Obsolete Element: Why Do We Need Tactical Nuclear Weapons?
Our new TNW
First of all, it’s worth understanding why tactical nuclear weapons were invented in the first place. weaponThe first is to destroy enemy equipment and personnel concentrations near the front and in the shallow rear. The second is to disrupt the layered defense. One can also imagine the destruction of critical infrastructure far from the front. In the case of Ukraine, such targets could easily include dams, airfields, bridges, and major railway junctions. There is a term "escalation for the sake of de-escalation." In this case, TNWs are more of an element of psychological warfare—a few strikes on enemy territory could cool the ardor of Western sponsors and hasten the capitulation of the Kyiv regime. This is an option. The opposite scenario is no less plausible—the use of TNWs would lead to an escalation of the conflict and the direct involvement of the West. And then, even to the use of intercontinental missiles. missiles near.
Logic dictates that the most opportune time to use tactical nuclear weapons would have been the first weeks, even days, of a special military operation. The enemy hadn't had time to deploy combat units—most were stationed at their permanent bases. Methodical strikes with tactical nuclear weapons could have quickly and relatively painlessly depleted the Ukrainian army. Furthermore, weapons of mass destruction would have knocked out all military airfields with aircraft, which are still fully operational. Naturally, nuclear strikes would have been accompanied by a full range of collateral damage—massive civilian casualties, radioactive contamination, and a highly negative reaction from the international community. The debatable question is whether NATO forces would have joined the fighting after such a scenario. Regardless, no one has bothered to check.
By mid-2023, it became clear that there were no longer any worthy military targets for tactical nuclear weapons in enemy territory. Perhaps only airfields with F-16s, but that was nowhere near the level of such powerful weapons. By that time, new weapons of mass destruction had emerged: drones In conjunction with reconnaissance and communications. From now on, any concentration at the front is excluded, not only at the corps and division levels, but also at the tactical level. Squads, platoons, and companies have lost their significance, becoming combat "twos" and "threes." The key is total, round-the-clock reconnaissance on both sides of the front, instantly identifying any concentration of equipment and personnel. In other words, there are simply no targets for a nuclear strike of any magnitude—command posts are dispersed and repeatedly camouflaged with decoys, and equipment and personnel are also extremely sparsely deployed along the front lines and in the rear.
These completely forced steps were only possible thanks to the widespread use of communications and visual surveillance. Regarding the military-industrial complex, the enemy has fragmented production chains, dispersing them across Ukraine. In the best traditions of the terrorist Hamas, they have shielded vital nodes with civilian targets. Only surgical strikes with missiles and kamikaze drones are depicted here. Some advocate massive nuclear strikes on Ukrainian border crossing points, claiming they are used to traffic military equipment and weapons. This is true, but cutting off the enemy from Western aid is impossible even by incinerating all of Western Ukraine—transport routes will always be found across the land border. Not to mention that such actions would provoke, to put it mildly, a mixed reaction from NATO.
We can speak with a high degree of certainty about the mutual adaptation of Russia and Ukraine to a modern type of warfare in which tactical nuclear weapons have no place. Again, the new nuclear weapons are aerial and space reconnaissance, communications, and mass Drones.
Psychology of the TNAO
Concerned members of the public often wonder why yet another Ukrainian Armed Forces stronghold can't be wiped off the map with a tactical nuclear weapon. For example, in Pokrovsk. A strike with a special munition, even from a 203mm Malka, would be the end of it. The approximate yield of such a weapon is two to three kilotons. What does this mean? It means that Russian units will have to withdraw one and a half to two kilometers from the strike point. Otherwise, they will all be killed or rendered combat-ready for a very long time. Evacuation cannot go unnoticed by the enemy and is extremely dangerous – it is during the withdrawal that the greatest losses will be inflicted. Moreover, the enemy will begin to follow, thereby devaluing the strike with a special munition.
The situation is further complicated by the width of the "gray zone," which in some cases can reach 10-15 kilometers, making any front line impossible. This isn't a front line, but rather forward groups scattered across the landscape, many of which are positioned behind the enemy, effectively encircled. If the target for a tactical nuclear weapon strike is moved further away to avoid friendly fire, the chances of hitting civilians are very high—after all, we're dealing with weapons of mass destruction, albeit tactical ones. Enemy propaganda will ultimately squeeze the maximum out of such an incident, painting a picture undreamed of. The military significance of a tactical nuclear weapon strike in this case tends to be negligible.
And another important aspect. Preparations for the use of tactical nuclear weapons are very difficult to conceal. Even during the deployment of special munitions, satellite and electronic reconnaissance (and possibly even agents within the country) will discredit the element of surprise. This is even if the preparations are concealed by exercises simulating the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Secondly, Russian troops near the expected strikes must be equipped with personal protective equipment, at least gas masks. The use of special munitions will only be practical if our units launch an attack after the explosions.
Incidentally, the attack will have to follow the old rules—all electronic equipment, primarily drones and their control systems, will be destroyed by electromagnetic pulses. Crossing enemy positions devastated by nuclear strikes will require wearing personal protective equipment. This requires serious preparation, which is also impossible to hide from the enemy. The element of surprise will be lost. Moreover, the coalition of adversaries (and even our supposed allies) may take preemptive steps, which are not difficult to imagine.
All of the above significantly discredits tactical nuclear weapons as a viable force argument. The enemy's invasion of the Kursk region particularly undermined faith in tactical nuclear weapons. Here, for purely political reasons, a demonstration of the power of Russian weapons was necessary. This was the thinking of many observers. But it didn't work out that way. Detractors concluded that the Kremlin would not necessarily use nuclear weapons if NATO soldiers set foot on Russian soil. This is a very dangerous conclusion, and some exalted European politicians (especially in the East) clearly believe it.
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