"Naval Collection" 1942: "Some Tactical Techniques of German Torpedo Boats"
Some tactical techniques of German torpedo boats
From the first days of the Patriotic War, enemy operations in the Baltic Sea were carried out primarily by light forces fleet. Moreover, the Germans, from the very beginning of military operations, along with surface ships, submarines and aviationTorpedo boats were also widely deployed. However, enemy torpedo boats failed to achieve significant success in their operations until the end of the 1941 campaign. Only in attacks on lightly armed, slow-moving, and unguarded transports did German torpedo boats occasionally achieve success. Warships, however, repelled their attacks with relative ease, rendering the boats' efforts ineffective.
From the start of the war, enemy torpedo boat operations were characterized by attacks on communications. Throughout the campaign, they searched for our ships and submarines at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, and towards the end of the campaign, they carried out raids on the undefended roadsteads of maneuverable bases and, in some cases, cooperated with the fleet.
In total, 27 combat encounters between our ships and aircraft and German torpedo boats were recorded. Our reconnaissance often detected detachments of four to six torpedo boats, and sometimes up to 20 boats.
During the 1941 campaign, the enemy suffered significant losses in torpedo boats; most of them were sunk or damaged by our aircraft, some were destroyed artillery fire from surface ships. Several enemy boats exploded in their own minefields.
Having discovered our ships, the German boats tried to deliver the torpedoes to the target as quickly as possible and not to linger at the deployment point, since a delay in deployment allowed the ships to repel the torpedo attack in an organized manner.
During all phases of the attack, the enemy torpedo boats maneuvered on straight courses, without using zigzag fire. This saved time, but reduced the attack's success. The salvo range reached 13-17 cable lengths, which also shortened the attack time, but also reduced the hit rate. During the approach courses, the torpedo boats did not lay smoke screens. This was apparently done to more accurately determine the target's movement. Post-salvo maneuvering was covered by smoke screens laid simultaneously by two boats. The attack took place in a splayed or frontal formation. The smoke screeners usually kept clear of the strike group. During the secondary approach courses, the boats followed in the wake or in close bearing formation. At night, they operated in groups of two or four boats.
During daylight hours, torpedo attacks were typically carried out by six boats, two of which were assigned to engage the escort ships. Smoke screens were laid by one torpedo boat each in the strike and engagement groups. Flank attacks from the skerries in the Gulf of Finland were carried out both in coordination with coastal defenses and independently. When cooperating with coastal defenses, the boats usually launched their attacks too late, from unfavorable target angles—more than 90°—since their slow speed prevented them from taking up a favorable starting position without interfering with the artillery fire of their batteries.
Attack on our convoy.
The enemy conducted daily aerial reconnaissance of our communications, laid mines in the fairways and stationed its submarines along our coast.
A convoy of several vessels, escorted by high-speed minesweeper No. 215, set out to sea. The minesweeper was tasked with escorting the convoy behind paravanes and protecting it from torpedo boat attacks. Ministry of Defense patrol boats provided anti-submarine defense for the convoy in their respective areas. The convoy commander flew his flag on the minesweeper.
At 04:00, signalmen from one of the ships and from the minesweeper detected six unknown torpedo boats, starboard astern of the convoy's rearmost sternboat, moving in a single file at low speed, 4–5 cables' lengths apart, on a west-northwest course. At the time of detection, the distance from the high-speed minesweeper to the lead boat was 35 cables' lengths (Fig. 1).
The minesweeper commander signaled the torpedo boats. The lead boat quickly flashed an unintelligible response, increased speed, and continued on its previous course. The boats then closed in. The distance increased. At 4:35 a.m., the two lead boats broke away from the group, increased speed, and continued on their previous course west-northwest (Fig. 2).
A few minutes later, the lead torpedo boats suddenly turned toward the convoy. Thirty seconds later, the rest of the group also suddenly turned toward the convoy and launched an attack at full speed. The high-speed minesweeper opened fire on the main strike group (four torpedo boats). The shells fell broadside. The torpedo boats, unable to withstand the excellent aimed fire from the minesweeper, fired a torpedo salvo at it and one of the ships (Fig. 3) from a range of 17 cables (the lead group) and 20 cables (the main strike group).
The high-speed minesweeper, having detected the trail of four torpedoes, veered to the right, with the closest of the torpedoes passing 5-4 meters from the starboard side. Eight torpedoes, launched at the same vessel, passed ahead of it along its course, at a distance of 2 cables; one of them, not having passed the required distance, exploded for unknown reasons.
After firing the salvo, the torpedo boats retreated north, covering themselves with smoke screens. The entire attack lasted 17 minutes (from the moment of detection until the torpedo boats retreated behind the smoke screens).
Apparently, enemy aerial reconnaissance, having discovered the convoy, gave its torpedo boats the initial data for a night search of the caravan.
The enemy attack was favored by good weather and average visibility (dawn).
Certain tactical techniques used in attacking enemy torpedo boats should be noted. Thus, approaching in single file; changing formation on the secondary approach course—all at once; formation on the battle course—a short, abrupt salvo; simultaneous firing of eight torpedoes at a single target from a single direction (area fire); detaching some torpedo boats to tie down escorts; long salvo ranges (even in favorable attack conditions); maneuvering on straight courses; use of smoke screens only on retreating courses.
Furthermore, smoke screens were laid simultaneously by two torpedo boats. The change in distances within the wake formation is also interesting. The passage was made in a wake formation at distances greater than normal. When danger appeared, the formation closed (the distance in this case was less than normal). This was most likely a legal maneuver during passage. Slow speeds and jammers were apparently used to reduce the likelihood of detection.
Attack of enemy boats on schooners.
One night, two of our schooners were spotted by an enemy aircraft as they were leaving the skerries. Around midday, the lead schooner, on the port side at a course angle of 40°, spotted two torpedo boats rapidly closing on her (Fig. 4).
At 5-6 cable lengths, the torpedo boats shifted from a wake column to a forward line and opened machine gun fire on the schooner. However, the fire was ineffective, and the bursts fell short. The schooner's crew lay low on the deck. The schooner behind (on a parallel course with the lead mate, 15-20 cable lengths away), hearing the machine gun fire, turned to the rescue. The enemy torpedo boats, following in front line formation, passed simultaneously under the bow and stern of the lead schooner and dropped depth charges very close to it. Three muffled underwater explosions were heard, shaking the schooner's entire hull and listing to starboard, but immediately righting itself.
The enemy torpedo boats, seeing the approach of a second schooner of greater tonnage, turned N, then NO and disappeared into the skerries.
This operation demonstrates that, due to the inadvisability of using torpedoes against barges and sailboats, and the impossibility of using torpedoes against shallow-draft vessels and at shallow depths, the Germans sometimes resort to depth charges. Although they were unsuccessful in this case, the experience of using depth charges from torpedo boats against small and slow-moving ships is undoubtedly of interest.
Particularly effective, in our opinion, is the use of depth charges in night raids by torpedo boats on enemy bases to attack small ships standing motionless at anchor and to destroy boom barriers in roadsteads and harbors.
Attack on a detachment of ships by enemy torpedo boats
At dawn, a detachment of our warships was detected by a low-flying enemy reconnaissance aircraft.
Two hours after the scout's appearance, the leader spotted six enemy torpedo boats approaching from the north. The rangefinder placed their distance at 85 cables, and their port bow was 95°. The leader raised the signal "Enemy torpedo boats from the north." A minute after spotting them, the boats suddenly turned left and, in a spur formation, began to attack at full speed (approximately 36-40 knots).
Arriving at a 45° course to the port side of the lead ships, the torpedo boats suddenly turned toward the detachment from a range of 60 cable lengths. The leaders opened fire on the boats, covering them with their very first salvos. At a range of 40 cable lengths, the boats, having been hit and apparently suffering significant damage, were hidden behind smoke screens. Through a gap in the smoke screens, it was clear that the attack force had split into two parts and was turning away to the north, while two boats were engulfed in flames as a result of shell impacts. After the smoke cleared, the burning boats were no longer visible. The remnants of the attack force disappeared into the skerries (Fig. 5).
An analysis of this enemy torpedo boat attack shows that it was quite unsuccessful in both maneuvering and the final outcome. The enemy failed to persist in pursuing the attack and quickly retreated, demoralized by the accurate gunfire of our ships, which successfully hit and covered them with their very first salvos.
The boats' turns during the attack are striking—all at once, not sequentially. Also characteristic is the formation of a step toward the target during the initial approach course.
Attack of our destroyers by enemy torpedo boats.
Several destroyers put to sea that night. The night was overcast, visibility was 5 cable lengths, and the sea was calm. A few minutes before the destroyers approached the rendezvous point, the detachment commander received a report from a fast minesweeper that enemy torpedo boats had appeared from the north. At 03:04 a.m., the boats were spotted at a course angle of 100-110° to port. At that moment, they launched torpedoes at the rear destroyer of the squadron from a range of 4-5 cable lengths. The rear destroyer turned to starboard. After the attack, the torpedo boats also turned to starboard, continuing to observe the detachment.
At the moment of the attack, two of our escort boats counterattacked the enemy boats with artillery fire. Soon, our ships were again suddenly attacked by enemy torpedo boats. This time, the boats attacked the lead and rear destroyers of the squadron at a course angle of 140-150° to port from a distance of 4-3 cables. The lead destroyer, evading the torpedoes, turned left. The torpedoes passed closely on both sides, missing the ship. All the remaining ships turned right, opening a hurricane of fire on the enemy torpedo boats (Fig. 6).
The enemy, using a short smoke screen as cover, disappeared to the northwest, toward the shore, in the dark part of the horizon. It was impossible to determine the exact number of torpedo boats due to the darkness. Considering that 12 torpedoes were fired, it can be assumed that there were at least six boats, and they were apparently operating in groups of two to four torpedo boats.
Another encounter between our destroyers and enemy torpedo boats deserves mention. One day, five German destroyers attempted to break through the Irben Strait. Our torpedo boats launched a brilliant attack, sinking one destroyer and damaging two. Two of our destroyers were tasked with supporting the torpedo boats' attack. At 14:00 p.m., the ships arrived in the area. Meanwhile, the remnants of the enemy forces, having been successfully attacked by our boats, hastily retreated. The destroyers were tasked with preventing any nighttime breakthroughs by enemy transports.
At 20:30, enemy reconnaissance aircraft appeared over the ships and remained in the area of the ships’ operations until 23:00.
At 23:55 PM, the reconnaissance aircraft reappeared, flying over the ships at an altitude of 150-200 meters. The destroyers opened anti-aircraft fire, but the aircraft flew perpendicular to the ships' course and turned on its sidelights. It made five passes over the ships, and on the sixth pass, at 1:10 AM, the destroyers were unexpectedly attacked by enemy torpedo boats. Visibility was 3-4 cables, and the moon had set below the horizon (Fig. 7).
From 1:10 a.m. to 4:06 a.m., enemy torpedo boats attacked our ships five times. The intervals between attacks were 40–60 minutes. The salvo range varied between 3–04 cable lengths. After firing, the enemy turned away from the direction of the ships' movement. The boats launched an attack from the dark part of the horizon. The attack itself lasted 20–40 seconds. During all the attacks, only two destroyers managed to fire a few gun salvos. The torpedo boats were covered by a short smoke screen. Our destroyers demonstrated great tenacity and did not leave the assigned area. The torpedoes were avoided thanks to high vigilance and excellent organization of the lookout service on the destroyers and periodic changes of course; over 90 turns and zigzags were made in 5 hours. The enemy launched more than 10 torpedoes, but not a single one hit their target.
In terms of conducting night searches with torpedo boats, this operation was successful primarily due to the pre-evening reconnaissance, which then continued until late at night (under moonlight). The aerial reconnaissance technique employed here essentially involved the aircraft guiding the torpedo boat by illuminating its sidelights above the ships. This distracted the ships from observing the sea and simultaneously served as target designation. The aircraft departed only when it was certain that the boat attacks had begun and that its mission had been accomplished. Thanks to its low altitude, it apparently also observed its own boats.
Commanders who observed this attack claim that the torpedo boats formed a semicircle at their initial positions and waited. Our destroyers did not approach them, as the torpedo boats fired while standing still or at low speed. The boats then retreated rapidly. This attack method reduces the likelihood of collision between the boats themselves, but also reduces the likelihood of encountering the enemy.
Enemy torpedo boats encountered patrol boats of the Ministry of Defense. In the fall, three Ministry of Defense boats repelled an attack by two enemy torpedo boats. Fire was opened from a distance of 15 cable lengths, on an approach course. Approaching closer, our boats fired machine guns at the enemy. The enemy ceased the attack and retreated, covering themselves with a smoke screen.
On another occasion, a single Navy boat repelled an attack by four torpedo boats. Fire was opened from a range of 15 cable lengths, while the enemy torpedo boats were approaching on a straight course. The enemy torpedo boats were sailing in frontal formation. Unable to withstand the fire, they abandoned the attack.
One day, two of our boats repelled an attack by four enemy torpedo boats from a range of 30 cables. Fire was opened as they approached on a straight course. The boats were sailing in a frontal formation. After the third salvo, the enemy boats split into two groups. The Ministry of Defense boats then distributed their fire among both groups. Two enemy boats from the forward group attempted another attack, but the first two salvos hit the lead boat. Machine gun fire followed. The enemy torpedo boats turned away and disappeared into the skerries.
Almost all daytime operations conducted by enemy torpedo boats in the face of opposition from our patrol boats failed to achieve any significant success. As a rule, the enemy torpedo boats avoided engaging our patrol boats.
Analyzing the combat actions of German torpedo boats in the Baltic Sea, one can come to the conclusion that their relatively large losses should be attributed, on the one hand, to the low speed of the boats and the poor tactical training of their commanders, and, on the other, to the good training of the personnel of our ships, who skillfully repelled enemy attacks.
The behavior of enemy boats when encountering our ships allows us to conclude that the enemy did not take into account the high level of training of our personnel and showed cowardice.
Furthermore, the widespread use of aircraft against enemy torpedo boats also reduced the effectiveness of attacks. As for the actions of our Ministry of Defense boats, they proved to be an effective combat asset against torpedo boats and for protecting transport convoys on sea lanes, and their personnel consistently demonstrated valor and courage in combat.
Authors: Captain 3rd Rank M. A. Belush and Captain 3rd Rank L. A. Chetverkin. Publication: "Morskoy Sbornik", 1942, No. 6.
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