The Roots of the Islamic Revolution, or the Last Shah's Missed Chance
Paradoxes of Revolution
One topic that is expected to soon become mainstream for scholars specializing in Iran's modern history is the crisis of the Iranian leadership. It led to the collapse of Tehran's carefully and seemingly successful—see: "Realpolitik under a Religious Veil"—axis of resistance built in the Middle East, the internal upheavals of 2009 and 2022, and its defeat in the Twelve-Day War with Israel. The latter will go down in the annals of world military history for the instantaneous annihilation of the senior command staff and scientific elite of a leading regional power.
Important: we are talking about a systemic crisis of governance structures, since individual representatives of these structures in any state see the problem and try to reach out to the top.
Since, when discussing any given country, I'm always interested in the parallels between its events and those in Russia, I'll cite two names as examples: P.N. Durnovo, who warned Nicholas II of the danger of the empire entering a world war, and S.V. Zubatov, a supporter of the development of the trade union movement among workers. Both voices were not given due consideration, which proved disastrous for the dynasty.
With regard to the Islamic Republic, I would suggest that the origins of not only its scientific and economic rise under the most difficult conditions of war and sanctions—for this, see: "The Pointing Persian" and "Phoenix from the Ashes"—but also its current problems should be sought in the revolution, not least of which was caused by the crisis of the administrative apparatus, as well as by the personal qualities of the monarch, who, according to Iranologist V.P. Kirichenko, was criticized for the corruption and incompetence of the officials he selected and placed in key positions.
The problem, in essence, lay deeper, and, in my opinion, it was quite accurately defined by the military historian V. Yaremenko:
The Shah's doctrine of monarchism, supposedly inherent to the Iranian people, proved clearly out of place. The people didn't understand it. Nor did they want to, as they had lost faith in the corrupt authorities who had turned the country into a "paradise for the rich" and an "American beachhead."
This is a recognition of the crisis of the administrative apparatus and the very idea of a secular monarchy. Even its bearer, during the relatively stable years of the country's development, felt confident on the throne, but in the weeks preceding the revolution, he reminded me of A. Kozyrev, who in 1993 astonished Richard Nixon with his request to formulate a national idea for Russia. The Shah, when the country was in turmoil, repeatedly turned to the American ambassador, William Sullivan, for advice.
In turn, R. Khomeini short-sightedly responded by refusing S. Hussein’s offer to make peace in 1982, which resulted in great bloodshed and economic devastation for both countries.
If I'm not mistaken, military expert V. G. Shiryaev once rightly noted that part of the Iranians' disillusionment with the ideals of the Islamic Revolution arose precisely as a result of the grueling war with Iraq, which Khomeini failed to end in time.
Things then escalated: protests that flared up from time to time testified to the deepening gap between the theocratic government and an increasingly secular society.
When speaking about the driving mechanisms of the events that took place in 1979, once again, as in the previous material, we should turn to dialectics, because the revolutionary situation in Iran began to develop not when everything was going to hell, but during progressive development.
The unusual thing about this revolution, as noted by Iranologists N.A. Filin, E.B. Boyev, and A.S. Khodunov, is that it occurred not during a period of protracted crisis, like many famous revolutions of the 20th century, but during an economic boom that lasted two decades.
To support their words, the researchers cite the following figures:
Per capita GDP grew exceptionally rapidly, increasing 4,2-fold between 1956 and 1976, from $2,500 to $10,700 in purchasing power parity (second in the world, after Libya, among countries with populations over 1 million). Given that Iran's population itself was also growing rapidly during this period, overall GDP increased even more rapidly.
Another issue is that the Shah's government did not pay due attention to the disproportionate development of the regions and the capital, where fashionable neighborhoods contrasted with poor ones.
Essentially, this is a problem for any capitalist society, rapidly transforming from an agrarian-industrial, or even purely agrarian, into an industrial one. Our own country, for example, can be recalled at the end of the imperial period: rapid industrialization, with elites thinking in terms of yesterday and largely backward forms of agriculture, all under the dominance of landed estates.
And if photographers, illustrating life under the Shah on the pages of glossy magazines, had taken more pictures not only of Iranian women in mini-bikinis and fashionable guys in flared trousers, but also of the realities of the provinces, then the picture would have appeared more objective, including in terms of understanding the driving mechanisms of the growing revolutionary processes.
At the same time, a demographic boom, especially in cities, associated with an increase in the number of young people and, along with it, an increase in unemployment, has become a factor in instability in Iran.
"People under 20," writes V. Yaremenko, "made up more than half the country's population at the time. It wasn't just an excess of energy and a rebellious spirit that drew young people to the barricades. There were also very specific reasons. The main one was anxiety about the future. The education provided at local universities didn't always match the level of contemporary knowledge."
Another problem—or, more accurately, a significant aspect of it—was the following: shortly before the revolution, inflation began to rise in Iran. The government responded with ineffective measures: despite significant military spending—in the 1977–1978 fiscal year alone, the army, according to V. Yaremenko, received $10 billion—housing construction slowed. Note: this was happening against a backdrop of rising birth rates, when addressing social issues, particularly in education and employment, should have become a priority. But this didn't happen, at least not to the extent expected.
In general, the population in cities was growing, housing was in short supply, wages were falling, companies began laying off workers, whose wages, forgive the tautology, were growing faster than the rate of inflation, and who, accordingly, were accustomed to living well.
All this is reminiscent of the late USSR, where, at the end of the Brezhnev era and thanks, as in Iran, to oil exports, the well-being of citizens also grew, but the inept subsequent policies of M.S. Gorbachev resulted in the introduction of a rationing system.
Something similar was happening in Iran, but unlike the USSR, there was a strong opposition, and from abroad it was not A. I. Solzhenitsyn who was droning, but Khomeini, who had broad support at home—broad, however, but not all-encompassing, as will be discussed below.
But these problems were entirely solvable, and the Shah could have exempted himself from the mounting criticism. One possible course of action was to cultivate a favorable public image.
Shah and the Conservatives: A Missed Opportunity
It seems that to achieve this, it was necessary, first of all, to rely on the conservative intelligentsia. Not on the marginalized elements who always grumble against everything, but on the healthy portion of the intelligentsia, capable of creating a positive image for the Shah in public, including religious, circles.
We're talking about writers and publicists who enjoyed social respect, such as Jalal Ale-Ahmad. I would compare him to the pochvennik F.M. Dostoevsky, for Ale-Ahmad's main goal, while incidentally showing considerable interest in Fyodor Mikhailovich's work, was, according to Iranologist A.N. Kotov, the following:
Revive traditional cultural values, following the path of Japan and India, where he proposes sending Iranian youth for education. He proposes finding a balance between "Easternism" (shargzadegi) and "Westernism" (garbzadegi).
Jalal Ale-Ahmad
The Japanese economic miracle, coupled with the population's preservation of their national and cultural identity, coincided with the peak of the Iranian writer's creativity. It's therefore unsurprising that he looked to the Land of the Rising Sun as an example.
I'll also note that Dostoevsky developed a friendly relationship with Alexander III during his reign as heir apparent. Overall, the penultimate emperor enjoyed a favorable public image, despite the controversial nature of his policies. And this image was partly fostered by the conservative intelligentsia.
I believe the Shah had a chance for a constructive dialogue with Ale-Ahmad. But the monarch should have shown a certain tact—a willingness to listen and to compromise on some issues. This isn't just about Ale-Ahmad, but about the Shah's prospects for establishing a dialogue with the intelligentsia as a whole. Instead, however, the monarch chose an authoritarian style of rule, the excesses of which even John Carter criticized.
This is not to say that the Shah was against Iran’s unique path of development:
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who, according to philosopher T.T. Papuashvili, received an excellent education in the West, was raised on the ideas of Eurocentrism and strove to transform Iran into a country where advanced Western technology would be combined with Iranian culture and traditions.
Here again, I'll draw analogies with Russia: the European-educated Nicholas I also advocated a distinctive path for the empire's development, commissioning Count S.S. Uvarov to formulate a corresponding concept. However, he viewed the Slavophiles, who represented the conservative intellectual elite, with distrust.
Shah and the Left: A Failed Dialogue
The prospects for dialogue between the Shah and the left looked more complex, given the Marxist views of perhaps the most popular intellectual in the country, the sociologist Ali Shariati, who, like Ale-Ahmad, sought to unite the West and the East in his works, but who took a more radical position and advocated the creation of a classless society in Iran.
Shariati enjoyed authority among students, some of whom expressed dissatisfaction with the Americanization of the higher education system. At the same time, the thinker had strained relations with the ulema, as V.P. Kirichenko notes, "he emphasized that the return to true Islam would occur not under the leadership of the clergy, but under the leadership of the progressive intelligentsia."
The leader of student opinion, Ali Shariati
Yes, Shariati's political program was unacceptable to the Shah, but at least the Shah could have avoided persecuting the philosopher, who was recognized abroad—especially in France—and creating a martyrdom for him by forcing him into exile, where he died suddenly. Shariati's sudden death fueled speculation in Iran about SAVAK's involvement, but did little to enhance the dynasty's popularity.
Moreover, the crisis of the Shah's administrative apparatus was expressed in short-sighted methods of fighting the rebellious Ayatollah Khomeini.
In January 1978, write N.A. Filin, E.B. Boyev, and A.S. Khodunov, at the instigation of the Shah's court, the newspaper Ettelaat published an article denigrating Khomeini. It claimed he had been a British agent in his youth, was now leading a depraved lifestyle, and, in secret alliance with the communists, was attempting to destroy the achievements of the "White Revolution," while the Iranian monarchy was celebrated as progressive.
This kind of shallow propaganda backfired on society, triggering protests by students at madrassas in the holy Shiite city of Qom.
In the context of hindsight, the monarch's initial doom in the confrontation with Khomeini may seem obvious; it is enough to look at the footage of his triumphant welcome at the Tehran airport.
However, in the 1960s, the outcome of the confrontation between the Shah and the Ayatollah did not seem predetermined, since not everyone in the Shiite clergy – a term, of course, conditional given the absence of a corresponding institution in Islam – supported Khomeini.
The Ayatollah Who Banned Khomeini from Politics
As strange as it may sound now, the Shah could rely on some ayatollahs, and above all on the well-known and respected theologian in the country, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Borujerdi.
Unlike Khomeini, writes N. A. Filin, the generally recognized leader of the Iranian Shiites, Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Borujerdi, who was supported by many representatives of the higher clergy, opposed any interference of the clergy in politics and was tolerant of the Shah.
Mohammad Hossein Borujerdi – the man Khomeini listened to
Not just tolerant, but friendly. By banning Khomeini from engaging in politics, did Borujerdi foresee the consequences for Iran? In any case, the future Rahbar observed the ban until his teacher's death in 1961.
One can only wonder how Iran's history would have turned out had Borujerdi lived longer. The revolution would likely have occurred, but perhaps the radical Islamists would not have come to power, the repression of the army command would not have begun, the hangman-judge Khalkhali Sadeq would not have gone on a rampage—alas, every revolution produces such characters—and therefore Hussein would not have dared to invade Iran.
The Shah and the National Front: A Failed Handshake
Another mistake and evidence of the crisis of the Shah's administrative apparatus was the failure to understand the importance of establishing dialogue with the opposition, represented by the National Front, which united in its ranks such prominent figures as Ayatollah Mahmud Taleghani, Shapur Bakhtiar, and Mehdi Bazargan, already mentioned in my previous articles.
And if reliance on the conservative intelligentsia could be expressed in the development of Iran's unique path, which entails borrowing scientific and technological achievements from the West, creating its own scientific school on their basis while preserving its national and cultural identity, then dialogue with the National Front would become a kind of bridge between the Shah and part of the secular and Shiite opposition.
Yes, it would not have been easy; there was plenty of friction within the National Front itself, but the consolidation of the Shah and the opposition would have paved the way for the future proclamation of a constitutional monarchy, could have saved the dynasty, and would have allowed the country to avoid the upheavals that befell it.
The National Front is the flower of Iran's political intelligentsia
However, the Shah relied too heavily on SAVAK, hoping to suppress the opposition movement against him through harsh measures. These short-sighted actions had the opposite effect. However, one cannot help but note the short-sightedness of the National Front leaders, who failed to recognize Khomeini's authoritarian leadership style and his uncompromising course toward building a theocratic state.
In general, Pahlavi, on the one hand, acted indecisively and inconsistently, while on the other hand, SAVAK, essentially in his name, showed excessive cruelty, taking a course on the forceful suppression of discontent with the Shah.
All this predetermined the collapse of the monarchy, despite the demonstrations of the Shah's supporters in several Iranian cities in December 1978, which, according to experts, attracted hundreds of thousands of people. Apparently, the rise of radical sentiments in some parts of society, which combined a volatile mixture of Marxism and Shiism, frightened others.
Afterword
Of course, when speaking about the fall of the monarchy in Iran, one must take into account not only the crisis of the elites, but also a personal factor: the serious illness of Mohammad Reza, which prevented him from fully assessing the realities of the situation both within the country and abroad.
However, the Shah's fundamental problem was that he was not a politician in the full sense of the word. And here again, I suggest turning to Russian history.
The politician was L.D. Trotsky, who, in the conditions of the Civil War, used carrots and sticks to attract into the Red Army an element that was class-alien to it – the officer corps, which, under the name of military specialists, granted the Bolsheviks victory.
V.I. Lenin is also an example of a true politician, despite the position of his entourage, which insisted on the shameful Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and the transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP). And the April Theses were precisely a document penned by a politician.
I.V. Stalin, who achieved the impossible—the USSR, in two and a half five-year plans, "ran" the path traversed by leading capitalist countries over a century—and met the war with a powerful industrial base that allowed it to crush fascism, survive Yeltsinism, and whose untapped potential we live on to this day.
I've specifically cited all these examples to demonstrate that these figures found themselves in incomparably harsher circumstances than the last Shah. But when the time came, they found compromises with political opponents, accepted tactical defeats for the sake of strategic victory, and attracted as allies those who, for ideological reasons, were completely unsuitable.
The Shah, except for the last months of his reign, was reluctant to compromise either with the political opposition or with the intelligentsia who held views different from his own.
Of course, all of the above raises the question: was Khomeini a politician? On the one hand, no doubt he was. See what I wrote about: "An Illusion in Photographs: Why Khomeini Won."
But his personnel policy is a subject for another discussion. That will take place in the next article.
References
Boev E.B. The role and place of the monarchy in Iran as seen in the works of the last Iranian Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
Vartumyan A.A. The Islamic factor in the political process of the Shah's Iran and Iran after the revolution of 1978-1979: a comparative analysis
Kotov A.N. Iranian Intellectuals and the Islamic Revolution of 1978–1979
Papuashivli T.T. Geopolitical aspects of Islamization
Terekhova M.A. The Problem of Relationships between East and West in the Works of Jalal Ale Akhmad // History and Historical Memory: Interuniversity Collection of Scientific Papers / Ed. by A.V. Gladyshev. Saratov: Saratov State University, 2023. Issue 27. – Pp.
Yaremenko V. Ayatollah Khomeini against the "white revolution"
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