"Strategy" by A.A. Svechin: at the Turn of the Epoch, or Reflections on the Eve of the Anniversary

The World Where Strategy Was Born, or the Path from the Plow to the East

Next year is the anniversary stories Russian military-scientific thought: the centenary of the publication of the "Strategy" by Major General Alexander Andreevich Svechin.

The twists and turns of his career and fate coincided with a period of tectonic changes in the socioeconomic and psychological life of Russia and the USSR. These are the topics we will discuss, as it is hardly possible to understand the content of the "Strategy" outside the context of the era—or rather, eras—that continue to provoke hoarse debate and argument to this day.

Major General A.A. Svechin

It was no accident that I turned my attention to psychology, since the worldview of one or two generations underwent changes that transformed a semi-feudal empire into a superpower, the crowning achievement of whose scientific thought and evidence of the might of its military-industrial complex was the Energia-Buran space system.

The leap from lingering feudalism to socialism occurred in a very short period of time. And the gulf between the former serf of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, who still remembered the master's shout and lived in a world reflected in the pages of A.N. Afanasyev's collected fairy tales or the eerie realism of G.I. Uspensky's works, and his son, who moved to the city, received a higher education thanks to the workers' faculty, and perhaps became one of the co-creators of the space age, is striking.

Sokha and Vostok-1... The time between them, I repeat, is insignificant by historical standards. I remember my great-grandmother, who lived through both: she was born in 1890 and died in 1972.

It's no surprise that the era from the Great Reforms to Stalin's industrialization evokes polarized opinions, for radical change is always painful, as brilliantly captured by A.P. Chekhov in "The Cherry Orchard": the agony of a degenerating, aristocratic Russia, unable to fit into the new socioeconomic realities, whose seemingly unshakable existence is depicted in N. Nevrev's famous painting, and the birth of a new, Lopakhin-era Russia. And Yasha—oh, how wild they'll be in 1917... However, his son will already be sitting at a school desk and, like thousands of servants' and peasants' children, will receive a start in life.

The birth of the new and the death of the old occurred no less dramatically, even bloodily, in the army. It's no coincidence that the First World War heralded the advent of the non-calendar 20th century, as discussed in the article "At the Turn of the Eras, or Thoughts of a Forgotten General."

N. Nevrev. "Bargaining. Scene from Serf Life." A little time will pass, and if not the children, then the grandchildren of the characters depicted in the painting will perhaps swap places on the social ladder, which is, in fact, reflected in "The Cherry Orchard."

War is a marker of civilization. Accordingly, the change of eras is reflected primarily in military affairs, where almost all scientific achievements are tested, and this often happens with dizzying speed. In relation to the 20th century: cavalry artillery at the beginning of the First World War and, twenty years later, armored forces, and thirty years later, the first jet fighters.

And the one who drove a horse-drawn carriage, preoccupied with finding hay at the stables and whiled away the night in a rickety hut with an earthen floor, could, decades later, command a squadron of MiG-9 jets.

In Russian military history, the attack of the Russian Guards on horseback against the 2nd Landwehr Brigade near Kauschen on August 19, 1914, symbolized the change of centuries. That day, the 20th century was mown down by the heavy fire of German machine guns.

He mowed it down because "the cavalry," wrote A. A. Svechin, "successfully, until the beginning of the 20th century, retained the tactical methods of mounted combat inherited from the 18th century. By the start of the World War, only the German cavalry satisfactorily met the new requirements. The Russian cavalry acted, especially in East Prussia, like a ghost from another century. The appalling selection of Russian cavalry commanders was the work of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich during his tenure as Inspector of Cavalry."

A ghost from another century... You couldn't say it more figuratively.

And the bloodthirsty Moloch of war demanded new victims: not, so to speak, the beardless cavalry guards who died gracefully on the Prasnensky Heights, but yesterday's semi-literate peasants in dirty greatcoats and damp trenches. They would become the gravediggers of the Russian Empire, which had armed millions of peasants but had failed to first resolve the land issue and failed to properly transform them into a conscious element clearly understanding the goals of the war.

Instead, the famous lines from Brusilov’s memoirs became a symbol of the peasant attitude towards the First World War: “Some Archduke and his wife were killed by someone.”

Yes, regarding the Horse Guards and the Pratzen Heights: of course, even before 1914, it wasn't only aristocrats who fought, but there was something romantic about war. Perhaps it was the beautiful uniforms. Or this from Charles Louis de Lassalle: "A hussar who lives to be 30 is not a hussar."

Since the 20th century, the bloody aesthetics of war have been a thing of the past, and the strategy of attrition has emerged. War prose has replaced its poetry, the last representative of which was perhaps Nikolai Gumilev with his "Offensive," written in 1914. But that same year, it became finally clear that the Ulm Offensive, pioneered by Napoleon's genius in 1805 and which forced the capitulation of Field Marshal-Lieutenant Karl Mack's Austrians, was now, if possible, not the outcome of a war with a serious adversary.

Now, economies are fighting no less than armies, something the frenzied Führer failed to take into account on the eve of 1941, underestimating the power of the USSR's industrial potential, born in the first five-year plans. And, most importantly, he failed to take into account the emergence of a new generation onto the historical stage—not a downtrodden, ignorant one, but an educated one, dreaming of heaven and ready to fight for the Motherland that had given them a start in life. It was for this generation that the "Strategy" was written.

Future commanders of the Red Army, it was for them that A.A. Svechin wrote the "Strategy" and it was they who had to put its provisions into practice

It's a shame its author didn't see the dawn of the aforementioned space age. It would have been interesting to read his thoughts on the relationship between the exploration of near-Earth orbit and the strategy of future wars.

However, Lieutenant General Mikhail Svechin, Alexander's elder brother by two years, lived to see Yuri Gagarin's time. As often happened in the lives of brothers who had previously served in the Imperial Army, the two found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades. As an example, I'll cite the Makhrov brothers: a Red Army brigade commander and a White Guard lieutenant general.

Lieutenant General M.A. Svechin

While Alexander chose the Reds, Mikhail fought for the Whites, holding important positions in the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS) in exile. His earthly life ended in Nice in 1969. Unlike his brother, was he lucky? I can't say. Yes, he dodged a bullet in the Yezhov prison. But he ended his days in a foreign land, albeit in material comfort, but far from the fateful events in the life of his homeland.

In this regard, Major General A.A. Turkul's "Drozdovsky Men on Fire" came to mind—the Volunteer Army's retreat from Orel in November 1919. Captain Kovalevsky served as Turkul's adjutant, then a colonel and commander of the 1st Regiment of the Drozdovsky Division.

Unable to bear the defeat, the captain decided to shoot himself. Turkul learned of this by chance. He persuaded him to live while the fighting continued. He later wrote:

Kovalevsky agreed to live. Adrian Semyonovich shot himself after all this, in 1926, in America; there he had lived very well, comfortably, with his sister. Such a death, it seemed, was destined for him. His last note contained just five words: "I cannot live without Russia." He was no more than thirty years old.

However, this was more the exception than the rule. The majority of former White Guards, like Mikhail, adapted to the realities of the diaspora and even dedicated poetry to their new homeland. N. N. Turoverov, for example:

I gave you the best years,
I have entrusted everything to you without hiding it, France, the country of my freedom,
My stepmother is cheerful.

In short, all sorts of things happened. Yes, a remark about the two Russias. At one point, I bought "Drozdovites on Fire," published in one volume with the memoirs of former White Guard Drozdovite G.D. Venus, "War and People."

Both write about the same officers and events, in great detail, but I've never encountered more polarized assessments and characterizations. And yes, G. Venus's brother served in the Red Army...

He himself returned to his homeland after the war, unfortunately falling under the flywheel of repression, despite A. N. Tolstoy’s attempts to save him.

So, Mikhail Svechin. He left behind fascinating memoirs. Let's read some of them—and other pages—to better understand the facets of the era of which the author of "Strategy" became both a co-creator and a victim.

The brothers' military careers were predetermined. They were descended from an ancient and military family—Tver boyars. Their father, Lieutenant General Andrei Svechin, ended his service as a brigade commander.

However, it would be unfair to say that the brothers chose a military path strictly according to established principles. No. They owe their choice to a Zouave captured during the Crimean War near Sevastopol, who served as the family's tutor:

"With his captivating stories," Mikhail recalled, "of his participation in battles, probably heavily embellished, he charmed my brother and me; for hours, forgetting our childhood games and pranks, we listened attentively to him, and our imaginations painted battle scenes of that time in our young heads.

Mikhail was sent to the 2nd Peter the Great Cadet Corps, which was transformed into a gymnasium during the military reform of Infantry General D.A. Milyutin, which we will discuss in more detail.

Gymnasiums instead of cadet corps, or the dispute over Milyutin's legacy

The renowned military historian of the diaspora, A. A. Kersnovsky, critically and with his characteristic emotionality, evaluates Milyutin's reforms in the field of military education:

In 1863, the cadet corps were completely abolished. Of the 17, only two remained – the Page Corps and the Finland Corps. The rest were converted: 12 – into military gymnasiums.

After the death of Alexander II and the resignation of D.A. Milyutin from the post of Minister of War, the gymnasiums were again transformed into cadet corps.

Cadets of the 2nd Moscow Cadet Corps

But Alexander Svechin assessed the reforms quite positively:

In 1863, Milyutin, pursuing the idea of ​​separating specialized education from general education, began reforming the cadet corps. He eliminated drill, which he considered an obstacle to the cadets' intellectual development. Five-year corps, where classes were interrupted by military exercises, were transformed into seven-year military gymnasiums, whose curriculum fully covered the curriculum of a real school.

In my opinion, Kersnovsky is more correct. The reasons were discussed in the article "General Milyutin and the Military Education Reform: Why a Half-Result Was Inevitable."

Here I will cite the arguments of military historian S. V. Volkov:

By the beginning of the 80s, it became clear that military gymnasiums, while satisfying the requirements of secondary real education and the pedagogical goals of upbringing, did not fully meet the task of a professional military institution and did not adequately prepare students for the transition to military schools in a professional and psychological sense.

In other words, the improvement in the general educational level of future officers was achieved through their military professionalism. I don't think this didn't have an impact on the bloody battlefields of the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War.

The Happiness of Seeing an Autocrat, or A Fragment of Patriarchal Life

Another interesting aspect of military life at the turn of the century was the attitude of the officer corps towards autocracy.

In 1912, Mikhail, now an officer of the General Staff, attended the bicentennial of his corps. Following the celebration, the graduates were invited to the opera "A Life for the Tsar," and, as his memoirs recount, were delighted by the presence of the Emperor and his wife.

I would like to draw the readers' attention to the phrase "happy" and compare it with the reaction of another military leader, Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin, to meetings with the sovereign.

Both came from different social backgrounds. Denikin was the son of a serf conscripted by his landowner. He served the required nearly quarter century, passed the examinations for officer rank, and retired as a major. Ivan Yefimovich received personal nobility—hereditary nobility was granted only to those attaining the rank of colonel—but never escaped the clutches of poverty, as his son vividly and vividly described in "On the Journey of a Russian Officer."

And therefore Anton Ivanovich has a different attitude, if not towards the monarchy, then towards the personality of the last autocrat, especially after the story of the injustice associated with his non-assignment to the General Staff after completing his studies at the Nikolaev Academy:

As for me, the conversation, so painfully awaited, left a heavy feeling in my soul and disappointment in the “truth of the monarch’s will.”

Denikin described the story itself in great detail, so I won't recount it. I'll just note that the future military leader owes its ultimately successful outcome to the involvement of Infantry General A. N. Kuropatkin, who headed the Ministry of War at the time and whose father also came from the lower classes.

Denikin is four years older than Mikhail Svechin, and their lives brought together the rising raznochintsy of Russia and the old, feudal Russia. I'd even say this: Mikhail's reaction to the august couple's visit to the opera is a glimpse into the vanishing world of Turgenev's P.P. Kirsanov. Denikin is somewhat similar in character to E.P. Bazarov.

In this regard, Mikhail’s perception of the reign of Alexander III, which he treated with undoubted reverence, is interesting:

My education and youth took place during a time of peace in Europe, amid the patriarchal life of that time in our country. Life in those days was patriarchal, and the absence of today's great inventions made it less stressful.

In fact, it was people like Denikin who made it nervous. Why? Because they went against established notions about relationships in society, including among officers. It's not that, contrary to popular belief, it was caste-based, especially in the early 20th century, when "the proportion of hereditary nobles in the officer corps," writes S.V. Volkov, "fell sharply, including the Guards, they accounted for only 37% of the officer corps."

But it's not a matter of caste, but of traditions and ideas about subordination, which also changed. Mikhail writes about a period when the empire was undergoing industrialization and the country's social landscape was rapidly transforming.

I will again allow myself to return to The Cherry Orchard, where in the last scene Firs dies, for whom the greatest grief is the abolition of serfdom, and the sadness is the coat forgotten by the master who abandoned him.

Mikhail Svechin's memoirs describe an episode that evokes a patriarchal Rus', fading into the past along with the Firs family. The episode concerns the 1888 crash of the tsar's train in Borki:

A member of the retinue who was on the train reported that residents of nearby villages had flocked to the scene of the disaster. An elderly crest peasant, seeing the mighty figure of the Tsar descending from the carriage, holding the slightly damaged Grand Duchess Olga Alexandrovna (who was five years old) in his arms, was so touched by the thought of being able to see the Tsar in his old age. In a burst of common sentiment, he loudly exclaimed, "Look, so here's the Tsar!" And, apparently without realizing it, but in his own endearing way, he added a rude remark. He was seized by the guards who were trying to remove him. Unsure of why or where they wanted to take him, he resisted. The Tsar noticed the commotion and asked, "What's the matter?" Recognizing the situation, he smiled and ordered them to let him go, for it was he who had let out the cry of his village soul. He ordered that he be given a silver ruble with a portrait of the Tsar.

What happiness the peasant had, and the talk of the village was: a ruble with the tsar's portrait on it... Very soon, P.A. Stolypin would begin to destroy the community, changing the face of the village and the peasant mentality. Some peasants would not adapt to the new reality and would leave for the city. For these, the tsarist ruble would become not an object of reverent veneration, but an opportunity to improve their financial situation by selling it.

As M. Gorky wrote in his novel “Mother” about many, presumably, yesterday’s peasants who became workers:

In the cold gloom they walked along the unpaved street towards the high stone cages of the factory; she waited for them with indifferent confidence, illuminating the dirty road with dozens of fat square eyes.

But it is their children who will make up the bulk of the youth entering military schools, and accordingly, Alexander Svechin worked for them.

B. Ioganson, "The Workers' Faculty is Coming": a visual illustration of the work of social elevators in a new type of society, thanks to which the implementation of Svechin's ideas became possible in practice

Not only the peasants but also some sections of educated society held the monarch in high esteem. Take Mikhail himself. Here's how he describes Nicholas II's address to the graduates of the Nikolaevsky Cavalry School in 1895, among whom stood Svechin Sr.:

The young Emperor, still unaccustomed to the duties entrusted to him by God's grace, addressed us with gracious words that were heard with emotion and deeply touched our hearts. The Tsar approached us, cast his captivating gaze over the lined-up young cadets and pages, and said with a loving smile, "Serve Russia and me faithfully and truly."

Ivan Efimovich Denikin also had a patriarchal-mystical attitude toward autocracy. In his memoirs, his son recounts a characteristic episode from his childhood:

Another event that also touched me. I was seven or eight years old at the time. It became known in town that Emperor Alexander II was returning from abroad via Aleksandrov-Pogranichny and that the Tsar's train would stop in Włocławsk for ten minutes. In addition to the city's officials, several local residents, including my father, were allowed to meet the Tsar. My father decided to take me with him. Raised in a mystical attitude toward the Tsar, I was overjoyed.

When the Tsar's train pulled up, the Tsar approached the open carriage window and chatted affably with someone who was greeting him. My father stood frozen, his hand raised to his cap, ignoring me. I kept my eyes on the Tsar.

But this "I never took my eyes off the Tsar," unlike Mikhail's attitude toward the monarchy, didn't last long for Anton Denikin. Already a student at the Academy, he formulated his political worldview as follows, a view I believe common to many officers from the raznyat'i (common) milieu:

I embraced Russian liberalism in its ideological essence, without any partisan dogmatism. Broadly speaking, this embrace led me to three propositions: 1) Constitutional monarchy, 2) Radical reforms, and 3) Peaceful paths to national renewal.

And it is simply impossible to imagine Svechin’s “enchanting gaze of the young emperor” under the pen of Denikin.

The future general's witnessing of social injustice, the hardship he experienced, his profound intellect, and his education refined his political views. Gradually, these views also prevailed among the officer corps. As a result, we see that there were virtually no monarchists among the leaders of the White movement.

The Civil War itself was a confrontation between the supporters of February and October. Two Russias were at odds with each other.

Why did this happen? This will be discussed in future articles, where we will continue our discussion of the eras that preceded the birth of Svechin's "Strategy."

Uses of literature

Volkov S.V. Russian officer corps. – M.: Voenizdat, 1993
Gorky M. Mother. – M.: Sovremennik, 1984
Denikin A.I. The Path of a Russian Officer. Moscow: Sovremennik, 1991
Kersnovsky, A.A. History of the Russian Army. Volume 1. From the Northern War with Sweden to the Turkestan Campaigns. 1700–1881. – Moscow: Centerpoligraf, 2022
Svechin M.A. Notes of an Old General about the Past. – Nice, 1964
Svechin A.A. Strategy. – M.: State Military Publishing House, 1926.
Svechin A. A. Evolution of Military Art. Volume II. – Moscow-Leningrad: Voengiz, 1928
Chekhov A.P. Cherry Orchard. – M.: AST.2017

Comments

[Soldatov V.]

Nothing changes in Rus', and the Tsar was greeted with bated breath by Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, etc.

[Songwolf]

The article is more like an essay not about General Svechin, but about the time and people.
I'd just like to point out my personal perception of what's often emphasized in articles about individuals who are so-called "from the people." As if you can bring a girl from the village, but never the village from the girl.
The fact that General Denikin's ancestors were serfs didn't stop him from becoming a general in the White Army. Many famous counts and princes traced their lineages back to peasants, servants, and even bandits, but this didn't stop them from loyally serving the Tsar and the Regime. Had the coup not occurred, they would have continued to serve. Svechin, too.
Although they still try to spread the idea that Lenin was a genius, I personally consider him a political moron and an idiot. Because a genius, having taken power, would have first preserved the army, repealed Order No. 1, and restored law enforcement. And many of the officer corps of the Russian Empire would have gone to serve the new government. And perhaps, if the Civil War had happened, it wouldn't have been so bloody. To achieve a better life, you don't have to chop down the cherry orchard!

[cpls22]

Quote from Songwolf

To achieve a better life, you don’t have to cut down the cherry orchard!

I'd really like to agree with you, but empirical experience shows that something fundamentally new cannot emerge without the destruction of the old. The simultaneous existence of parts of a system with different mechanisms for the same functions destroys the system. Forgive my arrogance.

[Songwolf]

I agree that it's better to tear down the old and dilapidated and rebuild anew. But not to the ground, and then we'll build our own, our new world... But what did all this ultimately lead to?

[cpls22]

Quote from Songwolf

But not to the ground, and then we will build our new world...

The problem here is assessing the quality of this "foundation." It seemed so "trodden down" back then, to the point of impossibility of new growth. It was so thoroughly "loosened" back then that much unnecessary material rose to the surface. It then had to be "trodden down" again. In general, this is a dilemma between two approaches to building society: the organismic, which treats it as a living being that needs to be nurtured, and the mechanistic, which views society as a mechanism with interchangeable cogs, aggregates of institutions where the old can be thrown out and a new one assembled from "human material" installed. Unfortunately, a hundred years ago, the latter approach was favored, as something new and hitherto unexplored.

[Igor Khodakov]

The USSR wasn't completely destroyed. Not all military specialists shared the tragic fate of A.A. Svechin. Many had successful lives and careers, and their knowledge and talent were used in building the Red Army. I remember a long-ago series of articles about military specialists in the now-defunct Military-Industrial Courier. Among others, I wrote about Admiral Alexander Nemitz. Without him, no one would have known about the "commander" Yakir.

[Doctor]

Because the first thing a Genius would do, upon assuming power, would be to preserve the army, repeal Order No. 1, and restore law enforcement. And many of the Russian Imperial Officer Corps would have gone to serve the new regime. And perhaps, if the Civil War had occurred, it wouldn't have been so bloody. To achieve a better life, you don't have to chop down the cherry orchard!

And so it happened. The vast majority of the Red Army's senior and mid-level ranks were former Tsarist officers. They simply automatically defected to the new state, much as they did in 1991.
Of the 21 front commanders during the Civil War, only one was neither an officer nor a military man at all—Frunze. But that was a special case...

And the white officers are rebels who did not accept the new order.

[Igor Khodakov]

"Only one person who wasn't an officer and wasn't a military man at all—Frunze. But that was a special case..." And Frunze wasn't exactly a special case, considering his nominal command; the operations were planned by General Novitsky, his chief of staff. After all, in the 20th century, ability alone wasn't enough; a proper military education was required. Frunze didn't have it.

[Doctor]

"Only one person who wasn't an officer and wasn't a military man at all—Frunze. But that was a special case..." And Frunze wasn't exactly a special case, considering his nominal command; the operations were planned by General Novitsky, his chief of staff. After all, in the 20th century, ability alone wasn't enough; a proper military education was required. Frunze didn't have it.

That's right. It seems Novitsky was even initially assigned to the 4th Army, with Frunze as his commissar. But Fyodor Fyodorovich realized the situation early on and stubbornly refused, saying Frunze was a genius and could handle it, while I was a modest Chief of Staff. That's why he outlived his Commander by almost 20 years.

There were three brothers, all three generals in the RIA, the eldest for the Whites, the middle and youngest for the Reds. Incidentally, all three apparently died of natural causes. Such were the times and such were the fates...

[Igor Khodakov]

"The article reads more like an essay less about General Svechin than about the times and people." Actually, I did say that I wanted to dedicate several articles to the era first. There will also be a discussion about the author of "Strategy," his fate, and the book itself, but this time specifically for the anniversary. "And many from the Officer Corps of the Russian Empire would have gone to serve the new government." And most of them did, otherwise the Bolsheviks would not have won the Civil War. All the chiefs of staff of the Red Army divisions and armies were military specialists.

[Songwolf]

There's no point in speaking so confidently about something that's dubious. The number of officers who served in the Red Army, especially senior officers, remains unknown.
First, it's important to remember that the majority of the Imperial Army's regular personnel perished in the battles of World War I. They were replaced by wartime ensigns from various backgrounds.
Secondly, some often crossed from one side to the other more than once.
It's easier to pay attention to the General Staff officers.
Abroad, Colonel Zaitsev and General Baiov believed that 319 generals and officers of the General Staff served in the Red Army out of a total of 1500 people, that is, 21%.
Kavtoradze believes that 334 served.
In general, all calculations agree that 300 generals and officers of the General Staff out of 1500 served in the Red Army, the same 20%.

[Doctor]

There's no point in speaking so confidently about something that's dubious. The number of officers who served in the Red Army, especially senior officers, remains unknown.
First, it's important to remember that the majority of the Imperial Army's regular personnel perished in the battles of World War I. They were replaced by wartime ensigns from various backgrounds.
Secondly, some often crossed from one side to the other more than once.
It's easier to pay attention to the General Staff officers.
Abroad, Colonel Zaitsev and General Baiov believed that 319 generals and officers of the General Staff served in the Red Army out of a total of 1500 people, that is, 21%.
Kavtoradze believes that 334 served.
In general, all calculations agree that 300 generals and officers of the General Staff out of 1500 served in the Red Army, the same 20%.

Here Kaminsky counted 703 names.
https://istmat.org/node/40033

Ganin has 857.
https://militera.lib.ru/research/0/pdf/ganin_av03.pdf?ysclid=miexvmplv3508811522

[Songwolf]

The point here is that 227 people “were transferred to the General Staff of the Red Army in November 1918, 88 in May 1919,” as having graduated from the All-Russian Academy of the General Staff already during the civil war, i.e., under Soviet power.
In addition, according to the lists compiled by the head of the department of the General Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Colonel A.A. Podcherkov, as of August 1, 1922, there were 667 officers and generals of the General Staff listed abroad, including 94 assigned to it after completing short-term courses at the Nikolaev Military Academy in 1916 and 1917.
(N. Rutich. Biographical directory of the highest ranks of the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of the South of Russia.)
In general, it is not worth taking all the calculations of different historians, where more or less, as the ultimate truth.

[Doctor]

The point here is that 227 people “were transferred to the General Staff of the Red Army in November 1918, 88 in May 1919,” as having graduated from the All-Russian Academy of the General Staff already during the civil war, i.e., under Soviet power.
In addition, according to the lists compiled by the head of the department of the General Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Colonel A.A. Podcherkov, as of August 1, 1922, there were 667 officers and generals of the General Staff listed abroad, including 94 assigned to it after completing short-term courses at the Nikolaev Military Academy in 1916 and 1917.
(N. Rutich. Biographical directory of the highest ranks of the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of the South of Russia.)
In general, it is not worth taking all the calculations of different historians, where more or less, as the ultimate truth.

There's no doubt that military specialists dominated the Red Army command. Just look at the ranks from top to bottom:
Commanders-in-Chief - Vatsetis, Kamenev;
Chief of the General Staff - Stogov, Svechin, Rattel, Samoilo, Kostyaev, Bonch-Bruevich, Lebedev;
Front Commanders - Parsky, Nadezhny, Olderogge, Egorov, Sytin, Slaven, Egoriev, Gittis.... There's nothing to say about the General Staff.
It is possible to go down to Armies and Divisions, but there is no point.
Budyonny and Chapaev were exceptions, as they used to say, the Red Army was like a radish, only red on the outside and white on the inside.

Incidentally, all of this was well known in the USSR, too; it just wasn't publicized. For example, between 1971 and 1978, the four-volume "Directives of the Red Army Front Command. 1917-1922" was published.
Volume 4 contains information on the combat and numerical strength of the Red Army for the main periods of the war, lists of commanders, members of revolutionary military councils and chiefs of staff and armies, lists of division commanders, military commissars and division commanders during the civil war, information on the reserves and logistical support of the Red Army.
Scroll through and everything will become clear.

[Songwolf]

Well yes!
And then the Spring Case
"Russia, stars, the night of the execution
And the ravine is covered with bird cherry trees."
(Vladimir Nabokov)

[Olgovich]

the emergence of a new generation on the historical stage – not clogged, dark, but an educated man, dreaming of heaven and ready to fight for the Motherland that gave him a ticket to life

.

Thanks to Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov
ASYA LINSKAYA, VALYA MYZINA. Moscow, School No. 272, 5th grade "A".
Dear Nikolai Ivanovich! Yesterday we read in the newspapers the verdict against a gang of right-wing Trotskyist spies and murderers. We would like to express our sincere thanks to you and all the vigilant members of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
Thank you, Comrade Yezhov, for catching the gang of lurking fascists who wanted to rob us of our happy childhoods. Thank you for smashing and destroying these viper's nests.
We urge you to take care of yourself. After all, the snake Yagoda tried to bite you. Your life and health are needed by our country and by us, Soviet children.
We strive to be as brave, vigilant, and implacable towards all enemies of the workers as you, dear comrade Yezhov!

And the "dark, downtrodden generations" of thousand-year-old Russia were spared such "enlightenment" and built the largest country in the world.

Those provided with travel vouchers did not come out to protect the distributors in 1991 and destroyed what had been created by the dark generations.

And while Alexander chose the Reds, Mikhail fought for the Whites, and in exile held important posts in the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS). His earthly journey ended in Nice in 1969. Unlike his brother, was he lucky? I can't say.

..
Lived a life free a man for almost 100 years, raised children and grandchildren.

Mikhail Kh could only say what he was told, he was imprisoned three times, trampled upon, executed—what's there to envy? Maybe he got it at least in '37...

[Cartalon]

It is immediately obvious that the author is a truly profound philosopher, who says that it is better to be shot in a basement or die of old age in Nice.
I think we can organize a vote, everyone who is for the execution, give me minuses, you love this stuff.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Cartalon

It is immediately obvious that the author is a truly profound philosopher, who says that it is better to be shot in a basement or die of old age in Nice.

It's clear that the Tukhachevskys happily accepted their own, Bolshevik, bullet.
He would be even happier if he knew that his entire family - his mother, wives, brothers, sisters, their husbands and wives, children - received the same bullet or their own, native concentration camp... Well, what Nice can compare to this?

[Igor Khodakov]

"It's better to be shot in a basement or die of old age in Nice." Where do I write about this? Not all military specialists were executed, and not all émigrés could afford Mikhail Svechin's quality of life. And the example cited by Turkul is far from the only one in the history of emigration.

[Cartalon]

How many purges did a military specialist have to endure in order for his fate to be considered favorable?
You personally have a choice: to live poorly abroad or just as poorly, but also with the permanent threat of arrest, and not only will you be arrested, but your family will also suffer, what will you choose?

[Igor Khodakov]

"How many purges did a military specialist have to endure for his fate to be considered favorable?" Not everyone was subjected to repression—I didn't cite Admiral Nemitz as an example for nothing. And he's not the only one. But I don't deny the tragedy and complexity of the era. And it's not for nothing that I wrote that it evokes such polarized opinions. It couldn't be otherwise. Anyone who even slightly touches on the topic of the 1930s exposes themselves to criticism. The era and its leaders continue to evoke polarized opinions to this day. It's not for nothing that I wrote: "I don't presume to judge..."

[Olgovich]

Quote: Igor Khodakov

Not all military specialists were shot,

DIN Volklv wrote that only a few hundred RIA officers (out of 270 thousand) took part in the Great Patriotic War.

[oleg Pesotsky]

This article is so overwrought! It's mind-boggling. The narrative is disjointed, jumping from one topic to another, and there's a complete lack of cohesion or logic. And yet the topic is fascinating. Svechin, in his "Strategy," was ahead of his time and advanced military science so far that many of his points perfectly explain what's happening in the Central Military District today. Propaganda (or rather, the lack thereof), unreliable information, the gap between the home front and the front, and methods for overcoming it, and a whole host of other things! I wish I could write about all this instead of just spewing out a disjointed stream of consciousness.

[Igor Khodakov]

"In his 'Strategy,' Svechin was ahead of his time and advanced military science so far that many of his points perfectly explain what is happening in the Central Military District today." Don't you think yours is a disjointed thread? I specifically drew attention to the emergence of a new type of society, and within a very short historical period—the lifetime of a single generation—which made the strategy of attrition possible. Svechin wrote precisely in the rhythm of his time. We'll talk about the 'Strategy' later. But it's also important to discuss society, albeit briefly. I'll give an example from outside Russian history: is it possible to understand the causes of France's defeat in May-June 1940 by analyzing only the strategic errors of Gamelin and Weygand, or should we instead try to understand the transformation that occurred within French society during the interwar period?

[Pravodel]

"Strategy" by A.A. Svechin: at the Turn of the Epoch, or Reflections on the Eve of the Anniversary

Everything is clear, except for one thing: what does A.A. Svechin’s “Strategy” have to do with it!?
If author Igor Khodakov set out to describe the history of Russian everyday life, that's one thing, albeit a bit weak. But if he intended to talk about strategy, he's a complete failure. No strategy, just pure mundanity. So what's strategic about that?
Or is the strategy so unclear that nothing is clear at all!?

[Igor Khodakov]

"What does A.A. Svechin's 'Strategy' have to do with this?!" The discussion was about society, not the book, as stated at the very beginning of the article. That's the first point. Second, regarding "decided to describe the history of Russian life"—where did I mention that? I only touched on some aspects of social life, illustrated in the memoirs of Mikhail Svechin and Anton Denikin, focusing on the attitudes of both—figures from different social backgrounds—toward autocracy.

[cpls22]

Quote: Igor Khodakov

It was about society, not about a book, as stated at the very beginning of the article.

To be fair, it's worth noting that the title makes a promise that the article's content doesn't deliver. It's psychologically gripping, and you keep waiting for the narrative to turn to the book itself. I have no complaints about the text itself, thank you.

[Igor Khodakov]

"The title makes a promise that the content of the article doesn't keep." I accept your comment with gratitude and will take it into account in the future. Thank you.

[Pravodel]

It was about society, not about a book, as stated at the very beginning of the article.

Dear Mr. Igor Khodakov, what you wrote at the very beginning of your article is summed up in just one phrase, which in your first draft was included in the preface as "not to be read by the slow-witted," but is missing from the current version. Therefore, your remark that

It was about society, not about a book, as stated at the very beginning of the article.

This is not acceptable. Either you're describing society using a book as an example, in which case the article title should be completely different, or you're talking about strategy, in which case the article's content doesn't match its title.
But now, to the point. If we follow the single rule that all writers (except journalists, but that's a separate topic) follow when writing articles and texts—that the content reveals the meaning of the title of the article, text, book, etc.—then, in your case, there's no correspondence between the article's title and its content. Therefore, if you decide to touch upon, as you claim,

some aspects of social life

Using the memoirs of Mikhail Svechin and Anton Denikin as examples, then what does "Strategy" have to do with it, and especially the cover of A.A. Svechin's book "Strategy" included in the article's content? And since you also refer to A.I. Denikin's memoirs when describing "certain aspects of social life," then why isn't there a similar cover for Denikin's memoirs? Or else you should say you rely solely on A.A. Svechin's memoirs.
Furthermore, A.A. Svechin's work "Strategy" has nothing to do with memoir literature, but rather with the theory of military art, its tactics, and strategy. I believe it was published in the USSR as a textbook for military colleges and academies. Therefore, once again, the title of your article is at odds with the content of A.A. Svechin's work "Strategy."
Summary:
If you want to rely on memoirs and describe "certain aspects of social life," then the title "Strategy" is completely unsuitable for such an article, since it indicates content different from what you intend to present.
So either figure out the content or the title. But keep in mind that the title must be consistent with the contentAnd the value of any given article lies not in the flashiness of its title, but in the correspondence between the title and the material.
I'll leave it at that. You don't have to answer. Because if you keep the title "Strategy" and the content you presented in the article, everything has already been said above.

[Maks1995]

So, there was a general who went after the Reds, but they killed him anyway. After several attempts.
It happens.
After the news about "300 people with one bomb," one person, although knowledgeable, well-read, and honest...

Unfortunately, statistics are everywhere...

[deddem]

Quote: Olgovich

Quote: Igor Khodakov

Not all military specialists were shot,

DIN Volklv wrote that only a few hundred RIA officers (out of 270 thousand) took part in the Great Patriotic War.

Don't forget to cure your hangover, otherwise your fingers are getting tangled up in the keyboard.

Does Mr. Doctor of Historical Sciences (by the way, what was the topic of his dissertation?.. What year did he defend it?..) provide statistics on the age groups of officers? Lists of names?

Or is he lying falsely, as has always been fashionable among the so-called "monarchists"?

[Pavel57]

Interesting sketches.

[Marrr]

I don’t understand why the author titled the article “Strategy” by A.A. Svechin?
I did not see in the text an analysis of this work or even the history of its writing and subsequent removal from the libraries of military schools.

[Songwolf]

I have a work or memoir by Svechin in my archive... I need to look it up... I'm writing on my tablet, but the archive is on my computer. If you're interested, I can take a look.

[Marrr]

No need, I have his STRATEGY, 1927 edition, in electronic form.
I read it selectively; if it had been on paper, I would have read it completely.
I don't like texts from the screen