How Napoleon Outplayed Emperors Alexander and Franz
General situation
On the eve of Austerlitz, the strategic situation was developing in favor of the allies of the anti-French coalition. Kutuzov, despite all the efforts of the French and the erroneous instructions of the Austrian high command, preserved his army and joined up with reinforcements (The Battle of Schöngraben: To Die, but to Save the Army).
The allies now once again had a powerful army. Furthermore, the Russian corps of General Essen, Bennigsen's army, and the Austrian army of Archdukes Charles and John were expected to arrive soon from Italy and Tyrol. Prussia, which had a strong army, was leaning toward Russia and Austria.
The victory of the British was of great moral importance for the coalition and of strategic military importance for England. fleet under Nelson's command over the Franco-Spanish fleet at Cape Trafalgar. The French idea of invading England was destroyed in the depths of the sea. From then on and for a long time, England became invulnerable to France; the strait separating the British Isles from the continent became impassable. England finally became the "mistress of the seas," emerging victorious from a long confrontation with other maritime powers—Spain, Holland, Denmark, and France (How Britain Became 'Mistress of the Seas').
The naval battle was regarded as the most significant event of the military campaign. Nelson's victory overshadowed Mack's Ulm disaster and the fall of Vienna. According to European newspapers of the day, after Trafalgar, the fortunes of war had shifted to the Allies. This turned the heads of the Russian and Austrian emperors and their advisers. Once again, they overestimated their capabilities while underestimating the enemy.
As a result, France began to lose the information war. Napoleon clearly understood that the defeat of the French fleet had lowered the imperial eagle banner in the eyes of the world. Trafalgar had overshadowed Ulm, Vienna, and the Austrian retreat from Italy. Napoleon once again needed a decisive and brilliant victory that would shame and intimidate his enemies.
Therefore, Napoleon Bonaparte decided to give the allies a decisive battle before additional Russian and Austrian armies arrived and Prussia intervened. The French emperor waged a subtle diplomatic struggle to prevent the Russians and Austrians from retreating, strengthening their forces, and prolonging the war. In a protracted war, Russia, Austria, and England had the advantage over France.
The Wisdom of Kutuzov
It must be said that the cunning and wise Russian commander Kutuzov easily discerned the enemy's plan. He proposed to the Russian Tsar that he continue his retreat to the Carpathians. This would solve two strategic problems. First, the Russian troops would be reinforced by the contingents of Essen and Bennigsen, as well as by the Austrian army of Archduke Charles. The Russo-Austrian army was significantly strengthened.
Secondly, this led to an even greater stretching of the French army's communications, further weakening Napoleon's Grande Armée, which was unable to receive significant reinforcements and was forced to watch its northern and southern strategic flanks. Kutuzov would later execute this strategy brilliantly during the 1812 campaign.
Indeed, the French were in no better position. Forced to disperse his troops to secure the rear and occupy captured territories, Napoleon halted near the fortress of Brünn, 70 miles from Vienna. He had only 53,000 soldiers. The closest forces, the corps of Davout and Bernadotte, were two or three marches away from Brünn; after joining them, Napoleon could have had 75,000 men.
The Grand Army, exhausted by forced marches and battles, forced to protect its flanks and guard its communications, was far from France, in a hostile country.
Napoleon knew that Count Haugwitz was coming to his headquarters with an ultimatum from Berlin, whose demands were unacceptable to the French Emperor from the outset. Prussia could enter the war at any moment and deploy an army of 180 to the flank and rear of the French army.
Therefore, it was crucial for him that the allies not retreat again and prolong the war. By ordering Davout and Bernadotte to join him, the French commander played a diplomatic game, demonstrating his hesitation in the face of a powerful enemy. Although he himself desired to engage the enemy, he skillfully concealed his plans.
Unfortunately, Kutuzov no longer had any say at headquarters; Alexander I's presence deprived the general of his true authority as commander-in-chief. At this time, court generals dominated the imperial headquarters, pushing the young tsar to take "decisive action." They compared Alexander to Peter I and predicted his triumph as victor. Alexander himself craved military glory, and retreat offered no laurels of victory.
The Austrians also advocated decisive action. The Austrian Quartermaster General, Weyrother, was a proponent of "decisive action," despite his complete lack of understanding of the French army's strategy and tactics. Ultimately, everything ended in disaster and a lost campaign.
Tsar Alexander I, Field Marshal Kutuzov. Fragment of the first icon of the New Russian Mother of God – "Salvation of Russia in the War with Napoleon"
Party plans
On November 8 (20), 1805, the day Napoleon entered Brünn, Kutuzov joined up with the first column of Count Buxhoeveden's corps at Wischau and advanced toward Olmütz, where the rest of the corps' troops were located. In total, Buxhoeveden's corps numbered approximately 27 men.
On November 10 (22), Kutuzov entered Olmütz, where the Russian Emperor Alexander and the Austrian Emperor Francis were already stationed. Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian and Austrian forces, although in reality he did not have full authority. Prince Volkonsky became the army's duty general, and Weyrother became quartermaster general.
The monarchs initially planned to remain in Olmütz to rest Kutuzov's army and await the arrival of the Russian Guard, Essen's corps, Bennigsen's troops, and Archduke Charles. Archduke Charles, commander of the Army of Italy, announced that he planned to join Archduke John on November 14 and then advance to the Danube with an army of 80.
Good news from Prussia was awaited. The war party, which wanted war with the French, was dominant in the kingdom. Berlin was actively preparing for war. The main 120-strong Prussian army was to march through Bamberg to the communications of Napoleon's Grande Armée. An auxiliary corps of 50 was also to follow Napoleon's communications. With independent corps and reserves, the Prussian army numbered up to 240 men.
Only three circumstances prevented Prussia from immediately declaring war on France: disagreements with the British over financial aid, disputes with England over Hanover, and the expectation of Napoleon's response to Prussia's ultimatum. Meanwhile, the Prussian envoy sent to Napoleon, Count Haugwitz, had secret instructions to delay his journey to give the Berlin court time to consider and mobilize its army.
Alexander, eager to defeat Napoleon, was actively preparing to continue the war. Deciding that the Russian troops sent from Corfu to Naples in Italy would have little impact on the outcome of the war and would be more useful in the main theater, he ordered the corps to embark on ships and sail from Naples to Trieste to establish contact with Archduke Charles.
At the same time, Alexander ordered Essen's corps to accelerate its march, and Bennigsen to hurry from Breslau to Bohemia to join up with Archduke Ferdinand's Austrians. Rimsky-Korsakov was to deploy 35 battalions and 45 squadrons from the border troops between Brest and Brody, so that they could, at the first call, go to the aid of the main forces.
On November 12 (24), the Russian Guard (8,5 men) arrived under the command of Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich. As a result, the allied army now numbered approximately 85 men. Archduke Ferdinand also commanded approximately 10 soldiers in Bohemia. The Russo-Austrian army was positioned in an elevated, defensible position. Ahead lay a river and swamps. Reserves could be easily concealed behind them, and bridges were built across the river in case of retreat.
Thus, the time factor was on the Allies' side. Allied forces were approaching from all sides, encircling Napoleon from the flanks. Prussia, upon entering the war, could cut off Napoleon's corps' communications with France. Napoleon would soon be forced to fight forces incomparably superior to his army and face threats on his flanks and in the rear.
The duplicity of the Austrian court
Having taken up a defensive position to the east of Brunn, Napoleon, not wishing to further stretch his communications and attack the Russians in a strong position at Olmütz, sent his representative, General Savary, to the Russian and Austrian monarchs located there with a proposal to begin peace negotiations.
The Austrian Emperor Franz believed that, due to the distance from France and the threat of war with Prussia, Napoleon would agree to an easy peace for Austria. Alexander disliked this, but seeing the Austrians' desire to negotiate with Napoleon, he did not interfere. As a result, the Austrians began negotiations with Napoleon.
Meanwhile, a food shortage developed in the Olmütz camp. The Austrians planned to advance, not retreat to Moravia, so they hadn't prepared any supplies. The supply trains were far away and moving slowly. Directions from the central authorities were met with sabotage from local authorities. After the Ulm disaster, Austrian society longed for peace. The peasants, unwilling to supply the army, fled, and the villages around Olmütz were deserted. Something had to be done to prevent the army from reaching the brink of starvation.
A war council was convened. Kutuzov proposed a further withdrawal, closing in on reinforcements and supply bases. His opinion was not supported. The war council adopted a plan of action drawn up by Weyrother, already approved by Alexander and Franz. The latter proceeded from the idiotic assumption that Napoleon would be passive, take a defensive posture, surrender complete initiative to the allies, and thus allow himself to be defeated unhindered. Once again, the strategists were about to fall into the same trap. Weyrother's plan consisted of a flanking march to cut off the French army from Vienna, where, according to the Allied headquarters, the enemy's main line of communication lay, defeat them at Brünn, and drive them back to the Bohemian Mountains.
It should be noted that this decision was based on the shared opinion among Austrian dignitaries and generals regarding the need to end the war on Austrian soil as quickly as possible. The Austrians knew that continuing to fight Napoleon on imperial soil would lead to heavy losses, and even with Prussia's participation, the war would be protracted and devastating. Therefore, it was essential to conclude peace as soon as possible. This required engaging in a decisive battle with Napoleon's army.
In any case, Austria would emerge victorious. The camp at Olmütz contained only 14 Austrians, mostly new recruits; the rest were Russian troops. Even in defeat, the Austrians lost nothing. The sacrifice of a few thousand recruits was worthless. The entire burden of the battle fell on the Russians.
Both victory and defeat led to the longed-for peace. An allied victory forced Napoleon to abandon Vienna and most of Austria. Peace negotiations could have been initiated, or at least an armistice concluded. Defeat would have crippled the Russian army. Alexander would be forced to accept the Austrians' view of peace.
On the Russian side, only the cunning Kutuzov discerned both Napoleon's desire for a decisive battle and the duplicitous Austrian maneuver, but he was ignored. Alexander's other advisers and commanders also longed to fight the French. During this period, Russian society, influenced by previous victories during the era of Rumyantsev and Suvorov, developed a perception of the army's "invincibility."
Napoleon offers peace to Alexander
On November 15 (27), 1805, the allied army abandoned the Olmütz position and advanced in five columns along the road to Brünn. On November 16 (28), Bagration's vanguard attacked the French at Wischau. The French cavalry detachment stationed in Wischau refused to engage and retreated. Only one squadron hesitated and was captured during the rapid Russian invasion.
Murat, stationed in Rauznitz, sent aid to the retreating troops and began preparing for defense. Prince Bagration followed closely behind the French, not giving them time to regroup and prepare for defense, launching two successful cavalry attacks. Informed of the Russo-Austrian army's advance, Napoleon rode out to the forward units and ordered Murat not to persist in defending Rauznitz but to retreat.
The allied army was stationed near Wischau, 30 miles from Brünn. A clash with the French was becoming inevitable. Initially, the allies planned to take the main road and attack Napoleon's army at Brünn. But then they decided to abandon the Olmütz road and take a side march to the left, cutting off the French army from Vienna and closing in on Archduke Charles's army.
Meanwhile, on November 16, a Prussian envoy arrived in Brünn with an ultimatum. Immediately received by Napoleon, Count Haugwitz hesitated to present all demands at once and initially limited himself to general remarks about the need for peace in Europe and offered Prussian mediation for a general reconciliation. Napoleon, aware of the true purpose of the Prussian envoy's mission, did not escalate the situation, but stated that with the advancing Russian army in sight, he had no time for diplomacy. He suggested that Haugwitz travel to Vienna and begin negotiations with Talleyrand there. Thus, the threat of a rupture between France and Prussia was postponed.
Napoleon again decided to offer Alexander peace. It's worth noting that Napoleon had always persistently sought peace with Russia. That night, he sent Savary to Wischau, offering Alexander a personal meeting and ceasing hostilities for 24 hours. Alexander himself refused direct negotiations but sent his adjutant general, Prince Pyotr Dolgorukov, to Napoleon's headquarters. On November 17, the allied army continued its advance. Bagration's vanguard stood at Rauznitz, and Kienmayer's at Austerlitz.
Napoleon received Prince Dolgorukov and spoke with him deliberately cautiously, modestly, and peaceably. It must be said that Napoleon's words were quite sensible:
What do they want from me? Why is Emperor Alexander fighting me? What does he demand? Let him expand Russia's borders at the expense of his neighbors, especially the Turks, and then all his quarrels with France will end.
Indeed, St. Petersburg wasn't solving national problems in this war. Russia had no fundamental conflicts with France, becoming "cannon fodder" for England and Austria. Dolgoruky could only respond to this with generalities about Alexander "armed himself for the independence of Europe"The prince spoke of how the Russian Tsar could not remain indifferent to the French conquest of Holland and the plight of the Sardinian king. Napoleon rightly noted that "Russia needs to follow a completely different policy" и "to think about one's own benefits".
An excellent actor, the French Emperor played the role of a man preoccupied with mounting difficulties and seeking a path to peace. Napoleon was reserved with the prince and pretended not to notice his arrogance. Later, the French ruler noted:
This young braggart spoke to me as if I were a Russian boyar exiled to Siberia.
Napoleon put up with this arrogance and this haughtiness. The conversation ended in nothing, but Dolgorukov, returning to headquarters, reported to the Russian Tsar that Napoleon feared battle most of all, that he was seeking peace and had no confidence in his troops. In his opinion, despondency reigned in the French army. "We only have to go forward and the enemies will retreat, just as they retreated from Vishau"They believed his words. If the French Emperor is afraid, he must be attacked.
Later, high society considered Dolgorukov one of the main culprits behind the defeat of the Russian-Austrian army.
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