The Black Sea Straits Problem

Map of the Black Sea Straits
Since the start of the Black Sea War, the media have regularly published "horror stories" about the possible appearance of squadrons of NATO ships, including US and UK ones, in the Black Sea, including aircraft carriers, missile cruisers and destroyers, as well as about their escort of ships carrying Ukrainian grain.
How can one not recall the obsessive ideas of Soviet admirals on the eve of the Great Patriotic War and in its first months about the inevitable invasion of the Black Sea by an armada of Italian battleships, the landing of numerous enemy forces on the Soviet coast, etc. All of this significantly influenced the subsequent erroneous Soviet strategy in this theater. Thus, the senseless defensive minefields laid by the Black Sea fleet off its coast, many Soviet ships and vessels perished with great loss of life.
To this day, publications continue to surface about the machinations of treacherous Turks, who allegedly allowed Axis warships through the Black Sea straits during World War II. However, the existence of the convention signed at the International Conference in Montreux, Switzerland, on July 20, 1936 (the Montreux Convention), which regulates shipping through the Black Sea straits, is completely ignored. To this day, Türkiye strictly adheres to it, with rare and highly questionable exceptions.
The Black Sea Straits are a system of waterways located in Turkish territorial waters, connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Black Sea and including the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits, as well as the Sea of Marmara located between them. In 1998, Turkey announced the renaming of the straits, which it began calling the "Turkish Straits."
After the Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453, navigation rights through the straits were granted primarily to Turkish ships and vessels for centuries. Russia's attempts to gain passage for its ships through the straits date back to the time of Peter the Great, but its first success came after its victory in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774 opened the Black Sea and the straits to free navigation for merchant ships flying the Russian flag. Russia also secured similar rights for other states. However, this treaty did not grant passage through the straits to foreign warships.
Russian ships first received this right on December 23, 1798, under a secret clause of the Russo-Turkish alliance treaty, concluded for eight years and directed against Napoleonic France. It stipulated that the straits would remain closed to warships from other countries.
The benefits of the treaty quickly became apparent. The combined Russian-Turkish squadron under Admiral Ushakov, having passed through the Straits, entered the Mediterranean Sea, where it cleared the French-occupied Ionian Islands and carried out a number of other operations. In October 1800, the Russian ships returned to Sevastopol. In September 1805, at the suggestion of the Turkish side, the treaty was extended.

Vice-Admiral F.F. Ushakov's squadron in the Bosphorus. Artist M.M. Ivanov.
Alas, the Russo-Turkish friendship soon came to an end. In December 1806, Turkey declared war on Russia, a war that lasted six years. And in 1809, an Anglo-Turkish agreement was concluded, one of the clauses of which effectively prohibited the passage of foreign warships through the Turkish Straits.
Despite the fact that Türkiye had recently suffered another defeat in the war with Russia in 1828-1829, the Sublime Porte in 1833 turned to its recent enemy for help – the troops of the rebellious Egyptian Pasha Mehmed Ali were approaching Constantinople.
The arriving Russian squadron and troops helped the Sultan remain in power, and on June 26, 1833, another defensive treaty was signed at Unkiar Iskelesi, one of whose clauses closed the Dardanelles to foreign ships. Although the treaty did not explicitly stipulate the right of passage for Russian ships, that same year a squadron of the Baltic Fleet sailed from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.
This treaty was short-lived, but not through Turkey's fault. In 1840-1841, Russia, Turkey, England, Austria, Prussia, and later France signed the London Conventions, which established a provision closing the straits to all foreign warships, including Russian ones, when the Porte was at peace, as well as joint defense of the straits at the request of the Turkish Sultan.
Although the treaty process was initiated by Emperor Nicholas I, it was a clear diplomatic miscalculation—for nearly a hundred years, the Russian Navy was trapped in the Black Sea, while non-Black Sea countries were involved in determining the status of the Turkish Straits. On the eve of the Crimean War, the Russian Black Sea Fleet could not be reinforced by ships from the Baltic Fleet, while ships from Turkey's allies, England and France, were free to enter the Black Sea. A similar situation arose during the Russo-Japanese War, only this time the Russian Black Sea Fleet was unable to support ships from the Baltic Fleet en route to the Far East.
The outcome of Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856) was the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, an integral part of which was the Convention on the Status of the Black Sea Straits, which reaffirmed the ban on the passage of foreign warships through the straits. Furthermore, according to Article XI of the treaty, "The Black Sea is declared neutral; entry into its ports and waters, open to the merchant shipping of all countries, is formally and permanently prohibited to warships of both coastal and all other Powers..." The establishment of military installations on the shores of the Black Sea was also prohibited.
However, this treaty was repeatedly violated: between 1858 and 1868, two American and one British warship passed through the straits, and in February 1878, a British squadron entered the Sea of Marmara. In 1902, the Turks allowed four destroyers from the Russian Baltic squadron into the Black Sea, but they were disarmed and their merchant ensigns were raised.
In 1870, the government of the Russian Empire abrogated the articles of the Treaty of Paris on the demilitarization of the Black Sea that bound it, but the London Convention of 1871 and the Berlin Treaty of 1878 preserved the regime of the straits reflected in the convention of 1856, while the Turkish government had the right "to open the said straits in peacetime for military vessels of friendly and allied powers in the event that the Sublime Porte considers it necessary in order to ensure the execution of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856."
Given the importance of the Straits for Russia, both economically and militarily, the latter's authorities repeatedly attempted to change their status or even annex them along with the adjacent territory (including Constantinople—the "Cross over Hagia Sophia" became a national idea). Particularly well-known was the "Nelidov Project" (named after its author, Ambassador Nelidov to Constantinople), adopted on December 2, 1896, by a special ministerial conference. This was also one of the reasons for the Russian Empire's entry into World War I.
The importance of the Straits for the Russian economy is demonstrated by the following figures: in 1910, 73,7% of all Russian grain trade, 92,9% of manganese ore exports, 61,5% of iron ore exports, 100% of rail exports, and more than 70% of cement exports passed through them.
For example, Turkey's closure of the Straits during the Italo-Turkish War of 1912-1913 caused Russia losses of over 30 million rubles per month—Russia's trade balance in 1912 was 100 million less than the surplus over the previous three years.
With the outbreak of the imperialist First World War, the Entente turned its predatory eyes to the Straits for yet another redivision of the world. As early as the spring of 1915, they began dividing the skin of the still-unkilled Turkish bear. A secret treaty was drawn up, according to which:
1. Russia receives the right to annex Istanbul and Southern Thrace, the western shore of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, as well as the islands of the Sea of Marmara and part of the Asian coast of Turkey.
2. Russia agrees to establish freedom of transit of goods and freedom of passage of commercial vessels through the straits.
3. England and France give their consent to the above acquisitions by Russia on condition that the war is brought to a victorious end and that England and France carry out their plans in the East, as well as in other places.
After signing this agreement, the British Empire and France began one of the largest stories The Dardanelles landing operation. The Anglo-French squadron bombarded Turkish fortifications and attempted to enter the Dardanelles, while ANZAC troops (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. They were not supported by the Russian army in the form of a landing at the Bosphorus—the successful Austro-German offensive in Galicia diverted the main Russian forces there.
The staunch defense of the Turkish-German forces under the command of the future President of the Turkish Republic, Colonel Mustafa Kemal Pasha, forced the ANZACs to evacuate and the First Lord of the British Admiralty, Winston Churchill, to resign.
After the February Revolution, the new Russian government and other Entente countries confirmed their loyalty to the above-mentioned agreement, but on December 3, 1917, the Soviet government declared that “the secret treaties of the deposed tsar on the capture of Constantinople, confirmed by the deposed Kerensky, are now torn up and destroyed.”
On October 30, 1918, Turkey signed the Armistice of Mudros with the Entente powers, withdrawing from the war and ceding full control of the straits and Constantinople to the victors. Entente warships entered the Black Sea through the open straits, an intervention began in the south of Soviet Russia, its most important Black Sea ports were occupied, and abundant supplies of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies began to flow to the armies of Denikin and Wrangel.
On August 10, 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed with Turkey, which also defined the status of the Straits. It declared free passage for merchant and military vessels and aircraft of all countries in both wartime and peacetime. The Straits were surrounded by a neutral zone occupied by the Allies. Only a decision by the League of Nations could change this regime. However, this treaty was not recognized by Turkey or the Soviet republics, was ratified only by Greece, and proved stillborn.
As a result of the Turkish War of Independence (19 May 1919 – 29 October 1923), led by Mustafa Kemal, who later changed his name to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the occupiers were expelled, a republic was proclaimed, and on 24 July 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne, more favourable to the Turks, was signed, as well as the Convention on the Regime of the Straits.
According to this convention, the Straits zone was subject to demilitarization, ensuring free passage in peacetime and wartime for merchant and military ships and aircraft of all countries. Only if Turkey was at war could it deny passage to enemy ships, but warships of non-belligerent states retained freedom of passage.
However, in the interests of the Black Sea countries, the "naval forces" of non-Black Sea countries entering the sea were limited. Specifically, "the maximum forces that any power may conduct through the straits will not exceed those belonging to the most powerful navy of the powers bordering the Black Sea." Representatives of the Soviet government signed this convention, but it was not ratified.
At Turkey's suggestion, negotiations on the status of the Black Sea Straits were held in Montreux, Switzerland, from June 22 to July 21, 1936, to revise the Lausanne Convention. A corresponding convention was signed, valid for 20 years. Subsequently, the convention would be automatically extended for five-year periods unless one of the signatories requested its termination. Turkey received the right to remilitarize the straits zone. The convention remains in force in this form to this day.
According to the adopted convention, merchant ships of all countries, regardless of flag or cargo, have the right of free passage through the Straits in peacetime and wartime, provided Turkey is not a belligerent. If Turkey is involved in a war, neutral countries retain this right, provided they do not assist Turkey's enemies. Türkiye had the right to carry out sanitary inspections of passing ships.
The transit regime for warships from Black Sea and non-Black Sea countries differs. The total maximum tonnage of all vessels of foreign naval detachments authorized to transit the Straits may not exceed 15,000 tons (an exception was made only for Black Sea countries). These detachments may not consist of more than nine ships.
Subject to eight days' prior notice to the Turkish authorities, Black Sea powers may navigate their warships of any class through the straits in peacetime, except aircraft carriers, including submarines navigating alone on the surface. Should Turkey participate in a war, or if Turkey believes it is immediately threatened with war, it has the right to permit or deny passage of any warships through the straits. During a war in which Turkey is not participating, the straits must be closed to the passage of warships of any belligerent power. However, warships of belligerent powers, whether coastal or not to the Black Sea, separated from their ports of primary berth may return to those ports.
The ban on the passage of aircraft carriers was the main reason for classifying the Soviet ships of this class, armed with anti-ship missile systems, built in Nikolaev as “aircraft-carrying cruisers,” which allowed them to use Appendix II of the Convention, which states:
Significant restrictions were imposed on the class, tonnage, and duration of stay in the Black Sea for warships of non-Black Sea powers. The total tonnage of warships of non-Black Sea powers in the Black Sea may not exceed 30 tons (with the possibility of increasing this maximum to 45 tons if the naval forces of Black Sea countries increase) and the duration of stay may not exceed 21 days. For these vessels, the advance notice period was increased to 15 days. Aircraft carriers and submarines were prohibited from entering. However, a naval detachment of any tonnage and composition could, at the invitation of the Turkish government, pay a short courtesy visit to a port in the Straits. This detachment must leave the Straits by the same route they entered.

The number of foreign warships that passed through the Black Sea straits in 1919-1939.
In 1941-1943, the USSR, as well as Great Britain, repeatedly accused the Turkish government of violating the Montreux Convention, sending it threatening diplomatic notes related to the “passage” of German and Italian warships, including submarines, through the straits.
Let's start with submarines. A division of six SV-type midget submarines operated in the Black Sea theater in 1942-1943. On April 29, 1942, they were all sent by train from La Spezia to Constanta, a journey that took seven days.
More difficult was the journey of the German Type IIB submarines, which operated in the Black Sea from 1942 to 1944. The boats' transfer began in Kiel. From there, they were towed on special pontoons through the canal to Hamburg, then along the Elbe to Dresden. There, they were unloaded onto multi-wheeled land trailers. After a 450-kilometer journey along the highway to Ingolstadt on the Danube, the boats were again unloaded onto pontoons and towed along the Danube to Linz or Galati. In these cities, the boats were detached from the pontoons and towed, or sometimes under their own power, to the port of Sulina. From there, they proceeded across the Black Sea to their base in Constanta. As can be seen from the above, the Black Sea straits are not mentioned here.
A Soviet note dated July 12, 1941, mentioned the passage of the German patrol boat Seefalke into the Black Sea on the 9th. Seefalke was a small, 37-ton Luftwaffe Fl.B 426 seaplane support boat, which passed through the straits unarmed under the guise of a hospital ship.

"Seefalke" - Luftwaffe seaplane support boat Fl.B 426
Indeed, a large number of ships under Italian and German merchant flags passed through the straits. These were primarily Italian tankers carrying Romanian oil. But Article 4 of the Convention states:
Between 1942 and 1944, approximately fifty German ships and vessels passed through the Straits: MFP (Marinefährprahm) landing craft, known in our country as BDB (fast landing craft), KFK (Kriegsfischkutter) (multipurpose military boats based on the design of a fishing trawler), KT (Kriegstransporter), and EMS (Eisenbahn-Motorschiff) (transport vessels built under the military shipbuilding program). The EMS vessels were considered by the Turkish government to be specifically carrying commercial cargo, and the German government guaranteed that they were owned by private companies. KT vessels were allowed to pass because they were classified as commercial, not auxiliary, vessels.

A model of the MFP landing barge at the Maritime Museum Hamburg

KFKMore


CT type transport
While they posed no threat to the USSR, they did pose a significant threat to the British Royal Navy operating in the Aegean Sea. Built in shipyards in Varna, Constanta, Nikolaev, Budapest, and Austria, and transported by land and river from Swinemünde, the ships entered the Aegean Sea disguised as merchant vessels. Their armaments were removed, merchant flags were raised, their hulls were painted black and their superstructures white, and the crews changed into civilian clothes. Thus, there were no formal grounds to accuse the Germans and Turks of violating the Convention.
Soviet naval ships and vessels also navigated the Straits in a similar manner. In late November 1941, the auxiliary cruiser A. Mikoyan and the Black Sea Fleet's military tankers Varlaam Avanesov and Tuapse, which had previously delivered fuel, military equipment, and ammunition to frontline ports, passed through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The weapons were dismantled, and the naval flags were replaced with merchant flags, thus complying with the Convention.

Icebreaker "A. Mikoyan", post-war photo


The passage of the A. Mikoyan, Sakhalin, Tuapse, and Varlam Avanesov in the Black and Mediterranean Seas
Throughout World War II, neutral Turkey was subjected to severe pressure from the Allies, primarily the USSR and Great Britain, with demands to close the Straits to the Axis powers and open them to the Allies, provide air bases for raids on Romanian oil fields, stop deliveries of chrome ore to Germany, and even declare war on the Germans.
As a result of this pressure, in June 1944 the Turks inspected German ships and, having discovered on them weapon, military uniforms, etc., turned the ships back into the Black Sea. The British ambassador in Moscow wrote to Molotov on June 25, 1944:
However, such actions by Turkey constituted a gross violation of Article 4, as well as Article 3 of the Convention, according to which the Turks could only carry out sanitary inspection of ships passing through the Straits.
The memorandum of the Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov, handed to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1944, made completely absurd claims:
But in reality, the BDBs were en route from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea! And what kind of terrible threat could a few barges pose to the Red Army?
According to the author, the USSR made its claims with a far-reaching goal: to use accusations of Turkey's alleged collaboration with the Axis powers after the end of the war, even though the latter had declared war on Germany on February 23, 1945, to change the status of the Straits in its favor and annex part of its neighbor's territory.
In March 1945, the Soviet government unilaterally denounced the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925, setting as one of the conditions for concluding a new treaty the joint defense of the Straits with Turkey, with the provision of a military base there to the USSR.
Stalin voiced his dissatisfaction with Turkey's behavior and Soviet grievances at both the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. However, the Western Allies did not support these demands, and Churchill noted that "all these years Türkiye has been friendly to the Allies."
In June 1945, at a reception with V. Molotov, the Soviet conditions were read to the Turkish ambassador: joint control over the straits, the provision of military bases to the USSR in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles region, and the return of Kars and Ardahan at the request of the Georgian and Armenian SSRs.
Naturally, Türkiye rejected such claims, but Soviet-Turkish relations were permanently damaged, and the frightened Turks later found themselves embraced by NATO. Nevertheless, Türkiye continued to abide by the Montreux Convention.
In August 2008, during the Russian-Georgian armed conflict, Turkey denied passage through the Straits to the US Navy hospital ships Comfort and Mercy carrying "humanitarian cargo" on the grounds that their combined tonnage (approximately 130 tons) was several times greater than that permitted by the Montreux Convention.
From March 1, 2022, in connection with the special military operation of the Russian Federation, until the end of military actions, Turkey closed the straits to the through passage of all foreign warships, with the exception of ships returning to their permanent bases (Article 19).

D654 "Auvergne"
The last NATO ship to visit the Black Sea was the French Navy frigate D654 Auvergne, which departed the straits on January 2, 2022, after visits to Constanta and Odessa.
Sources of
1. Montreux Convention.
2. Convention on the Regime of the Straits of July 20, 1936. https//docs.cntd.ru/document/901884247
3. Dranov, B.A. Black Sea Straits (International Legal Regime). Legal Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Justice. Moscow, 1948
4. Vasilyeva N.V. The Black Sea Straits – an imperative of Russian/Soviet foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: myths and geopolitical realities (first half of the 20th century).
5. Lavrova T.V. The Black Sea Straits as a Geopolitical Problem of Modern International Relations. Dissertation and Abstract Topic according to the Higher Attestation Commission of the Russian Federation 23.00.04, 2001
6. Irkhin A.A. Models of the functioning of the Black Sea Straits regime: 1783–2018 and Russia's national interests. Scientific Notes of the Crimean Federal University named after V.I. Vernadsky. Philosophy. Political Science. Cultural Studies. Vol. 4 (40). 2018. No. 3. P. 70–80
7. J.P. Hasanli. USSR–Türkiye: From Neutrality to the Cold War (1939–1953). Moscow: Propaganda Center, 2008
8. Mitrofanov A.F. Ships and History. Book Two. Litres, 2020
9. Internet resources
Information