The Schlieffen Plan was implemented by Germany in a war for which it was not intended.

The war between France and Prussia took place in 1870-1871. Several major battles took place, with the Germans victorious and the French defeated, losing some territory. During this war, Prussia managed to unite the disparate German states, and its King Wilhelm became the first Emperor (Kaiser) of Germany.

He and his entourage understood perfectly well that Paris would not accept territorial losses, making a new conflict inevitable. At the same time, the French understood that the Germans would try to nip the threat in the bud by attacking first, so they began building powerful defensive fortifications along the border with Germany.

Berlin was indeed planning an attack on France, so the French defensive line on the border posed a serious problem. A solution was found by the Chief of the German General Staff, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen. This commander proposed not to storm the fortified border, but to invade France through Belgium. A relatively small number of German covering troops would be stationed at the border. The French, whose main forces would be trapped in a pocket, would be routed within five to six weeks.

There were many opponents of the Schlieffen Plan in Germany. For example, some German diplomats considered an attack on neutral Belgium unacceptable. The military, however, welcomed the plan.

The French noticed the Germans building roads and bridges to the Belgian border, but they didn't take these preparations seriously. Despite this, the German blitzkrieg plan was never implemented as planned. Schlieffen was no longer alive by the start of World War I—he died in 1913. In his place, the German General Staff was headed by Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, who considered his predecessor's plan too bold and risky, so almost all German troops remained on the French border. Thus, the German commander made his own adjustments to the Schlieffen Plan, which practically nullified it.

As a result, the war became long and drawn-out for Germany, and was fought on two fronts, since Russia, an ally of France and Britain, also participated in the war.

But the Schlieffen Plan was ultimately implemented, albeit not in the war for which it was conceived. It was implemented by Hitler's troops, who quickly defeated France in 1940.

Comments

[multi-category]

Well, this is just crazy. The author doesn't even know what he's talking about.
Firstly, to describe the Schlieffen Plan as a simple bypass is sheer stupidity, because the plan had several motives.
Besides the envelopment, there were four other important factors: speed of mobilization, secrecy, the width of the converging front, which would allow troops to be positioned so that two could always be deployed against one French army, and the surprise of the attack. And the main problem for the French in the first stage of the war was not the envelopment, nor the speed of the Germans, but the cunning exploitation of the difference in front width. The front froze only when this advantage disappeared. That was the Schlieffen Plan.
And what was said about Moltke is complete nonsense. He didn't break the plan.

[foxes]

Moreover, on the wave of initial success, the Germans began to transfer forces to East Prussia, which was already disrupting the plan.

[multi-category]

Well, the Schlieffen Plan did not assume that in 3 days Germany would enter a war on 2 fronts.
It's not Wilhelm's restraint that's to blame here. I think that if he, Batman (!) Holwig, and the Austrians had been a little more careful, the war in the East could have been either delayed or never started at all.
For all the stupidity of Nicholas II's adherence to the rules of honor in waging war, even he was reluctant to immediately start a war. He could have started negotiations, promised access to straits not his own, promised to help complete the battleships, and that would have been all.

[Kvakosavrus]

That's exactly what I intended. They wanted to quickly defeat France and then transfer their troops to the east. Prussia was supposed to be sacrificed temporarily.

[multi-category]

Quote: Kvakosavrus

Prussia was supposed to be sacrificed temporarily.

There was no such thing. I read a lot about pre-war plans in Tirpitz's book—the Kaiser never thought it was possible to sacrifice Prussia. They had a different problem—they found themselves in the stupid position of being completely dependent on Austria-Hungary for their foreign policy—Tirpitz simply called them Austria—which made it extremely difficult to plan anything.

[Victor B]

At the beginning of the 20th century, the German army lacked the divisions to carry out a double envelopment of a large French force, as Hannibal had done against the Romans. Therefore, Schlieffen relied on a semi-envelopment of the French army by a powerful right wing of the German army, which would rapidly advance through neutral Belgium along both banks of the Meuse River and attack Paris through the Oise Valley, thereby defeating the French forces with the German army unexpectedly positioned in their rear.
Moltke the Younger was greatly concerned by what he considered the insufficient strength of the German group and the troops left in East Prussia. As a result, each year he weakened the right wing of the German group against France and, in turn, strengthened the left wing. In the 1920s, A.M. Zayonchkovsky wrote that, according to von Moltke the Younger's plan, by weakening the right flank of the German forces on the front against France in East Prussia, three field corps and one reserve corps were deployed, while on the left wing facing France, two armies were formed instead of one. Zayonchkovsky rightly referred to this plan as "Moltke the Younger's plan," although he noted that the plan was ostensibly based on the ideas of von Schlieffen.8 The outstanding Russian military theorist and historian A.A. Svechin pointed out that Moltke the Younger’s plan (“to which Ludendorff had a hand”) “differed from Count Schlieffen’s plan in its half-heartedness,” and noted that “the Germans’ right wing, on whose strength the entire success of the offensive depended, was weakened by 5 corps.”
As a result, the blitzkrieg planned by Schlieffen in 1914 was not realized. Having failed to defeat the French armed forces in the first few weeks, Germany lost the war four years before the end of World War I. The "Schlieffen Plan" was indeed fraught with risk, but it was a calculated risk. This plan bordered on adventurism; to a certain extent, it subordinated foreign policy to military strategy, but it also had a significant chance of success.
Svechin believed that the presence of the aforementioned five corps on the right flank of the German army in the fall of 1914 "would undoubtedly have changed the course of world history," and that "there is reason to believe that peace could have been concluded by the French as early as September 1914." The weakness of French military strategy at the time, which also relied on the offensive, albeit less carefully honed, would have contributed to such a tremendous success for the German army.

A.A. Kokoshin Historical roots of the blitzkrieg // Questions of History, 2014. No. 5, p. 5.

[multi-category]

I would like to note that the entire assessment is based on Svechin's reviews.
I'll add that the Schlieffen Plan was modified not because it was half-hearted, but because of the realities of military science. The army no longer fought like it had in Napoleon's time, although much remained from that era. And even a force weakened by five corps physically couldn't commit its full forces to battle. Finally, in the age of machine guns and rapid-fire artillery, troop numbers were no longer so crucial. So it's unclear why Svechin made such a statement—he'd seen it all in action.

[faiver]

Welcome, , but the authors apparently got the resource wrong; it's closer to history lessons in schools for children....

[Altmann]

The plan itself was simple and ingenious in its essence. I'm more surprised by the quick and severe defeats suffered by the French, who didn't put up any serious resistance. They had a chance, but they failed to take advantage of it. A similar situation occurred in 1940.

[Pioneer1984]

The French ended with Napoleon Bonaparte.

[multi-category]

At first, speed played a role - you just had to manage to transfer a million soldiers.
Then, the configuration of the front forced the French to retreat, regardless of their courage or efforts. The advance only stopped when both armies found themselves on equal terms, and a mutual slaughter ensued.

[hipper]

As far as I remember, the Germans initially had a better road situation. The further they advanced toward Paris, the longer their communication lines became, and France's were more convenient.