"I won the battle with marches alone."

8 478 26
"I won the battle with marches alone."
The Surrender of Ulm: Bonaparte and General Mack Reach an Understanding. British political cartoon by James Gillray.


Party plans


As has already been noted, Bonaparte planned a war within England, dreamed of “taking London and the Bank of England,” but he had to wage war with England’s “mercenaries” – Austria and Russia, and end the war not in London, but near Vienna (Russian blood for the salvation of "foggy Albion").



However, the British were able to block the French fleet, reinforced by Spanish ships (and then it was burned down altogether – Trafalgar), and “hired” Austria and Russia to the war, who were reinforced in the north and south by the Swedes and Neapolitans.

London promised the Viennese court 5 million pounds sterling and, as final payment for its participation in the war, territorial acquisitions—Belgium, Franche-Comté (part of the former Burgundy), and Alsace. London promised all participants in the emerging coalition full monetary financing of military expenses. England agreed to pay 1,250,000 pounds sterling annually for every 100,000 soldiers.

The Habsburg Empire feared a new war with Napoleon. But gradually, the thirst for revenge overcame this fear, especially when the Austrian Empire was reinforced by Russian bayonets. On July 29, 1805, Austria issued a special declaration announcing its accession to the Russo-Anglo-Russian agreement.

Those who did not want war were dismissed from their posts. Archduke Charles, a renowned military leader and advocate of a sober foreign policy, was replaced by the militant General La Tour as chairman of the Hofkriegsrat. The Austrian army began preparing for war. Quartermaster General Duka, a moderate and member of Archduke Charles's "clan," lost his post. General Mack was appointed in his place.

At a meeting in Vienna, attended by the high command of the Austrian army and the Russian Tsar's envoy, Adjutant General Wintzingerode, a plan for war with France was adopted. The allies intended to deploy massive forces to combat Napoleon. Russia and Austria were to provide the main forces. The convention between Austria and Russia determined the forces allocated to the campaign: 250 Austrians and 180 Russians. The allies also hoped to enlist the aid of Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, the Kingdom of Naples, and various German states.

In total, they planned to deploy over 600 men. True, this was only in theory. In practice, neither Prussia nor the smaller German states, fearful of Napoleon, fought.

Therefore, the plan outlined in Vienna on July 16 1805 of the year suggested an offensive in four directions:

1) A 50-strong Russian army, whose command would later be transferred to General Kutuzov, was to assemble on the southwestern border of the Russian Empire near the town of Radziwill and advance into Austria to join forces with that power. A second Russian army was to arrive later (according to the original plan, through Prussian territory). Austria fielded General Mack's 120-strong Danube Army, which was to be joined by Kutuzov's troops. The Austro-Russian army was to operate in southern Germany. The total number of allied forces after unification was to reach 220 soldiers.

2) A Russian army of approximately 90 men was to assemble on Russia's western borders. St. Petersburg intended to demand passage of these troops through Prussian territory, thereby forcing Prussia to side with the anti-French coalition. Then, after entering Prussian territory, part of this army was to be sent to join the Austrians, while the rest would advance to northwest Germany.

As a result, the Volyn Army under General Buxhoeveden, 30 strong, was concentrated on Russia's western borders to reinforce Kutuzov's army, while General Bennigsen's 40-strong Northern Army was deployed in the Grodno region.

Another 16 Russian soldiers (Tolstoy's corps) and a Swedish corps were supposed to arrive by sea and land in northwestern Germany, in Pomerania. The Russian and Austrian commands hoped to be joined by the Prussian army. This army was supposed to operate in northern Germany, capture Hanover, and defeat the French forces in Holland.

3) Archduke Charles's 100-strong Austrian army was to advance in Northern Italy. The Austrian army was to drive the French forces out of Lombardy and begin the conquest of Southern France. To ensure communication between the two main attack groups in Southern Germany and Northern Italy, a 30-strong army under Archduke John was to concentrate in the Tyrol.

4) In the south of Italy, they planned to land a 20-strong Russian expeditionary force from the island of Corfu and an English corps, which were supposed to unite with the 40-strong Neapolitan army and act against the southern flank of the French group in Italy.

Thus, the allies planned to advance along four main axes: in northern and southern Germany, and in northern and southern Italy. Austria and Russia provided the main forces. In the autumn of 1805, massive coalition forces began moving toward the French border. On September 8, 1805, Austrian troops crossed the Inn River and invaded Bavaria. The war had begun.

The Allies hoped to take advantage of the fact that Napoleon's main and best forces were distracted by preparations for the landing operation. They believed Napoleon would not have time to quickly regroup his forces, and the Allies would then launch a decisive offensive, complete the objectives of the first stage, and prepare for the invasion of France itself. France would be forced to wage difficult defensive battles on several fronts.

Quartermaster General Mack of the Austrian army and Vice President of the Hofkriegsrat Schwarzenberg drew up a plan for a campaign against France. According to the plan, they envisioned a swift invasion of Bavaria and forcing it to side with the Allies, while simultaneously launching a large-scale offensive in Italy. These operations were to begin before the arrival of the Russian army, and upon its arrival, the fighting would shift to French territory.

Based on Vienna's interests, the northern Italian theater of military operations was considered the primary focus. As a result, Russian troops were once again forced, as they had been during the Second Coalition, to fight for the interests of London and Vienna.

Overall, the anti-French coalition's plan assumed that their opponent would not be Napoleon, but a leader of a different kind, and it contained major miscalculations. The allies counted on the enemy not being able to quickly counter their offensive and would surrender the initiative.

There was no unified command of all the allied armies. Allied forces were scattered across a large theater, with Austria's objectives being prioritized. Even during the previous campaign, Suvorov had proposed concentrating efforts on France.

The Austrians overestimated their strength and overconfidently planned to begin active combat before joining forces with Russian troops. Although Kutuzov recommended holding off on military action until all Russian and Austrian forces had united, and not splitting them into small units, Alexander I ignored this sound advice and decided to adhere to the Austrian plan.


France


Bonaparte didn't wait to be defeated. He acted swiftly and decisively, in the style of Suvorov. The "Grand Army" (formerly the "English Army") left the Boulogne camp, made a rapid march, and in September 1805 crossed the Rhine and invaded Germany.

The infantry walked along the sides of the roads, leaving the roadway for artillery and convoys. The average marching pace was about 30 kilometers per day. A well-developed supply system made it possible to cover the distance of 500-600 km separating the Boulogne camp from the theater of upcoming operations virtually without stopping.

In less than three weeks, less than 20 days, the army, enormous for the time, was transferred to a new theater of war with virtually no losses of sick and stragglers. On September 24, Napoleon left Paris; on September 26, he arrived in Strasbourg, and the crossing of the Rhine began immediately.

As Bonaparte himself noted: “I won the battle with marches alone.”


Napoleon addresses the II Corps of his army on the bridge over the Lech in Augsburg, Germany, October 12, 1805. French artist Pierre-Claude Gautherot

The Grand Army


A distinctive feature of Napoleon's army was that each corps was an independent combat unit ("army"), with its own artillery, cavalry, and all necessary institutions. Each corps had the ability to fight independently from the rest of the army.

The main artillery and cavalry forces were independent of any marshal and were not part of any of these corps. They were organized as special units of the Grande Armée and placed under the direct and immediate command of the emperor himself. Thus, Marshal Murat, appointed commander of the entire cavalry, which consisted of 44 men, was the executor of the emperor's will. This allowed Napoleon to concentrate the bulk of his artillery and cavalry in one area.

A special part of the army was the Guard, which consisted of regiments of foot grenadiers and foot chasseurs, horse grenadiers and horse chasseurs, two squadrons of mounted gendarmes, one squadron of Mamelukes recruited in Egypt, and the "Italian Battalion" (which contained more French than Italians). Only particularly distinguished soldiers were selected for the Imperial Guard. They received pay, were better supplied, enjoyed good food, lived in close proximity to the imperial headquarters, and wore elegant uniforms and tall bearskin caps. Napoleon knew many of them by sight, their lives, and their service.

At the same time, the soldiers loved Napoleon and believed that the words "a marshal's baton lies in every soldier's knapsack" were not just empty words; after all, many officers, even generals and marshals, began their service as common soldiers. Napoleon introduced a unique discipline. He did not allow corporal punishment in the army. Military courts sentenced serious offenses to death, hard labor, and, in lesser cases, military prison. But there was one particularly authoritative institution—the comrade's court, when soldiers themselves could, for example, sentence a comrade to death for cowardice. And officers did not interfere.

Napoleon was very attentive to his command staff and unhesitatingly promoted talented commanders. Napoleon surrounded himself with a retinue of brilliantly gifted commanders. Almost all of them were decisive and independent, possessing their own talents and, at the same time, excellent executors, understanding Napoleon's thoughts at a glance. In the hands of Napoleon's strategist, this magnificent cohort of commanders and tacticians was a formidable force.

As a result, the French army's senior command was head and shoulders above the Austrian command. Napoleon himself was at the peak of his powers during this period.

The French army had high morale, as it was an army of victors, confident in the justice of the war that France was waging.

This army, Marmont noted, was powerful not so much by the number of its soldiers as by their nature: almost all of them had already fought and won victories. The inspiration of the revolutionary wars still lingered, but it had been channeled; from the commander-in-chief, from the corps and division commanders to the ordinary soldiers and officers, everyone was battle-hardened. Eighteen months spent in camps had given it additional training, unprecedented cohesion, and boundless confidence in its soldiers.

Napoleon, a master strategist, easily uncovered the enemy's plans and acted in the style of Suvorov—"eye, speed, and onslaught." He destroyed the enemy's numerical superiority by rapidly moving the French army and crushing the enemy armies one by one. He dismembered the enemy forces and dealt them blow after blow.

Napoleon could muster no more than 250 bayonets and sabres and 340 guns for the campaign. The "Great Army" was significantly inferior to the combined forces of the coalition, but it was united and subordinated to a single will.

The Emperor immediately identified the most important objective: seizing the strategic initiative, defeating the enemy's main force, and taking Vienna. Napoleon planned to eliminate Austria, the central power of the enemy coalition, in a few battles and dictate peace terms to it. After that, the anti-French coalition would lose most of its ability to wage war against France.

As for the other fronts—Hanoveria and Naples—Napoleon treated these theaters of war as subsidiary ones, sensibly believing that successes in the main front would offset any losses. Marshal Masséna's 50-strong corps operated in Italy. Masséna accomplished his mission perfectly. He defeated Archduke Charles at Caldiero, then occupied Venice, Carinthia, and Styria.


A French grenadier of the Grande Armée in field uniform. Sytin's Military Encyclopedia, 1912.

Austrian offensive


While his troops marched along the roads of France, Napoleon closely monitored the enemy's movements from Paris. Marshal Murat and his staff were stationed in Strasbourg, from where he kept the emperor informed of the Austrian army's movements.

The Austrian army was incomparably better supplied and organized than before. Mack's army was intended for the first clash with the advanced forces, and particularly high hopes were placed on it. Much depended on the first battle. Austria, Russia, and England believed in the success of Mack's Army of the Danube. This belief stemmed not only from knowledge of the Austrian army's good condition, but also from the Allied command's assumption that Napoleon would not be able to transfer the entire "English Army" at once and would send only part of it. Even if he did send the entire army, he would not be able to quickly transfer and concentrate it on the Rhine.

On September 8, 1805, Austrian troops under Archduke Ferdinand and Mack crossed the Inn River and invaded Bavaria. A few days later, the Austrians occupied Munich.

The Bavarian Elector hesitated and was in constant fear. He was threatened by a powerful coalition of Austria, Russia, and Britain, demanding an alliance, and the French Emperor was also threatening him, also demanding an alliance. The Bavarian ruler initially entered into a secret alliance with the anti-French coalition, promising Vienna assistance in the nascent war. However, after a few days of further reflection, he took his family and government and fled with his army to Würzburg, where Bernadotte's 1st Corps was headed. Bavaria remained on Napoleon's side.

As a result, the anti-French coalition suffered its first diplomatic defeat—Bavaria was unable to be forced to oppose France. The Elector of Württemberg and the Grand Duke of Baden also remained on Napoleon's side. As a reward, the Electors of Bavaria and Württemberg were elevated to king by Napoleon. Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden were rewarded with territorial grants at Austria's expense.

After the Austrians failed to force Bavaria to side with the anti-French coalition, Mack, instead of stopping and waiting for the Russian army to arrive, continued to lead his troops west.

On September 21, the Austrian advance units reached Burgau, Günzburg, and Ulm, and after receiving the first reports of the French army's approach to the Rhine, it was decided to bring up the stragglers to the front line—the Ipper River. Meanwhile, the Austrian army was disorganized by the forced march along poor roads, the cavalry was exhausted, and the artillery could barely keep up with the rest of the troops. Thus, before clashing with the enemy, the Austrian army was in poor condition.

Karl Mack himself rose from soldier to general. While possessing some ability and undoubtedly courage and tenacity, he was not a good commander, and his military exploits were not particularly brilliant. Mack was more of a theorist than a practitioner. In 1798, commanding a 60-strong Neapolitan army, he was defeated by an 18-strong French corps. Mack himself was captured. However, this was not held against him, as the poor fighting qualities of Italian troops at the time were well known.

However, Mack caught the eye of Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor Ludwig von Cobenzel, as he was not an aristocratic general, was not a supporter of Archduke Charles, and shared the Vice-Chancellor's militant views. Thanks to this, Mack made a meteoric rise, becoming Quartermaster General under the nominal Commander-in-Chief, the young Archduke Ferdinand.

Bonaparte, who met Mack in Paris, where he lived as a prisoner, noted:

Mac is the most mediocre man I've ever met. Full of conceit and self-love, he thinks he can do anything. I wish he'd been sent against one of our good generals; then we'd get to see some interesting things. Mac is arrogant, that's all; he's one of the most incapable men, and he's also unlucky.

By September 22, the Danube Army, with four detachments—Auffenberg, Werpeck, Riesch, and Schwarzenberg—was positioned along the banks of the Danube and Ipper in the Günzburg-Kempten area. The right flank was secured by Kienmayer's 20-strong corps, scattered from Amberg to Neuburg, with detachments stationed at the Danube crossings.

At this time, Kutuzov's army was 600 kilometers from the Danube Army and was making a forced march to the Austrians' aid. Some Russian troops were transported by cart to speed their progress. However, the Austrians themselves did everything they could to prevent the Russians from reaching their aid in time.


Karl Mack von Leiberich (1752 – 1828)

To be continued ...
26 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. 0
    8 October 2025 07: 00
    Thanks to the author for the article.
    Quote from the article
    Napoleon was very attentive to his command staff and unhesitatingly promoted talented commanders. Napoleon surrounded himself with a retinue of brilliantly gifted commanders. Almost all of them were decisive and independent, possessing their own talents and, at the same time, excellent executors, understanding Napoleon's thoughts at a glance. In the hands of Napoleon's strategist, this magnificent cohort of commanders and tacticians was a formidable force.
    You probably didn't storm plywood fortresses to the squeals of young ladies, and you didn't saw up the budget with chainsaws.
    1. 0
      8 October 2025 07: 54
      Soult, Davout, Eugene de Beauharnais were capable of independent command; Massena cannot belong to the Napoleonic school.
      The tactics degenerated into attacks by monstrous columns of infantry, with equally monstrous losses.
      Well, as for the embezzlement of the budget, everything was fine, because it was possible to simply rob and take bribes from Europe, blessed with wise governance.
      1. 0
        8 October 2025 10: 18
        “They were capable of independent command,” Napoleon himself put Suchet in first place.
        "cannot belong to the school of Napoleon" - MacDonald, Bernadott, Kellerman..., and practically everyone who became a general before 1800.
        "Tactics degenerated into attacks by monstrous columns of infantry, with equally monstrous losses" - a direct consequence of the decline in the quality of the rank and file.
        “Well, as for the embezzlement of the budget, everything was fine because it was possible to simply rob” - good
  2. +2
    8 October 2025 08: 06
    The author is a supporter of the policy of appeasement of Napoleon.

    But by then Napoleon had bloodied and captured half of Europe and Egypt, and had no intention of stopping. The coalition's actions were thus both forced and logical.
    1. +1
      8 October 2025 10: 22
      Let's do this without unnecessary moral reproaches.
      Europe would have been awash in blood under any circumstances after the French Revolution.
      And it was not Napoleon who started it.
      And there was a club of those who wanted to destroy France as a state, and they have not gone away.
      I won't even mention the mobilization of 600 professional fans of this position.
      So there were only two options for any leader of France: either deal with these forces and those who mobilized them, or lose helplessly, and then France itself would be drenched in blood.
      Not necessarily in battle - robbery, hunger and so on down the list.
      1. 0
        8 October 2025 10: 33
        Quote: multicaat
        Let's do this without unnecessary moral reproaches.
        Europe would have been awash in blood under any circumstances after the French Revolution.
        And it was not Napoleon who started it.

        Maybe yes, maybe no. The fact is that the Revolution was the FIRST to reach beyond France.
        Quote: multicaat
        And there was a club of those who wanted to destroy France as a state, which did not go away

        not France, but the revolution
        Quote: multicaat
        So there were only two options for any leader of France - either to deal with these forces

        Hitler was also always on the defensive.
        1. 0
          8 October 2025 11: 20
          Quote: Olgovich
          Hitler was also always on the defensive.

          Hitler started with a starving Germany, against which economic warfare was already underway, after WWI. So he certainly wasn't the first to start. Also, check out how the French interacted with Germany at the time—very hostile. And yes, Hitler was on the defensive for a while.
          But after the defeat of France, Hitler already needed to somehow feed and maintain a huge army without immediate threat on the battlefield, and it was at this point that the battle for Brittany, the landing in Norway, and then the attack on the USSR were no longer defense.
          Quote: Olgovich
          not France, but the revolution

          There is no need to have illusions and confuse slogans and real goals.
          They wanted to destroy the product of the revolution - all of France, and not just the formal form of government.
          1. +1
            8 October 2025 11: 48
            Quote: multicaat
            against which an economic war had already been waged after WWI

            After World War I, Germany received loans from the United States through the Dawes Plan (1924)—that's what "war" is all about.
            Quote: multicaat
            And yes, Hitler defended himself up to a point.
            But after the defeat of France, Hitler

            In Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland?
            Quote: multicaat
            They wanted to destroy the product of the revolution - all of France

            nothing prevented it from being destroyed in 1815
            1. 0
              8 October 2025 12: 07
              Quote: Olgovich
              After World War I, Germany received loans from the United States through the Dawes Plan (1924)—that's what "war" is all about.

              only to pay reparations, the country suffered from famine for several years, where hatred towards usurers, mainly Jews, grew strongly
              Quote: Olgovich
              In Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland?

              After the decision to stop paying reparations, Germany essentially found itself in permanent preparation for war, primarily with France.
              Most subsequent events are logically connected to this. You forgot to add Spain. It was thanks to France's unyielding stance on reparations that Hitler even had a chance at power. And you're confusing cause and effect. Or do you think Hitler was the only one obsessed with revanchism in Germany? He expressed the will of the people, and it was fulfilled. If not he, someone else would have done the same. And what was the reason for such a thirst? Well, tell me.
        2. -1
          8 October 2025 13: 27
          The Revolution was the FIRST to spread beyond the borders of France.

          And can you even prove that the revolutionaries in France, whose consolidation of power was, to put it mildly, delayed by the civil war, had no other concerns than "exporting the revolution" (even though they had no such programmatic point) rather than trying to cling to power within the country? And how did this "export" occur?
          The coalition's actions were thus forced and logical.

          Oh, really?
          The Austrians began preparing the "Army of Princes" as early as 1791. I think you can figure out for yourself that 1792 was after 1791.

          P.S. I'm not being unfair when I say you blame the Soviet leadership for failing to respond preemptively to the concentration of German forces on their border. Remind me of the situation with the concentration of Austrian troops on the French border.
    2. 0
      8 October 2025 10: 24
      Quite the opposite. Napoleon was ready to stop, but no agreement could be reached. In the case of England, it was a case of a dead end. And Alexander I turned out to be a dark horse.
      1. 0
        8 October 2025 10: 36
        Quote: Sergey Valov
        Quite the opposite. Napoleon was ready to stop, but they couldn't reach an agreement.

        Where to stay—Scotland, Portugal, Sicily, Minsk? Isn't it too much?
      2. +5
        8 October 2025 18: 36
        Quote: Sergey Valov
        Napoleon was ready to stop, but no agreement could be reached.

        Because Napoleon was prepared to negotiate on the principle of "what's mine is mine, what's yours is mine." This... isn't exactly a position that can be negotiated. laughing
        1. -3
          8 October 2025 18: 48
          What unacceptable demands did Napoleon make of Austria and Russia before the 1805 campaign? What demands did he make of Prussia in 1806 before the war? What did Napoleon demand of Austria before the 1809 campaign? In 1812, Napoleon demanded of Russia only compliance with the terms of the Peace of Tilsit. Nothing more. In Spain, he truly stepped into someone else's sandbox.
          But after the victorious war, he really “stripped” his opponent completely.
          By the way, he also demanded from England that they strictly fulfill the agreements they had made, but they were stubborn.
          1. +2
            8 October 2025 19: 24
            Quote: Sergey Valov
            What unacceptable demands did Napoleon make of Austria and Russia before the 1805 campaign?

            So, you know what unacceptable demands he made of England. Excellent. Austria, however, had suffered enormous losses under the Treaty of Lunéville, and obviously couldn't help but seek revenge. Not only had it been driven from the left bank of the Rhine, not only had Luxembourg and Belgium been taken away, but Napoleon was also treating the western and southern German states as if they were his own. For Russia, this was an excellent chance to stop Napoleon by attacking him en masse, that is, as part of a coalition.
            Quote: Sergey Valov
            What were the demands on Prussia in 1806 before the war?

            None. Napoleon simply attacked Prussia without any demands.
            But first, he conned her beautifully. Napoleon demanded an alliance with Prussia, promising to return Hanover in exchange. Prussia signed the alliance, but Napoleon didn't return Hanover. Instead, England declared war. Then, Prussia realized that Napoleon, wanting to make peace with England, had offered Hanover to her...
            Quote: Sergey Valov
            What did Napoleon demand from Austria before the 1809 campaign?

            Continental blockade. Not to mention the horrific territorial losses.
            Quote: Sergey Valov
            In 1812, Napoleon demanded that Russia only comply with the terms of the Peace of Tilsit.

            Yeah, and the continental blockade, which doomed Russia to ruin. It was just a small thing, really.
            1. -5
              8 October 2025 19: 56
              To summarize what you wrote: Napoleon made NO demands on his opponents! Austria was seeking revenge! But you're wrong about Prussia; it was they who started the war with France. As for the Continental Blockade, don't sign an unfavorable treaty; then you won't have to enforce it. And it was unfavorable after the defeat in a war they had entered into on their own initiative.
              "You know what unacceptable demands he made of England. Excellent." - no need to distort the facts, more about England below.
              1. +5
                8 October 2025 20: 18
                Quote: Sergey Valov
                To summarize what you wrote, Napoleon did not make ANY demands on his opponents!

                How lovely:)))))
                Quote: Sergey Valov
                Austria was looking for revenge!

                And the reason was an unfair peace for Austria, plus Napoleon's autocracy, as I wrote about above. These were Napoleon's unacceptable demands—Austria was required to accept his expansion.
                Quote: Sergey Valov
                But you are mistaken about Prussia; it was they who started the war with France.

                Is it okay that the declaration of war occurred after Napoleon's troops crossed the German border? Is it okay that Napoleon violated the agreement he himself had made?
                Quote: Sergey Valov
                As for the Continental Blockade, there is no need to conclude an unfavorable agreement, then you won’t have to implement it.

                Brilliant. So you admit that it was Napoleon's impossible demands that led to the war, but you also claim that
                Quote: Sergey Valov
                Napoleon was ready to stop, but no agreement could be reached.

                Don't you see any contradictions?
                Quote: Sergey Valov
                And it was unprofitable after the defeat in the war, which they were drawn into on their own initiative.

                Yes, if Napoleon had been defeated, he probably wouldn't have insisted on a continental blockade:)))))
                Sergei, Russia could have fought Napoleon, or it could have kissed him on the gums, but Napoleon would have forced us to choose either way: a continental blockade or war. Simply because a blockade was the only way to deal with England.
                Quote: Sergey Valov
                "You know what unacceptable demands he made of England. Excellent." - no need to distort

                You didn't ask this question, so I assumed you knew at least something about the Napoleonic Wars. Alas, I was wrong.
                1. -5
                  8 October 2025 20: 51
                  "And the reason was an unfair peace" – what do you mean, unfair? Austria lost the war, made peace, wanted revenge, and Napoleon is to blame?
                  "Is it okay that the declaration of war occurred after Napoleon's troops crossed the German border? Is it okay that Napoleon violated the agreement he himself had made?" - Is it okay that Prussia presented an ultimatum to Napoleon to dissolve the Confederation of the Rhine? Is it okay that after Napoleon rejected this ultimatum, Prussian troops advanced on Hesse?
                  "So you admit that it was Napoleon's impossible demands that led to the war"—precisely the opposite. Napoleon's demands were accepted, a respite was gained after the defeat to recuperate, and an attempt at revenge was made? And who initiated the new war?
                  "Don't you see any contradictions?" - What's the contradiction? A man wants peace, yet he's attacked time and time again, he crushes his opponents, punishes them with tougher sanctions, and yet his opponents, having recovered from their defeats, attack again. What's the contradiction?
                  “Yes, if Napoleon had been defeated, he probably would not have insisted on a continental blockade” - and he did not insist, and twice.
                  Allow me not to answer your last thesis.
                  1. +3
                    8 October 2025 21: 50
                    Quote: Sergey Valov
                    Austria lost the war, made peace, wanted revenge, and Napoleon is to blame?

                    Of course. Because the peace terms were unacceptable to Austria. But it couldn't fight at the time the peace was signed either—its armies were defeated. What's left? Sign the peace as is and prepare for revenge.
                    Quote: Sergey Valov
                    Is it okay that Prussia presented an ultimatum to Napoleon to dissolve the Confederation of the Rhine?

                    Nothing. Because before this ultimatum, it was Napoleon who abandoned Prussia to Hanover, as I wrote to you about. That is, it was Napoleon who failed to comply with the terms of the treaty with Prussia that he had established. And the Confederation of the Rhine is a direct threat to Prussia, if anything. Just like the 200-strong French army on the Rhine.
                    And yes, Prussia did first send Napoleon an offer to explain its intentions, which Napoleon ignored.
                    Quote: Sergey Valov
                    Is it okay that after Napoleon rejected this ultimatum, Prussian troops moved on Hesse?

                    They didn't invade Napoleon's territory. You're a truly remarkable person—you forgive Napoleon everything. He can break treaties he signed, he can threaten other states, he can keep large armies on their borders, he can ignore questions about what's going on. Prussia is still to blame.
                    Quote: Sergey Valov
                    Were Napoleon's demands accepted, was a respite granted after the defeat to recuperate, and was an attempt at revenge made? And who initiated the new war?

                    Of course, the one who imposed unacceptable peace conditions.
                    Quote: Sergey Valov
                    What is the contradiction? Man wants peace.

                    What?:))))))) Was it Napoleon who wanted peace?:)))))) I'll quote Tarle in relation to the Confederation of the Rhine you mentioned
                    The Confederation of the Rhine included Bavaria, Württemberg, Regensburg, Baden, Berg, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau (both lines), and eight other German principalities. This confederation "elected" Emperor Napoleon as its protector. In gratitude for the emperor's acceptance of this new title, the Confederation of the Rhine pledged to provide 63 soldiers at Napoleon's disposal in the event of war. Many small independent princes, previously subject to the supreme sovereignty of the emperors of the Austrian House of Habsburg, now submitted to the sovereigns of the Confederation of the Rhine who had annexed their lands. This effectively ended the so-called "Holy Roman Empire," as the supremacy of the Austrian emperors over fragmented Germany and its de facto independent princes had been called. This title lasted for almost exactly a thousand years. Now (in 1806) the Austrian Emperor Franz renounced it at the direct suggestion of Emperor Napoleon. This new conquest by Napoleon, the addition of new territories to his possessions, greatly alarmed and irritated the Prussian court and the Prussian government. After all, the Confederation of the Rhine introduced Napoleonic power into the very heart of Germany and directly threatened the integrity of Prussia. The danger was further increased by the fact that, simultaneously with the preparation of this Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon made several appointments that were only weakly disguised as an expansion of the French Empire at the expense of new states. On March 15, 1806, Marshal Murat was appointed Grand Duke of Cleves and Berg (in western Germany), on March 30, Joseph Bonaparte was appointed King of Naples, and Marshal Berthier, Prince of Neuchâtel; On June 5, Napoleon's other brother, Louis Bonaparte, was appointed King of Holland, Foreign Minister Talleyrand was appointed Prince of Benevento, and Marshal Bernadotte was appointed Prince of Ponte Corvo in southern Italy. These weren't even vassals, but simply Napoleon's viceroys and governors-general. And all of Europe understood this. Meanwhile, Napoleon was once again preparing for war. In June, having formed the Confederation of the Rhine, he openly announced to the Legislative Corps that he had an army of 450 men and the means to maintain it without borrowing or incurring a deficit. Napoleon began to concentrate approximately 200 troops on both banks of the Rhine, in Alsace, Lorraine, and in the states of the newly created Confederation of the Rhine.

                    Yes, Napoleon wanted peace. All of it. At his feet and under his wise leadership.
                    1. +1
                      9 October 2025 11: 56
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Yes, Napoleon wanted peace. All of it. At his feet and under his wise leadership.

                      it's like that.
                      It's strange that they don't want to see this...

                      And Russia was right to try to stop Napoleon on foreign soil...
                      1. 0
                        9 October 2025 12: 48
                        There was a sect in historical science that claimed Napoleon's sincere love of peace, that he was forced to fight solely by external circumstances, but he didn't want to fight at all and was generally a white and fluffy man.
                        In fact, no one took this sect seriously even in France. It's all the more surprising to see people sharing its views here.
  3. 0
    8 October 2025 09: 24
    Quote: Proton

    You probably didn't storm plywood fortresses to the squeals of young ladies, and you didn't saw up the budget with chainsaws.


    They were all about the cutting and the show. The Empire style, also known as classicism, taken to the point of absurdity in terms of "expensive-bahato."

    It's just that the opponents were even worse.
  4. 0
    8 October 2025 11: 50
    "I won the battle with marches alone."
    This is what later led to his downfall - this won't work in Russia, this is what the rigidity and lack of strategic thinking of the conqueror of Europe led to.
    Europe can be bent like this, but Russia cannot, it won’t work.
  5. +1
    8 October 2025 12: 22
    He dismembered the enemy forces and dealt them blow after blow.

    It wasn't Napoleon who "dismembered" it, but the incompetent command of the coalition... who shot themselves in the foot.
    1. 0
      8 October 2025 18: 51
      Well, of course, Napoleon is a mediocrity, it’s just that his opponents are even more mediocre. laughing
  6. 0
    4 March 2026 18: 58
    If you allow me to use mystical terms, this is a natural demon of war, and Suvorov was like that, Hannibal... there are not many of them, but they exist, Tukhachevsky

    They're taking apart a company here, one of his best, there's nothing to take apart, nothing to find fault with, top-notch performance - the Paganini of war