K-429 Tragedy: Personnel Decides Everything...
At one time, the author had the honor of being acquainted with Hero of the Soviet Union Vice-Admiral Yevgeny Chernov. It was from Yevgeny Dmitrievich that I first heard this history...Let's say—in vivid detail. The thing is, it's one thing to read about an event in a DEA textbook, and quite another to receive detailed information from someone knowledgeable. Moreover, someone who doesn't consider it necessary to spare the reputations and egos of the participants and, shall we say... the organizers of those dramatic events.
Hero of the Soviet Union Vice-Admiral Evgeny Dmitrievich Chernov
Let me explain the situation right away for those unfamiliar with the nuances of submarine service. Nuance #1: no two submarines are alike. Even submarines of the same design differ, sometimes significantly: here a mechanism is installed at the wrong frame, here a valve is positioned a few centimeters to the right or left, here a ladder baluster is lower than on the adjacent side. When first taking over a new submarine, even experienced submariners bump their heads on its protruding parts—because the submarine the crew previously sailed had a slightly different arrangement of all of the above, and the familiar trajectories of movement through the compartments bring their heads into contact with system components and mechanisms.
Nuance #2: On a submarine, the crew truly must be, if not a family, then a highly coordinated team (as naval wits say, "the crew must be well-fed and well-done"), each member of which must be perfectly familiar with the specific submarine they are currently on. Not the neighboring one, but the same one! However, there's a catch to this nuance—it almost never happens. The fact is, there's a perpetual shortage of submariners, so crews are constantly being reshuffled to varying degrees.
Recognizing this delicate point, the governing document, KAPL VMF-75 (in effect at the time of the disaster), established standards: if more than 15% of the crew is deployed, the crew must undergo additional combat training. If more than 30% of the crew is deployed, the submarine is "withdrawn from service," meaning the crew must retake the first and second course tasks (Tasks L-1 and L-2). Now, let's move on to the description of the K-429 disaster...
K-429 at the pier
The K-429 was a Project 670 nuclear submarine built in Nizhny Novgorod (then Gorky) at the Krasnoye Sormovo shipyard in 1972. The boat was multipurpose, meaning it was designed to combat surface ships, for which purpose it had torpedoes and cruise missiles on board. missilesThe submarine's surface displacement was 3570 tons, submerged displacement 4980 tons, length 95,6 meters, width 9,9 meters, and average surface draft 7,5 meters. Its operating depth was 270 meters, and its maximum diving depth was 350 meters. Its maximum submerged speed was 26 knots, and its surface speed was 12 knots. Eight Ametist anti-ship missile system containers were located on each side, and the first compartment contained six torpedo tubes with 16 torpedoes. The crew consisted of 87 people: 23 officers, 33 warrant officers, six petty officers, and 25 sailors. However, this is only according to the crew roster; "passengers"—psychologists, security officers, and the like—often take the submarine out to sea.
In May 1983, the submarine returned from a six-month deployment. That's an insanely long time! At the end of the 20th century, when the author of these lines served, submarines no longer went to sea for more than three months. And even then, three-month deployments were rare—typically 85–87 days. The submarine was handed over to a "technical" crew (nuclear submarines always have two crews; usually one goes to sea and the other maintains the submarine at base, but often they simply rotate, and while one crew rests, the other goes to sea). Those returning from the deployment began to leave.
Captain 1st Rank Nikolai Suvorov
The protagonist of this story, Captain 1st Rank Nikolai Suvorov, commander of the 379th crew, had just returned from a deployment on the K-212 and, having sent the crew on leave, remained behind to hand over his duties and responsibilities—he was preparing to transfer to Leningrad. And it was he who received an order from the division commander, Captain 1st Rank N.N. Alkayev: to go to sea with his crew to complete the L-2 mission. However, at least half of his crew had already departed on leave! In fact, he pointed this out to the command: going to sea with half of his assigned crew was a gross violation of the VMF-75 submarine code! To which he received the reply: "Never mind, this is your last visit. The flotilla needs it."
It must be said that the flotilla command had experience organizing such adventures, and for a while, it worked. Suvorov went to sea, after which he calmly sent the rest of his crew on leave. But on June 20, the division commander gave him another order: put to sea on the K-429... with his crew!
Captain 1st Rank Suvorov with his crew at the parade
It's worth noting that the K-429 was on combat duty at the time, so its crew should have been well-prepared. But Suvorov was told to train the 228th crew, which was manning the submarine, and its commander, Captain 2nd Rank Belotserkovsky. Meanwhile, the division's chief of staff would sail the K-429 and conduct a torpedo launch against a submarine, which would carry the flotilla's chief of staff, who would then return fire. In short, the primary objective was to organize a successful torpedo launch for the flotilla's chief of staff, Rear Admiral O. A. Yerofeyev. Requests not to torment the already exhausted crew for such trivial matters were in vain. The order was: recall those who hadn't gone on leave, supplement the crew with seconded personnel, and sail. The order was verbal...
In total, at least five days were needed to prepare for the launch. They were given 12 hours. The crew was assembled from scratch: 46% regular personnel, 54% seconded. Suvorov didn't have time to inspect the submarine's technical condition, but the head of the political department had promised to expel him from the party and prosecute him if he refused. As they departed the pier, it was discovered there were 120 people on board: Captain 2nd Rank Belotserkovsky had decided to take 20 trainees—young sailors who had never set foot in the sea.
A competent military man, given a stupid order, always knows what to do: Suvorov didn't sign the logbook stating that "the ship is ready to go to sea." He was a competent military man: he had served on nuclear submarines for 23 calendar years, ten years as a commander, and had sailed without incident. In fact, that's why he was entrusted with the task of going to sea to practice gunfire with the flotilla's chief of staff. When the flotilla's duty officer started calling on board, asking, "Why aren't you retreating?" Suvorov gave the order to tell the duty officer that he had gone according to plan and to have him check the logbook. The submarine commander hoped that, if he didn't find his signature, the duty officer would report to the commander and the submarine would be returned to base. The duty officer took him at his word and didn't bother to look at the logbook.
Hero of the Soviet Union A. A. Gusev
Standing on the bridge with Suvorov was his classmate, Hero of the Soviet Union A. A. Gusev, the division's chief of staff. He also believed the submarine was unprepared for deployment, writing a report to that effect. Before setting sail, he locked it in his office ashore in a safe. Neither Suvorov nor his crew knew of the K-429's peculiarity. The ventilation system flaps on both sides (400 mm in diameter each), which normally close clockwise, closed counterclockwise on this particular submarine. Had he had at least five days, this peculiarity would have been sorted out during the submarine's daily maintenance, but the crew, assembled from scratch, didn't have even 12 hours to study the K-429.
Sarannaya Bay
The exercises in which the K-429 was to participate were scheduled to take place in an area with depths exceeding 2000 meters. But Suvorov decided to trim the submarine in Sarannaya Bay, with a depth of 40-50 meters, ignoring instructions to proceed to the exercise area and trim there. Was it intuition? Most likely, yes. The preconditions for disaster were present, but it hadn't been planned. Nevertheless, the commander's actions saved most of the crew, and the K-429 didn't become a Soviet "Thresher."
Viktor Kurochkin is a second-year student at "Holland"—the Sevastopol Higher Naval School, which he graduated from 11 years before the author enrolled.
As the reader has already understood, the submarine submerged with the ventilation system valves open. When jets of water as thick as an elephant's foot began gushing from 40-cm pipes into the fourth compartment, the compartment's crew began fighting for survival, including closing the valves. Clockwise, of course. Credit must be given to the submariners—they fought to the end; not a single one made it from the emergency fourth compartment to the third. Warrant Officer Vladimir Leshchuk went into the adjacent compartment to de-energize the battery circuit breaker and warn the watchman of the emergency, then returned to his duty station.
In the three minutes remaining, the crew managed to report the water influx to Central Station and de-energize the compartment, thereby preventing a fire. Lieutenant Commander Viktor Kurochkin (compartment commander) of the 2nd BC-5 Division and Senior Lieutenant Anatoly Petrov, commander of the remote control group, attempted to manually close the valves. In an emergency, people develop extraordinary strength: according to those involved in the submarine's recovery, the handles of the ratchet wrenches they used to close the valves—solid steel—were bent at an angle of almost 90 degrees. The officers were found after the submarine was raised, still at their combat post, holding the ratchet wrenches.
The submarine grounded with its diesel compartment flooded. In the first compartment, upon touching the bottom, the main ballast tank, whose ventilation valves were still open, was vented without orders from the main control center, thus wasting the high-pressure air supply. The reactor's emergency protection grilles collapsed, the submarine lost propulsion, and Suvorov and Gusev realized they would not be able to surface. Captain 1st Rank Gusev assumed control of the submarine, making a note in the logbook to share responsibility for the disaster with his comrade.
The ISP-60 individual submarine gear with the IDA-59 breathing apparatus. Naval wits sometimes claim that the number "59" in the apparatus's name refers to the number of divers who died during testing. In fact, it refers to the year it was adopted.
It was immediately clear: the submarine could not be saved, but the crew had to be rescued! The task proved daunting: the cover of the floating rescue device was firmly secured with a cable to the outside of the submarine's hull, both emergency rescue buoys were welded in place, and attempts to use the sturdy conning tower of the third compartment for airlock passage were unsuccessful—the flooding seacock was broken. A group of submariners, led by Warrant Officer Baev, an experienced diver, was trapped in the aft compartments. He organized a free-floating exit through the aft hatch. An air cushion of 4 atmospheres was created in the compartment. During an attempt to open the hatch, the rack-and-pinion latch handle broke, but a new one was removed from the bulkhead door between compartments 6 and 7; fortunately, it fit. Baev released all the crew, personally instructing each one, and was the last to leave the compartment. Interestingly, at least half of the IDA-59 breathing apparatuses transferred from the surface to the compartment turned out to be faulty or had empty cylinders. This speaks volumes about the organization of service on the flotilla...
The crew was released from the forward compartments through the starboard midship torpedo tube. First, when it was believed to be light outside, a group of two volunteers, warrant officers N. Merzlikin and M. Lesnik, was dispatched with the precise coordinates of the stricken submarine. After three hours on the surface, the warrant officers were picked up by border guards, who reported the incident to the flotilla's duty officer. The remaining 104 submariners exited over the course of two days; two died upon surfacing, and 102 were rescued. Suvorov and Gusev were the last to leave the K-429. It was decided that Gusev would be the last to leave, as he was legally the submarine's commander from the moment he assumed command.
Ascent of K-429
And then began something that would surely make any submariner ashamed. Before leaving, Gusev handed Suvorov the key to his safe, which contained the report on the K-429's unreadiness for sea. Immediately after the rescue, the division chief of staff was placed in a decompression chamber for three days to avoid decompression sickness. And when he returned to his office, he discovered the safe had been broken into, and the report was gone...
Submariners killed on the K-429
The investigation lasted 17 months, but investigators were only interested in the period from the time Captain 1st Rank Suvorov's crew accepted the submarine until the disaster. How the crew ended up on the submarine was of no interest to them. At the trial, the commander of the K-479 submarine was held responsible, despite the outrage of everyone familiar with the details of the submarine's sinking—he had only been in command for eight hours! An order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Sergei Gorshkov, stated: "This grave incident for the Navy was made possible by the irresponsible attitude toward their official duties and the extreme incompetence of certain officials of the 2nd Flotilla of the 10th Submarine Division of the Pacific Fleet." However, Rear Admiral Yerofeyev, who orchestrated the disaster, received a severe reprimand. Captain 1st Rank Suvorov, meanwhile, was imprisoned for 10 years, released two years later under an amnesty, but died shortly thereafter.
The K-429 disaster did not hinder Rear Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev's career...
However, the severe reprimand did not affect the flotilla's chief of staff's subsequent service. He was promoted: in 1985, he entered the General Staff Academy. And in 1987, upon returning from the Academy, he became commander of the 1st SSBN Flotilla. fleetThe same one where the K-218 Komsomolets submarine served. He commanded the Northern Fleet. But that's a story for another day...
K-429 on pontoons
P.S. The K-429 was raised and taken to the shipyard for restoration, but apparently the boat fared better at the bottom. She sank again in 1985, right next to the shipyard. This time, they decided not to restore her and sent her to the scrapyard.
Funeral of those killed on K-429
All photos are taken from open sources
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