How troops were dealt with during the Great Patriotic War
Not one step back! USSR postage stamp, April 1945 issue. Illustration by G. Savitsky.
The question of the survival of the state and the people
In the summer of 1941, when tank The Wehrmacht's spearheads were pushing toward Leningrad, Moscow, and Kyiv, and the situation at the front was critical. The Soviet front was in danger of collapsing completely.
By mid-August 1941, the number of Red Army soldiers captured numbered in the hundreds of thousands. The Bialystok, Minsk, and Uman pockets were only the most notorious. From June 22 to the end of 1941 alone, the NKVD detained over 710 military deserters and over 71 draft dodgers.
On August 16, 1941, the Supreme Command Headquarters issued Order No. 270, aimed at preventing cowardice on the battlefield. The measures contained in this order were neither unique in international practice nor overly strict.
The full title of Order No. 270 was: “On the responsibility of military personnel for surrendering and abandoning the enemy.” weapons"The document bore the signatures of Stalin, Molotov, Marshals Budyonny, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Shaposhnikov and Zhukov.
The order paid tribute to the courage and heroism of our troops, but also reported on opposite examples, when cowardice, desertion and betrayal led to the defeat of our army with mass surrenders.
The soldiers faced a choice: continue fighting to the end, without laying down their arms, "without sparing their blood or their very lives, until complete victory over the enemy" (from the text of the military oath), or, saving their lives, surrender.
During the period of anti-Soviet ideology, a "black" myth prevailed that the mass surrender of Red Army soldiers was due to their unwillingness to die for the "hated Bolshevik regime." Therefore, NKVD troops were forced to form blocking detachments to execute Red Army soldiers, and penal companies and battalions were formed. Literally, "to overwhelm the enemy with corpses."
In fact, there's nothing new under the sun. It's a characteristic of the human psyche: no one wants to die. And manifestations of cowardice in the ranks of the military have always been combated, sometimes with great brutality.
Deserters have been punished harshly since ancient times. Barrier detachments existed as far back as the time of Ancient Persia and Alexander the Great.
The Greek historian Xenophon, in his 4th-century BC work, Cyropaedia, wrote about the rear rank in the vast army of the Persian king Cyrus the Great, whose function was to "encourage those who do their duty, restrain the faint-hearted with threats, and punish with death all who intend to turn to the rear, instilling more fear in cowards than in the enemy."
Xenophon also explains the psychological necessity of the barrier detachment:
A crowd of people, when full of confidence, evokes indomitable courage, but if people are cowards, then the more of them there are, the more terrible and panicky fear they succumb to.
In ancient Rome, there was a phenomenon known as decimation. A large unit was punished for cowardice on the battlefield by executing every tenth member, without any investigation into their personal guilt or innocence, in disgrace. Before execution, those sentenced were publicly flogged with rods. Desertion also carried the penalty of confiscation of property, death, or sale into slavery.
In the army-horde of Genghis Khan, they acted even more cruelly: for the flight of ten warriors from the battlefield, an order could follow to execute the entire hundred in which the cowards served.
In Japanese tradition, the concept of "captivity" for samurai warriors was practically nonexistent. A samurai defeated on the battlefield was expected to smile and announce his name to the victor, then commit seppuku (harakiri). A warrior who fled the battlefield condemned himself to such contempt from those around him that it precluded his and his family's continued honorary status as nobles.
Nothing changed later. Deserters were always harshly punished. There were separate units that maintained order and discipline (like the military police today) and served as barrier detachments.
Thus, in Tsarist Russia during the First World War, Cossack blocking detachments operating on horseback were formed, followed by infantry machine-gun units known as "death battalions." Regular, but more reliable, units were also assigned as blocking detachments, with orders to open fire on soldiers fleeing their positions without orders.
Barrier detachments performed similar functions during the Civil War. They were formed from units of the Cheka, special forces units (ChON), often internationalist soldiers, and detachments of former Austro-Hungarian, Latvian, Chinese, and other prisoners of war.
A Soviet poster from the Russian Civil War. L. O. Pasternak, 1919.
Great War
By NKVD order No. 00941 of July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were created in special departments of divisions and corps, and companies in special departments of armies, and battalions in fronts, which were staffed with NKVD troops.
These units and became the so-called "protective units." They had the right to organize a barrage service in order to exclude the flight of deserters, to carefully check the documents of all military personnel, to detain and detain investigators (during 12 hours) and to transfer the case to the military tribunal. To send laggards in their units, in exceptional cases, for immediate restoration of order at the front, the head of the special department received the right to shoot deserters.
The barrier detachments were also supposed to identify and destroy enemy agents and check those who had escaped from German captivity.
As a result, barrier detachments performed a vital function during the Great Patriotic War, detaining deserters and suspicious individuals (including spies, saboteurs, and Nazi agents). In critical situations, they engaged the enemy themselves. They also fought bandits, including nationalist groups in the Baltics.
During the brutal battle for Moscow, which decided the outcome of the war, Stavka, at the request of General Eremenko, commander of the Bryansk Front, on September 5, 1941, authorized the creation of barrier detachments in those divisions that had proven unstable. A week later, this practice was extended to all fronts. The detachments consisted of one battalion per division and one company per regiment.
They reported to the division commander and had vehicles for movement, several armored vehicles, and tanks. Their task was to assist commanders and maintain discipline and order within the units. They had the authority to use weapons to stop flight and eliminate those who instigated panic.
That is, their difference from the barrier detachments of special NKVD departments, which were created to combat deserters and suspicious elements, is that the army detachments were created to prevent unauthorized flight of units. They were larger (a battalion per division, not a platoon), and were staffed not by NKVD soldiers, but by Red Army soldiers. They had the authority to execute those who initiated panic and flight, but not to shoot those fleeing.
After the turning point in the war (the Battle of Kursk), the barrier detachments effectively assumed the functions of commandant companies, guarding headquarters, communication lines, and roads. On October 29, 1944, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, Stalin, the barrier detachments were disbanded due to the changing situation at the front. Their personnel were replenished by rifle units.
To stop those fleeing, they had the right to fire over the heads of those retreating, executing those who initiated the attack and those leading the line. However, these cases were not widespread, only individual ones. They could also prepare an additional defensive line in the rear to stop the retreating troops and allow them to consolidate their position. As a result, the NKVD and Red Army barrier detachments contributed to the overall Victory, faithfully fulfilling their duty.
"Penal Battalion" is a 2004 Russian television series. Based on the novel of the same name by Eduard Voldarsky, it was directed by Nikolai Dostal. It is a typical example of liberal, anti-Soviet propaganda: criminals save the Motherland, even though they were not in penal units; penal detachments execute their own en masse; the utter vilification of special officers, NKVD soldiers, and commanders, as well as the Red Army; fraternization with the Germans, etc.
Duty to defend the Fatherland
Order No. 270 distinguished between the families of rank-and-file Red Army soldiers who surrendered and those of commanders and political officers who "tear off their insignia during battle and desert to the rear or surrender to the enemy." The former were subject to the deprivation of state aid due to the relatives of defenders of the Fatherland, while family members of command personnel who showed cowardice were subject to arrest.
To those who are given more, more will be expected. This includes material support. Soviet officers received good salaries. Before the war, a platoon commander received 625 rubles, a company commander 750, a battalion commander 850, a regiment commander 1200 rubles per month, and a division commander 1600 rubles.
With the outbreak of hostilities, these salaries increased by an average of half, not counting bonuses. For example, for every aircraft shot down, our pilots received an extra thousand rubles. By comparison, the average pre-war salary in the USSR was 330 rubles per month.
Stalin is often criticized, inventing outright nonsense aimed at people with narrow horizons, such as the claim that all Soviet prisoners of war, after being liberated from Nazi camps, were sent to the Soviet Gulag or executed. In reality, liberated Red Army prisoners, after being screened by SMERSH, were in most cases sent back to the front lines to continue fighting. The same thing happened after the war ended: after screening the prisoners in filtration camps, the vast majority were sent back to the Armed Forces and the national economy.
Officers and political officers who surrendered were treated more harshly. Most often, they were demoted to privates and sent to the front lines. However, investigations yielded varying results. For example, General Muzychenko, commander of the 6th Army, captured in the Uman pocket in July 1941, was reinstated to the rank of general after an investigation, and he subsequently served as deputy commander of the Volga Military District. Meanwhile, Ponedelin, commander of the 12th Army, who surrendered in the same Uman pocket without exhausting all his resistance, was tried and executed.
Order No. 270 ordered the arrest of the families of deserters and traitors. They were sent to five-year exile in remote regions of the North and Siberia. Minors were not to be placed in prisons ("transit centers").
Punishment for treason included confiscation of the traitor's property. Military families most often lived in service housing at their place of service. This housing was not retained. Typically, housing was found for them in other locations where labor was short.
Thus, Order No. 270, like the later Order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Stalin of July 28, 1942 ("Not one step back!"), did not contain any particularly cruel measures, first applied in Soviet practice. It was intended to remind the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army of their duty to defend the Fatherland, their families and loved ones – and of the punishment for those who, wanting to preserve their lives at any cost, were prepared to violate this duty.
Under the conditions of the invasion of Hitler's "European Union," which aimed at the complete solution of the "Russian question," that is, the physical elimination of the indigenous peoples of Russian civilization, the Soviet government successfully resolved the issue of the survival of the state and the people.
Captured Red Army soldiers in open freight cars near Bryansk. November–December 1941. During such journeys, the Nazis literally froze entire trains of captured Red Army soldiers.
Appendix. Documents on the activities of barrier detachments // Toptygin A.V. Unknown Beria. Moscow, St. Petersburg, 2002.
“Report from the 3rd rank State Security Commissioner S. Milstein to the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs L. P. Beria on the actions of the Special Departments and barrier detachments of the NKVD troops of the USSR for the period from the beginning of the war to October 10, 1941.
Top secret
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF THE USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
General Commissioner for State Security
to comrade BERIA
REFERENCE
From the beginning of the war until October 10 of this year, special departments of the NKVD and barrier detachments of the NKVD troops protecting the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front.
Of these, 249 969 people and the NKVD troops guarding the rear - 407 395 military personnel were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Divisions.
Of the detainees, the Special Divisions arrested 25 878 people, the remaining 632 486 people formed into units and again sent to the front.
Among those arrested by the Special Divisions are:
Spyware - 1505
saboteurs - 308
traitors - 2621
panties and alarmists - 2643
deserters - 8772
distributors of provocative rumors - 3987
Gunners - 1671
others - 4371
Total - 25 878
According to the decisions of the Special Divisions and the sentences of the Military Tribunals, 10 201 people were shot, they were shot in front of the line - 3321 people.
Deputy Early Office of the NKVD NGO
State Commissioner security xnumx rank
Milstein
[October] 1941."
Top secret
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF THE USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
General Commissioner for State Security
to comrade BERIA
REFERENCE
From the beginning of the war until October 10 of this year, special departments of the NKVD and barrier detachments of the NKVD troops protecting the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front.
Of these, 249 969 people and the NKVD troops guarding the rear - 407 395 military personnel were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Divisions.
Of the detainees, the Special Divisions arrested 25 878 people, the remaining 632 486 people formed into units and again sent to the front.
Among those arrested by the Special Divisions are:
Spyware - 1505
saboteurs - 308
traitors - 2621
panties and alarmists - 2643
deserters - 8772
distributors of provocative rumors - 3987
Gunners - 1671
others - 4371
Total - 25 878
According to the decisions of the Special Divisions and the sentences of the Military Tribunals, 10 201 people were shot, they were shot in front of the line - 3321 people.
Deputy Early Office of the NKVD NGO
State Commissioner security xnumx rank
Milstein
[October] 1941."
So, from 657 364 detained by detachments and operational barriers of special departments, only 25 878 people were arrested, that is, 4%.
In defense of Stalingrad.
From the report of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR of 14 August 1942 of the Year “On the implementation of order No. 227 and the response of 4 Tank Army personnel to it”:
A total of 24 people were executed during the specified period. For example, squad commanders Styrkov and Dobrynin of the 414th Rifle Regiment of the 18th Rifle Division lost their nerve during the battle, abandoned their squads, and fled the battlefield. Both were detained by a barrier detachment and, by order of the Osoaviakhim, executed in front of the formation.
A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division, Ogorodnikov, self-inflicted a wound to his left hand, was convicted of the crime, and was brought to trial by a military tribunal.
Based on Order No. 227, three army barrier detachments, each with 200 men, were formed. These detachments are fully armed with rifles, automatic weapons, and light machine guns. Special operations officers from special departments have been appointed detachment commanders.
The specified detachments and barracks on 7.8.42 were detained 363 people in parts and formations in the army, of which: 93 people. out of the environment, 146 - lagged behind their parts, 52 - lost their parts, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with questionable injuries.
As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 to the recruitment department, 73 to special NKVD camps, 27 to penal companies, 2 to a medical commission, 6 people were arrested and, as indicated above, 24 people were shot in front of the formation.
A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division, Ogorodnikov, self-inflicted a wound to his left hand, was convicted of the crime, and was brought to trial by a military tribunal.
Based on Order No. 227, three army barrier detachments, each with 200 men, were formed. These detachments are fully armed with rifles, automatic weapons, and light machine guns. Special operations officers from special departments have been appointed detachment commanders.
The specified detachments and barracks on 7.8.42 were detained 363 people in parts and formations in the army, of which: 93 people. out of the environment, 146 - lagged behind their parts, 52 - lost their parts, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with questionable injuries.
As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 to the recruitment department, 73 to special NKVD camps, 27 to penal companies, 2 to a medical commission, 6 people were arrested and, as indicated above, 24 people were shot in front of the formation.
The Stalingrad Epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central Archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation. Moscow, 2000.
In accordance with the order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, 193 army barrier detachments were formed, including 16 on the Stalingrad Front (the discrepancy between this figure and the order of Lieutenant General Gordov cited above is explained by the change in the composition of the Stalingrad Front, from which a number of armies were withdrawn) and 25 on the Don.
At the same time, from 1 August to 15 in October 1942, the 140755 troops were detained by frontier detachments who fled from the front line. 3980 people were arrested from among the detainees, 1189 people were shot, 2776 people were sent to punitive companies, 185 people were sent to battalions, and 131094 people were sent back to their units.
The largest number of detentions and arrests were carried out by the barrier detachments of the Don and Stalingrad Fronts. On the Don Front, 36109 people were detained, 736 were arrested, 433 were executed, 1056 were sent to penal companies, 33 to penal battalions, and 32933 were returned to their units and transit points.
On the Stalingrad Front, 15649 people were detained, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions, 14833 people were returned to their units and transit points.
Captured commander of the 12th Army of the Red Army, Major General P. G. Ponedelin (center) and commander of the 13th Rifle Corps of the 12th Army, Major General N. K. Kirillov. Uman area. August 1941.
In early August 1941, south of Uman, German troops surrounded 20 divisions of the 6th and 12th Armies of the Southern Front. Approximately 55 Soviet soldiers and officers were captured, including Generals Ponedelin and Kirillov. The Germans widely exploited the surrender of such high-ranking officers, including this photograph, for propaganda purposes. By Order No. 270 of the Supreme Command Headquarters of August 16, 1941, Ponedelin and Kirillov were declared malicious deserters and traitors to the Motherland. On October 13, 1941, they were sentenced to death in absentia. The captured generals were held in German concentration camps. It is known that while in captivity, the generals behaved honorably and did not collaborate with the Germans, despite promises and known decisions made against them in the USSR. On April 29, 1945, they were liberated by American troops. Ponedelin was offered service in the US Army, but he declined. On May 3, they were handed over to the Soviets.
A few months after the liberation, the generals lived freely, but on December 30, 1945 were arrested. On August 25, 1950, they were convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR under the article “treason to the military personnel”, sentenced to capital punishment and executed on the same day. They were rehabilitated by the same Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in 1956 for the lack of corpus delicti in their actions.
Information