The Black Sea Straits Problem

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The Black Sea Straits Problem
Map of the Black Sea Straits


Since the start of the Black Sea War, the media have regularly published "horror stories" about the possible appearance of squadrons of NATO ships, including US and UK ones, in the Black Sea, including aircraft carriers, missile cruisers and destroyers, as well as about their escort of ships carrying Ukrainian grain.



How can one not recall the obsessive ideas of Soviet admirals on the eve of the Great Patriotic War and in its first months about the inevitable invasion of the Black Sea by an armada of Italian battleships, the landing of numerous enemy forces on the Soviet coast, etc. All of this significantly influenced the subsequent erroneous Soviet strategy in this theater. Thus, the senseless defensive minefields laid by the Black Sea fleet off its coast, many Soviet ships and vessels perished with great loss of life.

To this day, publications continue to surface about the machinations of treacherous Turks, who allegedly allowed Axis warships through the Black Sea straits during World War II. However, the existence of the convention signed at the International Conference in Montreux, Switzerland, on July 20, 1936 (the Montreux Convention), which regulates shipping through the Black Sea straits, is completely ignored. To this day, Türkiye strictly adheres to it, with rare and highly questionable exceptions.

The Black Sea Straits are a system of waterways located in Turkish territorial waters, connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Black Sea and including the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits, as well as the Sea of ​​Marmara located between them. In 1998, Turkey announced the renaming of the straits, which it began calling the "Turkish Straits."

After the Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453, navigation rights through the straits were granted primarily to Turkish ships and vessels for centuries. Russia's attempts to gain passage for its ships through the straits date back to the time of Peter the Great, but its first success came after its victory in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774 opened the Black Sea and the straits to free navigation for merchant ships flying the Russian flag. Russia also secured similar rights for other states. However, this treaty did not grant passage through the straits to foreign warships.

Russian ships first received this right on December 23, 1798, under a secret clause of the Russo-Turkish alliance treaty, concluded for eight years and directed against Napoleonic France. It stipulated that the straits would remain closed to warships from other countries.

The benefits of the treaty quickly became apparent. The combined Russian-Turkish squadron under Admiral Ushakov, having passed through the Straits, entered the Mediterranean Sea, where it cleared the French-occupied Ionian Islands and carried out a number of other operations. In October 1800, the Russian ships returned to Sevastopol. In September 1805, at the suggestion of the Turkish side, the treaty was extended.


Vice-Admiral F.F. Ushakov's squadron in the Bosphorus. Artist M.M. Ivanov.

Alas, the Russo-Turkish friendship soon came to an end. In December 1806, Turkey declared war on Russia, a war that lasted six years. And in 1809, an Anglo-Turkish agreement was concluded, one of the clauses of which effectively prohibited the passage of foreign warships through the Turkish Straits.

Despite the fact that Türkiye had recently suffered another defeat in the war with Russia in 1828-1829, the Sublime Porte in 1833 turned to its recent enemy for help – the troops of the rebellious Egyptian Pasha Mehmed Ali were approaching Constantinople.

The arriving Russian squadron and troops helped the Sultan remain in power, and on June 26, 1833, another defensive treaty was signed at Unkiar Iskelesi, one of whose clauses closed the Dardanelles to foreign ships. Although the treaty did not explicitly stipulate the right of passage for Russian ships, that same year a squadron of the Baltic Fleet sailed from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

This treaty was short-lived, but not through Turkey's fault. In 1840-1841, Russia, Turkey, England, Austria, Prussia, and later France signed the London Conventions, which established a provision closing the straits to all foreign warships, including Russian ones, when the Porte was at peace, as well as joint defense of the straits at the request of the Turkish Sultan.

Although the treaty process was initiated by Emperor Nicholas I, it was a clear diplomatic miscalculation—for nearly a hundred years, the Russian Navy was trapped in the Black Sea, while non-Black Sea countries were involved in determining the status of the Turkish Straits. On the eve of the Crimean War, the Russian Black Sea Fleet could not be reinforced by ships from the Baltic Fleet, while ships from Turkey's allies, England and France, were free to enter the Black Sea. A similar situation arose during the Russo-Japanese War, only this time the Russian Black Sea Fleet was unable to support ships from the Baltic Fleet en route to the Far East.

The outcome of Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856) was the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, an integral part of which was the Convention on the Status of the Black Sea Straits, which reaffirmed the ban on the passage of foreign warships through the straits. Furthermore, according to Article XI of the treaty, "The Black Sea is declared neutral; entry into its ports and waters, open to the merchant shipping of all countries, is formally and permanently prohibited to warships of both coastal and all other Powers..." The establishment of military installations on the shores of the Black Sea was also prohibited.

However, this treaty was repeatedly violated: between 1858 and 1868, two American and one British warship passed through the straits, and in February 1878, a British squadron entered the Sea of ​​Marmara. In 1902, the Turks allowed four destroyers from the Russian Baltic squadron into the Black Sea, but they were disarmed and their merchant ensigns were raised.

In 1870, the government of the Russian Empire abrogated the articles of the Treaty of Paris on the demilitarization of the Black Sea that bound it, but the London Convention of 1871 and the Berlin Treaty of 1878 preserved the regime of the straits reflected in the convention of 1856, while the Turkish government had the right "to open the said straits in peacetime for military vessels of friendly and allied powers in the event that the Sublime Porte considers it necessary in order to ensure the execution of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856."

Given the importance of the Straits for Russia, both economically and militarily, the latter's authorities repeatedly attempted to change their status or even annex them along with the adjacent territory (including Constantinople—the "Cross over Hagia Sophia" became a national idea). Particularly well-known was the "Nelidov Project" (named after its author, Ambassador Nelidov to Constantinople), adopted on December 2, 1896, by a special ministerial conference. This was also one of the reasons for the Russian Empire's entry into World War I.

The importance of the Straits for the Russian economy is demonstrated by the following figures: in 1910, 73,7% of all Russian grain trade, 92,9% of manganese ore exports, 61,5% of iron ore exports, 100% of rail exports, and more than 70% of cement exports passed through them.

For example, Turkey's closure of the Straits during the Italo-Turkish War of 1912-1913 caused Russia losses of over 30 million rubles per month—Russia's trade balance in 1912 was 100 million less than the surplus over the previous three years.

With the outbreak of the imperialist First World War, the Entente turned its predatory eyes to the Straits for yet another redivision of the world. As early as the spring of 1915, they began dividing the skin of the still-unkilled Turkish bear. A secret treaty was drawn up, according to which:

1. Russia receives the right to annex Istanbul and Southern Thrace, the western shore of the Bosphorus, the Sea of ​​Marmara and the Dardanelles, as well as the islands of the Sea of ​​Marmara and part of the Asian coast of Turkey.

2. Russia agrees to establish freedom of transit of goods and freedom of passage of commercial vessels through the straits.

3. England and France give their consent to the above acquisitions by Russia on condition that the war is brought to a victorious end and that England and France carry out their plans in the East, as well as in other places.

After signing this agreement, the British Empire and France began one of the largest stories The Dardanelles landing operation. The Anglo-French squadron bombarded Turkish fortifications and attempted to enter the Dardanelles, while ANZAC troops (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. They were not supported by the Russian army in the form of a landing at the Bosphorus—the successful Austro-German offensive in Galicia diverted the main Russian forces there.

The staunch defense of the Turkish-German forces under the command of the future President of the Turkish Republic, Colonel Mustafa Kemal Pasha, forced the ANZACs to evacuate and the First Lord of the British Admiralty, Winston Churchill, to resign.

After the February Revolution, the new Russian government and other Entente countries confirmed their loyalty to the above-mentioned agreement, but on December 3, 1917, the Soviet government declared that “the secret treaties of the deposed tsar on the capture of Constantinople, confirmed by the deposed Kerensky, are now torn up and destroyed.”

On October 30, 1918, Turkey signed the Armistice of Mudros with the Entente powers, withdrawing from the war and ceding full control of the straits and Constantinople to the victors. Entente warships entered the Black Sea through the open straits, an intervention began in the south of Soviet Russia, its most important Black Sea ports were occupied, and abundant supplies of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies began to flow to the armies of Denikin and Wrangel.

On August 10, 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed with Turkey, which also defined the status of the Straits. It declared free passage for merchant and military vessels and aircraft of all countries in both wartime and peacetime. The Straits were surrounded by a neutral zone occupied by the Allies. Only a decision by the League of Nations could change this regime. However, this treaty was not recognized by Turkey or the Soviet republics, was ratified only by Greece, and proved stillborn.

As a result of the Turkish War of Independence (19 May 1919 – 29 October 1923), led by Mustafa Kemal, who later changed his name to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the occupiers were expelled, a republic was proclaimed, and on 24 July 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne, more favourable to the Turks, was signed, as well as the Convention on the Regime of the Straits.

According to this convention, the Straits zone was subject to demilitarization, ensuring free passage in peacetime and wartime for merchant and military ships and aircraft of all countries. Only if Turkey was at war could it deny passage to enemy ships, but warships of non-belligerent states retained freedom of passage.

However, in the interests of the Black Sea countries, the "naval forces" of non-Black Sea countries entering the sea were limited. Specifically, "the maximum forces that any power may conduct through the straits will not exceed those belonging to the most powerful navy of the powers bordering the Black Sea." Representatives of the Soviet government signed this convention, but it was not ratified.

At Turkey's suggestion, negotiations on the status of the Black Sea Straits were held in Montreux, Switzerland, from June 22 to July 21, 1936, to revise the Lausanne Convention. A corresponding convention was signed, valid for 20 years. Subsequently, the convention would be automatically extended for five-year periods unless one of the signatories requested its termination. Turkey received the right to remilitarize the straits zone. The convention remains in force in this form to this day.

According to the adopted convention, merchant ships of all countries, regardless of flag or cargo, have the right of free passage through the Straits in peacetime and wartime, provided Turkey is not a belligerent. If Turkey is involved in a war, neutral countries retain this right, provided they do not assist Turkey's enemies. Türkiye had the right to carry out sanitary inspections of passing ships.

The transit regime for warships from Black Sea and non-Black Sea countries differs. The total maximum tonnage of all vessels of foreign naval detachments authorized to transit the Straits may not exceed 15,000 tons (an exception was made only for Black Sea countries). These detachments may not consist of more than nine ships.

Subject to eight days' prior notice to the Turkish authorities, Black Sea powers may navigate their warships of any class through the straits in peacetime, except aircraft carriers, including submarines navigating alone on the surface. Should Turkey participate in a war, or if Turkey believes it is immediately threatened with war, it has the right to permit or deny passage of any warships through the straits. During a war in which Turkey is not participating, the straits must be closed to the passage of warships of any belligerent power. However, warships of belligerent powers, whether coastal or not to the Black Sea, separated from their ports of primary berth may return to those ports.

The ban on the passage of aircraft carriers was the main reason for classifying the Soviet ships of this class, armed with anti-ship missile systems, built in Nikolaev as “aircraft-carrying cruisers,” which allowed them to use Appendix II of the Convention, which states:

If actions aviation is not their primary purpose, these ships should not be classified as aircraft carriers, even if they have a flight deck.

Significant restrictions were imposed on the class, tonnage, and duration of stay in the Black Sea for warships of non-Black Sea powers. The total tonnage of warships of non-Black Sea powers in the Black Sea may not exceed 30 tons (with the possibility of increasing this maximum to 45 tons if the naval forces of Black Sea countries increase) and the duration of stay may not exceed 21 days. For these vessels, the advance notice period was increased to 15 days. Aircraft carriers and submarines were prohibited from entering. However, a naval detachment of any tonnage and composition could, at the invitation of the Turkish government, pay a short courtesy visit to a port in the Straits. This detachment must leave the Straits by the same route they entered.


The number of foreign warships that passed through the Black Sea straits in 1919-1939.

In 1941-1943, the USSR, as well as Great Britain, repeatedly accused the Turkish government of violating the Montreux Convention, sending it threatening diplomatic notes related to the “passage” of German and Italian warships, including submarines, through the straits.

Let's start with submarines. A division of six SV-type midget submarines operated in the Black Sea theater in 1942-1943. On April 29, 1942, they were all sent by train from La Spezia to Constanta, a journey that took seven days.

More difficult was the journey of the German Type IIB submarines, which operated in the Black Sea from 1942 to 1944. The boats' transfer began in Kiel. From there, they were towed on special pontoons through the canal to Hamburg, then along the Elbe to Dresden. There, they were unloaded onto multi-wheeled land trailers. After a 450-kilometer journey along the highway to Ingolstadt on the Danube, the boats were again unloaded onto pontoons and towed along the Danube to Linz or Galati. In these cities, the boats were detached from the pontoons and towed, or sometimes under their own power, to the port of Sulina. From there, they proceeded across the Black Sea to their base in Constanta. As can be seen from the above, the Black Sea straits are not mentioned here.

A Soviet note dated July 12, 1941, mentioned the passage of the German patrol boat Seefalke into the Black Sea on the 9th. Seefalke was a small, 37-ton Luftwaffe Fl.B 426 seaplane support boat, which passed through the straits unarmed under the guise of a hospital ship.


"Seefalke" - Luftwaffe seaplane support boat Fl.B 426

Indeed, a large number of ships under Italian and German merchant flags passed through the straits. These were primarily Italian tankers carrying Romanian oil. But Article 4 of the Convention states:

In time of war, when Türkiye is not a belligerent, merchant vessels, regardless of flag or cargo, shall enjoy the right of freedom of passage and navigation in the Straits.

Between 1942 and 1944, approximately fifty German ships and vessels passed through the Straits: MFP (Marinefährprahm) landing craft, known in our country as BDB (fast landing craft), KFK (Kriegsfischkutter) (multipurpose military boats based on the design of a fishing trawler), KT (Kriegstransporter), and EMS (Eisenbahn-Motorschiff) (transport vessels built under the military shipbuilding program). The EMS vessels were considered by the Turkish government to be specifically carrying commercial cargo, and the German government guaranteed that they were owned by private companies. KT vessels were allowed to pass because they were classified as commercial, not auxiliary, vessels.


A model of the MFP landing barge at the Maritime Museum Hamburg


KFKMore




CT type transport

While they posed no threat to the USSR, they did pose a significant threat to the British Royal Navy operating in the Aegean Sea. Built in shipyards in Varna, Constanta, Nikolaev, Budapest, and Austria, and transported by land and river from Swinemünde, the ships entered the Aegean Sea disguised as merchant vessels. Their armaments were removed, merchant flags were raised, their hulls were painted black and their superstructures white, and the crews changed into civilian clothes. Thus, there were no formal grounds to accuse the Germans and Turks of violating the Convention.

Soviet naval ships and vessels also navigated the Straits in a similar manner. In late November 1941, the auxiliary cruiser A. Mikoyan and the Black Sea Fleet's military tankers Varlaam Avanesov and Tuapse, which had previously delivered fuel, military equipment, and ammunition to frontline ports, passed through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The weapons were dismantled, and the naval flags were replaced with merchant flags, thus complying with the Convention.


Icebreaker "A. Mikoyan", post-war photo




The passage of the A. Mikoyan, Sakhalin, Tuapse, and Varlam Avanesov in the Black and Mediterranean Seas

Throughout World War II, neutral Turkey was subjected to severe pressure from the Allies, primarily the USSR and Great Britain, with demands to close the Straits to the Axis powers and open them to the Allies, provide air bases for raids on Romanian oil fields, stop deliveries of chrome ore to Germany, and even declare war on the Germans.

As a result of this pressure, in June 1944 the Turks inspected German ships and, having discovered on them weapon, military uniforms, etc., turned the ships back into the Black Sea. The British ambassador in Moscow wrote to Molotov on June 25, 1944:

The issue of German shipping passage through the Straits was officially and publicly resolved to the satisfaction of the Allies. The Foreign Minister resigned, and the Prime Minister assured Turkey of its sincere cooperation.

However, such actions by Turkey constituted a gross violation of Article 4, as well as Article 3 of the Convention, according to which the Turks could only carry out sanitary inspection of ships passing through the Straits.

The memorandum of the Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov, handed to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1944, made completely absurd claims:

Furthermore, Turkish authorities repeatedly allowed German high-speed barges to pass through the straits in 1942-1943. The threat posed to Black Sea security was so severe that the Soviet Supreme Command was forced to withdraw a significant number of armed forces from the main theater of operations to defend the Black Sea region.

But in reality, the BDBs were en route from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea! And what kind of terrible threat could a few barges pose to the Red Army?

According to the author, the USSR made its claims with a far-reaching goal: to use accusations of Turkey's alleged collaboration with the Axis powers after the end of the war, even though the latter had declared war on Germany on February 23, 1945, to change the status of the Straits in its favor and annex part of its neighbor's territory.

In March 1945, the Soviet government unilaterally denounced the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925, setting as one of the conditions for concluding a new treaty the joint defense of the Straits with Turkey, with the provision of a military base there to the USSR.

Stalin voiced his dissatisfaction with Turkey's behavior and Soviet grievances at both the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. However, the Western Allies did not support these demands, and Churchill noted that "all these years Türkiye has been friendly to the Allies."

In June 1945, at a reception with V. Molotov, the Soviet conditions were read to the Turkish ambassador: joint control over the straits, the provision of military bases to the USSR in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles region, and the return of Kars and Ardahan at the request of the Georgian and Armenian SSRs.

Naturally, Türkiye rejected such claims, but Soviet-Turkish relations were permanently damaged, and the frightened Turks later found themselves embraced by NATO. Nevertheless, Türkiye continued to abide by the Montreux Convention.

In August 2008, during the Russian-Georgian armed conflict, Turkey denied passage through the Straits to the US Navy hospital ships Comfort and Mercy carrying "humanitarian cargo" on the grounds that their combined tonnage (approximately 130 tons) was several times greater than that permitted by the Montreux Convention.

From March 1, 2022, in connection with the special military operation of the Russian Federation, until the end of military actions, Turkey closed the straits to the through passage of all foreign warships, with the exception of ships returning to their permanent bases (Article 19).


D654 "Auvergne"

The last NATO ship to visit the Black Sea was the French Navy frigate D654 Auvergne, which departed the straits on January 2, 2022, after visits to Constanta and Odessa.


Sources of
1. Montreux Convention.
2. Convention on the Regime of the Straits of July 20, 1936. https//docs.cntd.ru/document/901884247
3. Dranov, B.A. Black Sea Straits (International Legal Regime). Legal Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Justice. Moscow, 1948
4. Vasilyeva N.V. The Black Sea Straits – an imperative of Russian/Soviet foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: myths and geopolitical realities (first half of the 20th century).
5. Lavrova T.V. The Black Sea Straits as a Geopolitical Problem of Modern International Relations. Dissertation and Abstract Topic according to the Higher Attestation Commission of the Russian Federation 23.00.04, 2001
6. Irkhin A.A. Models of the functioning of the Black Sea Straits regime: 1783–2018 and Russia's national interests. Scientific Notes of the Crimean Federal University named after V.I. Vernadsky. Philosophy. Political Science. Cultural Studies. Vol. 4 (40). 2018. No. 3. P. 70–80
7. J.P. Hasanli. USSR–Türkiye: From Neutrality to the Cold War (1939–1953). Moscow: Propaganda Center, 2008
8. Mitrofanov A.F. Ships and History. Book Two. Litres, 2020
9. Internet resources
59 comments
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  1. -3
    10 October 2025 05: 07
    When our media touches on the issue of the Black Sea straits, the Turks start to scratch their heads nervously. wink
    1. +1
      10 October 2025 06: 08
      Quote: Schneeberg
      When our media touches upon the issue of the Black Sea straits

      "The Fox and the Grapes" - the eye sees, but the tooth does not bite...
  2. BAI
    +3
    10 October 2025 06: 13
    And what kind of terrible threat could a few barges pose to the Red Army?

    The BDS were the main force of the German Navy against the Black Sea Fleet. And the main means of countering the landing operations of the Black Sea Fleet and the Red Army. And quite an effective one at that.
    1. +1
      10 October 2025 18: 07
      Quote: BAI
      The BDS were the main force of the German Navy against the Black Sea Fleet. And the main means of countering the landing operations of the Black Sea Fleet and the Red Army. And quite an effective one at that.

      Yes, they were. The question is, why? How could "barges," even "fast" ones (they weren't exactly traveling at 30 knots), "effectively" counter a fleet of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers.
    2. 0
      11 October 2025 12: 49
      After all, the barges left from the Black Sea for the Mediterranean, and not the other way around!
  3. 0
    10 October 2025 06: 57
    The last NATO ship to visit the Black Sea was the French Navy frigate D654 Auvergne, which departed the straits on January 2, 2022, after visits to Constanta and Odessa.

    That's great. But even without that, a lot of nasty military stuff is being shipped to Odessa and Ilyichevsk, and Ochakov is already a de facto British Navy reconnaissance and sabotage base with instructors and advisors.
  4. +2
    10 October 2025 08: 43
    N1's biggest mistake was failing to take advantage of the Egyptian rebellion and resolve the Straits issue definitively. How much trouble Russia could have avoided if that had been the case.
    1. +3
      10 October 2025 15: 36
      Quote: Trapper7
      N1's biggest mistake was failing to take advantage of the Egyptian rebellion and resolve the Straits issue definitively. How much trouble Russia could have avoided if that had been the case.

      The main mistake was made by Alexander the First, who, after the defeat of Napoleon in 1812, could have captured the strait and all of Asia Minor instead of marching on Paris.
  5. +3
    10 October 2025 08: 59
    What kind of terrible threat could a few barges pose to the Red Army?

    It was with them that the German group in Crimea was supplied and it was with them that they were successfully evacuated, mainly.
    1. +2
      10 October 2025 14: 19
      And not only from there, but even earlier from the Taman Peninsula. The author would do well to read the book "The Battle for the Black Sea"; it contains some information on this topic.
      1. 0
        15 October 2025 12: 36
        What do the Black Sea straits have to do with this? We're talking about them, not the Kerch Strait!
        1. +1
          15 October 2025 18: 12
          Do you really not understand or is it just that? Read the source you mentioned.
  6. +2
    10 October 2025 10: 02
    Since the start of the Black Sea War, the media has regularly published "horror stories" about the possible appearance of NATO squadrons of ships, including those of the US and Great Britain, in the Black Sea.

    Scary stories? Isn't Europe advocating for war with Russia, and Turkey isn't a NATO member? Why all this bravado in the article? Turkey itself isn't really our great friend, considering its navy boasts 12 submarines, 16 frigates, 10 corvettes, 9 frigates, and 10 high-speed patrol boats. Maybe we should take this issue more seriously, or we'll get NATO's "SVO" in a new "Crimean War"...
  7. +4
    10 October 2025 11: 03
    The Turks did not recognize the Treaty of Sèvres because, under one option, they would lose part of the Straits coastline; under the other, the Straits and the surrounding territory. The Turks "rebelled" and drove the Greeks out of Asia Minor.
  8. +1
    10 October 2025 11: 08
    for those who are concerned about NATO's fleet in the Black Sea.
    An aircraft carrier in the Black Sea is less a threat than a target, because it's simply impossible to hide a strike group there.
    Submarines are about the same.
    The only threat comes from three options: troop transports, minelayers, and Arleigh Burke-type missile-carrying ships.
    Whether there is room for large UDCs on the Black Sea is a question that remains unclear to me.
    1. +1
      10 October 2025 12: 54
      Quote: multicaat
      An aircraft carrier in the Black Sea is not a threat, but rather a target, because the AUG is simply there

      Because a strike group, simply by stationing itself in the Sea of ​​Marmara, could, with hundreds of SLCMs and carrier-based aircraft, effectively cover our entire southern underbelly (Sevastopol is 600 km away, Novorossiysk and Sochi 900 km, Rostov-on-Don 1100, Volgograd 1500—all within range). And carrier-based fighters could even operate successfully along the entire Black Sea coast from the Aegean Sea. And what's in return? The Turkish Air Force alone has 200 operational fighters. If necessary, they could also force Greece (also a NATO member and deeply in debt), and they have over 100 fighters.
      1. +4
        10 October 2025 13: 08
        What's the point of having a strike group stationed in the Sea of ​​Marmara if there are a bunch of unsinkable airfields around?
        Besides, yeah, you can shoot them down, but you'll be flying 400 kilometers already detected by radar, and it's still a question of who's going to shoot them down. I don't see anything out of the ordinary here. It's a different matter if an aircraft is parked 50 kilometers from the coast—that's a big threat, but it won't survive there for long.
        1. +1
          10 October 2025 13: 40
          Quote: multicaat
          if there are a lot of unsinkable airfields around?

          Which are also immobile, meaning they can be damaged or even destroyed at any moment. On the other hand, the AUS (2-3 aircraft carriers and 6-9 destroyers with 150-200 fighters, 500 cruise missiles), which after a rapid attack can escape and become unreachable for a retaliatory strike.
          Quote: multicaat
          You can cover them, but you'll be flying 400 kilometers already detected by radar, and it's still a question of who will cover whom.

          With the AGM-158B JASSM-ER ALCM, the range is 980 km, and the AGM-158C LRASM anti-ship missile is 930 km. The Hornets and 35-mm F-35s don't need to be too far from the Turkish coast (150-250 km).
          Quote: multicaat
          It's a different matter if the aircraft is parked 50 km from the coast.

          Is this a joke?
          1. 0
            10 October 2025 13: 48
            Quote: FIR FIR
            AGM-158B JASSM-ER with a range of 980 km and AGM-158C LRASM anti-ship missiles with a range of 930 km

            You see what the thing is...
            The JASSM-ER costs over a million dollars and carries only 450 kg of explosives; its first version cost less.
            The AGM-158C LRASM is about the same.
            Both are subsonic and quite within the capabilities of our air defense (if the Black Sea Fleet finally realizes that air defense needs to be used, that combat duty exists).
            The only problem is that they can be reliably detected relatively close by.
            The question is simple: can they destroy more than they are worth?
            1. 0
              10 October 2025 14: 12
              Quote: multicaat
              worth more than a million dollars

              Trump recently spoke of some unexpectedly discovered 30 yards, "which could be used to revive battleships." fellow wassat 30 billion is the equivalent of over 27,000 cruise missiles. It's all a question of production capacity. But even there, things are ambiguous. We remember the size of the US fleet in the 1930s and late 1940s (a mere decade and a half, but the results were staggering), how they built Berkeleys and Perrys, Nimitzes (in four years), almost two hundred F-35s a year, and so on. Who knows what else they might surprise us with?
              Quote: multicaat
              The only problem is that they can be reliably detected relatively close by.

              That's the whole point.
              Quote: multicaat
              The question is simple: can they destroy more than they are worth?

              They print their own money, which is still used today for over 50% of international transactions. Are you worried about the budget of the global financial dictatorship of the dollar? They have more aircraft carriers and cruisers and destroyers than the rest of the world combined. But why? The Soviet Navy has been absent from the seas for 35 years.
              1. 0
                10 October 2025 14: 14
                Quote: FIR FIR
                Trump recently spoke about some unexpectedly found 30 yards

                The yards have already been sawed off, do not encroach on what is sacred.
                I wouldn't be surprised if Trump bought shares in one of the shipbuilding industry's plants and is simply trying to raise their price by dumping them.
                1. +2
                  10 October 2025 14: 19
                  Quote: multicaat
                  simply by throwing in money he is trying to raise their price.

                  Maybe so.
                  My point is this: if Russia (like the USSR once did) had a viable naval group in the Mediterranean, the hypothetical scenario I described above of a strike on its southern borders would be unrealistic, even in theory. And Turkey could be pressured much more effectively, with not only gas pipelines but also powerful naval groups in the Black and Mediterranean Seas as trump cards.
                  1. 0
                    10 October 2025 14: 23
                    I'm not sure that, with the advances in missile performance, a KUG is even needed in closed seas like the Black Sea, the Aral Sea, or the Gulf of Finland. A fleet for reconnaissance, patrol, missile defense, air defense, and coastal protection is more likely needed here.
                    If you can't reach it by sea somewhere, the Navy and the Ministry of Defense have about a hundred long-range missile-carrying aircraft at their disposal.
                    It seems to me that the KUG is only relevant in the Far East and in Murmansk, or at some foreign base like Cuba, Port Arthur, Cam Ranh, or Tartus.
                    1. +1
                      10 October 2025 14: 34
                      Quote: multicaat
                      I'm not sure that with the improvement in missile performance, there's a need for a KUG in closed seas like the Black Sea.

                      If there are plans to use the sea economically or politically, then the navy is the only alternative. After all, a kind word or an ultimatum backed by the appearance of a combat squadron has always been more persuasive than "drawing red lines."
                      Quote: multicaat
                      Here, a fleet is needed rather for reconnaissance, patrol, missile defense, air defense, and coastal protection.

                      In both the Black and Mediterranean Seas, Russia needs a diverse naval force: guided missile frigates, anti-submarine warfare corvettes, non-nuclear submarines, coast guard ships and boats, minesweepers, large landing ships, integrated reconnaissance ships and supply ships, rescue vessels and tugboats.
                      1. 0
                        10 October 2025 14: 36
                        Quote: FIR FIR
                        the navy has no alternative

                        Yes, but which one? The question is precisely about the usefulness of the strike group.
                        But yes, a fleet is needed in any case to control what was honestly stolen.
                      2. +1
                        10 October 2025 14: 48
                        Quote: multicaat
                        The question is precisely about the usefulness of the strike group.

                        Four to six guided missile frigates, in addition to some air defense, also carry 64-96 Tsirkon anti-ship missiles with a range of up to 1000 km. Ignoring such a threat is impossible. Destroying such a guided missile group is possible, but it would require a significant increase in force, and who knows how it will all end.
                        Quote: multicaat
                        A fleet is needed in any case to control the honestly stolen goods.

                        The lion's share of exports and imports, as always, goes by sea.
                      3. 0
                        10 October 2025 14: 51
                        to build 10 frigates with a displacement of 50 tons
                        with 460-mm saluting guns for parades laughing
                      4. 0
                        10 October 2025 14: 52
                        It would be a lot of fun if it weren't for...
                      5. 0
                        2 November 2025 23: 57
                        The answer to all the questions is that the opponents clearly misunderstood the topic of the discussion. Let me remind you: the Montreux Convention and the status of the Straits. Not the BDB and Kerch. Read carefully and don't blame the author or the Turks. And the BDB sailed through the Straits to the Aegean Sea, not the other way around—that is, to fight the British.
                      6. 0
                        3 November 2025 00: 27
                        A list of authoritative sources is included with the article. Read it, and don't just spew your own thoughts onto your readers. Avoid reading tabloid journalism or political propaganda from the Great Patriotic War. The latter contains many redundant and exaggerated reports of victory, after all.
                        It was necessary to raise the spirit of the fighters.
              2. 0
                1 February 2026 11: 17
                *They have more aircraft carriers and cruiser-destroyers than the rest of the world combined. But why? The Soviet Navy hasn't been on the seas for 35 years.*

                but there is the Chinese Navy.
      2. 0
        10 October 2025 18: 15
        Quote: FIR FIR
        Because the AUG, simply by standing in the Sea of ​​Marmara, will be able to successfully cover the

        What, then, prevents NATO aircraft and cruise missiles from simply operating from mainland airfields and simply from Turkish territory?
        1. 0
          10 October 2025 23: 29
          Quote: Adrey
          What, then, prevents NATO aircraft and cruise missiles from simply operating from mainland airfields and simply from Turkish territory?

          The element of surprise. It's impossible to quietly redeploy hundreds of aircraft to Turkish airfields.
      3. 0
        7 November 2025 20: 29
        Read the Treaty of Montreux—it covers the entire Straits system, including the Sea of ​​Marmara. I'm amazed how my article could be so misinterpreted.
  9. -3
    10 October 2025 11: 26
    Good article. Unfortunately, we have a very common case of urv-PR propaganda, like "we'll throw hats at everyone."

    Turkey, as the crossroads of Europe and Asia, has been more or less a neutral state for everyone since the 19th century. Just read "The Count of Monte Cristo," about how France, late to the colonial division, sought to penetrate Asia and Africa through Turkey.
  10. -2
    10 October 2025 14: 21
    Why did the author insist on justifying Turkey and its behavior during World War II? Or were the Turks unaware of the "Siebel ferries" and other German and Italian vessels?
    1. +1
      10 October 2025 23: 36
      Grencer81 (Vladislav Yazhikov), sir, the author has been living abroad for a long time and works for Western shipping companies. For him, it seems, the sailors of the Third Reich are knights without fear or reproach, while Soviet sailors are people, but somehow... not quite, compared to the Germans... So he works for his masters, sometimes resorting to outright lies in his works, as always. I quote the author's comment on the work "The Death of the Ulm Minesweep" in the "History" section: "(Alexander Mitrofanov) July 26, 2025 2:17 PM
      Due to the shortsightedness or simply stupidity of the government of the young Soviet state, which rejected all treaties of the former Tsarist government, the USSR did not join either the Hague or Geneva Conventions, nor did it participate in the activities of the International Red Cross. Hence the consequences of the Great Patriotic War.
      On May 30, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federation, in its appeal to the International Red Cross and the governments of states that had accepted the Geneva Convention, recognized the Convention and reaffirmed their obligations to observe it. The appeal was signed by: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Vl. Ulyanov (Lenin), Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin, Administrator of the Council of People's Commissars Vl. Bonch-Bruyevich, and Secretary of the Council N. Gorbunov. The appeal was published in the newspaper Izvestia on June 04, 1918.
      The Soviet Union observed the Hague Convention regarding prisoners of war during the Great Patriotic War. This is confirmed by the fact that on July 17, 1941, the USSR addressed a note to the Government of Sweden in which the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to observe the Hague Convention on the condition of reciprocity on the part of Germany. The following document is proof of Moscow's serious intentions: "Telegram from Moscow dated August 8, 1941 to Mr. Huber, President of the Committee of the International Red Cross, Geneva. In response to your (note) No. 7162, the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, on the instructions of the Soviet Government, has the honor to inform you that the Soviet Government, by its note of July 17, has already declared to the Government of Sweden, which represents Germany's interests in the USSR: The Soviet Union considers it obligatory to observe the rules of warfare listed in the IV. Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, concerning the laws and customs of war on land, with the obligatory condition that Germany and its allies observe these rules. The Soviet government agrees to the exchange of information on wounded and sick prisoners of war, as provided for in Article 14 of the Appendix to the said Convention and Article 4 of the Geneva Convention of 26 July 1929 "For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field." Vyshinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The German government rejected this note on 25 August 1941. In August 1941, the Soviet Union transmitted information on the number of captured Nazi soldiers, but there was no response.
      The Soviet Union sent two more notes (November 25, 1941 and April 27, 1942) citing specific examples of abuses against Soviet citizens, but received no response. At the same time, the Soviet Union fulfilled its obligations to treat prisoners humanely. This is evidenced by numerous documents, from photographs to regulations adopted by the Soviet Government of the Soviet Union and the People's Commissariats of the USSR.
      Another document:
      Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
      in active armies from July 27, 1929
      Declaration.

      The undersigned, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereby declares that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accedes to the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, concluded at Geneva on July 27, 1929.
      In witness whereof, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, duly authorized for this purpose, has signed this declaration of accession.
      According to the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 12, 1930, this accession is final and does not require further ratification.
      Committed in Moscow on August 25, 1931.
      M. Litvinov."
      1. 0
        7 November 2025 20: 37
        The USSR neither signed nor ratified the Geneva Convention (at that time). And statements about its readiness to comply with it had no legal force.
    2. 0
      15 October 2025 12: 39
      What did Türkiye have to do with the "Siebel ferries"?
      1. 0
        15 October 2025 18: 17
        Didn't they pass back and forth through the Turkish Straits? Did they fly by air?
        1. 0
          15 October 2025 21: 07
          Learn the basics! The "Sibels" were collapsible and could easily be transported by road or rail. Why would they need the Turkish Straits? Besides, they weren't built in the Mediterranean, and they were never shipped through the Straits to the Black Sea.
          1. 0
            16 October 2025 01: 52
            What do you mean? They never crossed the Straits, either here or there? Oh, oh, oh!!! Such a grown-up guy...
  11. 0
    10 October 2025 18: 12
    I heard the opinion that if Türkiye builds a canal parallel to the Straits, the convention will not apply to it.
    1. +1
      15 October 2025 20: 57
      The Turks are putting forward plans to build a canal parallel to the Bosphorus to relieve congestion, rather than across the entire Straits. In any case, the Convention applies to the Dardanelles.
  12. -1
    10 October 2025 18: 30
    Excellent article, author! Wasn't it my "battle" in the comments on this topic that inspired you to write it? laughingYou've objectively and dispassionately examined a very complex and pressing issue. The level of analysis is excellent – ​​you cover both the historical period and the events that preceded the decisions made, and you shed light on the current state of affairs. Keep writing! good
    A question for the admins: why isn't there a ruble symbol under the article? I would support it.
    1. +1
      15 October 2025 21: 01
      Thank you! The other commenters either missed a word of my article or didn't understand it and went off into obscurity.
  13. 0
    11 October 2025 22: 23
    Quote: TermNachTER
    The Turks "rose on their hind legs" and drove the Greeks out of Asia Minor.

    The Bolsheviks helped with weapons and money, otherwise everything could have been different.
  14. 0
    11 October 2025 22: 33
    Quote: multicaat
    KUG in closed seas such as the Black and Aral Seas

    Has there ever been a KUG in Aralsk?
  15. -1
    12 October 2025 00: 03
    The conclusion is that loopholes in the laws were being exploited by everyone. Therefore, the formal demands on Turkey had a very dubious justification. In fact, the convention prohibited the passage of medium and heavy ships on which the installation and dismantling of weapons was either impossible or extremely difficult and could only be carried out in specially equipped docks. Small and auxiliary vessels were not covered by it at all.
  16. P
    0
    12 October 2025 01: 42
    Appealing to conventions during the preparation and conduct of world wars is utter nonsense; these conventions are not worth a pen until they are backed by military force and the corpses of the enemy, which means any measures to protect the northern Black Sea region were not unnecessary.
    1. 0
      15 October 2025 21: 12
      Maybe we should abolish the Criminal Code too? It's just a piece of paper. And all the laws, international agreements, etc. And the Constitution?
      1. P
        +1
        15 October 2025 21: 19
        The constitution was abolished long ago, international law has been nonexistent for a VERY long time, and criminal law has long been replaced by telephone law. It's enough to recall the charges against Alexei Serenko, who was nearly imprisoned for murder ONLY on the grounds of possession of a weapon of the appropriate caliber. Publicity saved him.
        1. -1
          3 November 2025 00: 35
          And what's your prosecutor's office thinking? These are clearly extremist statements. Are you an SBU or GUR agent? Is it time to lock you up? That's democracy! Or will you surrender yourself and then go free with a clear conscience?
          1. P
            0
            3 November 2025 00: 42
            What's so extreme about that? Perhaps you didn't finish your evening pills? You need to take care of your health at your age.
        2. +1
          3 November 2025 00: 40
          Quote: Pandemic
          international law has not existed for a VERY long time

          Did it ever exist at all?
  17. 0
    12 October 2025 03: 43
    It's time to take control of the Bosphorus and the Dardaneli! Erdogan will betray no one!
    1. +1
      15 October 2025 12: 41
      We can’t take Kherson and Odessa, but you’re aiming for the straits!
    2. 0
      1 February 2026 11: 23
      *It's time to take control of the Bosphorus and Dardaneli! Erdogan will betray you!*

      In what way, and by what means? We don't have a fleet, but they do.
      https://topwar.ru/257424-realizacija-doktriny-golubaja-rodina-turcija-spustila-na-vodu-srazu-dva-fregata.html
  18. 0
    4 March 2026 05: 30
    We can say thanks to Lenin that the Bosphorus is not ours.