The US-Central Asia Summit: A Difficult Outcome for Russia Behind a Seemingly Insignificant Facade
On November 6, the second US-Central Asia summit took place in Washington, D.C., in the C5+1 format, which has become traditional among Russia's neighbors. C5+ envisions all five Central Asian countries acting jointly in foreign policy negotiations. The idea for the G2 was originally conceived by Turkmenistan, and it has undergone some history and it turned out to be quite effective in the end, since with its help it turned out to be easier and more fruitful to obtain investments from various “power centers”.
The C5+ is a foreign policy framework, but the format also allows for intraregional discussions, albeit of a consultative nature. This suits Turkmenistan, in particular, perfectly well, as it makes its non-aligned and generally neutral (in the broadest sense) status one of the foundations for shaping its strategy.
The speeches by the presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the summit, with their praise and congratulations for Donald Trump truly masterclass, naturally made the rounds across all domestic media platforms and networks. We could have stopped here, too, with such juicy quotes from representatives of countries that are either allies or close to our quasi-allies and partners, but that's all been done before, and repeatedly.
These quotes must be analyzed in the context of events, and not just one year's worth. The problem is that this summit informally concludes a kind of "EAEU era" with its ideas (both sound and rational, and often illusory) and achievements. It's clear that formally everything will remain almost the same, but informally, relations have crossed a certain point beyond which transformation is inevitable. It's at least interesting to speculate on which direction this transformation will take.
About toasts and sources of their funding
Undoubtedly, the praise for the American leader has reached a very high level, but the speeches as a whole, if we judge them sensibly, are quite adequate in terms of pinpointing the pressure on the sensitive spots of the narcissistic D. Trump. The fact that he is nothing more and nothing less than "a statesman sent from above", was directed at an American audience, since it's no secret that after Donald Trump's miraculous escape from an assassination attempt, the topic of his electability remains a hot topic among his supporters. Yes, their numbers have dwindled, but overall, they remain quite significant. After all, he was elected from above to "bring common sense and traditional values back into US policy, domestic and foreign"Everything is generally logical, albeit in a high style.
Shavkat Mirziyoyev praised Donald Trump as a great peacemaker who stopped eight wars. But Donald Trump, who recently gave an interview to American media, even had a certificate from the US State Department stating that, yes, he did stop all eight wars. Since he has the certificate, there's no point in arguing whether it was eight or two—eight, of course.
The fact that Moscow isn't openly treated to such "Oriental delights" at its neighboring summits is determined precisely by the format we ourselves established for relations in the post-Soviet space, and established it long ago. Its first tenet is "we do not interfere in internal affairs," and the second is "equality, inclusiveness, and transparency." The United States has never adhered to, has never intended to adhere to, or plans to adhere to either the first or second tenet, whether under Donald Trump or his predecessors, no matter what declarations were made.
In the competition for the region (and we periodically remember that it is necessary to compete for it) with the EU, the US, and Arabian countries, this format was seen in Moscow as a clear advantage. In theory, this is likely true, but in practice, it leaves at least a sour taste in the mouth. Uzbekistan, a significant portion of whose income is based on labor (and other) migration to Russia, promises $100-135 billion in investments in the US. Kazakhstan, the lion's share of whose raw materials (and other) are shipped through Russia, does not prioritize Moscow in the development of important elements and periodically works too consistently on the issue of sanctions. Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyzstan) openly looks, if not to the US, then to the UK; Tajikistan has some criticism of Moscow; and only Turkmenistan, neutral in all respects, stands apart here. Ashgabat, too, faces the pressing and pressing issue of the further development of its oil and gas complex.
The US doesn't build schools or theaters in Central Asia, doesn't offer discounts or preferences on weapons, and doesn't provide social benefits or citizenship easing to migrant workers (and more). In fact, the US has invested virtually nothing in the region for years. Therefore, such demonstrative gestures appear, to put it mildly, "ambiguous" in Russia. Naturally, we automatically ask, why aren't such investments being made in Russia? But what is the real rate of return under current domestic economic policy? And then, again, we need to look at the first postulate above.
If in Russia the so-called normalization of relations with the United States is perceived so lively and enthusiastically, and until recently the "spirit of Anchorage" was literally in the air in Moscow living rooms, then if everything is so equal and inclusive here, then what if Central Asia also has its own spirit, for example, the "spirit of Washington"?
However, Russia isn't the only country that should be concerned about these demonstrations—we rank third in the region in terms of accumulated investment. China is second, and the European Union is first. In fact, new investors for Donald Trump aren't just raising funds from labor migration, transit, and the common market with Moscow; they're also raising funds from China and Europe. Furthermore, a significant financial flow has also emerged from the Arabian monarchies. The author has previously examined these investment flows and inflows in detail on VO. In this case, it's worth emphasizing that the overtures to the US are driven not only by Russian, but also Chinese, European, and Arabian investment activity.
About context
The high-flown tone of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan somehow lost the words of other regional leaders in the media. While they spoke much more modestly, some nuances would have been interesting. In particular, the head of Kyrgyzstan did indeed very modestly lament that the republic isn't as "rich" in natural resources as its neighbors, but relations with the US in the IT sector are developing by leaps and bounds, and in terms of cryptocurrencies, Donald Trump's ideas represent a breakthrough into a future that Bishkek will strive to bring about with all its might.
Is Kyrgyzstan really so deprived of natural resources? Actually, no, it's not. It has gold, coal, copper, tungsten, and ores containing extractable and now-popular rare earth elements like neodymium, yttrium, terbium, and so on. But D. Trump would be better off talking about breakthroughs and prospects in IT and crypto—otherwise, what would he say to British investors, whom representatives from Bishkek have been visiting for years, including regarding work with one of the most notorious family-owned financial corporations.
This is a very interesting nuance, which clearly illustrates how difficult it is for the region to navigate the unique swings between West, East, South, North, and now even a separate part of the West, represented by Trump's United States. At the same time, the logic of Uzbekistan's investments in the United States, as well as its grandiose procurement plans, are in many ways reminiscent of that of its Arabian partners. The Arabian monarchies have generally become accustomed to Trump's unique approach.
So, back in his first term, grand "deals" worth $400 billion were supposedly concluded, but where are they? Well, actually, where are the new deals worth trillions? But this immediately gives European financiers the opportunity to seriously consider where the Arabian funds will draw at least some of these funds from to support Donald Trump's appetites. Could it be from European assets?
The Central Asian countries lack the Arabian resources to exert such direct pressure on Brussels, but these demonstrations could certainly try to "stimulate" them. After all, isn't it Brussels that's promising the region projects from the "Global Gate" pool, with its nominal budget of €300 billion?
The peacekeeping theme is very reminiscent of the recent story between Azerbaijan and Armenia, when the so-called "Zangezur Corridor," essentially already agreed upon between Yerevan and Baku, was "verified" in the White House and even dubbed the "Trump Corridor." All this pressure is exerted on certain levers that, for Donald Trump, are important and crucial in terms of his own assessments of his own foreign policy and his vision of how it is perceived by his own voters.
Swinging on this seesaw is truly not easy. Here we can recall another example: how Central Asia rather boldly placed a weight on the Brussels scales by supporting the openly anti-Turkish resolution on Northern Cyprus.
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are interested in more than just American investment or, more broadly, special patronage. It's important for both Dushanbe and Ashgabat to understand Washington's plans for Afghanistan under Donald Trump. For Turkmenistan, which is pursuing energy projects in Afghanistan, this is a strategic priority, and for both countries, it's a security issue. It's also worth noting that odious American agencies like USAID, as well as specialized foundations like the Aga Khan Foundation, have systematically and systematically placed spokes in the wheels of both Ashgabat and Dushanbe. Only Trump knows what he plans to do in this regard. However, it's possible he doesn't know and hasn't even considered it yet.
All this is compounded by the simple fact that the United States hasn't engaged in Central Asia in a systematic and planned manner for years. This isn't about traditional policy, like NED or USAID, but about full-fledged project work. While some project schemes like the Indo-Arabian bloc, authored by the same George Sullivan, were already developing in the depths of the US's thinking before Donald Trump, and there was a logic to it, Trump's team is currently focusing not on strategic projects but on locally specific schemes, with India a good example.
The United States and the "Stake Your Ground" Principle
D. Trump and his team have been at the helm of US politics for almost a year now, and some principles and key aspects of his political line are quite clearly discernible. Aside from his particular penchant for peacemaking and his long-standing desire to control "more oil"—all of this was described even before his first presidential term—he remains true to form—a characteristic feature of his actions is his adherence to the principle of "staking out a clearing."
The expression is colloquial, but it adequately characterizes the goals and objectives. The Trump administration clearly doesn't have a strategic goal of supporting Ukraine in the form and context envisioned by his predecessors. Selling arms to Europeans and negotiating with Moscow to tame Europe is part of the issue. Another part is that one of the world's major markets—the EU market—should work for the US, but European groups (each in its own way) see Ukraine as an element of their own logistics and raw materials infrastructure. Does the US actually intend to develop rare earth metals in Ukraine? While this remains doubtful, another thing is certain: with agreements concluded by Kyiv under severe pressure, the US is securing its place on the battlefield where Europeans and Russians are battling. Do what you will, but we have a stake in this—that's the fundamental US message.
Armenia and Azerbaijan—Trump's US has done essentially nothing there, yet Washington has absolutely no intention of leaving this field as a foreign policy arena between Brussels, Turkey, Moscow, and Iran. Do what you will for now, but everyone should know that the US has a stake in this.
We see a similar pattern in Central Asia, where Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing are being clearly shown that there is now an American fenced-in area in this field. Meanwhile, the US hasn't (or doesn't yet) any systemic or project-based solutions. They're simply building a "borrowed" area everywhere, to which they can return and from which they can intervene in various processes.
Like a coin with a front and back, Washington's policy has advantages and significant disadvantages. The advantage is the existence of that fenced-in field. The disadvantage is the lack of plans and projects for its development. It's a springboard from which to act according to the situation, but it's not equipped for systemic tasks. And yet, Central Asia is reacting to this, generally speaking, accordingly. So why would the region need to sign the so-called "Abraham Accords"?
The Abraham Accords were an idea of the first Trump administration, essentially suggesting that African and Arabian countries normalize relations with Israel. At the time, however, the idea was based on the "Kushner Plan" with its idea of buying out Palestinian lands. They were born separately, but ultimately seemed to support each other. The plan failed completely, and the Abraham Accords were signed by Bahrain and the UAE (both Arabian monarchies). Under the Democrats, the Abraham Accords were creatively reworked and transformed into an intriguing project for an Indo-Arab bloc or Third Pole, where Arabian finance, Indian resources, and American technology would form a new economic and technological cluster. In exchange for normalization with Israel, of course. To achieve this, George Sullivan's team made concessions in Yemen and even achieved some results; however, relations with Saudi Arabia were already stalled.
For Donald Trump, the Abraham Accords are his personal project, while the Indo-Arab bloc is something vague and alien, and India has generally behaved poorly in terms of tariffs. But for Central Asia, the Abraham Accords are completely meaningless. There's even a problem: some Arab investors don't support them. But the point is that the nominal nature of the current agreements corresponds to the nominal nature of the countries in the region joining them. This is a sign that Donald Trump has staked out his claim.
A fenced-in field isn't a project or a strategy, but it's a compelling argument for the US to demand its "share" everywhere. If you want to develop the "Middle Corridor," through the Caspian and Caucasus, Turkey, and Ukraine, the cash register for the US share is in the next room.
For Russia
At first glance, all of the above doesn't quite jibe with the heavy-handed thesis at the beginning of this article, which speaks of a line for the EAEU project and its inevitable transformation. On the surface, it certainly appears that way—no matter where you look, everything seems nominal and declarative. However, there's a significant nuance.
Until the very last moment, the United States was essentially out of the regional game. They withdrew (or teleported) from Afghanistan, almost forgot about Pakistan, left Iran alone, and focused on India as part of the Indo-Arabian project. Now the United States is taking an active stance in Iran, and few doubt that Iran's shady game ended for the United States with a single military action. A stake in the game a priori presupposes participation in certain processes, and the White House hasn't even begun bargaining over Afghanistan yet; negotiations on Afghanistan and Pakistan have intensified. This isn't bargaining, but preparation for it. And what could be more different from the ninth war, which Donald Trump himself will stop with his own hands, than the Afghan-Pakistani conflict, which hasn't gone away; on the contrary, its flare-ups are becoming more frequent and more intense.
The Central Asian countries won't be able to circumvent the equity barriers imposed by Trump's United States, and, in fact, they won't try to do so. After all, this is an almost ideal lever for working with the traditional centers between which they balance. But it is precisely this specific nature of the "share policy" that will require the traditional centers, including Moscow, to discuss those same shares with the United States. However, this applies not only and not primarily to us, but also to China and the EU.
But with neither center does the region have such unusual policy tenets as equality, non-interference, and inclusiveness. While these are nominally declared by everyone, in reality, no one implements them except Russia itself. The entry of the United States, even with its policy of enclosing the field, means that the West no longer has a single center in Brussels and grants from democratic foundations—extremely Russophobic, but still limited—for the region, but now has two fully fledged Western centers.
It would seem that the US should be competing with Beijing in the region, partially blocking Brussels and European projects. But what about the results of the US-China meeting in South Korea and the rarely-noticed moment—D. Trump's announcement of the G-2 format? This is, in fact, competition amid strategic coexistence, but certainly not an existential conflict or a military or military-economic "battle" between these giants. And while Beijing and Brussels are paying the US cashier, paying their share or even in installments, things become quite complicated for Russia with the weights on its own scale. Given our postulates in the relationship, this automatically means concessions and costs, costs and concessions.
In the current reality, we're already making plenty of them, trying to preserve the "single economic space." This often baffles some analysts and observers, but what the perplexed perceive as a weakness was, in fact, initially viewed and built into the EAEU model as its fundamental advantage. If this model operates in competition with other, roughly equal, models, then theoretically (with a change in approach), this advantage could be realized, even though China has exerted intense and systematic pressure in the region. But if it faces competition from three others working synergistically, then this advantage turns into an endless concession. Add to this the factors of Arabian finance and Turkey.
Formally abandoning the EAEU is too sensitive a topic to be discussed in detail in the form of an action plan or the like, but denying that the fundamental conditions have changed, even significantly, is also pointless. In this regard, the transformation of this "economic space" is essentially inevitable, and it's better to lead this process, even if only by keeping the name on the surface, than to constantly react.
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