How the Russian army opened the road to Constantinople
Surrender of Kars, Crimean War. Artist: T. Barker
Caucasian Front
From the very beginning of the Eastern war, the Russian army led successful operations on the Caucasian front. This was explained by the fact that the Russian Caucasian Army had a vast experience of military operations in the mountains. Russian soldiers here were constantly in conditions of a small war with the mountaineers and tensions on the Turkish and Persian borders. At the head of the army were decisive, enterprising commanders, aimed at active operations.
The Ottoman Sultan and his British and French advisers planned to unite the Turkish army with Shamil's highlanders, cutting off the Russian army in Transcaucasia, which could lead to its complete destruction. They would then transfer the fighting to the North Caucasus. By the start of military operations in the Caucasus theater, the Turkish command had a significant superiority in forces—Abdi Pasha's 100-strong army. Two strike groups were aimed at Alexandropol and Tiflis.
To confront the enemy, a 30-strong army group was formed under the command of General Vasily Bebutov. Shamil's highlanders advanced quickly, allowing them to repel their attack. Having suffered a setback, Shamil remained inactive for quite some time, awaiting the arrival of the Turkish army. However, the Russian command had to reckon with this threat.
After a series of battles on the border, Russian troops destroyed the decisive plans of the Ottomans. On November 14 (26), in the battle near Akhaltsikhe, a 7-strong Russian detachment under the command of Prince Ivan Andronikov defeated the 18-strong Ardahan corps of Ali Pasha. On November 19 (December 1), in the battle near Bashkadyklar, Bebutov, despite a three-fold numerical superiority of the enemy (13 Russians against 37 Turks), which stood in a strong defensive position, routed the Anatolian army of Abdi Pasha. After this, the Turks were inactive for several months (Victory of the Russian army in the Caucasus. Akhaltsikhe and Bashkadiklar battles).
After the Battle of Bashkadyklar, the Russian army did not undertake any major operations. Emperor Nicholas advocated a decisive offensive against Batum, Ardahan, Kars, and Bayazet. But the Caucasus Viceroy Vorontsov, supported by Prince Paskevich (the Tsar's chief military adviser), was cautious, citing the comparatively small number of Russian troops (and weakening the army in European Russia was not possible), the shortage of ammunition, and the onset of winter, suggesting postponing the offensive until spring.
This allowed the Turkish command to rebuild the army and increase its strength to 120 men. The commander was also replaced, becoming Mustafa Zarif Pasha.
The Russian army, however, had grown less noticeably, reaching 40 bayonets and sabres. The commander-in-chief divided the army into three parts: the main force under Bebutov, 21 men, covered the central sector in the Alexandropol direction; Andronikov's Akhaltsikhe detachment, 14 men, defended the right flank from Akhaltsikhe to the Black Sea; and Baron Wrangel's detachment, 5 men, protected the left flank, the Yerevan direction.
Active hostilities resumed in the spring of 1854. The 1854 campaign was successful for the Russian army. Initially, the Ottomans attempted to break through on the Black Sea coast. Therefore, the Akhaltsikhe detachment was the first to enter the battle. In May, Eristov's 3-strong detachment routed Hassan Bey's 12-strong corps at Nigoeti. In June, Andronikov's detachment defeated Selim Pasha's 34-strong army at the Cholok River and secured the Russian army's right flank.
The Turkish command, having failed to break through to Russian territory on its left flank, decided to attack in the direction of Erivan. A 16-strong Turkish corps launched an offensive from Bayazet to Erivan in July. Baron Karl Wrangel did not take up a defensive position, opting instead for an attack. A Russian detachment reached the Chingil Pass by forced march and, on July 29, defeated the numerically superior Turkish army in a head-on battle.
The Baron organized a vigorous pursuit of the enemy and captured Bayazet on July 31. Most of the Turkish troops simply fled, with about 2 retreating to Van. Russian troops also secured the left flank of the Caucasian Front.
Prince Bebutov's forces remained inactive for a long time—the commander-in-chief lacked the strength and resources to storm Kars when he was confronted by a Turkish army more than three times larger. By June 20 (July 2), Russian troops approached the village of Kuryuk-Dara and began to wait for the Ottomans to emerge from the fortress and engage in decisive battle. The Turkish command took about a month to gather its courage. Hoping for numerical superiority, the Ottomans abandoned their fortified positions and attacked the Russian troops.
On August 5, 1854, an 18,000-strong Russian army engaged in a decisive battle with a 60,000-strong Turkish army. The brutal battle lasted four hours. Bebutov took advantage of the enemy army's extended position and routed it piecemeal—first on the right flank, then in the center. Victory was achieved through the skillful use of artillery и rocket weapons — rockets designed by Konstantinov. The Ottoman army lost 10 thousand men, the Russian losses were 3 thousand men (The defeat of the Turkish army in the battles at the Cholok River and at Kuryuk-Dar).
The routed Turkish army retreated to Kars. Bebutov, given the numerical superiority of the Anatolian army—it retained up to 40 men—and the strength of the Kars fortified region, deemed it impossible to storm Kars. Upon receiving news of the Turkish army's defeat, Shamil's highlanders did not harass the Russian troops for the rest of the war.
In early 1855, General Nikolai Muravyov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in the South Caucasus. He united the Akhaltsikhe and Alexandropol detachments, forming an army of 40 fighters. With these forces, Muravyov decided to take Kars, the main Turkish stronghold in the eastern Ottoman Empire. It was defended by thousands of the best part of the Turkish Anatolian Army. By destroying this garrison, the Russian army could advance deeper into Anatolia.
Kars was the key to Asia Minor. Muravyov argued to St. Petersburg that the fall of Kars would lead to "significant" results and ease the situation for the defenders of Sevastopol. According to various estimates, between 19 and 33 enemy soldiers were stationed in Kars. Near Bayazet, there was a 12-strong corps under the command of Veli Pasha, and 11-12 soldiers in Erzurum.
N. N. Muravyov-Karsky. Photographer: Sergei Levitsky. Source: Military Chronicle of Russia in Photographs. 1850s–2000s: Album. Moscow, 2009
Kars Fortress
The Russian army besieged Kars four times in the 6th century: in 1807, 1828, 1855, and 1878. In 1807, Major General Nesvetayev's detachment, consisting of six infantry battalions and two Cossack regiments, launched an assault on the fortress, which was defended by a garrison of 10 men. The assault, which the Ottomans themselves were confident of, was halted by order of Commander-in-Chief Gudovich. In 1828, the fortress was captured by Paskevich's forces.
Since then, the fortress has undergone significant changes. The Ottoman government, recognizing the fortress's importance in its wars with the Russian Empire, employed the services of British military engineers. First-class European fortifications were incorporated into the defense system of the Sharokh, Chakmak, and Karadag heights. Modern fortifications were erected on them. Below the Old Fortress, on the right bank of the Kars-chay River, a new bastion, Arab-Tabiya, was built, armed with powerful guns.
The entire fortress line consisted of redoubts, trenches, and a high rampart. Artillery batteries had excellent fire control over both the near and distant approaches to the fortifications. The flanks of the fortress were well protected by nature—rocky mountains and steep river banks. Communication across the river was via stone bridges and two pontoon bridges.
The fortress garrison numbered up to 30 men. These were regular troops, not militias, as in 1828. Many foreign mercenaries also fought on the Caucasus Front alongside the Ottomans, including participants in the Polish Uprising of 1830-1831 and the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. They had fought against Austria-Hungary and Russia, had extensive combat experience, and many changed their names and converted to Islam. For many of these exiles, the fight against the Russians became their life's work and purpose. The Anglo-French command refused to use them on the Crimean Front, so former Polish and Hungarian rebels fought in the Caucasus. In particular, the Hungarians Kmety and Kolman became Ottoman pashas – generals.
In 1855, Wassif Pasha was the commander-in-chief (mushir). He was ignorant of military affairs, so the British adviser William Fenwick Williams was in charge of virtually all matters. He was well versed in Turkish affairs, having served as a military adviser to the Ottoman Empire since 1841. With the outbreak of the Eastern War, Williams formally transferred to Turkish service with the rank of ferik (major general). Thanks to his efforts, the Kars garrison was well prepared for defense, with a four-month supply of provisions, and the fortifications were strengthened. Erzurum was converted into a rear depot for the army.
The defeat in the 1854 campaign forced the Ottoman command to abandon offensive operations in Transcaucasia. The Turkish army had serious problems with its trained reserves. Part of the Turkish army participated in military operations in the Danube theater, while the rest participated in the protracted siege of Sevastopol.
Kars Fortress
Siege
On May 24, 1855, the main forces of the Separate Caucasian Corps set out from Alexandropol. Turkish troops offered no resistance along the way. After a difficult journey along mountain roads, the Russian troops reached the enemy fortress on June 6. Muravyov personally conducted reconnaissance and confirmed that the fortress had been significantly rebuilt, transformed into a first-class stronghold.
At the fortress itself, the commander-in-chief had approximately 24,5 soldiers with 76 guns (according to other sources, 88 guns). With such a force, a general assault was out of the question. There were also few large-caliber guns, and no specialized siege artillery at all.
Nikolai Nikolaevich was an experienced general who had fought in the Caucasus, decisive and tough, but after consulting with his generals and weighing all options, he was forced to abandon the assault and proceed to a siege of the fortress. It was decided to use a blockade to exhaust the garrison's supplies and only then launch an assault. The main proponents of this decision were Generals Bebutov and Baklanov.
By June 18, the fortress was surrounded on all sides. The perimeter extended for about 50 miles, but the mountainous terrain itself prevented all trails from being blocked. The garrison retained limited capacity for resupply. Only Cossack outposts were stationed in the most inaccessible areas.
Muravyov himself moved his troops on a flanking march to the left bank of the Kars-chay River and set up camp near the village of Bolshaya Tikna. This cut off communication between Kars and Erzurum. The Kars garrison made no sorties to hinder the Russian troops.
Flying detachments operated along all known routes, near and far. They consisted primarily of Caucasian volunteer militia. With St. Petersburg's approval, the Caucasian viceroy deployed significant irregular forces, composed of volunteer hunters, for the 1855 campaign. The Separate Caucasian Corps included over 12 volunteers—Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Ossetians, and others. These comprised 74 mounted and 66 infantry companies. This allowed the Russian regiments to be withdrawn from auxiliary positions, sent to Kars, and covered by militia.
Having established a blockade zone, Muravyov moved his troops to Çiftlik Koy, where a fortified camp was established. The Kars garrison command was offered an honorable surrender but refused. Vassif Pasha hoped for swift assistance and the impregnability of the fortifications. Moreover, the fortress had ample provisions. He was also encouraged by his English adviser, Williams.
The Russian army's cavalry units made several attempts to lure the enemy into the open, but the cavalry patrols' attempts to harass them were unsuccessful. After several clashes between horsemen, the Turks stopped leaving the fortifications. Russian troops intercepted Turkish detachments attempting to deliver provisions to the fortress. For example, on August 18, Baklanov routed a strong detachment of Turkish foragers, and on August 20, Count Nirod's detachment routed another enemy detachment.
The siege dragged on. The Russian troops experienced no particular shortage of provisions. The siege gradually weakened the morale of the Turkish garrison: soldiers died in skirmishes, and more and more defenders deserted. Some of the fugitives were intercepted, while others dispersed to nearby villages. These fugitives became sources of information about the garrison's condition.
Thus, on August 21, a patrol of the dragoon squadron, led by Staff Captain Andreyev, captured a group of 60 fugitives from the fortress. They reported that all the provisions had been concentrated in three large mosques guarded by elite units. Two of them were already empty, and supplies from the third had begun to be consumed, while the guards around them had been reinforced. There were still provisions for approximately two months at minimum distribution rates. According to the fugitives, the garrison's strength had already been reduced by a third. The main losses were from skirmishes, desertion, and starving soldiers simply fleeing, fortunately for the mountains, where there were loopholes. Many died from disease.
The cavalry suffered the most; forage was scarce, and the starving horses were killed and eaten. Some of the cavalry were transferred to the infantry. Furthermore, the fugitives reported that the command had decided to use the remaining cavalry in the fortress—approximately 2,5 horsemen—to break through. The cavalry detachment was to operate in the Russian rear.
Muravyov decided to intercept the enemy detachment, not at the walls, to prevent the horsemen from returning to the fortress, but on the road to Erzurum. A dragoon ambush was set. On the night of August 22, the Russian outposts "failed to notice" the large enemy detachment. Having moved away from the fortifications, the enemy detachment was completely annihilated: over 400 men were captured, the rest were cut down. A few escaped but were intercepted by outlying outposts. The Kars garrison lost its entire cavalry.
The Turkish command attempted to reinforce the Kars garrison; a strong detachment under Ali Pasha was sent from Erzurum. Muravyov promptly dispatched a detachment under General Kovalevsky to meet the Turks. On August 31, near the village of Penyak, Russian troops routed the Turkish detachment, and Ali Pasha himself was captured.
Omer Pasha's offensive
To save Kars, the Turkish command planned to launch a major offensive operation. But not from Erzurum, where there was no longer a strong force capable of striking the Russian army, but from Crimea. On August 30 (September 11), the allied forces entered the smoking ruins of Sevastopol.It is sad and hard to leave Sevastopol to our enemies!). The Allied forces completely dominated the Black Sea. fleet, therefore, in September, 45 thousand expeditionary forces of Omer Pasha were transferred from Crimea to Batumi without hindrance.
Omer Pasha planned to march on Kars, but after two marches, he suddenly returned to Batumi and launched an operation in Mingrelia in October. The ruler of Abkhazia, Prince Mikhail Shervashidze, had betrayed Russia. Omer Pasha hoped to use the Abkhazians to invade Guria through Mingrelia and thereby divert the Russian army from Kars.
On September 21 (October 3), Turkish troops landed at Sukhum-Kale. However, the Turkish corps was unable to defeat the mostly irregular forces of General Bagration Mukhransky—19 fighters—who held off the Ottomans at the Inguri River and then finally stopped them at the Tskhenistskali River. The onset of winter and news of the fall of Kars forced Omer Pasha to withdraw his troops.
Assault
The news of the fall of Sevastopol and the landing of Omer Pasha's army forced the Russian command to decide on an assault. At the same time, the commander-in-chief knew that the existing balance of forces did not guarantee success.
On September 15, the military council decided to storm Kars. The attack was to begin with the capture of the Shorakh and Chakmak heights. These overlooked the city and citadel. It was assumed that after their capture, the Turkish garrison would capitulate. A supporting attack was to be launched against enemy positions on the right bank of the Kars-chay River.
All troops were divided into four assault columns. The first, under Lieutenant General Kovalevsky, had 4,200 bayonets and sabres, 16 field guns, and two rocket launchers. The second, under Major General Maidel, had 6,200 men with 20 guns. The third, under Major General Nirod, had 3,100 bayonets and sabres with 16 guns. The fourth, under Major General Brimmer, had 4,700 infantry, 500 cavalry companies, and 22 guns. Brimmer's column constituted the general reserve. A separate troop group, under Lieutenant General Prince Gagarin, was also created; it was intended to develop the offensive and penetrate the enemy's defenses. Gagarin's group consisted of 2,100 soldiers.
The Shorakh (Sharokh) heights were defended by nine battalions—up to 4,000 men with 28 guns. The bulk of the Turkish forces were stationed in fortifications on the right bank of the Kars-chay River. On the left bank were five group-tabors with 52 guns. Several days before the assault, the Turks secretly, working at night, built several new field fortifications that linked the Tahmas-Tabiya and Yuksek-Tabiya bastions.
Plan for the assault on Kars by Russian troops on September 17, 1855. Source: Military Encyclopedia (Sytin, 1911-1915)
They decided to attack without artillery preparation. Destroying the fortifications would require considerable time and a large expenditure of ammunition. They were counting on a surprise attack. At 4:00 a.m., the assault columns launched an attack. About 45 minutes later, Turkish outposts detected the movement of Russian troops. Rifle and artillery fire opened from the fortifications and trenches of the Sharokh Heights. Despite the steep climb and enemy fire, the advance element of Baron Maidel's column captured part of the enemy fortifications. The Turks cleared the Sharokh camp, located behind the fortifications.
The initial success was encouraging. But things didn't go so well. The Tahmas-Tabiya bastion repelled an attack by the Georgian infantry regiment. The riflemen came under intense crossfire, suffered heavy losses, retreated, and lay down, engaging in a firefight with the enemy. Kovalevsky's column, advancing on the left flank, couldn't even break through to the enemy positions. Its commander, Pyotr Petrovich Kovalevsky, was mortally wounded. Command was disorganized. Moreover, in the predawn darkness, friendly fire broke out.
Gagarin's reserve group captured the Yaryi fortification and twice stormed the Yuksek-Tabiya bastion. The column's commander, Prince Alexander Ivanovich Gagarin, was seriously wounded in the left shoulder and carried unconscious from the battlefield. Most of the senior officers were killed during the battle. The Ottomans, noticing the confusion among the attackers, launched a counterattack and drove the Russians from the fortification they had previously captured.
Maidel's column's initial success also failed to yield the expected results. The Turks held most of the fortifications. Yegor Ivanovich Maidel received two serious wounds: one in the arm and one in the chest. He was replaced by Colonel Tarkhan-Mouravov.
The commander-in-chief sent reinforcements to the Sharokh Heights—two battalions of the Belevsky Regiment. But they only helped hold the positions already captured. The enemy bastions were not captured. During the battle for Fort Tahmas, W. Williams' adjutant and bastion commander, Christopher Charles Tisdale, was captured.
Major General Bazin's detachment—4,700 bayonets and sabres, 16 guns, and eight rocket launchers—achieved the greatest success in storming the fortress. He was able to approach the enemy positions within canister shot range and, with a surprise attack, captured the Tizdel-Tabiya bastion. A battery was established on the bastion, which began firing at the adjacent Turkish fortifications. Under cover of its fire, the Russian infantry took the Thompson and Zohrab-Tabiya bastions. The entire fortified line on the Chakmak Heights was captured. Bazin, unable to advance further, had no success with his other columns.
The Turkish commanders threw all their available reserve infantry into the Sharokh Heights, and withdrew several units from other directions. Muravyov, having received reports from column commanders or their deputies, realized that Bazin's success would be impossible to exploit. He had already committed half of his reserves to the battle. Muravyov ordered the troops to withdraw from the captured positions.
This assault cost the Russian troops dearly: the infantry battalions that formed the front line lost up to a third of their numbers. Casualties amounted to over 2,500 killed and over 4,900 wounded. The Turkish garrison lost approximately 4,000 men, most killed or wounded in hand-to-hand combat. Losses were particularly high among the elite units defending the Sharokh and Chakmak heights. Twenty-three Turkish cannons were captured or damaged.
Pyotr Petrovich Kovalevsky (1808 – September 21, 1855) – Russian military leader, lieutenant general, hero of the conquest of the Caucasus and the Crimean War (mortally wounded during the storming of Kars). Source: "Military Encyclopedia of I. D. Sytin." St. Petersburg; 1913
Surrender
After the failed assault, the command did not lift the siege and continued the blockade of the fortress. In October, the Persian envoy Qasim Khan visited the Russian camp on a special mission. During this period, Turkey, England, and France were vigorously pushing Persia to go to war with Russia. A Persian attack was intended to lift the siege of Kars and seriously complicate the Russian position in Transcaucasia. News The failure of the assault pushed the Persian government into war with Russia. Qasim Khan was convinced that the Russian army was in good order and reported accordingly to the Shah. Persia maintained peace.
Siege warfare continued as usual. Control over roads and trails was tightened even more. The garrison could no longer send out small foraging parties at night. The autumn cold brought new disasters – a shortage of firewood and a shortage of warm clothing. All the trees, gardens, and shrubs in the city were cut down. The citizens of crowded Kars began to express discontent. Fugitives and deserters increased in number. Fugitives were especially numerous among the militia. The garrison began losing up to 150 men a day to fugitives or death from disease. Daily rations dropped sharply. All the horses had long since been killed and eaten.
In such a situation, an assault was already possible. But Muravyov saw no need. No external aid was forthcoming for the Kars garrison; they could wait for the surrender and spare the soldiers' lives. The Caucasian Army, however, was eager to fight, eager to avenge Sevastopol.
On November 12, Turkish envoys arrived. The following day, British adviser Fenwick Williams met with Muravyov. Williams stated that he considered it his duty to surrender the fortress, which had been defended to the last, and proposed setting general terms for the surrender. After brief negotiations, the terms were agreed upon.
Williams was most interested in the fate of the Europeans. Foreign volunteers in Turkish service were sent back to Turkey with their personal weapons. Turkish officers retained their personal weapons – swords. The Anatolian army (or rather, its remnants) surrendered. The Kars fortress, with all its weapons and property, passed into the hands of the Russian army. The Ottoman militias, after surrendering their arms, were dispersed to their homes and were not considered prisoners of war. Williams reported that no more than 16 men remained of the garrison, including the militia, the wounded, and the sick.
On November 16 (28), 1855, the garrison capitulated. A solemn surrender ceremony for the Anatolian army was held. The Russian army accepted 12 regimental banners. A great celebration ensued in the Russian camp. The long siege had ended in complete victory. The Russians, out of generosity, even fed the starving Ottoman soldiers and officers a celebratory dinner.
Sir William Fenwick Williams, 1st Baronet of Kars (1800–1883, July 18, 1856) was a British military commander who fought in the Crimean War. He led the defense of Kars. Transported as a prisoner of war first to Tiflis and then to Ryazan, Williams was released in 1856 and returned to his homeland. Upon returning to Britain, Williams was promoted to major general and elected a member of parliament. For his distinguished service in the defense of Kars, he was awarded the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, and the Turkish Order of the Medjidie, 1st class. He was also awarded an honorary doctorate from Oxford University and the title of Baronet of Kars.
Conclusion
The Russian army's main adversary in the Caucasus theater of war—the Anatolian Army—was no longer in existence. Commander-in-Chief Wassif Pasha, along with all eight pasha generals, his staff, and British advisers, were captured. More than 11,000 people were taken prisoner, including 687 officers. In Kars, 130 cannons and significant stockpiles of military equipment and weapons were captured. Russia gained control of Kars, an entire fortified region—the key to eastern Turkey.
This decisive success brought an end to the fighting on the Caucasus Front of the Eastern War. After the fall of Kars, hostilities did not resume. The Russian army did not continue the offensive for two main reasons: 1) there was no order from Emperor Alexander II; he did not wish to prolong the war; 2) winter had arrived, and at this time, the Caucasus traditionally experiences a lull in military operations (due to natural and climatic factors).
For the capture of Kars, Muravyov was awarded the Order of St. George, 2nd Class, on December 4, 1855. Nikolai Nikolayevich was also honored with the addition of an honorary title to his surname, becoming Muravyov-Karsky forever.
During the 1856 campaign, Muravyov planned a strategic operation—a march across Anatolia to Constantinople. The success of such an operation promised a completely different outcome to the Eastern War. However, peace negotiations began, and under the Treaty of Paris, Russia returned Kars to the Ottoman Empire in exchange for Sevastopol, captured by the allies. Sevastopol and Kars were considered strongholds of equal importance.
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