About the Admiral Nakhimov cruiser in light of the Northern Fleet’s capabilities in 2035–2040.
In previous articles I presented a forecast for the composition of multi-purpose underwater, surface и air forces of the CSF for the period up to 2040. The conclusion is sad - the once most powerful fleet The USSR is demonstrating intense "negative growth," rapidly declining to the size of a fleet. By 2040, it can be expected to retain the following (based on the average of previous forecasts, which can be characterized as rather optimistic):
Project 885 and 885M nuclear submarines "Yasen/Yasen M" - 8 units;
Project 677 Lada diesel-electric submarines - 8 units;
TARKR "Admiral Nakhimov" - 1 unit;
Large anti-submarine ship (now a frigate) of Project 1155.1M “Admiral Chabanenko” - 1 unit;
Project 22350 frigates – 6 units;
Project 20380 corvettes – 3 units;
Project 12700 minesweepers – 10 units.
Aviation The fleet will be represented by:
Su-30SM2 – 24 units;
MiG-29KR/KUBR – 22 units;
Tu-142 anti-submarine version – 8-12 units;
Il-38/Il-38N – if the modernization program is not resumed, then most likely only Il-38N will remain in service, that is, no more than 4 units;
Anti-submarine helicopters Ka-27M and, with great luck, Ka-65 – 18-20 units.
In addition to this, there will be a certain number of rescue helicopters, reconnaissance and, possibly, light attack UAVs, similar to the existing Forpost, Tu-142MR relay aircraft, some other auxiliary aircraft, and, essentially, that’s all.
About the tasks of the KSF
In the good old days, when floppy disks were big and monitors were small, the Red Banner Northern Fleet possessed extremely impressive capabilities. During the late Soviet era, the Navy had three major objectives:
1. Ensuring the use of strategic naval nuclear forces in the form of a retaliatory nuclear missile strike;
2. Destruction of enemy SSBNs in their combat duty areas;
3. Defeating enemy groups of naval multi-purpose forces.
And the Northern Fleet possessed sufficient capabilities to successfully accomplish these tasks within its area of responsibility. They could ensure the stability of their SSBNs, defeat US and NATO naval groups concentrated in the Norwegian Sea, and, who knows, even break through the Farrero-Iceland anti-submarine line and deploy attack submarine squadrons to the Atlantic.
Of course, the above wasn't guaranteed to happen—the US and NATO navies, preparing for a confrontation in northern waters, were numerous and capable. In some areas, the Americans enjoyed technical superiority, as evidenced by the Sea Wolf submarines. Nevertheless, in the event of Armageddon, a clash between the Red Banner Northern Fleet and the US and NATO navies would have been a battle of, if not equal, then at least comparable in strength.
Alas, those days are long gone. Let's try to estimate what the Red Banner Northern Fleet will be capable of by 2040.
About the enemy
During the Soviet era, the general concept of the US and NATO regarding military operations in northern waters was as follows:
1. The task of destroying Soviet SSBNs was assigned to submarines, which, while operating in the Barents Sea and other patrol areas of our “strategists” during peacetime, were supposed to escort them and destroy them at the very beginning of the conflict.
2. The tasks of destroying the surface forces of the Baltic Fleet and striking land targets were assigned to carrier-based aviation and cruise missiles Submarines. A submarine-launched carrier force consisting of a pair of aircraft carriers and escort ships was to enter Norwegian waters. The carriers were to carry aircraft with overload—a significant number of them would fly to Norwegian airfields and operate from them. Essentially, the carriers acted as a "floating rearguard," providing their aircraft with maintenance and ammunition, but avoiding attack from the surface and air forces of the Northern Fleet.
As for cruise missile strikes, it would be most convenient to launch them from submarines in the Norwegian Sea, which would achieve acceptable carrier safety, but would still increase the flight distance to targets on the coast and deep in the USSR.
Thus, the US and NATO planned for their fleets' surface forces to operate in the Norwegian Sea, avoiding the Soviet Union's heavy anti-ship missiles while maintaining the ability to sink our ships with air strikes using tanker aircraft, "jump airfields," and other means. At the same time, the concentration of surface forces, some submarine forces, base patrol aircraft, and other underwater surveillance assets would create a powerful barrier against our SSNs and SSGNs, as well as hinder the operations of Tu-142 anti-submarine warfare aircraft over the Norwegian Sea. If the surface squadrons of the Northern Fleet had advanced into the Norwegian Sea, the US and NATO navies would have gained a distinct advantage, as our ships would then be deprived of the cover and support of light fleet forces and a significant portion of land-based aviation.
At the same time, American submarines would have continued to operate in the Barents Sea. Generally speaking, nuclear submarines alone are incapable of withstanding the systematic counteraction of surface, submarine, and air forces. But the Americans were relying, firstly, on their technical superiority (which they had, since the USSR was catching up in terms of submarine stealth), and on the reasonable assumption that the destruction of SSBNs before they used nuclear weapons weapons will compensate for any losses of the "multi-purpose" submarine.
As far as I know, the Americans did not plan to invade our northern shores with surface squadrons, at least not until the main forces of the CSF were destroyed.
Overall, this US and NATO strategy appears quite rational; it is not outdated and could well be implemented today.
Note: Many, when discussing a possible war in the North, cite climate as our ally. They say that American carrier-based aircraft don't fly in cold weather, that catapults on aircraft carriers freeze, and so on. I won't dissuade anyone from this, but I will remind you that Russia will never initiate large-scale military action against the United States first and on its own initiative.
The reason is simple: such actions risk a nuclear missile Armageddon, in which Russia will cease to exist as a state and a nation. More than half of our population lives in just one hundred of the largest Russian cities, and they would be consumed by nuclear fire less than an hour after the missiles take off. Meanwhile, the Russian armed forces have no chance of delivering a "disarming" strike that would destroy the US nuclear potential before it could be used.
Accordingly, Russia has no chance of avoiding a full-scale retaliatory nuclear missile strike. Therefore, for us, a war with the US is a one-way ticket, so why would we buy it voluntarily? Of course, if we are forced to, if we are attacked (even a non-nuclear one) that we cannot repel, we will certainly use our nuclear arsenal. But Russia will never be the instigator of a large-scale conflict with the US.
At the same time, the United States, which has long been considering the concept of a "disarming" strike, may at some point become convinced that it is capable of delivering one and thereby preventing Russia from using its nuclear potential. Or it may decide that our leadership has become so weakened that it will not respond with nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Therefore, if anyone were to start a war between the United States and Russia, it would be the United States.
But if they decide to unleash it, then, of course, they will do so at a time convenient for themselves and their armed forces.
Ensuring combat stability of SSBNs
This is the most important task of the Red Banner Northern Fleet, as it will undoubtedly be home to some of our naval strategic nuclear forces by 2040. Today, the Northern Fleet has eight SSBNs, including five Project 667BDRM Delfin-class submarines, one Project 955 Borei-class submarine, and two Project 955A Borei-A submarines.
Most likely, by 2040, the Dolphins, having served their time with honor, will leave the fleet, but they will be replaced by two Project 955A SSBNs currently under construction. It is quite possible that one or two more, or even three more advanced Project 955AM, strategic submarines will be delivered.
To ensure their combat stability, it is necessary, at a minimum, to establish control of our near-sea zone, preventing enemy nuclear submarines and patrol aircraft from entering it. This will prevent enemy multipurpose nuclear submarines from lying in wait and tailing our SSBNs as they leave their bases, mining their approaches, etc. Furthermore, it will be crucial to establish a search and destruction capability for enemy nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea and further east, along their deployment routes and in SSBN combat patrol areas.
The CSF, even with the reduced strength I predict for the late 2030s, could attempt to address this challenge: the CSF admirals will still have some trump cards. Chief among these are the Project 677 Lada-class nuclear submarines, which, if brought up to technical specifications, will be able to welcome American submariners on Virginia-class submarines, just as our Halibut-class submarines once welcomed the first-generation American Los Angeles-class submarines.
And what happened? A Los Angeles-class submarine is sailing through the depths of the seas washing our coastline, all silent and invulnerable. It's undetected, splendidly isolated, because the world's best American sonar system can't hear anything. And then—out of the blue—someone taps on the side with an active sonar pulse, and it's no wonder the sound of torpedo tubes opening isn't audible... Our "Halibuts" weren't nicknamed "black holes" for nothing.
Yes, the Americans subsequently developed even more advanced submarines, and our Paltus-class submarines lost their advantage in mutual detection range. But the Lada-class submarines regained it.
Unfortunately, Project 677 Lada also has its own shortcomings, which stem from its strengths. It's a non-nuclear submarine, making it quiet, but its endurance is limited. It lacks a wind-independent propulsion system, so no matter how much you increase the battery capacity, whether by upgrading traditional batteries or switching to lithium-ion batteries, you'll still have to periodically turn on the diesel and travel halfway across the sea to recharge them. And it's clear that while recharging, our non-nuclear submarines are extremely vulnerable to both submarines and enemy patrol aircraft.
Therefore, while a submarine is recharging, it must be covered by someone, and for this cover to be successful, it must be comprehensive. For example, a submarine, after completing its assigned duty in a designated area, departs for a pre-arranged area, the approaches to which are covered by anti-submarine aircraft. A frigate is present in the area, whose Poliment-Redut will prevent the Poseidon patrol from approaching. And it would be even better if the airspace around this area was scanned by an over-the-horizon radar (OTHR), capable of warning the frigate of approaching enemy aircraft.
Today, this function can be performed by the Container or Podsolnukh radars. The former is strategically important and can detect aircraft at a distance of up to 3000 km. The advantage of this station is that in a non-nuclear conflict, it would be extremely difficult to destroy due to its distance from the theater of combat operations, even with pre-determined coordinates. And these coordinates are, of course, known to the enemy, as the Container is a stationary and easily identifiable structure. Another advantage of the Container is its ability not only to detect a large air force attack from Norwegian airfields or an aircraft carrier, but to do so in time to give air regiments based at our land-based airfields a chance to intercept an enemy attack on ships in the Barents Sea.
It's still widely believed that OHRV is a magic wand, capable of solving absolutely all air and surface situational awareness tasks. This, of course, isn't true, but the capabilities it offers should never be underestimated. A US aircraft carrier preparing to attack targets in our Far East could blend in so well with civilian shipping that it would be indistinguishable from a large tanker. But a squadron of reinforced Super Hornets heading to attack a Russian frigate in the Barents Sea is unlikely to be able to disguise itself as a group of civilian airliners.
The second variant, the Podsolnukh, has far more limited capabilities; its airspace surveillance range, according to various sources, is no more than 400-500 km. Moreover, closer to this maximum range, the Podsolnukh cannot detect low-flying targets. However, it does have its advantages: it has already demonstrated its high performance in exercises in the Caspian Sea and the Far East. For example, OHGR operators managed to promptly detect and warn the Caspian Flotilla flagship, the Dagestan, of the approach of four low-flying Su-24s, allowing the patrol ship to timely and successfully engage the threatening targets (using electronic launches, of course). And in the Far East, OHGR not only monitored the Pacific Fleet's exercises in full view but also detected two vessels mistakenly attempting to enter the exercise area, allowing them to be warned promptly and avoid unpleasant incidents.
Importantly, the Podsolnukh radar is usually under the direct control of the fleet, while the Container is unlikely to be issued to the fleet; that's the domain of the Aerospace Defense Forces. In a situation where every second counts, a naval radar can ensure the best possible data transfer speed. Of course, we must strive for network centricity, so that what one branch of the military sees is visible to all others in real time, but we're still a bit far from that.
The downside of the Podsolnukh is its vulnerability. This type of radar, which controls the air and sea over part of the Barents Sea, is within range of enemy cruise missiles and can be destroyed at the very outset of a conflict. And if it can, they'll be working hard; no NATO admiral would want to leave such an advantage to the Baltic Fleet.
However, for now, all of this is nothing more than idle speculation, since neither the "Container" nor the "Podsolnukh" that would control the Barents Sea (and for the "Container," the Norwegian Sea) appears to exist. But by 2040, one could very well emerge. At least, there have been rumors of a desire to supply the North with "Podsolnukh" systems (and even the beginning of construction somewhere on Novaya Zemlya).
There's also been some indirect information in the open press about the deployment of the Harmony underwater situational awareness system, a modern version of SOSUS. Apparently, the Europeans were quite perplexed by the fact that, despite sanctions, Russia managed to purchase some equipment for this system from them. All of this is, of course, classified and highly questionable, but if they've even begun to deploy something like this in the North, that would be wonderful and could help.
The conclusion from the above is simple: even taking into account that by 2040 the Caspian Fleet will have at least a dozen corvette and frigate class surface ships left, these, in combination with a dozen modern minesweepers (if any), two air regiments of decent multi-role fighters, some anti-submarine aircraft (more likely, alas, “nothing” than “some”) and helicopters, a division of Project 677 Lada nuclear-powered submarines and the possibility of using some of the fleet’s Yasen-M submarines to perform anti-submarine functions, may be… I repeat – may be able to ensure the combat stability of Project 955/955A, and even 955AM SSBNs.
Moreover, if we prevent the enemy from tailing our Borei-class submarines as they leave their base, then detecting them in northern waters, with their extremely challenging hydrology, will be a truly challenging task. Although not impossible.
Military operations in the Norwegian Sea.
Unfortunately, it must be acknowledged that the Northern Fleet will not have any means to successfully confront the US and NATO fleets in the Norwegian Sea. The Lada-class nuclear-powered submarine, all surface ships of frigate class and smaller, and anti-submarine aircraft will need to be dedicated to the highest priority – ensuring the combat stability of the SSBNs. The only ships that can be deployed to the Norwegian Sea will be the Admiral Nakhimov heavy cruiser, two or three Yasen-class cruisers, and several Tu-142s.
What can be achieved with such forces?
In theory, something is possible, especially if we acquire a surface-to-air radar capable of tracking ship movements in the Norwegian Sea. In this case, during periods of heightened tension, but before the outbreak of war, we could attempt to uncover enemy ship deployments using satellite reconnaissance data, surface-to-air radar, and additional reconnaissance by Tu-142s. And once the war begins, we could strike them with Tsirkon missiles.
The problem, however, is that the Americans are no strangers to naval warfare and simply won't bring their ACS within range of the Tu-142 and Tsirkon missiles before it begins. Furthermore, the Tu-142 can only perform reconnaissance missions in peacetime; if a conflict breaks out, they will be immediately destroyed while over the Norwegian Sea. There's nothing to cover them there except the Admiral Kuznetsov's carrier-based aircraft, and the Admiral Kuznetsov, judging by recent statements, will never return to the fleet. Land-based fighters, even the Su-30SM2, won't have the range. The surface-to-air radar won't be able to provide target designation for the Tsirkon missiles on its own, without additional reconnaissance, and space reconnaissance...
Today, many place their hopes on the Liana naval space reconnaissance and target designation system (MKRTS), especially since, according to our leadership, it has been fully operational. However, in my opinion, this system is currently inferior to the Soviet-era MKRTS Legenda, despite the latter not being able to guarantee either reconnaissance or target designation.
Both the Soviet and Russian ICRCs include passive and active reconnaissance satellites. Unfortunately, given decades of accumulated experience, the capabilities of passive electronic reconnaissance are somewhat limited. The Americans are adept at maintaining radio silence and adjusting their radio communications so that the activity of an aircraft carrier strike group is indistinguishable from that of ordinary commercial vessels. Active reconnaissance, conducted using radars mounted on satellites, is a different matter.
In the USSR, the Legenda system included US-A satellites, equipped with a surveillance radar capable of observing the Earth's surface from an altitude of 270 km—the satellite's orbit. Naturally, this required considerable energy, and to generate it, the US-A was powered by a small Buk nuclear reactor, whose capacity, according to my data, did not exceed 2,3-2,5 kW. Moreover, the US-A's service life was quite short—originally, these satellites were designed to operate for at least 45 days; in reality, the maximum operational time in orbit was 134 days, with an average of approximately 90 days.
What were the difficulties of operating the US-A? Due to its short lifespan, there were never more than two US-As in orbit at any one time, and most of the time, none at all—from 1974 to 1988, an average of two were sent into space per year. Moreover, in low orbit, the satellite's "field of view" was naturally limited, so a pair of US-As could likely only observe the same point on the Earth's surface for about an hour a day (half an hour each).
Thus, our ships carrying heavy anti-ship missiles had to be in the right place at the right time, and if something went wrong, they had to wait many hours for the next targeting "session." This doesn't mean the MKRTS was inoperable, but its operation didn't provide omniscience and was quite complex.
The Liana MKRTS solved at least one problem of its predecessor—the short service life of active radar reconnaissance satellites. This was achieved by placing these satellites (Pion-NKS) in a much higher orbit—approximately 470 km. However, this solution entailed not only advantages but also significant disadvantages.
The Pion-NKS lack a nuclear reactor and must rely solely on solar panels. Judging by the available images, their area is unlikely to exceed 12-15 square meters.
The power generated by solar panels in space reaches approximately 140–170 watts per square meter of surface area. Accordingly, solar panels can generate approximately 1,7–2,5 kW of energy. This would seem to be roughly the same as the Buk reactor used by the US-A. However, unlike a nuclear reactor, which produces energy 24 hours a day, the Pion-NKS solar panels do not operate around the clock, as planet Earth spends a significant portion of the time between them and the Sun.
But the main problem lies not in this, but in the fundamental equation of radar, which states that the received power of a radar is proportional to the fourth power of the distance. Accordingly, to provide the same receiving signal power as the US-A radar, the Piona-NKS radar in orbit at 470 km must emit a signal approximately 9,2 times stronger than the US-A radar. And the received signal power for a radar, for obvious reasons, is extremely important.
Thus, it can be assumed that, while the Pion-NKS has a longer lifespan, it is significantly inferior to the US-A in terms of power generation, which imposes limitations on its use. It is worth noting the Pion-NKS's very large weight—6,500 kg—while the US-A weighed only 3,800 kg, of which 1,250 kg was the reactor. It is suspected that the Pion-NKS's enormous weight is due precisely to the large number of batteries that store solar energy for use during radar operation. This means that the Pion-NKS radar is most likely unable to operate around the clock, as the US-A was capable of.
And again, all of the above doesn't render the Liana MKRTS unusable or inoperable. It's likely designed on the principle that passive reconnaissance satellites detect potential targets, and the Pion-NKS, activating its radar as it passes overhead, refines the acquired data. This is a perfectly viable design, well-suited for reconnaissance, but it has significant limitations in target designation—for example, for the Admiral Nakhimov heavy cruiser, which limits its Tsirkon missiles to maximum range.
The main problem with the Liana MKRC, in my opinion, is that the orbital parameters of its satellites are widely known. Considering that the altitude range of even early versions of the American SM-3 anti-satellite missile is 500 km, it's safe to say that the Liana MKRC will cease to exist within the first day of a conflict. Or perhaps even within the first hours, depending on the satellites' positions when the war begins. In fact, since American destroyers carry SM-3 missiles, the Pion-NKS missiles could be destroyed during their first pass over the carrier strike group.
On the role of the Admiral Nakhimov cruiser in the upcoming conflict
All of the above indicates that closer to 2040:
1. The task of ensuring the combat stability of the SSBNs can only be accomplished by deploying the overwhelming majority of the Northern Fleet's forces. And it is not a given that this will be sufficient;
2. The detachment of ships that can be allocated for operations in the Norwegian Sea without compromising the fulfillment of task No. 1 is small and unbalanced;
3. The Northern Fleet does not have the means to monitor the air, surface and underwater situation in the Norwegian Sea, which would allow it to carry out reconnaissance and target designation tasks for the forces that the Northern Fleet is capable of sending there.
Certainly, the Project 885M nuclear-powered missile ships and the Admiral Nakhimov heavy cruiser are formidable ships, but in the Norwegian Sea, they can only rely on themselves and their own enemy detection capabilities, which is completely inadequate. While the nuclear-powered missile ships, being highly stealthy, may still have some success, the Admiral Nakhimov heavy cruiser will have no such advantage. Alone, it won't hold out long against carrier-based aircraft attacks.
Perhaps it makes sense not to attempt to confront the US and NATO navies in the Norwegian Sea at all. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to deploy our Yasen-M missiles, not used to search and destroy enemy submarines as part of their SSBN cover mission, off the US coast. There, their Tsirkon missiles, armed with nuclear warheads, could significantly enhance a nuclear missile strike against the bastion of democracy worldwide.
As for the Admiral Nakhimov heavy cruiser, in my opinion, under the current circumstances, it can only be used as part of a "bastion" in the Barents Sea, where its air defense systems could provide cover for Project 677 submarines, while its powerful sonar system and helicopter air group could contribute to the search for enemy submarines. Using the heavy cruiser for a task that should be performed by frigates and corvettes is certainly irrational, but I honestly don't see any other possible uses for it.
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