Unmanned Systems Troops, Their Potential and Prospects

Last year, a decision was made to create a new branch of the Russian Armed Forces—the Unmanned Systems Troops. The main steps and procedures for establishing the new structure and organizing its operations have now been completed. The Unmanned Systems Troops have consolidated a large number of existing units and will now be tasked with improving their operational effectiveness.

Plans and results

In recent years, our armed forces have been paying special attention to unmanned systems. A large number of different types of systems have entered service, and they are being actively used in the current Special Operation. As a result, the number and range of such systems, as well as their role in the army, have necessitated new organizational measures.

In mid-December 2024, the next extended meeting of the Defense Ministry Board took place, during which some curious plans were revealed. It was reported that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief had instructed the Defense Ministry to establish a force of unmanned systems (UWS) within the armed forces.

By that time, the Ministry of Defense had already taken the first steps toward establishing this type of force. Further decisions and orders on the matter were expected soon. The formation of the VBS was scheduled to be completed in the third quarter of 2025.

The assigned tasks were successfully completed. Recently, representatives of the Ministry of Defense reported on the creation of the new branch of the armed forces and the commencement of its operations. Some details of the current status and future plans were revealed. The emblem of the new branch of the armed forces was also unveiled.

New structures

On November 13, the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper published an interview with Colonel Sergei Ishtuganov, Deputy Chief of the Unmanned Systems Troops. The officer disclosed some information and details cleared for publication.

As part of the formation of the new branch of the armed forces, the necessary organizational structure was established. Command bodies at all levels were formed, and established regiments, battalions, and other units were created. At the same time, plans are in place to form new subdivisions and units to strengthen the forces as a whole.

The VBS includes units using a wide range of equipment. These primarily include unmanned aerial vehicles of all types, from light copters to full-size unmanned aircraft. The new forces also operate a wide range of ground-based robotic systems and unmanned naval vehicles.

A unified combat plan for the VBS units has been adopted. It provides for the use of standard weapons and equipment, as well as active cooperation with units of other branches of the armed forces. Units with unmanned systems must work alongside ground forces and also support fleet and the Air Force, depending on the tasks at hand.

Training Issues

Currently, personnel training for the VBS units is carried out by various agencies and organizations. Specialists are trained at the Ministry of Defense's universities, as well as at military training centers of civilian universities. Industrial enterprises and public organizations also make a significant contribution to this process.

The training process utilizes various training grounds for practical exercises. Sites within various military districts, as well as facilities in the rear areas of the Special Operations zone, are used. Training at these training grounds helps operators, engineers, and others gain the most useful practical experience.

Training units are also studying and summarizing data on combat use of equipment. They are developing new tactics for using unmanned systems, adjusting training programs, and so on. Existing mechanisms allow for a rapid response to changing situations and help units adapt.

This summer, it was announced that the VBS would receive its own higher military school. This institution will assume a significant portion of the responsibilities of existing training units. It will train operators and technicians and also conduct scientific and theoretical work. The establishment of the school could take approximately two years. It is expected to begin operations in September 2027.

Until then, the new branch of the armed forces will have to use the existing training system based on existing units and organizations. However, experience shows that the current approach to organizing training is also consistent with the stated objectives. Furthermore, further development of the training system will yield clear positive results.

Organization and logistics

In recent years, the number of unmanned vehicles in the military has increased dramatically, as has the range of tasks they perform. Under these circumstances, the creation of a new branch of the armed forces responsible for unmanned systems is an obvious and appropriate step. Consolidating disparate units into a common structure will provide several important advantages.

The main advantage is the centralization of all key processes. Thus, units and subunits will no longer have to independently select equipment and organize its delivery. These tasks will be assumed by the VBS command. The new Joint Staff will also simplify personnel training and combat operations. A unified system for collecting, systematizing, and utilizing experience is of great importance.

The new branch of the armed forces already has all the necessary command and control bodies at various levels. Considerable attention has also been paid to organizing interactions with other units and formations. It is expected that its own command structures will enhance the effectiveness of such interactions and assist in accomplishing combat missions.

A course for efficiency

The Russian army currently operates a wide range of unmanned and robotic systems of various classes and for various purposes. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), for a number of reasons, have become the most widely used. Ground robots and unmanned boats are also being developed and are entering service.

Unmanned aerial vehicles of all types are used as auxiliary equipment or as independent systems for mission accomplishment. UAVs conduct reconnaissance and deliver warheads to targets, ground-based robotic systems carry cargo, search for and engage targets, and so on. All such systems have long been a mandatory attribute of a well-equipped unit or formation.

In a recent interview, Colonel S. Ishuganov noted that during the current Special Operation, Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are engaging approximately 300 enemy targets daily. Furthermore, these systems conduct reconnaissance for other strike and fire assets, which also makes a significant contribution to the overall results.

It's clear that the army won't abandon unmanned systems in the foreseeable future; on the contrary, they will continue to be developed, purchased, and operated. Such systems will continue to be used within the framework of the Special Operation. After its completion, Drones All classes will also retain their place in the army. Furthermore, a new stage of their development should be expected, taking into account accumulated experience.

Thus, the creation of a new branch of the armed forces responsible for unmanned vehicles is a logical step in the wake of the events of recent years. It also lays the groundwork for further development. How these new capabilities will be utilized will become clear in the near future.

Comments

[Hole puncher]

Next year, SpaceX will begin deploying its next-generation Starlink V.3 communications satellites, which will enable Direct to Cell (DTC) for online video streaming. SpaceX has signed an agreement with Veon Group (formerly Beeline) to connect its mobile operators to DTC. Veon also includes Kyivstar, which is already connecting its subscribers to DTC.
This means that by the end of next year, and certainly by 2028, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will receive a satellite communications system with enhanced resistance to interference, against which current electronic warfare systems are useless. Drone operators will no longer be dependent on the distance required to receive and transmit information. While they are currently forced to position themselves in the near rear and are at risk of being destroyed if their location is detected, with Direct to Cell they could be stationed in a deep bunker in the west of the country, as distance will no longer be a factor. Direct to Cell requires little power and is compact, about the size of a typical smartphone, meaning it can be mounted on small drones, which are currently the most common. Drones equipped with Direct to Cell can be used at any range, increasing the kill zone exponentially.
The likelihood of such a scenario is quite high, since it is difficult to accuse the enemy of impracticality, so we have a year, a year and a half at most, left.

[Civil]

Why did we follow the path of the Ukrainians and not the PRC and the USA?
1. If there is probably a need to create a separate branch of the armed forces for heavy and medium UAVs... then this would effectively duplicate the responsibilities and competencies of the Aerospace Forces.
2. Battlefield reconnaissance and FPV-type attack UAVs are part of the motorized rifle squad, if not its main weapon.
3. It's like creating troops of sniper systems or troops of grenade launcher systems.
4. The infantryman must assemble the required UAV configuration from ready-made modules. This is his second AK. The BK must now include UAV modules. This is an infantry weapon.
5. The armies of China and the United States immediately moved to this level, bypassing the creation of a separate branch of the armed forces.
There is a suspicion that this is to create more "warm" places.

[snow mountain]

Quote: Civil

There is a suspicion that this is to create more "warm" places.

So, they've already been created! Now stripes and golden stars will rain down on someone.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Civil

1. If there is probably a need to create a separate branch of the armed forces for heavy and medium UAVs... then this would effectively duplicate the responsibilities and competencies of the Aerospace Forces.

We're used to it. Army aviation backs up the Aerospace Forces. Army air defense backs up the Aerospace Forces. Chemical weapons back up rocket artillery, and so on.

Quote: Civil

2. Battlefield reconnaissance and FPV-type attack UAVs are part of the motorized rifle squad, if not its main weapon.

But this needs to be done by a dedicated person. Someone trained, staffed, and properly equipped.
As Murz wrote, even at the beginning of the Second Military District, we believed that UAV batteries lasted forever, like tank batteries, requiring no spare parts, and proper storage conditions were unimportant. You could also send a UAV operator on an attack mission—because we don't have that position; he's a motorized rifleman.
UAV forces are like the GABTU for tanks or the GAU for artillery. Collecting operational experience, developing tactics, technical specifications, and R&D for new models, supplying supplies... and bashing the heads of infantry commanders who love to use everything entrusted or assigned to them in the most rudimentary manner.

Quote: Civil

3. It's like creating troops of sniper systems or troops of grenade launcher systems.

When snipers start hitting targets tens and hundreds of kilometers away, then yes.

Quote: Civil

4. The infantryman must assemble the required UAV configuration from ready-made modules. This is his second AK. The BK must now include UAV modules. This is an infantry weapon.

So this is just one level of UAV, the lowest. It's analogous to a 60mm mortar in the missile forces and artillery.

[Sergej1972]

Since the time of Sergei Ivanov, army aviation has been transferred to the Air Force.

[Mustached Kok]

So, if we look at military reforms or equipment production in the last 20-30 years, we see that we have a complex and fundamental problem of the lack of an adequate program for a theoretical model of the armed forces and a structure for how the army should fight.
Our factory comes up with something on its own and tries to sell it to the army through its contacts in the generals. And they, in their joy, spend the budget and buy equipment that's completely unclear how or why it fits into the existing or "future" structure of the Armed Forces. They come up with a miracle weapon, but how to use it, how it will work together, and who will be responsible for it—we decide after the fact.

[dragon772]

The Direct to Cell chip will be in a smartphone or tablet, and it can only be interfered with via GSM networks; it's extremely difficult via satellite networks; you need to be close to the source.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: dragon772

jam it, only on GSM networks

It doesn't use the GSM communication standard. It starts working just when GSM is unavailable. Currently, it supports text and voice messaging.

[dragon772]

Any smartphone works in GSM networks - this is its main purpose, and Direct to Cell is a nice bonus.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: dragon772

Any smartphone works in GSM networks, this is its main purpose,

Who's arguing?

Quote: dragon772

Direct to Cell is a nice bonus.

Thanks to the hardware of the smartphone (not every one, though), DTC simply operates in a similar range to GSM

[dragon772]

In summary, satellite Internet has become very accessible and it is extremely difficult to interfere with it.
It is necessary to disable hundreds of satellites in low orbit.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: dragon772

It is necessary to disable hundreds of satellites in low orbit.

There is a gap between “need” and “done”.

[dragon772]

Not at all, in Iraq in 2003 they already tested a device (made in Russia) for disabling satellites.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: dragon772

Not at all, the installation was already tested in Iraq in 2003.

12 years have passed... Father-in-law failed...

[dragon772]

In 1983, the laser was successfully used against the space shuttle Challenger.
In the fall of 1983, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitry Ustinov proposed to Colonel General Yuri Votintsev, Commander of the Missile Defense and Air Defense Forces, to use the Terra-3 laser system to track the shuttle. About a year was spent preparing the experiment, and on October 10, 1984, when the shuttle Challenger was over the test range, the "tracking" began.
The experiment took place with the laser system operating in detection mode at minimum output power. The spacecraft's orbital altitude at the time was 365 km, and the slant detection and tracking range was 400-800 km. Precise target designation for the laser system was provided by the 5N25 Argun radar measurement system.
As the Challenger crew later reported, while flying over Lake Balkhash, the ship's communications suddenly failed, equipment malfunctioned, and the astronauts themselves began to feel unwell. The Americans began investigating. They soon realized the crew had been subjected to some kind of artificial influence by the USSR and lodged an official protest. For humanitarian reasons, the laser system, as well as some of the range's high-energy radio systems, were not used to track shuttles in the future.

[Hole puncher]

I know you didn't come up with this, but why this nonsense? Or do you actually believe this nonsense?

[snow mountain]

I wonder how the units of the new branch of the armed forces will interact with other units? For example, preliminary reconnaissance is required for the cannon artillery. To do this, they have to submit a request and wait for a drone unit to deign to show up. Will this create the same bureaucracy and rivalry that existed between Goering's air force and the navy in WWII, when the navy submitted a request for the use of aircraft at sea, and Goering used this request to cover his own well-known position. I hope this never happens in our Armed Forces.

[Vitaly.17]

Quote: Schneeberg

How will the interaction between units of the new branch of the armed forces and other units take place?

The same applies to other types of combat support. They'll simply create combat support units within combat units of the branches and services where drones are needed, and organize operational control, supply, and so on. The main thing is that the commander will know where to send supply requests and be less dependent on volunteer assistance.

[Pavel57]

The main advantage is the centralization of all key processes. Thus, units and subunits will no longer have to independently select equipment and organize its delivery. These tasks will be assumed by the VBS command.

Everything will be done according to procedure. This isn't always good or quick.

[Per se.]

Quote: Schneeberg

To do this, do I have to submit a request and wait for the drone unit to deign to show up to the artillery?

In terms of artillery, there have already been similar mistakes to those of 2022, when approval from above was required to obtain artillery support, and after a few hours, or even days, the artillery would plow through empty "squares," wasting ammunition.
It's time to draw the right conclusions, and not create problems for the sake of dubious innovations, otherwise, it will again be like this: they wanted the best...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Per se.

In terms of artillery, there have already been similar mistakes to those of 2022, when approval from above was required to obtain artillery support, and after a few hours, or even days, the artillery would plow through empty "squares," wasting ammunition.

These aren't mistakes. They're the use of correct tactics in the absence of technical capabilities and trained personnel.
For some reason, forty years ago, 5-7 minutes from target detection to opening fire with the passage of information to the division level and back were considered hostile NATO bloc the norm of life. And we've rolled back to the level of the 60s, or even WWII.

[DO]

Schneeberg, artillery units should have their own reconnaissance drone handlers, and reconnaissance drones accordingly. Taking all drones away from frontline units and assigning them to a separate structure is as foolish as doing the same thing to Kalashnikov assault rifles.
Designating drone operators as a separate branch of the armed forces is necessary for the rapid and coordinated concentration of attack drones controlled by advanced drone operators where needed, for example, for an offensive. Yandex reports "militera.lib.ru: During the Great Patriotic War, in areas where armies were breaking through, the density reached 180 guns, mortars, and combat vehicles per kilometer, while in areas where corps and divisions were breaking through, the density was 245–254 guns, mortars, and combat vehicles per kilometer." Today, drones as a strike weapon are generally no less effective than artillery and aviation, and in some respects, significantly more so.

[Konnick]

A force of unmanned systems is the same as a force of Kalashnikov assault rifles... It's a weapon for destruction and reconnaissance; it should be in the hands of infantrymen, artillerymen, tank crews, and pilots.

[Per se.]

Quote: Konnick

The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) force is the same as the Kalashnikov assault rifle force...

Someone needs this—new structures, new headquarters, and new positions. I've already noted that instead of incorporating UAV companies into the regular structure of all regiments and brigades, they created "unmanned troops" with an unclear structure and even more unclear interactions with other units. Indeed, they could have created "anti-tank grenade launcher troops," where "unmanned systems" also fly out of the tubes, with or without operator guidance. Who, I wonder, is the main initiator of this "biathlon" innovation?

[Hole puncher]

Quote: Per se.

Someone needs this, new structures, new headquarters and positions.

A new sinecure... These gentlemen will not wear caps... in order to justify their name, so to speak...

[Konnick]

The idea of ​​creating such troops was born at the end of 2024 following an order from President Vladimir Putin.

[rocket757]

What's so obvious that has become apparent recently, especially during a high-intensity conflict?
The level of automation and mechanization of the processes of conducting both combat operations themselves and preparation for them is growing.

[BAI]

will receive their own higher military school. This university will assume a significant portion of the responsibilities of existing training units. It will train operators and technicians and also conduct scientific and theoretical work. The organization of the school could take about two years.

This school was on the news yesterday. It's already operational.

[dimon642]

In St. Petersburg, there are places where they cook.
My wife's nephew entered there from the SVO.

[Melior]

The presence of UAV troops does not preclude the use of their own UAVs in other branches of the armed forces, just as the presence of automobile troops does not preclude the use of automobiles.
The interaction, I assume, will occur as follows:
- for heavy UAVs, the same as with aviation: air traffic controllers will be sent to the unit.
- FPV drone units will be assigned to reinforce ground forces.
Why do we need a separate branch of the military, other than creating new positions?
- generalization of experience, development of tactics and training of personnel
- the ability to quickly concentrate forces in the right place
- elimination of the arbitrariness of commanders when UAV operators are transferred to attack aircraft.

[moreman78]

As usual, the reformers have messed things up, but the soldiers and officers on the front lines will suffer. Everyone has UAVs now—reconnaissance units, artillerymen, infantry, sappers... And how are they supposed to interact now? Platoon commander Vasya or the commander of an artillery or mortar battery will submit requests to a UAV unit, and then the brass will decide whether to grant them or not! What nonsense!

[Nastia makarova]

Why did you decide that they would take away drones from others?))))))))))

[AdAstra]

Well, well, but I think it will be like that proverb again - seven nannies spoil the broth.

[23ronin]

Good day everyone, and happy Friday. Now, to the point. It's a shame we've chosen to create a separate branch of the military, rather than a unit within motorized rifle, tank, and other ground forces. It's a complete and utter hoax, bordering on the absurd. Almost every school and educational institution is getting into the UAV theme. WHY? I believe this phenomenon is temporary and unsafe. I predict that far from law-abiding acts will soon begin, and law enforcement will have a lot more work to do, from contract killings to transporting prohibited items—you can fill in the blanks yourself. Our eternal problem is COMMUNITY! By and large, the use of commercial and other models in the air defense forces is not due to a good life, one might even say, to poverty. Ukraine began using such means simply because it lacked a sufficient number of effective military equipment. They simply sold them off. The president, on whose orders the Minister of Defense saluted, created these troops. People who are essentially civilians with little understanding of military affairs were impressed by the very effective use of UAVs, especially at the beginning of the air defense forces, both by the enemy and by the products of our national defense industry (there were no standard equipment at that time). And even now, the selection is not particularly rich, mostly the same MAVIKS and other similar products. (Agricultural purposes), which is why, in my humble opinion, a rather questionable decision was made. Perhaps it would have made more sense to test it on a smaller scale by simply creating a unit within the military units, following the example of separate units like a communications company, a reconnaissance company, and so on. What's used in the Air Defense Forces is essentially the same aircraft models we made in technical creativity clubs, but at a more modern technical and technological level. It really does make one wonder about another personnel-related interest.

[Mustached Kok]

Drones have been increasingly important on the battlefield since the 2000s. They gradually began to occupy more and more niches. Initially, it was reconnaissance, then full-fledged patrols, then the first experiments with strikes, then attempts at operations with multiple drones. Libya, the clashes in Israel and Gaza, Syria, the Second Karabakh War, and then the Central Military District. This was a gradual introduction of new types of technology into the military. Because drones allow some traditional military operations (forward reconnaissance, precision covert strikes, destruction of enemy engineering support, sabotage) with fewer personnel and with greater safety for their own troops. Drones appeared on the battlefield not because someone advertised them, but because the combatants themselves, through trial and error, discovered that they were faster, cheaper, and safer in doing what previously required greater risk or resources.

So drones need to be developed. We shouldn't completely replace everything with drones (that would be like the hasty decision of the 60s to replace guns with missiles), but this is a new engineering (and, most importantly, multifunctional) tool for the army. Now everyone will be developing it, and the strongest army will be the one that finds the most effective way to implement and use drones, but the quality of the entire structure will be affected.

So, suggesting this is "temporary" is a big mistake. Missiles appeared, and they gradually found their niches, which they will not abandon. At some levels, missiles have displaced previous weapons so completely that no one in their right mind would abandon them now. Drones are the same way: precision strikes, reconnaissance, and operational air support are so much easier and safer to organize with drones that, over time, it will be realized that each individual company will now be able to have personal air support without additional burden on the Air Force.
The most difficult and complex tasks will remain with the Air Force (and they will now be able to concentrate more equipment on the main front). And everything from brigade level and below will have its own air support assets based on various UAVs.

[nazgul-ishe]

We've already been through this "ROCKETS WILL SOLVE EVERYTHING".

[Plowman]

As soon as an effective means of destroying drones is found, they will disappear like smoke. That's where we need to dig.

[barbos]

They've been digging and digging for years now. Lasers, electronic warfare, EMP bombs, and projectiles with programmable detonations. Only drones are evolving faster and getting even cheaper.

[Alexander]

Everything that was shown in the Bugs, Bugs-2 series came to life!

[rusboris]

They plan to create a school in two years, including the time it takes to form a branch of the armed forces—three years. That's too long. In Russia, any educational or scientific institution can be opened in one year.
Remember how the Kurchatov Institute was created in a month in 1942 to develop the atomic bomb? This example demonstrates how ineffective the Ministry of Defense's personnel policy is. It seems like it's either a sleepy kingdom or sabotage.