On the shipbuilding programs of the Russian Empire in the late 19th century – the emergence of the Japanese threat
Initially, I intended to present to the esteemed reader an article on why the Russian Empire, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, began mass-producing battleships similar to the French Tsarevich, rather than the American Retvizan. However, my exploration of this issue gradually led me to a detailed examination of our pre-war shipbuilding programs. These, in turn, cannot be examined outside the context in which they were created and the sources of their funding.
Therefore, we will have to approach from afar.
On shipbuilding programs of the Russian Empire up to 1898
Without delving into "the deeds of bygone days, the legends of deep antiquity" (otherwise we could reach back to the time of Prince Oleg's expedition to Constantinople), I will begin with the shipbuilding program of 1881, which was adopted during the reign of Emperor Alexander III. On his instructions, a Special Conference, chaired by the infamous Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who later became Admiral General, formulated the objectives fleet and defined a shipbuilding program that would allow these problems to be solved.
It's especially worth noting here that the navy was not intended to be built "in general" or "just in case," but rather in strict accordance with the foreign policy objectives of the Russian Empire. One can, of course, debate how accurately these objectives were defined. But since they were formulated precisely as such, from the perspective of creating a navy as a military force called upon to "implement policy by other means," the methodology was impeccable.
The political preconditions were as follows:
Chiornoe more. For a long time, the Treaty of Paris of 1856 prohibited the Russian Empire from maintaining a navy there, but in 1871, Russia succeeded in lifting this ban. However, due to a lack of funds, even a decade later, by 1881, it was impossible to build a viable fleet in the Black Sea. By the start of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, we had only two "popovkas," which were quite capable of serving as coastal defense ironclads but were not suitable for anything more. Consequently, the burden of active operations fell on armed steamships and torpedo boats, which achieved some success. However, naval supremacy remained with the Turks.
This was bad enough, but by 1880 the situation had become even more complicated. Turkey had become completely decrepit, and the British Empire, having wrested Egypt from the Ottomans, was reaching out to it with its greedy hands. "Foggy Albion" could very well continue its expansion, capturing the Bosphorus as well, which would have been a complete foreign policy disaster for the Russian Empire.
It's common knowledge that the Russian Empire didn't aspire to autarky, and hadn't fully begun the industrial revolution by 1881, making its industrial output highly dependent on foreign trade. Grain was the primary source of foreign exchange, and naturally, it had to be exported from the most productive regions along the shortest route to the consumer—that is, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Consequently, whoever controlled the Bosphorus controlled the most important trade flows of the Russian Empire. Therefore, surrendering the Bosphorus to the British was absolutely out of the question.
Baltic Sea. Here, the full-blown task of defending our native shores from British or any other expeditionary forces, should they decide to invade the Baltic Sea, was at stake. The memory of the Anglo-French squadrons that had perpetrated atrocities in the Baltic in 1854-1855 was still fresh.
In the 1860s, this task was planned to be accomplished not in a squadron battle on the high seas, but in close proximity to the coast. Naval forces sufficient for such a defense would automatically become the first among the potentially hostile Baltic powers. Interestingly, until 1878, Germany wasn't considered a potential adversary, but rather an ally, and, moreover, didn't possess a significant navy.
However, in 1878, it suddenly became clear that our friendly Germans weren't exactly friendly. At the Congress of Berlin, Shere Khan and Tabaqui… oh, sorry, Germany, along with Austria, took a rather unfavorable stance toward the Russian Empire, which deprived the latter of the fruits of its victories over Turkey in the war of 1877-1878. Therefore, even under Nicholas I, Germany began to be considered a potential enemy, and by 1880, it had begun strengthening its navy. Consequently, a new predator, rapidly gaining power and potentially dangerous for Russia, appeared in the Baltic.
Far East. It attracted the attention of the Russian Empire, in part, because it was perhaps the only location from which the Russian navy could conduct active military operations against the British Empire. Naturally, this was a cruiser war, and the cruisers necessary for such a war also guaranteed Russian interests vis-à-vis Asian countries that lacked strong navies. But by 1880, two states were gradually gaining naval power in the Far East: Japan and China. The Siberian Naval Flotilla, even reinforced by Baltic cruisers, was no longer sufficient to counter these adversaries. Furthermore, a conflict between Russia and Japan or China could lead to the presence of significant naval forces from European powers in the Far East, even if only for the purpose of carving up the "Chinese pie." Accordingly, the Russian Empire had to ensure a sufficient naval presence to ensure its interests were not ignored.
In general, it can be stated that the situation in all three theaters, two maritime and one “oceanic,” had become considerably more complicated for the Russian Empire by 1881, and this could only be corrected by increasing naval power.
Fleet tasks
Problem number 1. The Black Sea was declared the most important naval theater for the Russian Empire. The Black Sea Fleet had to be capable of conducting an operation to seize the Straits at any time, including the deployment of a 30,000-strong landing force. This required building enough ships to ensure complete dominance over the Turkish Navy. This task had the highest priority; it had to be accomplished first, and only then could fleets be developed in other theaters.
Problem number 2. The Baltic Fleet was supposed to be the first in its sea in terms of its strength, in comparison with the other Baltic powers, not excluding, of course, Germany.
Problem number 3. In the Far East, the Siberian Naval Flotilla was to be maintained at a strength sufficient to support the coastal defense of key locations and settlements from enemy fleets. In the event of an emergency caused by worsening relations with China, Japan, or elsewhere, it was intended to be assisted by armored squadrons from the Baltic or Black Sea Fleets.
Problem number 4. Moreover, a strong cruiser squadron was needed in the Far East to threaten England's maritime trade. Such a squadron was primarily intended to play a political role: by its very existence, it would force the sirs and peers of "Foggy Albion" to calculate the losses to colonial trade that could result from its use.
Armored frigate "Dmitry Donskoy"
A 19th-century analogue of strategic deterrence: cruisers instead of SSBNs.
Available naval forces
But to solve the aforementioned problems, the Russian Empire required a very powerful naval force, which it lacked. The Black Sea Fleet, as mentioned above, was in its infancy. While the Russian Empire had significantly more naval forces in the Baltic than in the Black Sea, the situation still left much to be desired. In the 1860s, Russia built numerous monitor-class ships, so that by 1870, the navy had 23 ships with 162 guns. Considering coastal defense secure, the fleet shifted to cruisers of various classes to engage British shipping lanes in distant seas and oceans. But by 1881, scientific and technological progress, having gained considerable momentum, meant that coastal defense armored forces were rapidly losing their combat value. Insufficient cruisers were built, and those that did were also rapidly becoming obsolete.
The size of the Siberian flotilla did not meet the challenges of the time.
Shipbuilding program 1881-1900 and the tasks of squadron battleships
All of the above gave rise to a grandiose 20-year shipbuilding program from 1881 to 1900, within the framework of which the Fatherland was to build squadrons of the following numbers:
The plan was sound, but the execution was disappointing. There were many reasons for this, but the most important was the simple lack of funds for such large-scale projects. Nevertheless, in terms of creating the navy's main force, the results achieved were impressive. By 1895, eight squadron battleships had been commissioned or were in various stages of construction in the Baltic, including:
- "Battleships-rams" "Nikolai I" and "Alexander II";
- “One mast, one pipe, one cannon – one misunderstanding” “Gangut”;
- A very solid and good for its time "Navarin", which can be considered the ancestor of the classic battleships in the domestic fleet;
- An attempt to build a full-fledged squadron battleship of reduced displacement, the Sisoj Veliky, which was unsuccessful both in concept and execution;
The sister ships "Sevastopol," "Poltava," and "Petropavlovsk," which at the time of their laying were almost the most powerful battleships in the world. Unfortunately, their protracted construction meant that by the time they were commissioned, they were no longer so.
Oddly enough, all of these extremely different ships were created within the framework of the same requirements, according to which the Baltic squadron battleships were to:
1. Defeat the German battle fleet in a general battle;
2. If necessary, make a transition to the Far East to confront China, Japan, or the squadrons of European powers there.
Shipbuilding program 1895-1902
Due to the impossibility of implementation, the 1881-1900 shipbuilding program underwent a series of revisions: the navy's goals and objectives remained unchanged, only the ship complement changed. Its final iteration was the 1895-1902 shipbuilding program, approved in March 1895 at a special meeting of officials of the Naval Ministry, chaired by General-Admiral Alexei Alexandrovich. This program, which essentially remained part of the 1881-1900 program, called for the construction of five squadron battleships, four coastal defense battleships, six first-rank cruisers, one second-rank cruiser, five gunboats, 54 torpedo boats, two minelayers, and four transports in the Baltic.
The first battleships of the 1895-1902 program, as well as the tenth and eleventh Baltic battleships of the 1881-1900 program, were Peresvet and Oslyabya, officially laid down in November 1895 - in fact, work on the slipways, of course, began somewhat earlier.
Where did the Peresvets come from?
Beginning with the Navarin, we can speak of a certain mature concept for the Baltic battleship. The ships designed were not particularly fast (16 knots), well-armed (12-inch and 6-inch guns), and armored (up to 16-inch belt), with a moderate cruising range and seaworthiness—the freeboard was the standard two interdeck spaces for the class.
And then suddenly—a sudden shift toward relatively fast (over 18 knots), high-sided ships with increased range, but with reduced armament, comparable to British second-class battleships. Why?
As noted above, the Russian Empire built very different and dissimilar squadron battleships in the Baltic to address the same missions, and these missions remained unchanged from 1881 onward. This was also true of the Peresvet-class battleships: It's undeniable that, given the technological advances and economic capabilities of the Russian Empire, the Peresvet-class battleship concept was extremely attractive. The preconditions for the Peresvet-class's construction were as follows:
1. Individual weakness of the German fleet's battleships. After the laying of four Brandenburgs, which were quite first-class for their time and were armed with 280-mm artilleryFor some reason, the gloomy Prussian genius switched to 240mm/40 main caliber guns. These were the guns that armed the five Kaiser Friedrich III-class battleships—the second series of German ships of this class, whose keel-laying began in 1895, practically simultaneously with the Peresvets.
"Kaiser Wilhelm II" is one of the five "Friedrichs"
The Friedrich-class ships were quite modest in size, as their designed normal displacement was less than 12,000 tons. As a result, the side armor of these ships, although quite thick, was quite small. Their speed was also not exceptional, at 17,5 knots.
The modest performance characteristics of the German battleships effectively placed them in a position between first- and second-class battleships, making the Peresvet-class ships perfectly suited to their needs. Consequently, the Peresvet-class ships were sufficient to counter the then-new German battleships in the Baltic—fully in line with the missions assigned to the Baltic Fleet.
2. World experience The British, a leading maritime nation, built second-class battleships with 10-inch guns for "colonial" service, while other European powers limited themselves to sending, at most, armored cruisers. Accordingly, one might expect that if a conflict broke out in the Far East, the European powers would be represented, in the worst-case scenario for the Russian Empire, by second-class battleships. For them, the Peresvet-class ships were an equal adversary.
3. Unification of naval and land large-caliber artillery systems, which led to the emergence of the 10-inch/45 gun model 1891. Of course, arming squadron battleships with such artillery systems was a highly questionable decision. However, once it was made, the lighter weight of both the guns themselves and their turret mounts compared to 12-inch guns made it possible to build high-sided warships, which improved their seaworthiness. This latter capability met the requirement to sail to the Far East if necessary and encouraged the use of battleships in cruising operations.
4. The appearance of cemented armor. This innovation made it possible to create thinner, and therefore lighter, armor plates compared to non-cemented armor, while maintaining equal resistance. This, in turn, allowed for either an increased side armor area or a reduction in armor weight in favor of coal reserves, thereby increasing the ship's range. During the design phase of the Peresvet-class battleships, it was possible not only to provide them with very powerful "squadron armored" protection of the British type, but also to increase their total coal reserves to 2058 tons, compared to 1050 tons for the Poltava-class battleships. It was also expected (unfortunately, incorrectly) that the use of a three-shaft propulsion system would increase range at economical speeds, with only one of the three engines (the middle one) operating. All this, again in theory, made it possible to design battleships with an increased range, suitable for use in cruising operations.
5. Cost/effectiveness criterion. The Peresvet-class battleships' performance specifications were intended to enable them to counter German first-rank battleships in battle, but also to engage in cruiser operations. Consequently, the Peresvet-class battleships could be used both as squadron battleships in the Baltic and as armored cruisers when deployed to the Far East. At the same time, the Peresvet-class battleships were still cheaper than first-rank battleships. This versatility was obviously very appealing to the Naval Ministry, whose budgets were quite limited.
In view of the above, it can be argued that the emergence of the Peresvet-class battleships was predetermined and inevitable. However, the construction of these ships was an undeniable mistake on the part of the Naval Ministry.
As early as 1894, the Japanese placed an order in England for the Yashima and Fuji, fully-fledged first-class battleships, which the Peresvets could not compete with on equal terms. Thus, having benefited from the potential use of the Peresvets as armored cruisers, we built battleships that were clearly inferior to the Japanese. At the same time, it was quite obvious that both we and the Japanese were striving to develop the Far East, and an overlap of our interests was more than likely. Furthermore, while comparable to the German battleships, the Peresvets would have been inferior to the ships of England and France and could not have effectively defended our shores from attacks by the expeditionary fleets of these powers.
The reliance on squadron battleships equivalent in strength to second-rank battleships, despite all its potential advantages, was flawed even at the conceptual level, and was compounded by executional errors. The lack of mechanisms to ensure the propellers of idle engines rotated at economical speeds rendered the Peresvet-class's middle engines redundant, incapable of ensuring economical cruising with low coal consumption. The Peresvet-class ships became "coal guzzlers" and were incapable of participating in any cruising operations. Furthermore, their speed proved insufficient for armored cruisers.
But all this became clear much later, and in 1895-1897, in the opinion of our Naval Ministry, the Peresvet-class battleships fully met the requirements. This is confirmed by another meeting, "of a lower rank" than those listed above, held in 1895 under the chairmanship of the former commander of the combined squadrons in the Pacific Ocean, Vice-Admiral S. P. Tyrtov, and with the participation of admirals experienced in ocean voyages. This venerable assembly concluded that the Far East required "18-knot" battleships with a range of 5000 miles at a speed of 10 knots.
An even more important indicator of satisfaction with the Peresvet project is the lack of development of a new type of squadron battleship during that period. Things reached the point that the Black Sea "Prince Potemkin Tavrichesky" was almost laid down in the Peresvet class, even though the "battleship-cruiser" was completely unsuited to the tasks of Black Sea battleships. Fortunately, common sense ultimately prevailed, and the Potemkin was built to the improved "Three Saints" design.
Changes in the tasks of the fleet in 1897-1898
As mentioned above, the 1895-1902 program was approved in March 1895. Even then, the admirals understood that a strengthening of the Mikado's fleet was to be expected: the Sino-Japanese War was drawing to a close, and the victor had been determined. It was to be expected that Japan would use part of the indemnity received from China to strengthen its naval forces, which had played a crucial role in the concluding war.
But this threat was gradually realized: everyone understood that the Japanese would strengthen their fleet, but no one yet understood by how much. Nevertheless, the first change in the navy's missions took place in November 1895.
Previously, it was assumed that the Russian Empire's naval forces in the Far East would be permanently represented only by the Siberian Naval Flotilla and a squadron of cruisers, which posed a potential threat to British shipping. A strong squadron, including battleships, was to be dispatched to the Far East only in the event of a flashpoint there, and once such tensions subsided, its ships were to return. But in November 1895, it was decided that the permanent presence of a powerful squadron, including battleships, was required in the Pacific Ocean.
Nevertheless, until the end of 1897, the Ministry of the Navy remained calm, believing that everything was proceeding as planned and that the 1895-1902 shipbuilding program fully met the navy's needs. This in itself is quite strange, considering that the Japanese plans, according to which, in addition to the Yashima and Fuji already under construction, four more first-class battleships and six armored cruisers, not to mention other "minor items," were to be laid down, were finalized in 1896.
However, I don't know exactly when the Russian Empire learned of the Japanese shipbuilding program. I can't rule out the possibility that the trigger for further changes was the news of the order for a second pair of Japanese battleships—Shikishima and Hatsuse—or the sharp increase in naval funding for the 1897-1898 fiscal year.
Anyway, history The history of the Retvizan and the Tsarevich should be dated back to the end of 1897, namely, to a very detailed review predicting the comparative strength of the Russian and Japanese fleets, completed by Captain 1st Rank A. G. von Nedermiller at the end of 1897. At the time of the review's preparation, this naval officer held the position of head of the naval accounting department of the General Staff, and the document that came from his pen turned out to be quite sensible and competent.
Review by A. G. von Neddermiller
According to this document, as early as 1898, the Japanese fleet would gain qualitative superiority over the Russian fleet in Far Eastern waters. The Russian cruiser squadron would consist of five armored cruisers, including the Rossiya, Rurik, Pamyat Azova, and Vladimir Monomakh, with a combined displacement (here and below, figures are given according to A.G. Nedermiller, although he is not always accurate) of 41,746 tons. The core of the Japanese armored fleet was almost a quarter smaller (32,105 tons), but nevertheless consisted of two first-class battleships, the Yashima and Hatsuse, and one second-class battleship, the Chin Yen. It is quite obvious that, despite their advantage in displacement, the Russian cruisers will not have a single chance in a battle with such an enemy, and the Japanese battleships are supported by 5 more old armored corvettes and frigates with a total displacement of 12,883 tons.
Three Russian armored deck cruisers – the first-rank Admiral Kornilov and the second-rank Zabiyaka and Kreyser, with a total displacement of 8706 tons – were opposed by the four Matsushima, as well as Akitsushima, Izumi, Naniwa, and Takachiho, with a total displacement of 30,580 tons. Five of our sea-going gunboats were opposed by four 4th-class cruisers, with only the smallest of them, Tsukashi, being slightly smaller than our largest gunboat – 1778 tons against 1490 tons. The overall ratio of the ships’ displacement without side armor was 15,454 / 38,707 tons, not in favor of the Russian Empire.
By 1903, the situation hadn't improved much. According to A. G. von Neddermiller's review, the following picture emerged:
To avoid complicating matters beyond necessity, I have omitted data for our gunboats (6 units) and the Japanese 4th-class cruisers (5 units) from the table. After all, their presence, while significant in itself, had little impact on the overall balance of naval power.
It turned out that against six first-class Japanese battleships and the Chin Yen, the Russian Imperial Navy could field only five, of which the two Peresvet-class battleships had the firepower of second-class battleships. True, there was still the reserve of battleships in the Mediterranean, but even transferring them to the Far East wouldn't solve the problem. Formally, of course, we would have eight battleships to the Japanese seven, and the total displacement would have been roughly equal. But the ships with modern artillery would have outnumbered the Japanese fifteen-thousanders six to six, while the Peresvet-class battleships and the Sisoii Velikiy, which was almost half their size, would have confronted the Japanese fifteen-thousanders.
The same was true for armored cruisers. Despite formal equality in numbers and even a slight superiority in displacement, our armored cruisers were categorically inferior to the Japanese in combat. Even the three best ships—the two Rossiyas and the Rurik—were still no match for the Japanese Asamoids, especially given the Rurik's outdated 8-inch guns. The remaining Russian armored cruisers (with the exception of the Nakhimov) were too small, slow, and had outdated artillery.
One can argue about whether our armored deck "goddesses," the Diana-class cruisers, were so bad compared to, say, the Takachiho or Izumi, but four cruisers against thirteen isn't a ratio of forces that can be compensated for by any number of excellent performance characteristics. And the "goddesses," unfortunately, weren't very good.
Interestingly, A. G. von Neddermiller listed only the Peresvet and Oslyabya in the Far East, while three more ships of this type were planned. He explained it this way:
Given the progress of shipbuilding at our St. Petersburg shipyards, and especially the slow pace of manufacturing artillery and turret mounts, as well as the financial resources from the shipbuilding program approved by the highest authority in 1895 for the ships currently under construction, we are unlikely to be able to equip two more battleships of the Peresvet type by 1903.
So, the problem was posed: the existing shipbuilding program of 1895-1902 proved completely inadequate to meet the emerging threats. The leadership of the Ministry of the Navy had to decide how to respond to the rapid growth of Japanese naval power.
To be continued ...
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