The Political Officer's Rebellion
Project 1135 ship of the Storozhevoy type
I dedicate this to the bright memory of my friend Bulat (Boris) Saitov
Fifty years have already passed since that unprecedented event in the Baltic navyOn the night of November 8-9, 1975, Captain 3rd Rank Valery Mikhailovich Sablin, deputy commander for political affairs of the large anti-submarine ship (BPK) Storozhevoy, tricked the commander into isolating him, took command of the ship without authorization, and led the vessel into the Irben Strait, declaring it "free territory." The ship was stopped by naval forces at the exit of the strait. Sablin was arrested and, after a brief trial charged with "treason," executed in August 1976.
Numerous books and articles have been written about the "mutiny on the Storozhevoy," and even documentaries have been released. Some sing Valery Sablin's praises, while others subject him to derogatory criticism. But all these "works" have one thing in common: unreliability. The country learned of the "emergency" in the Baltic Fleet in the late 80s, at the end of glasnost and perestroika. Since then, the events that unfolded on and around the Storozhevoy, and the name of the rebellious political officer, have become shrouded in myths and legends, often contradictory, and having little or nothing in common with reality. Often, assessments of an event or person are not made as a result of deep research. historical research, but based on the political situation.
Even from the investigative documents, excerpts from which were first published in Vladimir Shigin's book, "The Rebellious 'Storozhevoy,'" it's difficult to reconstruct the true picture of what happened to the 'Storozhevoy.' Here's what investigator Dobrovolsky recalled:
Overall, the Sablin investigation was straightforward. I guaranteed his objectivity, and he signed every report. He hid virtually nothing... He conducted no confrontations—there were no contradictory testimonies.
Well, how could this be? A unique event, an extraordinary incident, has occurred in the Soviet Navy: a Baltic Fleet warship has left its moorings without permission and, under the command of a political officer who has seized command, is heading off to an unknown destination. Significant forces are involved in its detention; ships and aviation fleet. The lives of the ship's officers, warrant officers, and sailors are at risk. And it's a "simple" matter?
A review of the investigative documents presented by Shigin reveals that the testimony of Sablin and other defendants and witnesses frequently contradicts one another. Sablin and the other defendants frequently change their testimony during interrogations. There are numerous inaccuracies regarding the presence of ammunition on the ship, and even dates. Furthermore, the investigator deemed it unnecessary to conduct confrontations. A forensic experiment and a psychiatric examination of Valery Sablin were also omitted during the investigation. Yet, the fate of not only the mutinous political officer but also many officers and warrant officers was at stake. The investigation was conducted sloppily; apparently, the investigator was tasked with shutting down Sablin as quickly as possible, and none of those "in power" cared about the truth.
Let me clarify right away that the value of V. Shigin's book lies in the fact that it introduces the reader for the first time to the investigative materials of Valery Sablin's criminal case, which the author of this article also uses. However, its drawback is that it contains numerous recollections from some of the participants in the hijacking of the large antisubmarine ship "Storozhevoy," but not a single testimony from the direct participants in the events—the ship's officers and warrant officers. Apparently, Shigin never met any of them. Yet, many of them (for example, V. Vinogradov and B. Saitov) were still alive and living in St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad at the time of the book's publication.
At various times, I met with officers I knew from the "Storozhevoy," who, unfortunately, were no longer with the ship by then. Some of them refused to share their bitter memories, but others told me what happened. Their accounts were almost identical, so I have no reason to doubt their veracity.
At that time, the author of this article, with the rank of senior lieutenant, served as the commander of the ZRB-1 (ZRB - anti-aircraft rocket battery) on the large anti-submarine ship "Silny", the same type as the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy" of Project 1135.
The "Storozhevoy" did not set out from Baltiysk alone on its ill-fated voyage.
On the morning of November 2, 1975, two ships were preparing to set sail: the large anti-submarine ship Silny (Strong) and the large anti-submarine ship Storozhevoy (Storozhevoy). The ships were scheduled to take part in the naval parade in honor of the 58th anniversary of the October Revolution: Silny in Leningrad, Storozhevoy in Riga. While the Silny was preparing for battle and the voyage, I assumed the duties of watch officer upon the command "Marine watch, stand by."
At that time, Captain 1st Rank Yuri Ivanovich Mozharov, commander of the 128th Missile Ship Brigade, was on the bridge, sailing aboard our ship, along with some of his staff officers, to Leningrad. The brigade commander decided to take advantage of the upcoming voyage to write a standard ship schedule book for Project 1135 ships, which included most of the 128th missile ship brigade. His observations of the ships' preparations for sea were briefly interrupted by "our" special agent, whose monologue he listened attentively to, occasionally interrupting. I couldn't hear what they were saying. But... According to Chekist logic, the special agent should have gone to Riga on the "Storozhevy," since the brigade commander and his staff were sailing aboard the "Silny." But he went with us—to Leningrad.
I know from speaking with this lieutenant commander that he graduated from the Leningrad Higher Naval Engineering School, and his entire family lived in Leningrad. His choice is understandable; it gave him the opportunity to see his family and friends. Incidentally, on the afternoon of November 9th, a launch approached the Silny, anchored in the Kronstadt roadstead, and rescued a special officer, whom I never saw again. I assume he got the full treatment from his department for choosing the wrong place to stay.
The Silny and the Storozhevoy set out to sea together and sailed together to Liepaja. The Storozhevoy called in Liepaja to hand over its missile and artillery ammunition, and the Silny continued on to Leningrad. Before the Storozhevyi was scheduled to undergo dry-docking at the Liepaja Ship Repair Yard (SRZ-29) starting November 9, all ammunition was to be unloaded. That's why the 85R missiles of the Metel anti-submarine system, bombs for the RBU, and torpedoes were delivered to the mine and torpedo base in Baltiysk.
All day on November 3, the "Storozhevy" (Storozhevoy) unloaded Osa-M air defense missiles and ammunition for the AK-726 artillery mounts at a special pier at the entrance to the Liepaja Military Canal. The ship arrived in Riga the following day and stood in parade formation on the Daugava River. On November 5 and 6, scheduled training sessions for the upcoming parade took place, including the ceremonial raising of the flag and flag-paintings, grueling crew formations in full dress uniform, and cries of "Good health to you!" and "Hurrah!"
V. Sablin speaks to the ship's crew
The large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy" was preparing for the parade, and on November 5th, its political officer had already made the final decision to implement his plan to transform the ship into a "free and independent territory from state and party organs." The naval parade took place on November 7th. Following the parade on November 7th and 8th, officers and warrant officers were allowed to disembark. The sailors were also given leave. Group tours of the Latvian capital were organized for some of the personnel. By 18:00 PM on November 8th, the entire crew was already aboard the "Storozhevoy."
November 8, 1975, presented V. Sablin with what he apparently believed was a unique opportunity to carry out his plan. Firstly, the Storozhevoy was far from its unit, away from its home base of Baltiysk. Secondly, for various reasons, several officers were absent from the ship, whose presence would have made it almost impossible to even start a "mutiny."
I know for sure that the ship's senior assistant, Captain 3rd Rank N. Novozhilov, was not on board, as he was recovering in the hospital. The commander of BC-58, Captain-Lieutenant A. Ivanov, and the commander of ZRB-2, Senior Lieutenant A. Rozhko, were on leave; the commander of ZB-39, Senior Lieutenant S. Kolomnikov, was left in Liepaja to return the artillery ammunition unloaded into the depot.
He knew these officers well. It was unlikely that Sablin would have succeeded in isolating not only the commander but also the first mate; Nikolai Nikolaevich, with whom I had served on the same ship, was a courageous and decisive man. Without the command of the electromechanical combat unit commander, the ship would not have moved; Alexander Ivanov enjoyed great respect and authority among his subordinates. And so the special officer departed "for rest" to his native Leningrad.
Having received a report from the duty officer that the entire crew was present, the ship's commander, Captain 2nd Rank A. V. Potulny, decided to rest before the night's passage. But his rest was short-lived. An hour later, the deputy commander for political affairs, Captain 3rd Rank V. Sablin, entered the commander's cabin and anxiously informed the commander that a large group of sailors was drinking in the hydroacoustic station in the bow of the ship. Potulny ran out of the cabin and rushed to the bow, with Sablin following him. When the commander descended to the station, Sablin closed the hatch behind him and padlocked it. Sablin assigned Senior Seaman A. Shein, whom he had briefed on his plans in advance and who had agreed to support him, to guard Potulny. The ship's commander was isolated.
At 19:30 PM, on Sablin's orders, the ship's duty officer announced two commands over the ship's intercom: "Personnel, assemble in the crew mess hall to watch a film" and "Officers and warrant officers, report to the warrant officers' mess hall." At this point, Shein, armed with Sablin's pistol, took his place in the projection booth of the warrant officers' mess hall. Before entering the mess hall, Sablin loaded his pistol, readying it for firing.
From the very beginning, Sablin began recounting his biography, and then outlined the reason he'd gathered the officers and warrant officers. Here's what Sablin testified during his first interrogation:
I spoke for over an hour. The gist of my conversation was as follows: I intend to appear on television with a critical analysis of certain issues of the CPSU's domestic policy. In my speech, I want to say that it is impossible to speak out on a number of issues here; we lack freedom of speech and the press. Socialism is a more developed system compared to capitalism. Social relations must develop and improve. We must eliminate bureaucracy and the gap between the highest and lowest salaries, and intensify the work of the Komsomol. We must ensure that more workers and peasants are admitted to the CPSU. I said that I would speak to the rank-and-file personnel, after which we would begin preparations for battle and the campaign, then we would set sail and head for the Baltic Sea. From the sea, we would send a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief asking him to apply to the Central Committee for permission for one crew member to appear on television for 30 minutes daily until May 1, 1976. After a positive response, we head to the Kronstadt roadstead and must demand that the television equipment be delivered to the ship for the broadcast. After a few broadcasts, we must proceed to Leningrad and stand at the pier there…
Having recovered from the initial shock and disbelieving Sablin's announcement that the ship's ailing commander was supporting him, the officers and warrant officers reacted violently to his speech. They accused him of violating his oath and of hypocrisy as a political officer. They asked unflattering questions, accused him of adventurism, and warned that his plan would fail and that he was endangering the lives of the ship's crew. Nevertheless, after his speech, Sablin poured checkers onto the table and asked those present to vote: white for "yes," black for "no." He then threatened them with a pistol and announced (the political officer was bluffing – M.S.) that two sailors with machine guns were in the projection booth: "I advise you not to move. I'm not joking."
The voting result was disappointing for the political officer: the overwhelming majority of officers and warrant officers refused to support SablinAfter Sablin's threat, two officers and five tipsy midshipmen lost their nerve and expressed their support. However, they were of no use at sea: Lieutenant V. Dudnik was not certified as a watch officer, and Second Lieutenant V. Vavilkin was the assistant commander for supplies (he graduated from the Volsk "land-based" Logistics School), in charge of the ship's provisions, skipper's equipment, and personal belongings. The midshipmen were recent graduates of the school for senior technical officers, the same age as the sailors in their final year of service, and enjoyed no authority among the crew.
Sablin and Shein, holding pistols at the dissenting officers and warrant officers, locked them in the hydroacoustic station closest to the wardroom. The commander of BC-3 (BC-3 stands for mine-torpedo warhead unit), Senior Lieutenant Boris Saitov, informed Sablin that he "did not agree with his methods" and refused to be arrested, citing his intention to "maintain order on the ship as acting senior mate." Sablin, still stunned by the officers' refusal to support him, for some reason agreed with Saitov and did not arrest him.
After leaving the wardroom, Sablin gathered the off-duty personnel of BC-4 (BC-4 stands for combat communications unit) in the communications crew's quarters. There, he explained his plans to the stunned sailors and the importance he attached to the radio operators in their implementation. None of the sailors dared object to the political officer, who managed to convince them that their actions did not constitute a violation of their oath and that "the appeal to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy will be made in encrypted form, without violating established naval radio communications procedures." Sablin, who assured his listeners that nothing would happen to them and that they had absolutely nothing to fear, deemed it unnecessary to mention that he planned to transmit his "appeal to the Soviet people" in plain text.
Even before Sablin decided to convey the "ship capture plan and further plan of action" to the petty officers and sailors, a fight broke out near the hatch to the control room where the ship's commander, Potulny, was locked. Petty Officer 1st Class V. Kopylov and Senior Seaman K. Nabiyev, who were going to the forecastle, heard a knock on the lower part of the hatch and the commander's voice: "Sablin and Shein are traitors to the Motherland." The sailors attempted to free their commander, but Shein and Warrant Officers Boroday, Velichko, Gomenchuk, and Kalinichev, who had come to his aid, managed to prevent this initial attempt at resistance. Shein struck Kopylov on the head with the butt of his pistol. The sailors were forced to retreat.
At 23:00 PM, the ship's crew formed up on the poop deck (the aft superstructure of the ship, or the aft part of the upper deck) at the command "Assembly." Sablin appeared before the line of unsuspecting sailors.
"We were surprised," recalled sailor Preinbergs, "that no other officer came forward. No, there was only one..."
The officer who came out to form up was Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Firsov, commander of the electrical engineering group. Firsov, who was on duty at BC-5 (BC-5 is the electromechanical warhead unit), was in the PES (the power and survivability post on a warship, the room from which all types of energy are distributed on the ship and control is carried out during the survivability of its combat and technical assets. The PES is equipped with information about the operation of mechanisms, diagrams, electronic computers, communications equipment, and remote control of fire extinguishing systems, room drainage, ship righting, etc.) during Sablin's speech to the officers and warrant officers and was unaware of the events taking place on the ship.
Sablin delivered a speech to the sailors that was roughly the same as he had to the officers and ensigns. He did, however, announce that the ship would sail immediately to Kronstadt. When asked about the ship's commander, he lied again, claiming that Potulny was resting in his cabin, supporting him, Sablin, and would "soon assume command." To gain the support of the most "authoritative" sailors, the "godki," the political officer promised them what mattered most to them—a discharge into the reserve upon arrival in Kronstadt.
After the sailors' ranks were disbanded, Sablin had to answer to the "godki." They gathered in one of the quarters and demanded that the political officer, in exchange for loyalty, promise to discharge them into the reserve upon arrival in Kronstadt. Sablin again gave the "godki" such a guarantee. The "revolutionary" sailors cared little else. The support of the "godki" (naval slang for a sailor in his final year of active service, similar to the military term "ded" (grandfather), derived from the term for a negative phenomenon in the navy—"godkovshchina") was crucial for Sablin, since in the absence of officers, there was no one else to ensure his orders were carried out.
Having dismissed the sailors, Sablin went up to the ship's navigation station and sent below a bewildered Lieutenant V. Stepanov, who had been serving as officer of the watch the entire time. Stepanov, finding no officers in the officers' corridor, went to the poop deck, where he encountered Firsov standing there, lost in thought. Firsov told the lieutenant what had happened.
The officers decided to search for the ship's commander, but in the officers' corridor they encountered only Senior Lieutenant Saitov and Warrant Officers Zhidkov, Zverev, and Kovalchenkov, who were absent from the warrant officer's mess for various reasons, along with Warrant Officer Kalinichev, who had sobered up and joined them. The officers broke into the arsenal and the ammunition box in the artillery cellar (where the "spare" keys are kept), Captain-Lieutenant V. Vinogradov, commander of the BC-2 (BC-2 is a missile and artillery warhead unit), had managed to inform Saitov before his arrest. Saitov, Stepanov, and Firsov armed themselves with pistols.
Saitov ordered Firsov was ordered to abandon ship and report the emergency aboard. The easiest way to abandon ship was from the quarterdeck, but a large group of sailors was still there. So, risking a fall from a great height into the cold water, Firsov descended from the forecastle along the bow mooring line to the anchorage buoy. A submarine stationed ahead of the Storozhevoy heard Firsov's cry, and a short time later he was already at the headquarters of the 78th OVR (Overwatch) Brigade, where he reported the situation on board. Soon, news of the emergency on the Storozhevoy interrupted the rest of the Baltic Fleet's commander, Vice-Admiral Kosov.
Earlier, the political officer had been informed of Firsov's absence from the ship by the ETG commander's immediate subordinate, sailor Sakhnevich. Saitov merely confirmed what Sablin had initially been reluctant to believe; the element of surprise was now gone. After all, he had been banking on the Storozhevoy's departure according to the fleet's daily plan. The fleet's operational service, so long as instructions and procedures for leaving the base and all radio communications regulations were followed, would take no action against the ship. Only when the ship began to follow a course different from the recommended one would questions arise. While those on shore were trying to determine what was happening to the Storozhevoy, the ship would already be far from its home shores, out at sea, where, Sablin believed, he would be in control.
Officers of the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy." In the foreground is Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Firsov.
The plan had to be adjusted. Sablin hurried to the control room and gave the command over the ship's intercom: "Prepare the ship for battle and voyage immediately." The turbines were started on the command of Warrant Officer Khomyakov, who agreed to serve as the watch engineer. Half an hour later, at 2:00 a.m. on November 9, the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy" unmoored and headed down the Daugava River toward the Gulf of Riga. An hour later, a cryptographer brought Sablin a telegram from the Baltic Fleet commander demanding that he return the ship to Riga. The deputy commander for political affairs realized that the fleet command had begun to take action, but ordered the communications officers not to respond to the telegram and to maintain radio silence.
Since the naval command was unaware of Sablin's plans to transform the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy" into a "free and independent territory from state and party organs," they quite logically assumed that the mutinous political officer's goal was to hijack the ship to Sweden. Kosov reported this to Moscow, to the Navy Commander-in-Chief, who then reported it to Defense Minister Grechko. The order was issued to prevent the hijacking of the ship by all possible means. However, just an hour after the ship left its moorings on the Daugava, measures were taken to detain the "Storozhevoy."
The patrol ship SKR-14 was the first to leave Riga in pursuit of the "Storozhev." Small missile ships from the 109th small missile division, a patrol ship from the 57th separate division, and small anti-submarine ships from the 106th division of the 118th OVR brigade were then dispatched from Liepaja to intercept the ship. Border guard ships from the 4th Patrol Ship Brigade of the naval forces of the USSR Border Troops, which were on patrol duty there, were ordered to block the "Storozhev" from entering the Irben Strait.
At 4 a.m., Sablin decided to carry out part of his plan. On his orders, radio operators transmitted the following coded message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy:
Outgoing ciphergram No. 0400.
The Main Command of the Navy from the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy"
04 22 hours minutes
Please report immediately to the Politburo and personally to L.I. Brezhnev.
Our requirements:
1. We declare the territory of the ship a free and independent territory from state and party organs until May 1, 1976.
2. To provide the opportunity for one of the crew members, at our discretion, to appear on central radio and television for 30 minutes between 9:30 p.m. and 10 p.m. Moscow time every day, starting from the specified time.
3. Provide the ship with all types of provisions, according to the standards, at any base.
4. Allow the Storozhevoy to anchor and moor at any base or point within the waters of the USSR.
5. Ensure delivery and dispatch of the "Watchdog" mail.
6. Allow the transmission of the Storozhev radio station in the Mayak radio network in the evening.
7. When the crew members of the Storozhevoy go ashore, consider them as inviolable persons.
8. Do not use any measures of violence or persecution against family members, relatives and close friends of crew members.
Our action is purely political in nature and has nothing to do with betraying the Motherland. We are ready to be in the forefront of defending the Motherland in the event of military action. Those who oppose us have betrayed the Motherland.
For 6 hours, starting at 04:00, members of the revolutionary committee will wait for a political response to their demands.
In the event of silence or refusal to comply with the above demands, or an attempt to use force against us, all responsibility for the consequences will fall on the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and L.I. Brezhnev personally.
Members of the ship's revolutionary committee (? - M.S.), captain 3rd rank Sablin.
The Main Command of the Navy from the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy"
04 22 hours minutes
Please report immediately to the Politburo and personally to L.I. Brezhnev.
Our requirements:
1. We declare the territory of the ship a free and independent territory from state and party organs until May 1, 1976.
2. To provide the opportunity for one of the crew members, at our discretion, to appear on central radio and television for 30 minutes between 9:30 p.m. and 10 p.m. Moscow time every day, starting from the specified time.
3. Provide the ship with all types of provisions, according to the standards, at any base.
4. Allow the Storozhevoy to anchor and moor at any base or point within the waters of the USSR.
5. Ensure delivery and dispatch of the "Watchdog" mail.
6. Allow the transmission of the Storozhev radio station in the Mayak radio network in the evening.
7. When the crew members of the Storozhevoy go ashore, consider them as inviolable persons.
8. Do not use any measures of violence or persecution against family members, relatives and close friends of crew members.
Our action is purely political in nature and has nothing to do with betraying the Motherland. We are ready to be in the forefront of defending the Motherland in the event of military action. Those who oppose us have betrayed the Motherland.
For 6 hours, starting at 04:00, members of the revolutionary committee will wait for a political response to their demands.
In the event of silence or refusal to comply with the above demands, or an attempt to use force against us, all responsibility for the consequences will fall on the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and L.I. Brezhnev personally.
Members of the ship's revolutionary committee (? - M.S.), captain 3rd rank Sablin.
You read this “ultimatum” message and the thought arises: is everything alright with the author’s mind?
At 6 o'clock in the morning, the cipher clerk handed Sablin a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, who, in response to his ultimatum, demanded the return of the Storozhevoy to Riga, threatening that if the order was not carried out, the ship would be subject to weapon (Was Sablin really so naive as to expect a different answer? – M.S.). Then Sablin decided to go on the air and broadcast his appeal to the Soviet people in plain text: "Everyone! Everyone! Everyone!" The signalmen disobeyed their political officer's orders; they did not violate radio communications regulations. Thus, two crucial points of his plan collapsed: the demands outlined in his encrypted message were not accepted, and "all honest people of our country and abroad" did not hear his appeal for support for the "rebellious" ship (and could not have heard it, even if it had been broadcast).
At 7 a.m., three border patrol ships (PSKR) approached the Storozhevoy and, while escorting it, constantly broadcast signals with the following orders: "Anchor. Commander-in-Chief's order. Stop, or we will open fire."
After some time, the frigate Komsomolets Litvy and the MPK-25 joined the pursuit of the Storozhevoy. Two small missile ships from the 106th Division approached within minimum cruise missile firing range. Sablin received constant encrypted messages from the Baltic Fleet Commander and the Navy Commander-in-Chief, insisting on the same demand: return to Riga and anchor the ship in the outer roadstead.
The ships pursuing the Storozhevoy were alerted to open warning fire, but command still hoped Sablin would comply with the Commander-in-Chief's order and return the ship to Riga. However, Sablin continued to steer the ship into the Irben Strait and only at 9:20 AM informed the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that he did not intend to comply. The contents of the coded message were categorical: "Expedite your response to outgoing message #0400. We expect a response by 12:00 PM. Members of the ship's Revolutionary Committee. Sablin."
Sablin transmitted this coded message as the Storozhevoy exited the Irben Strait and began leaving Soviet territorial waters. The ship had also turned left and increased speed to full speed (22 knots). The ship's course, 290 degrees, was now resting on the Swedish island of Gotska Sande; 55 miles remained to Swedish territorial waters. There was no longer any time to waste; the time for persuasion was over. The command of the Navy and the Baltic Fleet became convinced that Sablin was stealing the Storozhevoy to Sweden.
Two Baltic Fleet aircraft attacked the Storozhevoy. The bombs landed ahead of the ship and alongside its sides, causing minor damage. At 10:30, the ship stopped, the national flag was raised, and the ship's commander, Captain 2nd Rank Potulny, reported over the radio to the Baltic Fleet command post: "Ship stopped. I have taken control of the situation. Awaiting instructions from the fleet commander."
Even before the aerial bombing began, dramatic events occurred on the "mutinous" ship. Following the unsuccessful attempt by officers and warrant officers, led by Senior Lieutenant Saitov, to arrest Sablin, Warrant Officer Savchenko attempted to free the ship's commander. But this attempt also failed. The warrant officer was beaten by a group of "godki" (guys) guarding the arrested commander. Tensions rose among the sailors. Sablin was even forced to temporarily leave the navigation post to calm groups of sailors gathered in the ship's quarters and the crew mess hall. One by one, Sablin and his "comrades" among the officers and warrant officers abandoned him. Lieutenants Dudnik and Vavilkin, and warrant officers Borodai, Velichko, Gomenchuk, and Kalinichev fled to their cabins.
The first to refuse to carry out Sablin's orders were the sailors from BC-2, who did not send their representatives to the "meeting" called by the political officer right at the navigation post.
A few minutes before the ship was attacked by naval bombers, a large group of sailors, led by Chief Petty Officer Mironov and Petty Officer 1st Class Kopylov, overpowered the officers and warrant officers guarding the ship and freed them. Then, sailor Burov, who was guarding the ship's commander, was thrown to the deck, and Potulny was freed. The freed officers and warrant officers opened the weapons storeroom and armed themselves with pistols.
This is how Captain 2nd Rank Potulny recalled the end of the Sablin mutiny:
The first thing I needed to do was disarm Sablin. I decided to go to the bridge myself. It was my fault, so I had to fix it. I had no moral right to expose anyone to bullets. I ordered one armed group to cover me from the stern of the ship, another from the bow. I didn't want to kill him, although my chest was seething with indignation. I was aiming for the liver. Then I changed my mind: I'd shoot him in the leg and he'd fall. I went in. Sablin was pale at the engine room telegraph... I fired. He fell, huddled. I pulled the pistol from him. I sat him down in a corner. I put the sailor at the wheel. Then I sent Sablin to his cabin under arrest.
Armed groups landed on the drifting Storozhevoy from ships that approached its side.
Shein claims that "when the wounded Sablin was being led aboard after the ship's capture, someone from the crew said to the landing party: 'Remember him for the rest of your lives! He's a true commander, a true officer, a true officer of the Soviet Navy!'" The truth was more prosaic: the entire crew was isolated in the ship's interior, and Shein himself, hidden in one of the engine rooms, was not found for a long time. No one from the ship's crew was on the upper deck.
All of the ship's crew, with the exception of some of the petty officers and sailors from BC-5, were transported to Riga: the officers and warrant officers were placed in a KGB detention facility, while the petty officers and sailors were placed in the so-called "Voroshilov Barracks." The "Storozhevoy" was stationed at anchor at the entrance to Riga.
The following day, November 10, a commission headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, arrived in the Latvian capital. Boris Saitov, using his own experience, recounted to the author of this article how the commission members interrogated the officers:
I was led into a large room. Admirals and generals were seated at the table. I recognized only Gorshkov and Epishev. Andropov sat alone in the far corner. Questions began pouring in, mostly from Gorshkov and Epishev. I was barely given time to answer, constantly interrupted, accused of cowardice, indecisiveness, and passivity. All this was accompanied by choice obscenities. Gorshkov asked, "Why didn't you shoot, considering you were armed with a pistol?" I replied, "I believed Sablin's gamble would fail, and I didn't want to lynch him. And I ask you to behave with dignity, without swearing or insults." After these words, there was silence. Epishev was the first to react. "This is some kind of Tolstoyanism," he said. And then I lost my temper and raised my voice and addressed the head of GlavPUR: "Sablin is your nomenklatura, your protégé. It was you who awarded him, a slacker who spent his entire military service sitting in his cabin, an order." Epishev's face turned purple, and he yelled: "Get out-e-e!"
Saitov's behavior during this interrogation determined his future fate. Having organized the escape from Firsov's ship and resisted Sablin, he was demoted to the rank of sailor and discharged into the reserves.
Along with Sablin, Shein and 12 other active "accomplices" were arrested and transferred to Moscow's Lefortovo prison. The remaining crew members were tested as witnesses in the "Sablin case." After some time, all of Sablin's "comrades" except Shein were transferred from defendants to witnesses, as the investigation established "that they had no intention of betraying the Motherland; due to the unexpectedness and rapidity of the events, they failed to promptly discern the hostile nature of SABLIN's intentions and were unable to correctly assess them" (from the report of Defense Minister M.S. Grechko). After interrogation, the former crew of the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevaya," led by Potulny, was transferred to Kaliningrad and housed in the barracks of the coastal base of the Division of Newly Built and Repaired Ships.
Where was he going, led by the rebellious political officer of the Storozhevoy brigade?
My intention was not to proceed on the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy" to Kronstadt and Leningrad immediately after passing the floating lighthouse "Irbensky." I wanted to head out into the open Baltic Sea as far from any coast as possible—both Soviet and foreign—where I would have freedom of maneuver and where it would be difficult (due to the difficulty of detection and the presence of various merchant vessels) to use the Soviet Navy's weapons against the "Storozhevoy." At the same time, after passing the Irbensky lighthouse, I simply proceeded without turning anywhere. This course suited me, as it led to the open sea. In the Baltic Sea, I intended to wait for a response to my radiogram to the CPSU Central Committee by 10 a.m. on November 9.
Sablin conveyed this version of his plan of action to the officers and warrant officers and voiced it during the first interrogations.
The second option (this plan was communicated to the sailors during the formation on the quarterdeck and was also recorded in one of the interrogation reports):
I intended to seize the ship with the help of the entire crew, who, I was sure, would support me, and proceed to the Kronstadt naval base (as in the text of the Protocol – M.S.). While en route, I intended to radio the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and convey to the Central Committee of the CPSU our demands that one person appear on television (referring to himself).
Next, I believed, we would be given the opportunity to appear on television, and equipment would be delivered on board. Then we would move on to Leningrad. While in Leningrad, we were to continue our critical speeches on radio and television, engaging representatives of various social strata, including scientists and artists, and army and navy officials, on issues of government, social issues, youth education, and so on.
Next, I believed, we would be given the opportunity to appear on television, and equipment would be delivered on board. Then we would move on to Leningrad. While in Leningrad, we were to continue our critical speeches on radio and television, engaging representatives of various social strata, including scientists and artists, and army and navy officials, on issues of government, social issues, youth education, and so on.
The third option, which the Baltic Fleet commander, Vice-Admiral Kosov, reported to the Navy Commander-in-Chief and which many naval officers still do not rule out, is that Sablin intended to hijack the Storozhevoy to Sweden in order to present his “demands” from its territorial waters.
Sablin had no chance of carrying out his "plan" on the open sea or during the passage to Kronstadt. Absolutely not.
And it was clear to the young naval lieutenant that there would be no positive response to the demands outlined by Sablin in his telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
Sablin's hopes that the Storozhevoy would not be detected in the open sea due to the difficult navigational conditions are completely unfounded: they would have detected it and used weapons, despite the "presence of various merchant ships" (for this purpose, they would have declared the area where the Storozhevoy was located a zone dangerous for navigation, surrounded it with ships of the Baltic Fleet, and used weapons against the ship - M.S.).
If the demands set out in the radiogram to the Commander-in-Chief were not met, Sablin stated during the investigation, I intended to go along the coast of the USSR and transmit a radiogram-appeal to the Soviet people using a medium-wave transmitter: “To everyone! To everyone! To everyone!”
What foolish naivety. Who would have allowed you to "marching along the shores of the USSR" and bombard the airwaves with your revolutionary appeal? They knew how to jam radio waves in the Soviet Union. Besides, Sablin's entire "plan" is the plan of a man unaware of reality, a prisoner of his own illusions.
Moreover, V. Sablin exposed the ship to other dangers during his voyage on the high seas (or the passage to Kronstadt). Before setting out to sea, the ship's navigator prepares a set of charts for the route. These charts are used to plot a preliminary course, make corrections, mark turning points when changing course, mark control bearings, and so on. This entire prepared set of charts is stored in order in the top drawer of the automatic plotting unit.
Sablin had no navigational support for the voyage to Kronstadt. He also had no watch officer, an important assistant to the ship's commander during sea voyages, who manages the ship's entire watch and, above all, ensures the ship's compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (IRPCS).
There was no watch officer (WOO) (WOO is the combat information post of a warship), who would provide the ship's commander with information about the surface situation, or a qualified watch engineer, who would oversee the safe operation of the ship's engines and life support systems, ensuring the ship's survivability. Officers capable of performing these functions refused to participate in the "mutiny." Sailors were unable to replace the officers due to a lack of the necessary knowledge and skills. Therefore, the likelihood that the ship, having lost its way, could run aground (at that time, satellite navigation, which would provide a constant fix on a ship's position, did not exist), or collide with oncoming vessels, or that an engine failure would occur due to improper operation, was very high.
Let's assume the impossible. To avoid an international scandal, the Soviet leadership promised to fulfill Sablin's "demands," and the ship would have safely reached Kronstadt. As soon as the unarmed Storozhevoy appeared at the gates of the "city of three revolutions," it would have been immediately assigned to an armed capture team, and that would have been the end of the "center of political activity." Incidentally, the large anti-submarine ship Silny, fully armed, was moored at Kronstadt.
Now let's look at the third option.
The course of the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy" when leaving the Irben Strait was 290оThe ship deviated to the left of the recommended course (322,8о) by almost more than 30 degrees. That is, the "Storozhevoy" was not approaching, but moving away from the point (I called it the "point of no return" - M.S.), at which it was supposed to turn right and set a course leading to Leningrad. Moreover, the course was 290о - this is a course towards the Swedish coast; towards the island of Gotska Sande, the closest territory of Sweden.
Unable to contact the rebellious political officer himself or learn his true intentions, Baltic Fleet Commander Vice-Admiral Kosov logically assumed Sablin was heading for Sweden, which he reported to Moscow. The Storozhevoy was stopped by naval airstrikes 21 miles from the border of Soviet territorial waters and 55 miles from Swedish territorial waters; the Swedish coast was approximately two hours away at 30 knots.
If we assume that Sablin's goal was Sweden, then the chances of achieving it wereThese chances would have been even greater if Senior Lieutenant V. Firsov hadn't defected and reported the incident to fleet command. Had the "shore" been unaware of what was actually happening on the Storozhevoy, it could easily have reached Swedish shores while the fleet's operations team was investigating what had happened. After all, no one could have imagined, even in their wildest dreams, that a Soviet warship could be hijacked to a foreign country. Such a thing hadn't happened since the battleship Potemkin, which was captured by a mutinous crew, "wandered" for a time in the Black Sea, and then arrived in Romania, where it was interned.
There are three possible explanations for why the Storozhevoy deviated from its recommended course. First, Sablin, upon learning of Firsov's escape, realized that his planned "plan" was impossible to achieve and decided to change course for Sweden. Second, the ship's course had not been charted, resulting in the deviation from its recommended course. Third, the Baltic Fleet ships that intercepted the Storozhevoy as it exited the Irben Strait restricted its maneuverability. All of these theories are plausible.
But there's a very important detail. After turning onto course 290о The Storozhevoy followed them for almost an hour and a half and did not change course even when the pursuing ships had moved 50 cable lengths away (before the use of aircraft – M.S.). For almost half an hour, the patrol ships and other ships did not cross the Storozhevoy's course or move dangerously close to the large anti-submarine ship at sharp angles. Nothing prevented Sablin from changing the ship's course.
Where was the rebellious political officer actually taking the ship he had captured? Only one person could answer that question today: Valery Mikhailovich Sablin.
There's a category of people known as those with a faulty conscience. These people are sensitive to the plight of others, have a sense of personal and civic responsibility, and are acutely concerned about injustice and the fate of their homeland. At the same time, a faulty conscience can have a devastating effect on the psyche of its owner; such a person experiences severe psychological problems throughout their life. A person with a faulty conscience, in pursuit of their own goals, without recognizing the moral dubiousness of their actions, may commit acts that contradict their own moral principles.
Deputy Commander of the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy" for political affairs, Captain 3rd Rank V. Sablin
Sablin, it seems, was indeed a man with a troubled conscience. According to his fellow students at the military academy and the Military-Political Academy who knew him well, he was honest, conscientious, and firmly committed to his principles and convictions.
At school, recalled Sablina's former classmate A. I. Lyalin, Valery was called the conscience of the class. He was very cheerful and at the same time firm in his principles. He didn't shirk. He won not by voice, but by logic and conviction. He read a lot. The school administration valued him. He quickly became a section commander, and was one of the first in our class to join the party—in his fourth year. We elected him secretary of the faculty committee of the Komsomol.
Retired Rear Admiral E.M. Chukhraev, who studied with Sablin at the academy, gives the following characterization of his classmate:
He was a thoughtful, thoughtful, and extraordinary person. Valera attracted people with his original thoughts, analytical skills, and a good knowledge of history. He had a particular love for philosophy. By nature, Valera was an independent person. He had a solid, solid appearance.
But in the personal records and memoirs of the officers with whom Valery Sablin served in the navy, the "bright" image of the "exemplary officer" is portrayed quite differently. It's one thing to study, where you're essentially responsible only for yourself, and quite another to serve on a ship, where you demonstrate not only your knowledge but also your ability to apply it in the challenging environment of naval service.
Valery Sablin's officer career wasn't exactly a success. He graduated from the Frunze Naval School at 21, meaning he should have held the rank of captain (3rd rank) by age 30. However, after nine years of naval service, Sablin was a lieutenant captain and merely an assistant commander of a third-rank patrol ship. Furthermore, he was transferred from a second-rank ship, the destroyer Ozhestochenny, to a lower-ranking ship—a patrol ship.
Typically, it was the other way around: promising officers were often appointed to ships of a higher class. At that time, patrol ships were commanded by senior lieutenants, and second-rank ships were often commanded by captain-lieutenants. The navy developed rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, new ships were constantly arriving, and the careers of most good officers were rapid, without any connections, although that was not uncommon.
But things didn't work out for V. Sablin. Many of his classmates had long since passed him in the career ladder, becoming commanders of large ships and staff officers of naval units. V. Sablin, however, remained in the regular rank of lieutenant commander, a position typically held by officers two to three years after graduating from the Higher Naval Academy, or even after. Sablin received his rank of senior lieutenant almost a year and a half late, serving in his primary officer positions for five years, and as assistant commander of the Investigative Committee for four years.
Vladimir Shigin, who was able to review V. Sablin's personal file, found no "stellar performance reviews" there. Shigin also found the reason for the delay in awarding the future "revolutionary" the rank of "senior lieutenant."
The whole point, writes Shigin, was that Sablin's service on the "Ozhestochenny" hadn't been going well for a long time. He repeatedly failed the exams for independent command of his department (one month is allotted from the day of assuming the post to pass the exam – M.S.). When Sablin finally passed all the exams, he received a third star on his shoulder straps.
However, the SKR-33's assistant commander, Valery Sablin, was never able to obtain clearance to independently pilot the ship (this is granted within one year – M.S.). The former SKR-33 commander, Captain 3rd Rank Khokhlov, spoke negatively of his assistant:
Sablin... was burdened by the position of assistant commander and, openly neglecting his official duties, preferred to spend his working time in the cabin reading the works of Lenin.
Valery Sablin himself admits in his autobiography that serving as a naval officer weighed heavily on him. He complains of the "harsh life on board" and the "drab" everyday life. "Serving as an assistant is difficult and taxing," he laments. In 1968, Sablin decided to retrain as a political officer. But he was released to enroll in the Military-Political Academy only a year later. That year, Sablin admits, was "the most challenging, difficult, and responsible" for him.
«You had to serve well (! – M.S.), to be admitted to the academy (emphasis added – M.S.). Politics had to be put on the back burner… I had to suffer for a year,” Sablin reports in his autobiography. This admission by the future “revolutionary” speaks volumes. He was no “model officer”; his primary focus was not on the official duties of his positions, but on “politics.” Service as a line naval officer was sheer torture for Sablin. This explains his failures in his officer career and his prolonged tenure in minor positions that did not match his ambitions.
Sablin explained his decision to become a political worker by saying that he "moved (what a style – M.S.) from the idea of purging the party (the CPSU – M.S.) to the idea of changing the state apparatus," that he felt that "something… needed to be done, but lacked the knowledge." And Sablin decided to acquire this knowledge in the outpost of agitation and propaganda in the USSR Armed Forces, which was the VPA.
The secret behind V. Sablin's decision to drastically change his officer career likely lies elsewhere: having failed in his professional career, he decided to become a political officer, a position that typically saw easy career advancement. It was primarily those officers who, for one reason or another, had, as they say, "not had a successful career" on board that voluntarily "retrained" as political officers. Line commanders generally did not accept such positions. Among the naval officers, such a career change was viewed with disdain, as the navy had professional political officers: the Frunze Naval School had a political faculty, and after its closure in 1967, the Kiev Higher Naval Political School (KVVMPU) was established.
It wasn't without patronage, that notorious "connection" that Sablin himself so resented. Sablin's admission was "facilitated" by a friend and former colleague of Valery's father, Captain 1st Rank Mikhail Sablin, then head of the Political Directorate of the Navy, Admiral Grishanov (Vasiliy Maksimovich Grishanov (1911–1994), admiral and head of the Political Directorate of the USSR Navy from 1963–1981); after all, the VPA, as a rule, accepted qualified political workers who had served in their primary positions for at least two years, thus qualifying them for admission.
In 1969, Valery Sablin entered the academy, graduating with honors in 1973 and being sent to the Baltic Fleet, where he became deputy commander for political affairs of the large anti-submarine ship Storozhevoy.
The position of deputy political officer on a large anti-submarine ship corresponded to the rank of captain 3rd rank, which Sablin attained upon graduation. On similar ships, there were deputy political officers who assumed this position three years after graduating from the KVVMPU. After graduating from the Military-Pilot School, senior officers like V. Sablin were appointed at least to the positions of deputy political officers on first-rank ships, brigade political officers, or to the political departments of naval formations. The position of deputy political officer on a second-rank ship was "academic" only in the sense that it granted the right to enroll in the Academy, which V. Sablin had so brilliantly graduated from.
Feelings of injustice and wounded pride could have tormented Sablin's restless soul: his fellow Academy students had received more promising and higher-ranking positions, while he, an excellent student, was appointed to a position occupied by recent graduates. Could one of the reasons for V. Sablin's reckless behavior have been the fact that he had been appointed to a position other than the one he had hoped for?
In 1973, he was already 34 years old. Many of his fellow graduates from the Frunze Naval School were already in prestigious positions, already holding the rank of captain 2nd rank, while he had only just received the rank of captain* (naval slang for captain 3rd rank) upon graduation from the Academy and didn't even hold a position corresponding to a higher military rank. Sablin (this is the author's personal opinion – M.S.) projected his unsuccessful officer career onto "embezzlement and demagoguery, window dressing and lies... the absence of democracy and social justice... the lack of respect for honor, life, and human dignity" in the Soviet Union. Speaking on the Storozhevoy's quarterdeck before the start of the "mutiny," Sablin aired his personal grievances to the sailors with the following words:
I went to school with Admiral Grishanov's son (Valery Vasilyevich Grishanov (1939–1998), an admiral, graduated from the Frunze Naval School in 1960, a classmate of V. Sablin. In 1975, he became a captain of the 2nd rank and served as chief of staff of a missile ship brigade in the Northern Fleet). I often visited his parents at home; they have everything. They're living in clover. Grishanov's son is already a big boss, and I'm a political officer, even though we had the same education. But he's the son of an admiral.
Wasn't it this constant nagging sense of "injustice" that prompted him to take such a bold, reckless, and doomed action? After all, his first job as a political officer, as a ship's deputy commander of the 2nd rank, had been his first; he held it for only two years, and he couldn't expect a promotion anytime soon. His hopes of abandoning his naval career in favor of a political officer career were dashed.
I never had a high opinion of the political workers of the post-war (?! – M.S.) period, since they, as a rule, are very narrow-minded in their reasoning, think a lot about personal well-being and little about the matter, are idlers and chatterboxes, sometimes very beautiful chatterboxes, and they, as a rule, do not enjoy authority among the personnel.
Well, one can agree that for some political workers, Sablin's characterization of his colleagues was fair. Only he, too, is subject to such a merciless characterization.
Judging by the recollections of Sablin's fellow sailors on the "Storozhevy," he also lacked authority among his subordinates. Or rather, he did have authority among some of the sailors, but in the navy, among officers, this kind of authority is called "cheap." True, he had a friendly, even familiar, relationship with the ship's commander, Potulny. But he was constantly at odds with the ship's officers, especially the most authoritative of them: the commander of BC-2, Captain-Lieutenant Viktor Vinogradov, the commander of BC-3, Senior Lieutenant Boris Saitov, and the commander of BC-5, Captain-Lieutenant Alexander Ivanov. Vinogradov openly accused Sablin of the following at a party meeting, raising the cause of his conflicts with the political officer:
Your duty is to ensure the ship's combat readiness. But you're doing everything you can to lower its combat readiness. You're covering up gross violations of military discipline, playing up to the "year-olds"... You shouldn't cover up your actions with "concern for the needs of the personnel."
The ship's officers and warrant officers protested against Sablin by electing his "enemies" as leaders of the Storozhevoy party organization against his will: Vinogradov as secretary, and Ivanov as his deputy.
Sablin also had a major conflict with Captain 2nd Rank L. Rassukovany, the commander of the combat service detachment of ships that included the Storozhevoy. He accused Rassukovany, right in front of the sailors at the control post, of holding combat exercises too often. Rassukovany, so to speak, "sent Sablin away," demanding he mind his own business. Rassukovany was concerned with combat training (where else, if not on combat duty, when no work "from fence to lunch" interferes, would one engage in full-fledged combat training – M.S.), while Sablin was supposedly concerned with personnel.
The sailors on watch duty at the navigation post naturally told their comrades about the "caring" political officer. Sablin's indignation is understandable. He was sitting in his cabin, preparing to seize the ship, and Rassukovanny, with his "stupid" exercises, was distracting him from the important work of ideologically preparing the upcoming declaration of the "Storozhevoy" as a "free and independent territory..." After all, a combat exercise is a "combat alert," and whether you like it or not, you have to leave your cabin and at least pretend to be active. That way, there's no time to draw up a plan for the upcoming revolutionary actions and other necessary documents. He was forced to "work" at night. Saitov recalled that during his combat service, Sablin always appeared in public with a sleepy face.
Valery Sablin was a man who, by all appearances, was deeply troubled by the fact that Soviet reality was fundamentally different from the communist ideals he so fervently believed in. Sablin's involvement in "politics" initially manifested itself in his periodic letters to various high-ranking officials. He began his epistolary work as early as his first year at the naval academy: he wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (VLKSM) about how "Nakhimov students were being groomed to become gentry" (this resembled a denunciation and was untrue: education at the Nakhimov Naval Academy was very harsh for boys – M.S.).
Then, several letters followed from officer Sablin to Grishanov, in one of which he advised the head of the Naval Training Center “that the subject of political training should be changed, so that it does not evoke ‘political’ (ha-ha-ha! – M.S.) thoughts in the personnel.”
The letters then take on a more serious tone. Sablin informed the CPSU Central Committee that "we must fight for the purity of the Party," which required a "purge." This was followed by a letter to Khrushchev himself about the shortcomings of the CPSU and the Soviet state and how to address them. Sablin received no response to any of his letters. However, after his letter to Khrushchev, he was summoned to the Murmansk Regional Committee, where a secretary chided the young officer, who was "politically inconsequential," and advised him to focus on his official duties. This ended Sablin's interactions with the "higher-ups" without any consequences for him (it didn't even prevent him from enrolling in the Military-Political Academy—M.S.).
Sablin sought answers to the questions that troubled him in the works of Lenin, Marx, and Engels. He also constantly "collected... interesting facts exposing our (Soviet – M.S.) reality." Sablin perfected his study of the so-called "classics of Marxism-Leninism": he could not only recite a given quotation by heart, but also remember which page of the "imperishable text" it was located on. Sablin, he said, was a supporter of democracy, which presupposed the separation of powers, a multi-party system, and freedom of speech. At the same time, Lenin's "State and Revolution" made a "great impression" on him. After reading it, Sablin understood only one thing: "how far we (the CPSU – M.S.) have strayed from the principles of the Paris Commune."
Sablin failed to see the utopian nature of Lenin's ideas. "Forward development, that is, toward communism, proceeds through the dictatorship of the proletariat and cannot proceed otherwise," Lenin wrote. Parliamentarism and the separation of executive and legislative powers were rejected by Lenin. What kind of democracy could he possibly be talking about? Sablin failed to understand that democracy and socialism, or whatever it calls itself, are incompatible, and that the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, so advocated by the "leader of the world proletariat," has never existed, does not exist, and cannot exist. There can only be a state of the dictatorship of the communist nomenklatura, a state of lawlessness, violence, and tyranny. Our "communard" was completely confused.
Ultimately, after reflecting, studying the works of the "classics," and comparing their teachings and theories with Soviet reality, Sablin concluded that "the Party (the CPSU – M.S.) and the government had departed from Lenin's principles in the construction of socialism..." He saw this departure in "violations of the rule of law and justice in Soviet society..., in abuses in trade, shortages of goods, cases of window dressing and falsification of figures, bureaucracy and the abuse of official position for personal gain, etc." All of V. Sablin's assessments and judgments were fair and correct, but he could not understand one thing: it could not have been otherwise.
"After thinking long and hard about my next steps, I decided to abandon theory and become a practitioner," Sablin would write. Sablin made the fateful decision (according to him, in 1971 – M.S.) that he "needed some kind of platform from which to begin expressing free thoughts about the need to change the existing state of affairs" while still studying at the Military-Political Academy. Well, we already know how Sablin used the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy" as a "platform" and what came of it.
And what was this "theory" he'd already abandoned? There was no theory at all. Sablin's notes contain no theoretical research. Sablin himself acknowledges this fact. In his treasured notebook of quotes from Lenin and other "theoreticians," he wrote: "A programmatic document with theoretical propositions for the proposed revolution has not been written."
And what kind of revolution was the Baltic Fleet's political officer planning to carry out? "A communist revolution," replies Sablin. Another revolution, and a communist one at that. God forbid!
Here are some of Sablin's "theoretical" thoughts, as cited in his book by Vladimir Shigin, who has read his notes (judging by the style, a high school literature teacher would not have given Sablin an excellent grade for "content" - M.S.):
"Marxist-Leninist theory played its revolutionary, transformative role during the socialist revolution, but it can go no further. Grateful history has strangled it in its embrace."
"Socialism created the preconditions for the Communist Revolution. But it itself rejected the political revolutionary spirit of its movement, thereby becoming a brake on the progressive development of society."
“The communist revolution must have the character of an acute class struggle depending on a number of factors:
— will the people immediately believe in the need for social change;
— will a new revolutionary party be created in the near future;
- how fiercely the “upper crust” will resist and drown the people in blood.”
"The main task is an unshakable faith in the necessity of the Communist revolution, the creation of a new party, the creation of a broad popular front and its direction to storm the state fortifications."
"Socialism created the preconditions for the Communist Revolution. But it itself rejected the political revolutionary spirit of its movement, thereby becoming a brake on the progressive development of society."
“The communist revolution must have the character of an acute class struggle depending on a number of factors:
— will the people immediately believe in the need for social change;
— will a new revolutionary party be created in the near future;
- how fiercely the “upper crust” will resist and drown the people in blood.”
"The main task is an unshakable faith in the necessity of the Communist revolution, the creation of a new party, the creation of a broad popular front and its direction to storm the state fortifications."
More violence, more civil war and “forced” happiness?
Read Sablin's "theory" and you can't help but wonder: was this "champion of the people's happiness" all right in the head? No, Sablin was no fool. He comes across as naive and romantic, yet at the same time an ordinary individual with unfulfilled ambitions, who somehow decided he was destined for a special mission.
Moreover, Sablin completely misunderstood the historical processes and complex social relations in the Soviet Union. After all, the Soviet people were neither ready for nor desired any revolution. In the mid-70s, a rain of petrodollars poured down on the Land of Soviets, and an unspoken social contract existed between the "upper crust" and the "lower crust": we, the "upper crust," would ensure you, the "lower crust," a modest but comfortable coexistence, while you, the "lower crust," would meekly follow the course dictated by "the intellect, honor, and conscience of our era." Everyone was happy with the arrangement. And there was no revolutionary situation in the land of "developed socialism."
From January to April 1975, the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy" carried out combat duty in the Mediterranean Sea and then transited to Cuba. During the day, Deputy Political Officer V. Sablin went about his usual business: lecturing the crew on the peace-loving policies of the CPSU and the Soviet government and the aggressive machinations of global imperialism led by the United States, preparing and conducting party and Komsomol meetings, supervising officers' note-taking of the classic works of Marxism-Leninism and the proceedings of the latest "fateful" Party Congress and Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and checking the officers' readiness to conduct political classes and political briefings. In other words, he conscientiously participated in the brainwashing to which all Soviet citizens were subjected from childhood. And during the long evenings and nights, in the political officer’s separate cabin, V. Sablin “thought intensely and for a long time about further actions” to turn the ship into a “center of political activity” and developed a plan to seize the ship.
This duality led to V. Sablin becoming a man obsessed with a particular idea, that is, simply put, a man who says one thing, but in reality plans and does something else.
Here's what a psychology textbook says about people obsessed with a particular idea:
They know exactly what they want and constantly bend reality to fit their own patterns and perceptions of the world. They discard anything that doesn't fit as harmful. They perceive all criticism as an unequivocal evil, detrimental to their cause. Such a person, even if they have the resources, will never be able to abandon their plans. The obsessive's motto is that the end justifies the means, but in reality, the means justify the end. The result of such "single-mindedness" can be various disasters: both for the obsessive (Sablin - M.S.) and for those around them (Sablin's parents and family, the officers of the "Storozhevoy" - M.S.).
Whether V. Sablin intended it or not, his actions followed the Machiavellian principle, adopted by the Bolsheviks: "The end justifies the means." Incidentally, this dictum is the motto of the Jesuit order and, accordingly, the foundation of their morality. The renowned Spanish Jesuit Antonio Escobar y Mendoza (1589–1669) was the first to openly express and develop the idea that purity of intentions justifies actions condemned by morality and law.
Among the sailors (from left to right): Political Deputy V. Sablin, Commander Potulny, First Mate N. Novozhilov. There are no other officers in the photo.
How did V. Sablin manage to lure most of the sailors into his scheme? This is a very complex question, and there's no definitive answer. We can only speculate and put forward the most realistic versions. Well, let's give it a try.
First of all, it's necessary to honestly and impartially characterize the average, so to speak, Soviet sailor of the 70s. Our Armed Forces have always been workers' and peasants' forces, so its former name—the Red Army—most accurately reflects its social composition. Many sailors came from low-income families with their own numerous problems; many were from single-parent families, meaning they were raised by so-called single mothers before entering the military. How the sailors longed for letters from home! Many of them yearned for the people they held dearest: their mothers, brothers, and sisters. But what if their father drank?
Most sailors, although they had a secondary education, had performed poorly in school, had failed to acquire any specialty before entering service, and were poorly educated (although there were exceptions: some of them earned higher education after serving, became highly skilled workers, and even successful businessmen). In any case, the vast majority of sailors were ignorant of politics. During political studies, many of them couldn't name the job title of their "beloved" Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, had only a vague idea of the decisions made at the recent historic CPSU Congress, which countries were part of the Warsaw Pact, and so on.
The words of the fiery speech by V. Sablin, an officer and political officer, fell on fertile ground, and there were no other officers nearby; there was no one who could explain the entire illegality and danger of the adventure into which the political officer was involving the sailors.
Another important aspect: at the command "Assembly," not all sailors report to the ship's quarterdeck for formation. Those responsible for maintaining the ship's operations, those on watch, duty, and patrol duty while the ship is anchored, remain at their posts. These primarily include the sailors from BC-5, who are in the remote engine starter, where the engines are remotely started, the boiler engineers on duty, and the electricians on duty. The watch specialist for the anti-aircraft fire alarm is also in his radio room. So, some sailors were completely unaware of what was happening.
And one more thing. The autumn demobilization of sailors who had served their time was coming to an end. This important event usually dragged on for quite a while and took place in several stages. Disciplined, "not brazen" sailors were discharged first. "Godki" (old sailors), whose behavior and frequent violations of military discipline caused their commanders considerable trouble, were kept, as they say, "until the first white flies"—until the last day required by law. Usually, a demobilization team was formed from these sailors.
There were such sailors on the "Storozhevy" too, and they were expected to "earn their discharge" by performing shock work cleaning the ship's hull during its drydock in Liepaja. Therefore, it was these "godkovshchina," disgruntled and embittered, who were the first to support their political officer and exerted influence on the young sailors, which, admittedly, they did exert. Although officers and warrant officers waged a constant battle against "godkovshchina," and it remained within acceptable limits, the problem persisted. In those years, "godkovshchina" did not take the savage forms it would manifest in the final years of the USSR.
Sablin's chief assistant was Senior Seaman Alexander Shein, the ship's part-time librarian and projectionist, whom he brought into close proximity and granted privileged treatment. He was a frequent violator of military discipline, but nevertheless, at Sablin's request, he took two leave days and lived in "his cabin" (as Shein referred to the ship's library during interrogations – M.S.). Only the ship's commander, first mate, political officer, BC-5 commander, and... Shein had their own cabin on the Storozhevoy.
When Shein decided to recruit sailors Burov and Averin for the upcoming "uprising," the former declared, "I love these kinds of troubles," while the latter, if necessary, "was ready to work for state security agencies." Sablin characterized another of his active assistants, sailor Salivonchik, as follows: "He has poor knowledge of his specialty, is underdeveloped, shows little initiative, and is prone to hooliganism." Such are revolutionary sailors. Sablin also had a low opinion of the officers who initially agreed to participate in his venture. Regarding Dudnik: "Overall development is weak. Insufficient knowledge of technology and his specialty. Slow, withdrawn, and unable to work with personnel." Regarding Vavilkina: "Overall development is weak, inactive." Sablin assessed the "traitor" Vladimir Firsov differently: "A mature officer, he enjoyed respect among the personnel."
Now let's turn to social psychology and try to find an answer to a difficult question: why did V. Sablin manage to captivate sailors who barely understood the essence of his appeals?
The famous French psychologist, founder of social psychology Gustave Le Bon (1841 – 1931) wrote:
The most striking fact observed in an inspired crowd is this: no matter the individuals composing it, no matter their way of life, their occupation, their character, or their intelligence, their mere transformation into a crowd is sufficient to create within them a kind of collective soul that compels them to feel, think, and act entirely differently from how each of them would think, act, and feel individually. There are ideas and feelings that arise and are transformed into actions only in the individuals composing the crowd. An inspired crowd is a temporary organism, formed from heterogeneous elements that have momentarily united together, just as the cells that make up a living body unite, forming through this union a new being with properties distinct from those possessed by each cell individually.
In psychology, there's a concept called the "crowd effect." A crowd isn't defined by its size; it's defined by specific characteristics. The first is that people must be so close, in such close physical contact, that they enter each other's personal spaces (in our case, in formation on the quarterdeck – M.S.). Everyone has a certain space they don't allow anyone else, even close ones, into. So, in crowds, people enter each other's personal spaces, creating psychological discomfort. Here's what renowned Russian psychologist Professor Anatoly Zhuravlev says about the crowd phenomenon:
Crowds typically gather for a reason, and the reason is always emotionally charged: a threat, something unusual, interesting, or significant (V. Sablin's speech – M.S.). Therefore, people in a crowd are in a state of heightened emotional arousal. A very important phenomenon is that individual members of the crowd express this arousal more intensely, infecting others. One of the most important mechanisms, without which there is no crowd, is the mechanism of mental contagion, when the mental state and behavior patterns of one person are transmitted to another. One person starts speaking in a raised voice – and so do others; one starts shouting – and so do others; one starts waving his arms – and so do others.
V. Sablin succeeded in transforming the sailors he had gathered on the quarterdeck into this very "spiritual crowd." He prudently "separated" the sailors from their commanders, who were able to neutralize this "crowd effect."
Many, even very many, authors of books, articles, and films claim that the emergency on the large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy" was a "revolt of Soviet sailors." No. It was a mutiny by the political officer.
It's no coincidence that very soon, after leaving the crowd, many of the sailors distanced themselves from it. It wasn't long before they realized the full extent of the illegality of the actions they had been drawn into by the ship's deputy commander for political affairs, Captain 3rd Rank V. Sablin. Some time after the ship's departure for the Gulf of Riga, some of the sailors learned through radio operators that the fleet commander had ordered the ship returned to Riga. They refused the political officer's orders and attempted to free the ship's commander. The second attempt was successful: the ship's commander, officers, and warrant officers, isolated from the crew, were freed by a group of 25-30 sailors before the Baltic Fleet's aircraft began bombing the Storozhevoy. The remaining sailors "came to their senses" when the bombers began attacking the ship.
The Sablin investigation lasted until the end of March 1976. Valery Sablin was presented with a warrant, the main charge of which was treason. During the investigation, Sablin wrote several statements repenting of his actions but denying the charge of treason. In his statement dated March 30, 1976, Sablin wrote:
While acknowledging that my criminal actions, as set forth in the indictment presented to me, can be qualified as treason, I at the same time declare that I cannot consider myself a traitor to the Motherland. …Based on an incorrectly constructed political "theory," I nevertheless set myself the ultimate goal of transforming our society into a communist one, changing existing social and public relations to communist ones, and eliminating all vices and shortcomings. …Wanting to do something good, something useful for the Motherland, I, without realizing it, dealt it a blow, as stated in the indictment presented to me.
˂…˃…renouncing all my false theories as incorrect and harmful, admitting myself guilty of committing crimes, I want to assure you that I sincerely wish to atone for my guilt and will prove this with my entire subsequent life for the good of the Motherland.
˂…˃…renouncing all my false theories as incorrect and harmful, admitting myself guilty of committing crimes, I want to assure you that I sincerely wish to atone for my guilt and will prove this with my entire subsequent life for the good of the Motherland.
But Valery Sablin's words of repentance were not heard by the court.
On July 13, 1976, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced Valery Mikhailovich Sablin to death by firing squad. The sentence was carried out on August 3 of that year.
The “repentant” Shein was sentenced to 8 years in prison, which he served “from start to finish.”
Second-Class Captain Potulny was assigned to a minor shore post. All combat unit commanders were demoted to the rank of sailor and discharged into the reserve. The same fate befell Lieutenants Vavilkina, Dudnik, and the midshipmen who had supported Sablin during the first stage of the "mutiny." Other officers were sent to serve ashore; many soon submitted their reports and were discharged into the reserve.
Many officers involved in one way or another with the "mutinous Storozhevoy" were reprimanded or dismissed. Among those dismissed were Vice-Admiral Kosov, commander of the Baltic Fleet, and Captain 1st Rank Yuri Ivanovich Mozharov, a fanatically devoted naval officer and excellent sailor who commanded the 128th BRC and who was predicted to have a brilliant career. This remarkable professional was transferred to the Northern Fleet as chief of staff. Defense, not corresponding to his command level.
All retired officers, warrant officers, and Sablin's widow received apartments in Leningrad, Kaliningrad, and other cities. This "generosity" was explained by the fact that, according to a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, they were prohibited from living in closed military towns. And Baltiysk, where the officers' and warrant officers' families lived, was a closed military town.
A new crew was assigned to the "Storozhevaya" from the sister ship "Druzhny," which was being built in Kaliningrad and intended for service in the Pacific Fleet. After completing all the tasks required for permanent combat readiness, the "Storozhevaya" departed for its new home base in the Pacific Fleet (some authors have reported that the ship was renamed, which is untrue – M.S.). In 1977, the "Storozhevaya," like all ships of Project 1135, was reclassified as a second-class patrol ship.
Did V. Sablin commit a military crime? Yes, undoubtedly. After all, he violated the Military Oath, which he swore upon taking: "...be disciplined, unquestioningly comply with all military regulations and orders of commanders and superiors.".
Of course, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR deliberately delivered an unjust verdict against V. Sablin, sentencing him to the ultimate punishment—death by firing squad. Even before the official investigation began, in his memo to Brezhnev, USSR Defense Minister Grechko wrote: "The investigation revealed no grounds for asserting that SABLIN intended to take the ship to Sweden."
And the court had no material evidence to prove that he had committed treason. The investigation failed to present the facts to the court. The large anti-submarine ship "Storozhevoy," commanded by the rebellious political officer, did not reach the point at sea—the "point of no return," the boundary of Swedish territorial waters, crossing which could be classified as "treason."
In 1994, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation reviewed the case of the rebellious political officer and replaced Sablin's treason conviction with military crimes. The court sentenced Valery Mikhailovich Sablin to "10 years' imprisonment for abuse of power, insubordination, and resistance to a superior." Sablin did not live to see this just sentence. The tragedy ended in 1976.
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