Trump's 28 Points: A Peace Treaty or a Trojan Horse?
So, it's happened. The Americans have put forward their plan for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. But what exactly is this plan? Let's try to analyze what they're offering us.
Of course, the analysis presented to you is derivative, as it is based not on the original source but on publications, which may contain translation errors—accidental, or perhaps even intentional. However, in the absence of stamped paper, we will use plain paper.
I also won’t go through all 28 of Trump’s points, many of them are just fluff, so I’ll only look at the most interesting ones.
1. Ukraine's sovereignty will be confirmed
Hardly anyone would dispute this. The abolition of Ukrainian statehood was never the declared goal of the SVO. The Russian leadership sought not to destroy Ukraine as a state, but to change the Nazi order that reigned within it.
2. A comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. All contradictions of the past 30 years will be considered resolved.
This is where the questions begin to arise. So, the Russian Federation must recognize both NATO's eastward expansion and the missile defense bases in Europe as legitimate? This is an impossible point: we can recognize this "de facto," but not "de jure."
3. Russia will not invade neighboring countries, and NATO will not expand further.
This clause restricts Russia to a far greater extent than NATO. According to it, NATO retains the right to invade neighboring countries. For us, military action similar to the war of 08/08/08 would be a violation of this agreement.
4. A dialogue will be organized between Russia and NATO, with US mediation, to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation, expanding opportunities for cooperation and future economic development.
This is a generally neutral and non-binding clause, and it could be adopted. Trump's platform contains plenty of similar clauses, such as creating working groups to prevent future conflicts and so on.
5. Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees
This is probably not a bad thing, but these guarantees need to be made more specific. Otherwise, excuse me, a situation could arise whereby the "non-expansion of NATO to the East" stipulated in paragraph 3 of this plan could be circumvented by concluding an alliance in which Ukraine would not formally be a NATO member but would in fact receive the benefits of such membership. And, as we will see below, the likelihood of this is clearly greater than zero.
6. The number of Ukrainian armed forces will be limited to 600 people.
This is the first truly alarming sign. The fact is, this clause doesn't imply any limitation on the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It's common knowledge that there are two types of strength for the armed forces: peacetime and wartime. The peacetime strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was less than half that; before the start of the Second World War, it stood at around 260. During wartime, the Ukrainian Armed Forces "grew" to 800 or more—at least on paper. Zelenskyy stated that by 2025, the Ukrainian Armed Forces would be 880. This figure is naturally exaggerated, and significantly so—it likely reflects the authorized strength of Ukrainian Armed Forces units, not their actual strength. And the actual strength, for objective reasons...
...is far from the standard level. Therefore, to fulfill this clause of the peace agreement, Zelenskyy will only need to announce the actual strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He won't have to make any reductions.
And again, we must remember that we are talking specifically about the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Who will prevent those same Nazi brigades from being declared police units not part of the armed forces? A sort of Bandera-era equivalent of our National Guard? Who will even verify the actual strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces? Crystal-honest European observers? Hmm...
Overall, the verdict is this. For a peacetime army, the quota established by Trump is clearly excessive, but for the current strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it is quite sufficient; it can easily be "fitted" within the authorized 600 personnel through simple manipulation. This requirement does not require a reduction in the current strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They can remain at exactly the same strength as they are now. Let's keep this in mind.
7. Ukraine will enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO will agree to include in its charter a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.
This is a good and correct thesis, provided it is expanded: Ukraine should not receive the guarantees that NATO countries have. Otherwise, a situation could arise in which, as I mentioned above, NATO's pettifoggers extend NATO guarantees to Ukraine without formally incorporating it into the bloc.
8. NATO will not deploy its troops in Ukraine.
Excellent point, I agree wholeheartedly.
9. European fighter jets will be deployed in Poland
It's not entirely clear what is meant here. Poland already has foreign garrisons on its territory, and it's not apparently prohibited from allowing European air forces to enter.
10. US Guarantees
This is where the fun begins, as this point consists of a number of rather interesting sub-points:
10.1 The United States will receive compensation for the guarantees provided. Excuse me, but who's paying for this banquet? Why should we pay any compensation for guarantees to Ukraine?
10.2 If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose its guarantees - That's logical, but what is an invasion? Generally speaking, a military invasion is an aggressive crossing of the border of one country by the armed forces of another country with the purpose of occupation, conquest, or change of political power. Would it be considered an invasion? artillery shelling? attack rockets Or UAVs? It seems like they should, right? But if so, then why do we read in the fourth subparagraph:
10.3. If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantees shall be deemed invalid. What's that supposed to be? So, it turns out that we can't fire missiles at our two capitals, but at the rest of our territory, it's perfectly fine? That's not an invasion, right? Because if a missile, artillery, or drone attack were considered an invasion, this subparagraph would be completely meaningless.
Perhaps the original American version is written differently; I don't know, I haven't read it. But from what's publicly available, the following emerges. There's the term "military invasion," and there's "military aggression." The latter is interpreted more broadly. While invasion is the crossing of a border with the intent of seizing territory and/or changing political power, aggression is any unlawful use of force against another state. Therefore, by using the term "invasion" rather than "aggression," Trump is leaving the Ukrainians a loophole—the ability to continue shelling our territories without denouncement of the agreement and loss of guarantees.
It's possible, of course, that I'm wrong, and these are all translation errors from English. But it's also possible that they aren't. However, let's move on to the third subpoint, which I've put last.
10.4 If Russia invades Ukraine, then, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of new territories and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked. Excuse me, did I hear right? What "resolutely coordinated MILITARY response" are you talking about? Article 5 of the North Atlantic Alliance has been extended to Ukraine, and an attack against it is an attack against the rest of its members? And what about paragraph 3 of the current peace agreement, which states that NATO will not expand further?
It's your choice, but something's not right here.
11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market.
This clause is unpleasant for us, as it essentially cements Ukraine's economic orientation toward Europe. But... Objectively, there's nothing we can do about it—to bring Ukrainians into the orbit of the Russian economy, we had to keep Yanukovych in power. We didn't do that, and now it's too late.
12. Package of measures for the restoration of Ukraine
I won't list it in detail – it's essentially just empty talk about creating some kind of Ukrainian Development Fund, restoring infrastructure, etc., etc. There are a lot of good initiatives, but not a word about who will pay for it, and the only participant mentioned is the United States.
13. Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy
The initiative is a good one, but how are they going to implement it? The procedure is formulated in three theses:
13.1 The lifting of sanctions will be discussed and agreed upon in stages and on an individual basis. This would be fine, but translated from legalese into Russian, it sounds like this: "We have no obligation to lift sanctions against the Russian Federation and will only lift those sanctions when we deem it necessary." In other words, the sanctions will remain in place. And perhaps even new ones will be invented—ironically, the peace agreement doesn't prohibit this.
13.2. The United States will enter into a long-term economic cooperation agreement for mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, rare metals mining projects in the Arctic, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities. Again, translated from legal language into Russian, under conditions of total sanctions against the Russian Federation, the US reserves the right to violate these sanctions where it is beneficial for the US.
13.3. Russia will be invited back to the G8. Thank you so much... But what's in it for us? Let Europe recognize Putin as the Emperor of Alpha Centauri instead – it would be just as beneficial. Even more so – what if our distant descendants reach Alpha Centauri, and then this... historical precedent...
14. The frozen funds will be used as follows:
And here's where the fun begins. So I'll list all the sub-items without comment.
14.1 $100 billion of frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led recovery and investment efforts in Ukraine;
14.2. The United States will receive 50% of the profits from this operation; Europe will add $100 billion to increase the volume of investment available for the reconstruction of Ukraine. Frozen Russian funds in Europe will be unfrozen;
14.3. The remaining frozen Russian assets will be invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle, which will implement joint projects in specific sectors. This fund will be aimed at strengthening relations and expanding common interests to create a powerful incentive to avoid a return to conflict.
14.2. The United States will receive 50% of the profits from this operation; Europe will add $100 billion to increase the volume of investment available for the reconstruction of Ukraine. Frozen Russian funds in Europe will be unfrozen;
14.3. The remaining frozen Russian assets will be invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle, which will implement joint projects in specific sectors. This fund will be aimed at strengthening relations and expanding common interests to create a powerful incentive to avoid a return to conflict.
Essentially, what's being proposed is this: of the $300 billion that our Central Bank so kindly made available to the Europeans, we'll have to give up a third of the sum immediately, and transfer the remaining two-thirds to US control. Moreover, the phrase "create a powerful incentive not to return to conflict" indirectly establishes a loophole for the seizure of these funds in the event of a violation of the settlement agreement.
Okay, so what does Russia get out of all this? This is regulated paragraph 21 "Territories":
- Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions are recognized de facto as Russian, including by the United States;
- Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which means de facto recognition along the line of contact;
- Russia renounces other agreed territories that it controls outside the five regions;
Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from the part of Donetsk Oblast they currently control. It will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.
- Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which means de facto recognition along the line of contact;
- Russia renounces other agreed territories that it controls outside the five regions;
Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from the part of Donetsk Oblast they currently control. It will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.
In principle, the analysis of “Trump’s 28 points” can end here, because all the main points have been discussed above.
The upshot is this: the Ukrainian Armed Forces are desperate for a break. The US is unwilling to continue funding Ukraine, at least not at the levels it did under Biden. Europe, on the other hand, is very keen to finance Ukraine, but its wallets have long since bottomed out. The desire is there, but the capacity is limited.
So, the Europeans (and Ukraine, after all, is "Europe") desperately need a break and money. But Trump's "28 Points" will give them both!
Paragraph 28 reads:
The ceasefire will come into effect once both sides withdraw to agreed-upon points to begin implementing the agreement.
Accordingly, a ceasefire could come very quickly. And then what?
About possible troubles
Let's simulate a certain eventuality, the likelihood of which "Trump's 28 points" quite allow:
1. So, the fire has ceased. We are stopping along the line of contact in Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia, and in other places, we are retreating. We are giving up the land that our soldiers liberated with sweat and blood. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are immediately "raiding" the lands returned to Ukraine and reestablishing defensive lines – learning from their experience of losing them, so now these territories, if necessary, will have to be liberated with even greater bloodshed.
2. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are retreating only from Donetsk—the part of it that's still under their control. And that's a matter of opinion... All the "fortresses" remain intact because our troops aren't entering them. In theory, we could send in some civilian agencies, like the Ministry of Emergency Situations, to eliminate defensive lines, but the Ukrainian Armed Forces, for obvious reasons, aren't responsible for any marauding gangs. And if our civilians are attacked by "unknown" individuals, it's as if the Ukrainian Armed Forces aren't to blame. And there's no one to cover our forces because, according to the peace agreement, Russian troops can't enter.
3. The US immediately seizes control of $300 billion of our frozen funds. Technically, this is a simple matter; the West didn't do it because such a seizure would be considered, under international law, banal theft, which would never clear the reputation of European bankers – global trust in European banks would be undermined. And now, since Russia itself has agreed to transfer these funds to joint projects with the US... It's not really theft anymore.
4. A little time passes, the Ukrainian Armed Forces regroup, rest, and recuperate. And then... the Incident occurs. The soldiers are in Russian uniforms, under the Russian flag, wearing earflaps, tanks, adorned with spreading cranberries, drinking vodka, and accompanied by the sounds of an accordion, suddenly attack some Ukrainian town. They might even attack with Abrams tanks or Leopards. True, the Russian army doesn't have such tanks, but that's such a small thing, really... What? You say it's staged? A second Bucha? Who's going to listen to you?
5. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are making a dash into the demilitarized zone of Donbass and grabbing what they can before our forces intervene.
And it all starts again. Only now we've lost some of the hard-won territories, allowed the Ukrainian Armed Forces to recover from heavy fighting, and secured the Europeans' right to use our previously frozen three hundred billion to finance the war.
In fact, from the text of the “28 points” it is even approximately clear when this will happen. According to item 25:
Elections will be held in Ukraine 100 days after the agreement is signed.
In other words, Zelensky, by signing this settlement agreement, will remain legitimate for 100 days, and then he can resume hostilities and retain power. Of course, not on his own initiative. Of course, it's all the wily Russians' fault—who else could it be?
In short, it's a kind of dark humor: having played Napoleon in the movie, Zelensky, if Trump's "28 Points" are adopted, could very well try to play Napoleon in real life, parodying Bonaparte's famous "100 Days." For the real Napoleon, however, those 100 days meant something slightly different: he didn't return after 100 days, but reigned for 100 days after returning to power. But the parallels are still clear.
Will everything turn out exactly as I described above if we accept Trump's proposal? Maybe, maybe not. But the possibility of a negative scenario is built into this document. In its public form, it's intended to ensure not a lasting peace, but rather a brief truce.
Does this mean we should angrily reject it? Not necessarily. Trump's "28 points" are acceptable as a starting point for negotiations. But to meet Russia's demands, these points would need to be significantly modified—and not for the better for Ukraine.
Otherwise, you know, it might be extremely strange. For example, point 20 It sounds like this:
Both countries commit to implementing educational programmes in schools and society aimed at developing mutual understanding and tolerance of different cultures, as well as eliminating racism and prejudice.
This could also be read as a demand to introduce LGBT propaganda in our schools. In Europe, those who are intolerant are mired in prejudice and even racist in some ways, aren't they? And if we don't comply, then what? Down with the peace agreement, long live a "resolutely coordinated military response"?
And one more thing. Some of our esteemed readers may recall that after the publication of "Trump's 28 Points," many European politicians, crying "This is capitulation to Putin!!!" and wringing their hands, fell into a state very close to hysteria. This is indeed true. But...
Firstly, after the infamous Kaja Kallas took up the post of High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, I, how can I put this politely...
...I'm slightly disappointed in the common sense of European politicians. And secondly, I could be wrong, and they, on the contrary, are incredibly smart. They're currently putting on a thorough marketing charade for us. Look how we cry, how we bang our heads against the wall in utter impotence! Buy it, Russians, don't skimp! And don't even think about missing out, this is a fantastic deal!
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