hands on deck." This became the last entry in the Otvazhny's logbook. Rear Admiral Saakyan was informed that the ship would sink in half an hour and the crew needed to be rescued. At the same time, the Chief of the Technical Directorate ordered the crew evacuation to begin. At 15:07 PM, the crew began abandoning the Otvazhny.
The "Singing Frigate" is beautiful even in death...
People jumped into the water from a height of 15 meters, and those afraid to jump were pushed off. The crew of the large anti-submarine ship was picked up from the water below by longboats and boats. In total, approximately 220 people jumped, and there were no fatalities while abandoning ship. Meanwhile, the towing of the Otvazhny continued! Fleet command hoped to have time to beach the sinking ship. At 3:20 PM, the fire intensified, and by 3:36 PM, the crew had completely abandoned the large anti-submarine ship, but the list and trim increased. It's worth noting that the Project 61 ships were well designed for stability: the Otvazhny did not capsize, despite a list of 32 degrees! At 3:43 PM, the towing line on the Bedovy was cut. At 3:45 PM, the ship began to rapidly sink by the stern, and at 3:46 PM, it stood upright, submerged up to its hull number. At 3:57:30 PM, the ship sank. Nineteen crew members and five naval academy cadets died in the disaster, and 26 others were burned and injured.
The large anti-submarine ship "Reshitelny" was used to "test" the crew of "Otvazhny" during the investigation.
The Otvazhny's commander, Captain 2nd Rank Vinnik, who was the last to leave the ship, remained convinced even after the ship's demise that the fire was caused by a high-pressure fuel cylinder explosion. This theory was questioned by the Black Sea Fleet's Technical Directorate. An investigation was to determine the precise cause of the ship's demise. Boris Kupensky, the Project 51 large anti-submarine ship's chief designer, who arrived in Sevastopol, told Vinnik, "What an experiment you've performed on me!" A bathyscaphe made several dives to the sunken Otvazhny, finding no ruptured cylinders but carefully recording all the holes and damage. The Otvazhny's crew was placed on a sister ship (the large anti-submarine ship Reshitelny) and tested for their knowledge of their duties, the qualifications of their specialists, and their actions upon the "Combat alert!" signal. Naturally, the inspection revealed that Warrant Officer Shuportyak had been rated zero.
An unknown artist's depiction of the Otvazhny's remains being examined by a bathyscaphe.
In principle, the Otvazhny's sinking, from a submariner's perspective, raises many questions about the crew's survivability training—every mistake that could have been made was made (perhaps I'm being unfair: during a submarine accident, valuable instructions from higher command are not forthcoming; the crew perishes or flees on their own). However, one must take into account the organization of service on a surface ship: there, cleaning, painting, and formations are always given more attention than survival drills. The large anti-submarine ship's crew was relatively well trained, and had Warrant Officer Shuportyak appeared on any other Project 61 ship, the outcome of the survivability battle would likely have been similar, to paraphrase I.V. Stalin. Here, one specific person decided everything. At the same time, the investigation established that the large anti-submarine ship's superstructure, made of aluminum-magnesium alloy, began to burn and melt during the fire. This was the first time that the aluminum-magnesium alloy had performed poorly during a fire. The first, but not the last...
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