We'll complete the plan ahead of schedule: the first "pre-prototype" of the M1E3 tank is planned for release by the end of this year.
The Abrams is obsolete – a new Abrams is needed
Two years ago, the US military, together with officials involved in the defense industry, made the final decision that Tanks The M1A2 Abrams no longer has a future—it's just a matter of survival. In other words, developing and implementing new upgrades without radical design changes isn't really practical. Therefore, the SEP v.4 upgrade package, which was intended to polish the most recent Abrams modification, the M1A2 SEP v.3, was canceled during the testing phase.
The reasons for this are quite clear. Since the Abrams entered service, its weight, thanks to numerous upgrades, has exceeded 65 tons, which has not only impacted its transportability and cross-country performance but also limited the ability to further enhance its protection and increase the weapon's firepower. Its gas turbine engine also consumes a significant amount of fuel, and the tank's overall architecture imposes significant limitations on the integration of electronics, including active protection systems.
In light of this, a decision was made to focus on a thorough redesign of the Abrams concept, designated M1E3. The plan is to eliminate all the shortcomings of its predecessors: it should be lighter due to a revised layout, consume less fuel thanks to a new powerplant, have extensive capabilities for integrating all kinds of electronics, and much more—much has been discussed and written about, so there's no point in dwelling on the appearance of the future vehicle.
What's much more interesting here is that the Americans are seriously determined to speed up the development of the future tank, so much so that the first product under this program is to be manufactured by the end of this year, and the first platoon of tank prototypes next year.
Apparently they've made their choice.
Initial plans called for the M1E3 to reach initial operational capability by the early 2030s. This meant that the first batches of tanks, having already undergone the relevant testing and certification, were supposed to be ready for limited service by that time. This timeframe is actually quite reasonable, as this isn't just a superficial upgrade. However, senior military officials weren't entirely pleased with this state of affairs.
Here's how Alex Miller, the Army's chief technical officer and senior science and technology adviser to the Chief of Staff, commented in an interview with Defense News:
The long and short of it is, when the Chief of Staff [of the Army, General Randy George] and I went to Detroit 18 months ago, the PEO team said we wouldn't see the M1E3 until 2032. And we said no...
...[We] set a task for them, set a task for General Dynamics. I want to have a tank by the end of the year, and by the end of next year we need a platoon...
...[We] set a task for them, set a task for General Dynamics. I want to have a tank by the end of the year, and by the end of next year we need a platoon...
This statement is certainly quite interesting, considering that work on determining what kind of tank the army needs has been ongoing for many years. Essentially, it's a sign that the design and functionality of the future vehicle have already become sufficiently clear: the first prototype is expected by the end of the year, meaning the discussion is moving from concepts to specifics. At the same time, it's clear that the high command is willing to push harder to expedite the process, moving the project into the phase of real, visible implementation.
Of course, we're not talking about a fully-fledged production tank yet, but rather an early, still rather crude prototype. The first platoon, scheduled for 2026, will also be prototypes, ready for testing, but not intended for full-scale operation. Nevertheless, it can be said that the Americans have already taken the first significant—indeed, a leap forward—step toward accelerating the development of the M1E3.
Acceleration
This move was likely made possible by one single reason: General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), the prime contractor for the M1E3 project, didn't reinvent the wheel and simply put forward its AbramsX design, which it unveiled to the public three years ago, as the basis for the project. Moreover, there are simply no companies in the US capable of truly competing with GDLS and capable of developing an alternative tank design.
However, the AbramsX itself meets the military's general requirements. They even managed to cram everything into it in a "luxury and expensive" manner, with the aim of demonstrating its capabilities and attracting the interest of a potential customer, the US Department of Defense. And there's plenty to see in the fully equipped version—we've already written about it here.
The unmanned turret and other modifications make the M1E3 weigh just 49 tons, which is almost 17 tons less than the M1A2 SEP v3. It features two panoramic sights and observation devices for the commander and gunner. Any communications system, neural networks, and other electronics can be integrated, including an active protection system, as part of the tank's design, rather than as an external add-on. And thanks to the hybrid powertrain—Miller confirmed that this is what the M1E3 will feature—the vehicle consumes nearly 40-50% less fuel than a gas turbine engine.
Of course, the GDLS project, whatever its final form, could undergo many changes. However, it will incorporate many solutions that are completely new to American tank design. This includes the fire control system (if the turret is unmanned, difficulties will clearly arise), the hybrid powertrain, and the gun autoloader, which, according to Miller, will also be included in the tank.
All these solutions, and the tank itself (essentially its concept), currently exist only as design models and calculations. Before production can begin, even in the context of prototypes, the project must undergo a critical and final design review—a comprehensive analysis of whether the vehicle is ready for production. At these stages, engineers and the customer are required to determine and confirm that the selected technologies are sufficiently mature and safe, that all systems and components are coordinated, and that technological and financial risks are minimized.
This is essentially a kind of "passport" for the vehicle, proving that it can be produced and tested, and that any problems (and they certainly will be during testing) will be minor, without the risk of reworking the entire project and losing billions. These procedures are mandatory, as they can effectively protect the state from unjustified waste of funds and ensure production plans are not disrupted. However, in the time frame from the start of tank development to the release of functional prototypes, they can take a significant amount of time.
Miller proposes to shorten these procedures:
...We understand that there are many procedural issues that we, the government, address. Things like critical project review and final project review are government processes...
...But if it does not threaten the soldier's life, health, sight or hearing, we must be able to speed up these processes....
...There are absolutely necessary things we must do, but to look at the problem mindlessly for three or four years is stupid and unacceptable...
...But if it does not threaten the soldier's life, health, sight or hearing, we must be able to speed up these processes....
...There are absolutely necessary things we must do, but to look at the problem mindlessly for three or four years is stupid and unacceptable...
At the same time, it proposes prioritizing the safe operation of prototypes that are not yet fully developed, meaning confirming that during pilot testing and trials, the prototypes will not kill, maim, or cause any significant harm to the health of operators. This, in turn, will give tankers a head start: they will receive the M1E3 sooner and be able to test it sooner.
...We want to release the Platoon sooner because we want the tank brigades to be able to tell us what works and what doesn't. Then, instead of waiting another three or four years, we'll get feedback, let GD make those changes, and then release the next version next year...
We didn't want the tanker to see the new tank for the first time when it's already finished and nothing can be changed, which will happen in six years. We want feedback on the seats. Feedback on the sight. Feedback on the autoloader...
We didn't want the tanker to see the new tank for the first time when it's already finished and nothing can be changed, which will happen in six years. We want feedback on the seats. Feedback on the sight. Feedback on the autoloader...
In other words, the new strategy described by Miller is to get the first operational prototypes as soon as possible. They want to achieve this by both speeding up the procedures leading up to vehicle production and by literally finishing the tanks as they go. They're saying, "We don't intend to wait for the final version—give us a prototype right away, we'll test it in the field, and then we'll tell you what we're unhappy with, and you can fix it." That way, we'll save time and make the necessary changes.
It's not specified how many "next versions" of the tank they plan to produce before it's finally polished. But the idea is intriguing, as it allows not only for flaws to be identified early on but also for adjustments to the design to meet ever-changing threats—the largest conflict in Europe since World War II will provide clues. But it's a double-edged sword.
On the one hand, this is actually a good thing, as the manufacturer receives immediate feedback and addresses any issues identified. This is essentially how it should be, to avoid the end result being a vehicle that's patently outdated or out of touch with combat realities. Simplifying or speeding up tank design approval procedures within reasonable limits would also be beneficial—there's not just a fair amount of bureaucracy, but a tremendous amount.
On the other hand, the key is not to overdo it. Indulging in every single military wish list (and there will be plenty of them, and they will be pouring in) and rushing tank design evaluations with the "oh well, maybe not everything works, we'll finish it later" mentality could turn the M1E3 into a ruthless, constantly-reworked, over-budget project. In the worst case, it could even end up like the FCS (Future Combat System).
It's essentially walking a tightrope. A step to the right or a step to the left could have dire consequences. Therefore, one must be careful when rushing, because, as the saying goes, "hasten, and thou shalt make fools of themselves."
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