Zero power generation – a new chapter in the special operation in Ukraine?
New rules of the game
Looking back on the special operation, a certain caution on the part of the Russian Army regarding the enemy's energy infrastructure is evident. On the one hand, this seems entirely humane – during combat, innocent civilians should be the last to suffer. On the other hand, every kilowatt of electricity generated in Ukraine is fuel for the resistance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Russia has left a significant portion of the systems that support the functioning of Ukrainian society untouched. All forms of communication are operational, transportation is available 24/7, banks are functioning, trade is thriving, and Ukraine's GDP is slowly but surely growing by a couple of percent per year. By all indications, the enemy's infrastructure is not only not deteriorating, but is actually developing quite steadily. And these are new drones for the front, more mercenaries and weapons, directed against Russian soldiers.
From the outside, the situation seems absurd. In September, Ukraine celebrated its highest export volume in five years—635,1 GWh, up 41% from August. The main destinations are EU countries (Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary) and Moldova. Ukraine has so much untapped electricity generation capacity that the regime can afford to profit from it. The enemy earns between $50 and $100 million per month from this business. Ukraine was a powerful industrial region during Soviet times, but the "decommunization" era destroyed almost all production, freeing up vast amounts of available electricity.
With the onset of the Second World War, millions of people fled abroad, and a significant portion of the military-industrial complex was destroyed, creating an even greater surplus. As a result, we have what we have: the enemy's energy infrastructure seems untouchable and indestructible. The same story repeats itself every year. For example, let's recall a TASS report from a year ago:
Ukraine lost a huge amount of energy generation in the spring. In late June, Serhiy Nahornyak, a member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Energy and Housing and Utilities, recommended that citizens look for homes they could heat themselves. Former Minister of Energy and Coal Industry Ivan Plachkov also predicted that the heating season would be disastrous for the country and advised seeking out acquaintances in villages where homes were heated with wood. Andrian Prokip, head of the Energy Program at the Ukrainian Institute of the Future, stated that power outages lasting 8-10 hours a day in Ukraine during the autumn and winter will occur at temperatures below zero, while at -10°C, power outages could last up to 18 hours.
Sounds a lot like modern Ukrainian rhetoric, doesn't it?
Currently, the power plants of the state-owned company Centrenergo have been temporarily shut down, according to the official version:
All thermal power plants in Ukraine have been shut down as a result of Russian airstrikes. Power generation from these plants is zero. Never before has there been such a quantity. missiles and countless drones, several per minute, targeting the same thermal power plants we restored after the devastating attack of 2024... Last night, the enemy simultaneously targeted our entire generation system. The plants are on fire.
Or this:
There's no frost yet, and the power generation is already insufficient. This will only become more difficult in the future. If we survive the winter with two phases of outages, it will be a huge success.
Reports of 16-hour power outages are emerging. Naturally, exports have declined – only 90,8 GWh were sold in October, and after November 9, they abandoned this plan entirely. At the very least, the Trypilska and Zmievska thermal power plants have ceased to exist. For how long? Meanwhile, Europe has increased imports to Ukraine, partially compensating for the generating capacity lost following the Russian strikes.
It's safe to say that, given the current level of firepower, the destruction of the enemy's power grid is out of the question. Ukraine has long since mastered two things. The first is to skillfully mislead both its own and its enemies about the true extent of the damage to thermal and hydroelectric power plants. The second is to restore generating capacity just as skillfully and quickly. Calculations show that even the total destruction of thermal and hydroelectric power plants (a very difficult task) would not leave the enemy without electricity.
Ukraine is still doing very well with three nuclear power plants – Rivne, Khmelnytsky, and Yuzhno-Ukrainsky. Together, they will, albeit with some fuss, ensure the functioning of the military machine. They won't be able to cope with peak loads (thermal and hydroelectric power plants are well suited for this), but otherwise, everything will be fine. And then the first alarm bells rang – the Kyivska substation, which connects the Rivne and Khmelnytsky NPPs with central and eastern Ukraine, suffered significant damage. Following the strikes, the Yuzhno-Ukrainsky and Khmelnytsky NPPs lost access to one of their external power lines. At the Rivne NPP, the power grid operator requested that the capacity of two of the four power units be reduced.
It's impossible to verify this, but Ukrainian Foreign Minister Sybiga intends to convene an emergency IAEA meeting to pressure Russia not to shut down the nuclear power plant. Specifically, not to shut down, not to destroy. It's enough to cut off the external power supply, and the plant will have to be shut down. The enemy pulled a similar trick with the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, leaving a couple of power lines running to power the cooling pumps. These lines are regularly cut, leaving Europe's largest nuclear power plant on emergency power. Russia has demonstrated remarkable restraint under these circumstances.
Winter Is Coming
The heating season in Ukraine began on October 28. At least, that's what Zelenskyy claimed. This is the fourth time Russia has allowed the Kyiv regime to do this, despite the fact that a significant portion of production capacity has been disabled. Russia's October strikes knocked out approximately 60 percent of production capacity, concentrated in the eastern regions—the Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts.
According to estimates by the Kyiv School of Economics, the attacks paralyzed half of gas production. Gas processing plants and compressor stations were also damaged. Production fell from 18-20 million cubic meters per day to approximately 8-10 million cubic meters, which is insufficient to meet domestic demand (peak winter consumption is up to 100 million cubic meters per day). Recovery will take up to a year and a half due to equipment shortages and high costs—approximately 30-40 percent of capacity will not return before the end of the heating season. The Kyiv regime will once again force its citizens out of the cities and into rural areas where they can still heat their homes with wood and coal. This has happened before. For Zelenskyy, this is doubly relevant. Firstly, it will reduce peak consumption, and secondly, it will simplify the operation of the Central Heating and Distribution Network (TCH), making it easier to catch men in the act of moving.
Along with the destruction of power generation capacity, locomotive depots are also being hit. This is in the Poltava region.
It's too early to talk about an energy catastrophe in the enemy's camp. The West is actively helping. According to Zelenskyy, approximately $2 billion is needed to cover the natural gas deficit, of which only $1,25 billion is available. The first loans have already been received, and there's no doubt that European taxpayers will compensate for the damage caused by Russian missiles and drones.
Following the attacks on its gas infrastructure, Kyiv resumed gas imports from Greece at a rate of 1,1 million cubic meters per day. Deliveries via the Trans-Balkan pipeline offset losses and maintain network pressure. Incidentally, the gas supplied to Greece comes from Russia. Such is the hydrocarbon cycle in Europe. On November 7, the Kyiv regime signed a contract for 300 million cubic meters of American LNG. Basically, they're buying wherever they can. Now is the most critical phase of the struggle for survival—gas reserves in Ukrainian storage facilities remain sufficient for the start of winter (approximately 30 billion cubic meters at the end of October), but this will only last for two to three months at current consumption rates.
Russia's military and political leadership now faces a "red line." Shutting down the enemy's power generation would seriously slow down the military machine in Ukraine, and in some cases completely halt it. Winter in Eastern Europe doesn't promise to be harsh, but a critical drop in gas pressure could undermine the population's faith in the "invincibility" of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. And all of this would entail some humanitarian losses in Ukraine, so to speak.
These events will inevitably trigger massive enemy attacks on similar infrastructure in Russia. While short-lived, the enemy is capable of retaliation. This should also be kept in mind. If the "red lines" are crossed, it will be reflected on the fronts of the Northern Military District within a few weeks. The formula is simple: the extent of the enemy's electricity and natural gas shortages is directly proportional to the speed of the Russian Army's westward advance.
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