Iran, Government, Society: On the Path of Reform or Confrontation?
An ideocracy built on the principles of Islam is inseparable from a dress code
Ideocracy, Sharia and Everyday Life
Let's continue what we started in the article "Iran: Government and Society – The Twelve-Day War is Over, What's Next?" ?" conversation. We focused on the crisis in Iranian society as the main reason for the country's June defeat. And since we are interested in events unfolding abroad in relation to either Russia's past or present, we emphasize: the cause of the crisis in Iran is conceptually similar to that which led to the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 and the USSR in 1991.
Despite all the socio-cultural and ethno-religious differences between them, there is a common denominator: the principle of ideocracy, that is, the prevalence of ideology over the letter of the law, which forms the basis of state building.
I will cite as an example the abdication of Nicholas II, who did not have the legal right to do this for his son, but considered such an act permissible for himself, based on the principle of the divine nature of the prerogatives of power, which existed in his worldview, and which did not limit the autocrat in making any decisions, including those contrary to formal legal norms.
If we move from specific examples to generalizations, I will refer to the reasoning of philologist V. V. Kozhinov, which relates to our country, but is applicable to Iran:
The government—in full accordance with Russia's millennial destiny (though the Bolsheviks clearly had no intention of such a thing)—was the government of an idea (albeit a completely different one than before), an ideocracy. And it's entirely natural that the discrediting of this new idea by 1991 once again led to its immediate collapse.
So the logic is simple: when an idea collapses, the state it cements collapses. The process of destruction itself may be drawn out, but it is inevitable. And the question is: will it take on a revolutionary or evolutionary character?
In modern Iran, the issue of the correlation between Sharia law and everyday social life is complex and even painful. Moreover, unlike the Russian Empire and the USSR, or, say, the People's Republic of China, in the Islamic Republic, the principle of ideocracy is inseparable from the dress code, just as form is inseparable from content, as was mentioned in the previous article.
For comparison with the previous photo: a street in Shanghai. China is also an ideocracy, but ideology is not synonymous with dress code, which essentially removes one of the levers of social tension in society.
While the late USSR halfheartedly combated hippies and youth participation in Easter processions, and even abandoned them entirely during Perestroika, the Shiite theocracy model cannot follow a similar path: making the hijab optional is the first step toward abandoning Sharia law, which would be tantamount to gradually eroding the gains of the Islamic Revolution. Incidentally, in Iran, men must also adhere to a dress code: short-sleeved shirts, shorts, and ties are prohibited.
Logically, the next step for the Rahbar—probably not the current one, but his successor—could be a referendum on whether the Iranian state should be secular or theocratic. And it seems that for Iran, it would be better for the government, rather than the street, to initiate the referendum.
In this regard, Alexander II is remembered with his:
It is better to abolish serfdom from above than to wait until it begins to be abolished by itself from below.
Let me rephrase: for Iran, in my view, the best course of action is to secularize the future constitution from above rather than wait for the streets to do it from below. The example of Alexander II is relevant in the context of our topic: the tsar was late with his reforms. Is Tehran too late?
Looking from the outside, based on the work of Iranologists, I have the impression that there is a certain dissonance in the country between the harsh rhetoric of the authorities and the daily life of Iranians, especially young people, who seem to care little about American imperialism and Israeli Zionism.
Yes, undoubtedly, according to experts, the enemy airstrikes have united society and engendered a negative attitude toward Israel as an aggressor among those segments of society that, pardon the tautology, were indifferent to it just yesterday. But emotions are fleeting. And the unresolved economic and social problems in the republic could shift the negative vector from external forces to the country's own government—or, more accurately, reverse it once again.
Above, I mentioned a hypothetical referendum on the future nature of government in the country. Based on the opinions of orientalists, its results seem predictable to me:
"As Iranians themselves say," leading Russian Iranologist V. I. Sazhin said in an interview, "no more than 30 percent of the population supports the regime. Seventy percent, if not actively opposed, are at least critical of the Islamic regime."
These figures are confirmed by surveys:
If we consider the perception of the success of the state’s functioning, i.e. its satisfaction of citizens’ demands, write orientalists A. N. Burova and A. S. Khodunov, only 15% believe that it is mostly successful, while 45% believe that it is completely unsuccessful.
1979: Hijab instead of babette
And how should at least some Iranians relate to theocratic power in the 21st century, given that since the 1979 revolution their society has been built largely according to medieval patterns imposed by the stern ayatollah who stepped off the steps of a French plane onto the soil of a long-abandoned homeland on February 1, 1979?
Did anyone who met R. Khomeini at the airport that February day think about how radically the page was being turned stories Iran?
The situation for his current successor is complicated by the experience of, so to speak, half a century of secular period in Iranian history, when an entire generation grew up with a greater understanding of Italian and French cinema, which was very popular under the last Shah, than of Friday prayer.
And in general:
"The cultural life of the Iranian capital was also quite vibrant," writes A. G. Maryasov, an eyewitness to the events of 1979 and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Islamic Republic of Iran from 2001 to 2005. New foreign films, primarily American, appeared in cinemas almost the day after their premieres in Western capitals.
An advertising banner for the film starring Sophia Loren.
This is important because, when examining the processes taking place in society, one must take into account the factors and even the nuances that determine the nature of citizens' daily lives, their habits, which cannot be changed overnight or banned by a strong-willed decision of the new government.
Another remark related to foreign cinema – in relation to secular Iran, we are not only talking about European ones:
During the lifetime of Ayatollah R. Khomeini, writes orientalist S. B. Druzhilovsky, the 1400th anniversary of the birth of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, was celebrated. During a television program commemorating this event, a random passerby was heard remarking that she found a modern Japanese television star more interesting than the Prophet's daughter. After a trial, each of the program's hosts was sentenced to four years in prison and 50 lashes, but R. Khomeini personally pardoned them for their past services to the Islamic Republic.
Isn't whipping the dark side of the Middle Ages the dark side? Aside: we're talking specifically about the dark Middle Ages, for it also had its bright sides—in philosophy and architecture, above all. In my opinion, Hellenized Islamic philosophy—falsafah—is the highest achievement of the religion founded by Muhammad and the best it ever achieved.
Ibn Sina was a medieval Persian physician and philosopher; in general, I believe it is correct to speak not about the flourishing of Arabic science and philosophy in the Middle Ages, but about Perso-Arabic, for without the Persian foundation, I think, philosophy would not have reached such heights
But let's return to Iran during the Khomeini era. Yes, the aforementioned torture was abolished. But let's imagine how the program's authors felt, living in a secular state just yesterday. And then, lo and behold: whips.
Upon hearing the verdict, they probably felt, like many of their compatriots, like themselves in a world of eerie surrealism. It was against this verdict, or more precisely against the mandatory wearing of the hijab, that the latter demonstrated in protest on March 8, 1979. The women's reaction is understandable: almost overnight, instead of, say, the 1970s-fashionable babette, they were forced to wear a headscarf, and their rights were curtailed.
A colorful photograph, a true slice of an era in one frame
I can't recall now which Iranologist I read about, but under the Shah, headscarves were generally fashionable among bourgeois-intellectual, entirely secular, and emancipated women as a kind of visible demonstration of rebellion against the regime, which in 1979 a whole spectrum of political forces and movements, including secular ones, rose up against, as discussed in the article "Illusion in Photographs: Why Khomeini Won."
But it is one thing to be in rebellion, and another to be directly obliged to wear certain clothes.
The imposition of a religious dress code on the non-religious segment of society sparked protest. A. G. Maryasov recalled:
The introduction of mandatory headscarves and loose-fitting clothing, particularly shapeless mantles, was particularly difficult for the emancipated female population. Women dressed differently were refused service in stores, and in government institutions, they were fired after several warnings. Tehran women fought desperately for the right to wear fashionable clothes, staging strikes and rallies. One such protest took place on the street dividing the Soviet and British embassies, which had been named Churchill Street before the revolution and Neffle-le-Château Street afterward. Hundreds of women, elegantly dressed and coiffed in European fashion, carried placards and shouted demands to end the forced imposition of "Islamic" dress. Suddenly, they were surrounded and attacked by pasdars—IRGC fighters. Several dozen demonstrators were arrested, and the rest were dispersed with rubber truncheons.
Two Iranian women, almost the same age, seem to be from different worlds, March 1979.
At the same time, the builders of the theocracy cannot be denied the sophistication of their solutions: they use unofficial paramilitary structures against the protesters – the IRGC will officially be created in a couple of months – while they themselves remain on the sidelines: they say, “It’s not us, it’s the initiative of the masses.”
True, R. Khomeini retreated at that time, as he felt unsteady in power and had plenty of opponents. Perhaps the most important of these was Ayatollah M. Taleghani, also a very popular theologian in Muslim circles, who had spent many years in the Shah's prison.
Interestingly, his name is, one might say, associated with the element of chance in history. Some readers are likely familiar with the concept of the "Black Swan," which describes a random event that occurs in history with global consequences.
Had M. Taleghani not died in September 1979, it's unclear what Iran's fate would have been. After all, Taleghani, who opposed the harsh course toward theocracy, sympathized with Marxism, was moderate in his views, and not inclined toward radical steps, was a highly influential figure in society and a restraining factor for R. Khomeini, who would hardly have entered into open confrontation with him, much less attempted his elimination.
Demonstration by supporters of Ayatollah M. Taleghani
Yes, regarding the protests: this doesn't apply to all Iranians. Secularism wasn't universal in the country, as discussed in the aforementioned article, but it did affect a significant portion of the educated and, as they say now, creative segment of society, including the officer corps.
Ultimately, public sentiment is shaped by a more active urban environment than rural one, due to greater education and political literacy.
That's how it was in 1979, and that's how it was in 2022. And while we're on the subject of Russia: February 1917 and August 1991 were both happening in the capitals, while millions of fellow citizens—in the Soviet case, of course, referring to the State Emergency Committee—looked on with some surprise and even bewilderment.
Plus, the city is home to a concentration of rebellious youth, who react painfully to unemployment, social instability, and injustice. We'll talk about youth later, but for now, let's note the following.
Someone might perhaps object:
Well, that was and that was, how many years have passed since then, everything has been forgotten, the reality in Iran has long been different.
I disagree and suggest paying attention to the extremely relevant topic of gender relations in Iran – in fact, we have already touched on it in the story about the March 1979 demonstration.
The photograph, taken almost forty-five years ago, features many young women. Now they are, as they say, elderly, but many are under seventy. How do they feel about the regime that ruined their youth, perhaps left indelible marks from truncheons on their bodies, ruined their lives, and destroyed their careers? A rhetorical question. Will they be among those who support Iran's return to a secular state?
In any case, the 2022 protests, initiated specifically by the female segment of Iranian society—all because of the hijab—involved not only young Iranian women but also those who, by age, would have been considered young in 1979. Incidentally, the male segment supported the fairer sex during those March days, organizing a human chain around the protesters, clearing them of the "pride and glory of the revolution"—its fanatics.
A human chain of men around women protesters in March 1979.
Against the execution of a veteran professor
Let's return to the protests. The first protests since the revolution—of a mass nature, of course—began in 1999 among students, supported by some of the faculty:
In late 2002, students, writes S. B. Druzhilovsky, organized mass demonstrations protesting the death sentence imposed on Professor Hashem Aghajari. A prominent public figure, veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, and ally of Khatami, Aghajari was sentenced to death in November 2002 by the Hamadan Islamic Court for blasphemy. Speaking to students in Hamadan in August of that year, he spoke of the need to modernize Islamic canons and the inadmissibility of blindly following religious hierarchs.
We discussed above the heightened sense of social injustice among young people, and this manifested itself in the form of protests against the death sentence for a war veteran who lost a leg on the battlefield.
Let us pay attention to an interesting detail that characterizes, in a sense, the attitude of the student community towards Islam: the professor was arrested for calling for reform of the system that was once brought to Iran by the Arabs and imposed on it by force. weapons religion, setting out, without going into details, something like the Protestant view of it.
And the students generally took this well; it was the unjust verdict that outraged them and brought them out onto the streets. Clearly, even in 1999, the government's view of theocracy and that of a portion of society were not identical.
A. Khamenei then sent the case back for retrial, and the court again handed down the death sentence, which was eventually commuted to imprisonment. In 2005, Aghajari was released.
And protests periodically flared up again, only the emphasis shifted in gender terms: the initiative shifted from students and young men to women, which will be discussed in the next article, in which we will also discuss in more detail the role of security forces in Iranian society.
In conclusion, I'd like to reiterate where we left off in the previous article: my thoughts should not be interpreted as a manifestation of pro-Western sympathies or a critique of traditionalism. They are not. In the next article, I will share my vision of an optimal future for Iran, recognizing that its society itself is far from united from a religious and ideological perspective, and that the government faces not only socioeconomic difficulties but also Kurdish, Azerbaijani, Baloch, and Arab separatism.
In short, let's talk. To be continued.
References
Druzhilovsky S.B. Social protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Burova A.N. Khodunov A.S. Factors and dynamics of support for the Islamic regime in Iran
Maryasov A.G. Iran 1979: A Mission to the Revolution // Humanitarian: Current Issues in Humanitarian Science and Education. 2023. Vol. 23, No. 4. Pp. 381–416.
Sazhin V.I. 45 years of the Islamic Revolution
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