Venezuela's Navy and Air Force: Evolving to Survive

Earlier in the article Venezuela 2025: Waiting for the Strike We looked at why the armed forces of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela will not be able to counter US precision strikes weapons or even conducting a limited ground operation by special operations forces (SOF).
However, Venezuela has the potential to create armed forces capable of resisting American aggression, or rather, it had it before, but it was not realized, and now it is unclear whether Venezuela has the time for this.
Missed Opportunities
In 2019, the author published the article “Does Venezuela have a chance to resist the US armed aggression??, which examined the construction of balanced and sustainable armed forces designed specifically to counter the US Armed Forces.
Some quotes from that material:
“…In turn, operational-tactical weapons can be classified as military equipment that meets the requirements of asymmetric warfare missile complexes (OTRK), artillery and mortar systems of guided weapons, portable and vehicle-mounted anti-tank missile systems (ATGM), helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) of various classes, non-nuclear and diesel-electric submarines (NNS, SSK), coastal anti-ship missile systems (BPKRK), mine weapons…"
"...The armed forces formed on the basis of the above-mentioned types of weapons and military equipment will have the following advantages:
- high stealth and mobility in combination with high firepower;
- the ability to not come into direct contact with the enemy or suddenly attack from disguised positions;
— simplification of military personnel training Defense due to the absence of the need to select targets based on the “friend/foe” principle – the “scorched sky” concept...”
However, this material is not original and was itself built on the basis of a military-technical proposal prepared by the author on his own initiative back in 2009 and sent to the Venezuelan Embassy, specifically to the Defense Attaché of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in the Russian Federation, Brigadier General Victor Paul Sanchez Croes.
The material in question examined in more detail the types of weapons and military equipment needed by the Venezuelan Armed Forces to deter the United States, identifying specific types of certain weapons and their quantities.
The offensive weapons proposed were the Bastion, Bal and Club-M missile systems, as well as modifications to the Su-30MKV fighters for use aviation versions of the Indian Brahmos missiles, created on the basis of the Russian Onyx missiles from the Bastion missile system, as well as the Iskander-E tactical missile system.
Enhancement fleet It was proposed to provide for the purchase of Russian diesel-electric submarines (DES) of Project 636M or non-electric submarines of Project 677E "Amur 1650/950" (at that time, all open sources said that these submarines were about to enter service), as well as German non-nuclear submarines (NNS) "Type 214" or French NNS of the "Scorpene" type (at that time, sanctions against Venezuela had not yet been introduced and this was possible).

At that time, it seemed that the Amur would soon go into production.
It was planned to develop air defense systems using the S-400 long-range air defense system, as well as short-range systems – the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile and gun system and the Tor air defense system.
It was also planned to purchase a significant number of Igla-S MANPADS, Kornet-E man-portable anti-tank missile systems (ATGMs), Krasnopol-E guided missiles, and Gran guided mines with Malakhit target designation and fire control systems.
The priority need for the purchase of communications equipment, reconnaissance UAVs, and acoustic reconnaissance equipment was indicated. (which have now proven themselves to be very successful in Ukraine), electronic warfare equipment (EW), false targets – mock-ups of equipment and much more.
Naturally, there was no reaction to this material, and indeed, from the moment Russia first supplied arms to Hugo Chávez, it can be said that Venezuela's armed forces have ceased to develop. It seems that Venezuela's leadership was content with the fact that they were perfectly capable of fighting their neighbors, and they weren't counting on a confrontation with the United States, or were relying on assistance from third countries, including, more precisely, Russia.
Recently, information emerged in open sources that Russia had already supplied Venezuela with certain weapons intended to assist Maduro. Specifically, an Il-76TD transport aircraft belonging to Aviakon Zitotrans, a company under US sanctions for transporting weapons in the interests of the private military company (PMC) Wagner and the Russian military-industrial complex (MIC), landed in Venezuela.
Possible cargoes include the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile and gun system or the Buk-M2E air defense system, but whatever the case, a single transport aircraft is clearly incapable of ensuring Venezuela's security...
In principle, the Venezuelan Armed Forces have a "skeleton" that can be worked with, but it will take approximately one to two years to "pump up" it. By adapting the list of weapons previously proposed by the author, primarily by including UAVs and unmanned aerial vehicles of various types, as well as a number of other weapons, it is possible to create an extremely unpleasant adversary for the US Armed Forces.
In this article, we will discuss what adjustments can be made to the Venezuelan Navy and Air Force, taking into account current realities and in the shortest possible time.
Navy
For countries like Venezuela, the current naval situation is clear. No frigates, corvettes, let alone destroyers, amphibious ships, or aircraft carriers—for the US Navy, they're all just targets. Some sources in Russia are talking about Venezuela's need to purchase Buyan-M-class small missile ships to deter the US, which begs the question— Are you serious?
The Project 21631 Buyan-M missile ships have virtually no air defense capabilities—they wouldn't survive a US attack for even an hour. And given their seaworthiness, it's far from certain they'd be able to operate properly in that region.
The situation with air defense is slightly better for other small missile ships – the Project 22800 Karakurt, allegedly desired by Venezuela (or those offered by Russia to Venezuela?), but it also won’t protect them from US attacks, they might just last a little longer – a couple of hours...

MRK project 21631 "Buyan-M" (left) and MRK project 22800 "Karakurt" (right)
The same can now be said about submarines; there is no point in Venezuela purchasing diesel-electric submarines (DES) or non-nuclear submarines (NNS) with other power plants now or in the future – it is too late, such weapons require the highest qualifications, responsibility and diligent training, and their development will take years, if not decades.
What is left?
Of course, these are unmanned boats (UBC) of various types, primarily kamikaze UBCs, with which Ukraine, which has virtually no fleet, effectively drove the Russian Black Sea Navy into naval bases (VMB).
Autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles (AUVs) for various purposes should be used together with the BEC.
Together, the UAVs and UAVs can force the US Navy to stay as far away from its shores as possible. They can not only directly attack American ships, but also shoot down helicopters and even low-flying aircraft, lay naval mines, and conduct optical, acoustic, and electronic reconnaissance.

Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles
Unfortunately, Russia is significantly behind even Ukraine in the area of BEK and AUV, so Venezuela's hopes lie with China and/or Iran.
Another issue is communications: Russia doesn't have its own network of low-orbit satellites providing high-speed, low-latency communications. However, the UK does have such a network, and according to some publicly available information, the UK is competing with the US for the right to exploit Venezuela, so they could very well provide access to their satellites to the OneWeb network.
It's unclear how good the Chinese satellites are in the Venezuelan area, so if they and OneWeb don't work out, the only option left is much less effective conventional radio communications with repeaters on land, sea, and air platforms.
Fishing boats, which would carry out reconnaissance and relay communications, could be an effective auxiliary asset for the Venezuelan Navy. Of course, the US Navy could sink them, but not all civilian transport, especially if it was flying the flag of a third country, could be sunk. Special equipment could always be thrown overboard if there was a risk of inspection.
Of course, it is also possible and necessary to preserve the Venezuelan Navy's existing surface ships and submarines, but, understanding that this is only a tool for fighting all sorts of riff-raff, in the event of the possibility of any, even slightly serious, conflict arising, they must be removed "outside the ring."
Air force
There is no particular point in talking about any new purchases now; we need to start from the existing fleet of aircraft and helicopters, that is, first and foremost, from the existing 23 Su-30MKV units and 15 Lockheed F-16A units.
We need to solve two main problems.
The first task is to thwart the US ability to deploy a continuous radar umbrella over Venezuela to gain air superiority.
To achieve this, all existing Su-30MKV fighters must undergo modernization similar to the Russian Su-30MK2, with the aim of replacing the radar with the most modern N035 Irbis-E, with a concomitant upgrade of the onboard electronic equipment (avionics) and the introduction of long-range R-37M (RVV-BD) and medium-range R-77M (RVV-SD) air-to-air missiles.

This combination will allow American airborne early warning and control aircraft (AEW&C) to be kept as far away from Venezuela's borders as possible, as their loss could be very damaging for the US Navy and Air Force.
The second task is to destroy, or at least create a serious threat of destruction, ships from the American AUG.
Let's start with the fact that some sources mention Venezuela's desire to obtain and Russia's ability to supply Kh-32 anti-ship missiles. I'm tempted to ask, guys, how are you going to launch them? These anti-ship missiles are only carried by one type of aircraft—the Tu-22M3, which Venezuela doesn't have and never will have.

The supersonic heavy anti-ship missile Kh-32 is a development of the anti-ship missile Kh-22 and is used only from long-range bombers Tu-22M3
Accordingly, the second area of modernization is equipping the Su-30MKV with the Russian-Indian supersonic anti-ship missile BrahMos. This capability has already been added to the Indian Su-30MKI, of course, with the corresponding purchase of these anti-ship missiles from India. Of course, all this is only possible if the timid Indians decide to throw a spanner in the works for the US.
The warhead and flight speed of the BrahMos anti-ship missile make it possible to damage or even destroy an aircraft carrier, provided, of course, that there is a sufficient number of anti-ship missiles in the salvo.

As an indirect alternative, the integration of Russian Kh-35U/Kh-59MK anti-ship missiles could be considered. Of course, these missiles are much more vulnerable to air defense fire, but only if AWACS aircraft are present to provide target designation for subsonic anti-ship missiles flying at minimum altitude.
With a simultaneous attack by AWACS aircraft and the launch of Kh-35U/Kh-59MK anti-ship missiles, the chances of penetrating the American carrier-carrying group's air defenses will significantly increase. Another advantage of the Kh-35U/Kh-59MK anti-ship missiles is that a single Su-30MKV can carry up to two Kh-59MK anti-ship missiles or up to four Kh-35U anti-ship missiles, while the Su-30MKI carries only one BrahMos anti-ship missile.
Considering the experience of Ukraine, it can be stated with a high degree of confidence that the Kh-35U/Kh-59MK anti-ship missiles can be integrated into the armament of Venezuelan F-16A aircraft, which will significantly increase the number of anti-ship missiles in a salvo.
The most interesting thing is that helicopters can potentially be adapted to launch the Kh-35U anti-ship missiles, since there is a helicopter modification of these anti-ship missiles used with the Ka-27, Ka-28, and Ka-52K.

Venezuela doesn't have such helicopters, but it does have several dozen Mi-35M and Mi-17V helicopters, which could also likely be adapted to carry the Kh-35U anti-ship missile. Let's not forget the experience of Ukraine, where "Frankensteins" are being created even from systems developed and manufactured in different countries by different design schools.
The advantage of helicopters is that it is extremely difficult to locate the location of their landing bases, provided, of course, that the correct approach is taken.
Finally, the Venezuelan Air Force has 6 Lockheed C-130H Hercules transport aircraft, and is also expected to receive 8 Chinese Shaanxi Y-8 transport aircraft, with a carrying capacity of approximately 20 tons.

Lockheed C-130H Hercules (left) and Shaanxi Y-8 (right)
In the material Wartime missile-carrying bomber: the question is not the plane, but its contents We talked about how transport aircraft could be relatively easily converted into missile-carrying bombers.
Unfortunately, this area has not yet been actively developed in Russia, although some reports suggest that some work is underway. If the Venezuelan Air Force focused its efforts in this direction, it could acquire a fleet of near-strategic missile carriers capable of delivering a sufficiently dense salvo of anti-ship missiles to breach the defenses of a carrier-carrying group.

Rapid Dragon cruise missile cassettes dropped from Lockheed C-130H Hercules aircraft
As we can see, in our time even relatively simple air forces, with the right approach, can have serious offensive potential.
Potentially, by focusing on the Kh-35 family of anti-ship missiles, the Su-30MVK could be left with only the task of hunting American AWACS aircraft, as well as other aircraft vulnerable to R-37M missiles.
Conclusions
Even a country like Venezuela can develop a sufficiently powerful naval and air force offensive, capable of repelling an adversary from its shores. After all, if the Houthis can do it, why can't Venezuela, with its far greater resources, do the same?
In the next article, we will discuss the development of the ground component of the Venezuelan armed forces – ground forces, air defense systems – and we will also discuss unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which we will develop into a separate branch of the armed forces, similar to what is currently happening in many armies around the world, including Russia.
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