A round table was held at the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation on the topic “Economics, defense and security: analytical support for management and control”. It has become an important contribution to the development of the idea of consolidating analytical organizations. The event, which continues the theme of analytics development in Russia (“MIC”, No. 4, 2013), was attended by representatives of the Presidential Administration, the Federation Council, the Accounts Chamber, the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Defense, and other departments.
The consequences of voluntarism
Modern processes in the sphere of defense and security of the state, especially in the conditions of modernization of the Armed Forces, need to search for optimal solutions to complex issues that require intellectual accumulation. Without a deep analytical study of the problems here is not enough. Unfortunately, the Russian specificity is aggravated by the lack of a single information space, the heterogeneity of the development of the country's regions, and the lack of readiness of local managers for operational actions. Therefore, to the fore for the highest bodies of state and military control are the tasks of improving the quality of management.
The decision-making process at the state level differs from the management of, say, a business primarily by the scale of the possible consequences. In order to choose the most correct option, the task assessment must be comprehensive, otherwise it will not provide a complete picture of the problem. Therefore, one of the most important tasks is the creation of a single information space that could combine not only interdepartmental analytical resources, but also regional ones.
Taking into account the formation of the new command and control system of the Armed Forces, the modernization of weapons and military equipment and unprecedented defense spending, it is advisable to pay close attention to the following tasks.
Define the concept of financial control of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, its place in the system of government. Formulate the principles of financial control in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, establish its functions, and empower them to effectively solve the challenges. On the basis of scientific analysis and expert assessments, prepare proposals for the improvement of federal legislation regulating the activities in the field of financial support and control in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as the bodies exercising supra-departmental and interdepartmental financial control.
In domestic legislation, to provide such a form as attributing to the aggravating circumstances actions of employees of the Ministry of Defense aimed at undermining the country's defense capability, which fully can lead to tougher penalties when committing unlawful acts and, as a result, reducing crimes in the field of defense and security.
In addition, in the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation it is advisable to provide for the implementation of comprehensive expert and analytical work aimed at identifying the facts and causes of corruption risk, analysis of positions on corruption, the formation of anti-corruption mechanisms.
Head of the Department of Analytical Department of the Council of Federation, Doctor of Law, Professor
Where does the money go?
Today, defense spending is growing, but the effectiveness of these expenses leaves much to be desired. The reason for their low efficiency lies in the lack of expert and analytical support for both planning and the use of resources allocated by the state.
One of the main goals of the development of the Armed Forces is to give them a look that would correspond to the economic possibilities of the state and at the same time be sufficient for guaranteed armed protection. To a greater extent, the solution of this problem depends on the military-political situation and the economic power of the country.
The basis of the formation of plans for the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and their resource support should be based on a comprehensive military-economic analysis, which is based on both economic laws and the laws of warfare, together linking the goals, objectives and resources. This will allow the country's leadership to choose the preferred options for solving the problems of the development of the Armed Forces according to the “cost-effectiveness-feasibility” criterion.
The basis of this analysis, in our opinion, should be based on principles, the essence of which is as follows.
1. A comprehensive account of the laws of warfare and the development of the Armed Forces.
2. The unconditional translation of strategic and operational tasks into the language of quantitative and qualitative indicators, carrying out detailed military-economic calculations of the needs of troops (forces) in material and financial resources.
3. Concentration of material and financial resources in priority areas.
4. Minimal risk during structural reorganization.
5. Maximum use of resources and the modernization potential of existing weapons and military equipment, focusing on maintaining them in combat readiness.
6. Formation of plans for the construction and development of the Armed Forces on the principles of program targeted planning.
7. Analysis and evaluation of the development processes of the Armed Forces on a single methodological basis, based on the results of coordinated scientific research, methods and techniques of military-economic analysis, economic and mathematical models, information and analytical support tools.
Head of the Accounting Chamber Inspectorate, Candidate of Economic Sciences
The role of situational centers
For more than ten years, the problems of situational centers have been discussed on the basis of the Russian Academy of State Service, and now the national economy. Our approaches were widely scientifically tested, and ultimately they were heard at a meeting of the Information Security Commission of the Security Council. After that a list of orders of the head of state appeared.
Since 1996, since the creation of the president’s situational center, the Security Council situational center, the 50 order has been built at such centers of various levels. The task of integrating their ability to provide analytical public administration is obvious. Moreover, we still have to create 100 order of situational centers at various levels of government, at enterprises of strategic importance, including Rosatom and Roskosmos.
The decree of the President of the Russian Federation, which introduced the National Security Strategy, for the first time included the term “system of distributed situational centers operating under a single regulation”. This is a decree on the basics of strategic planning, where, through a system of distributed situational centers, it is intended to collect information on the state of socio-economic development and national security, to make appropriate decisions.
The architecture that we propose to implement includes three main levels. Federal level: situational centers of the president, government, presidential administration, ministries and departments. The level of federal districts and the level of subjects of the Federation. The integration base is the information and telecommunication capabilities of the FSO network, which today really exists and is currently being seriously modernized.
The main purpose of creating a system of distributed situational centers is to increase the efficiency of government in peacetime and in wartime, as well as in the event of crisis and emergency situations. It should not duplicate the existing systems, but combine the best designs for obtaining a political, social, economic effect.
It is clear that each federal executive body has its own specifics. We cannot compare the situational center of the Ministry of Defense and the situational center of the subsidized subject of the Russian Federation. They have different possibilities, but the only thing is that each must have visualization, integration, telecommunications equipment, etc.
In order to overcome the problem of technical incompatibility, the Federal Protective Service of Russia prepared methodological recommendations and sent them to all federal executive bodies, and made critical remarks.
As for personal information systems that provide the activity of a manager of one level or another online, now information systems of project management have become in high demand. An example is the sochi2014 portal, where all information is concentrated - from the process of preparing athletes to building facilities. This information system reflects all the pain points of the construction of infrastructure facilities in Sochi. To the extent that during the meetings of the Olympic Committee there even protocol decisions are prepared using this system.
It seems that this year we will be able to combine situational centers that already exist. At the second stage, those that are necessary for the full functioning of the system will be completed. And by the year 2015, as stated in the guidance documents, we will launch the entire system.
Head of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Candidate of Political Sciences
Border security is one of the areas of national security. Russia has a unique geographical location - more than 61 thousands of kilometers of sea and land borders. Many of its plots are still not equipped after the collapse of the USSR. Today, a multi-level geographically distributed information and analytical system has been created, which operates in three modes.
But we are not here to evaluate technologies within specific departments, but to come up with questions of a general problem nature that impede the development of systems at the organizational and system-technical level. Among them are organizational difficulties in ensuring interdepartmental cooperation. There is a tremendous need to use the information resources of other departments at the regional level. Suppose there is a situational center in Chelyabinsk. It is necessary to receive information from the Federal Migration Service, the Ministry of Defense, the Federal Security Service and so on. For some reason, these problems are addressed to the chief designer. But he can answer them only after the decision of organizational interdepartmental issues and the receipt of relevant regulations. This is problem.
The imperfection of the regulatory framework that determines the procedure for placing state defense orders is also an extremely acute problem. The existing base provides loopholes for the penetration of incompetent organizations that have neither experience, nor specialists, nor the corresponding potential.
There is no integrated approach to the organization, work. Enough and organizational confusion. Previously, traditionally, each military institution was subordinate to the appropriate military command and control body. The institute of communications — to the commander of communications, the Rocket institute — to the commander-in-chief of the rocket forces, etc. But in recent years this system has been destroyed. As a result, the Gostov concept was lost - the research institute of the customer. The customer in submission now had no institute.
The Ministry of Defense, as a customer, says that it does not want to develop equipment, it has eliminated all its institutions. But this is nonsense. Although the law on the state defense order is written: IWT can be ordered only by federal authorities, which have armed forces. Almost no corresponding specialists left. Therefore, it is necessary to re-create the infrastructure of the development of weapons and military equipment - the one dictated by the logic of events and challenges. Need a general designer with the appropriate rights. But the rights cannot be given to him within the framework of the current Civil Code, since the scientific, technical, military and scientific support, the procedure for developing weapons and military equipment samples, I repeat, have been violated.
Now we must help the new Minister of Defense and his deputies to formulate these questions, including from our public position. Without this, we can’t seriously talk about the development of weapons, the economics of industrial enterprises.
Deputy Director of the Institute for Informatics Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor
How to avoid a catastrophe
I see everything completely different. It said that we have 50 centers and things are not so bad. But let's look around. Consider the same defense order.
"Mistrali" - a huge failure of Russia. Despite the resistance of the Academy of Military Sciences, this decision was pushed through. As John Kennedy said, "I have thousands of specialists who know how to build a pyramid, but there is not one who knows whether to build it or not." In my opinion, situational, and more generally, cognitive centers should support, first of all, the specialists who determine the strategy. But this is not in sight.
We had a situational center on the Russian island. They spent more money for the APEC (with full control of the FSO) than at the previous 23 summit. But embezzlement and marriage in the works could not be avoided. One of two things: either the centers are no good (for this there is no reason), or there is no connection between the centers and decision making. In my opinion, the second reason is especially acute.
What is being said about the situation centers comes down to the following. A big screen is bought, expensive equipment is purchased and a good table is put. And that's all. At the same time, a revolution occurred in the world in this sphere. It became clear that in making well-considered decisions neither the big screen nor the perfect equipment would fundamentally solve anything.
We do not have a national model for the development of Russia. It is not at the level of regions, branches of the economy. In a sense, what we are doing is late years on 20. It is necessary to proceed to the next stage: the creation of cognitive centers, which allow you to work with mathematical models and large information flows, to receive distributed expertise and predict crises. If a similar center had been created, for example, at one time in Japan, then it could have done without 250 in spending billions of dollars on Fukushima.
It was about the Crisis Management Center of the Russian Emergencies Ministry. We were engaged in this center. Not a single mathematically meaningful model relating to risks and crises, which was proposed by the Academy of Sciences, has not been established. And the situation is this: what is proposed in most documents is a technique somewhere 10 – 15-year-old. Although the world has gone far ahead.
Situational centers that are created by FSO, should analyze events in the current time and in the dynamics of their development. But sometimes we just do not have enough information. Today it becomes clear what the systemic cause of many accidents and disasters is. But, unfortunately, precisely in this direction, many situational centers of Russia do not work.
The regions have been banned from conducting research activities, they do not have their own scientific budgets, and their leaders with whom we met simply do not know what to do. They should be helped, prompted, and most importantly - taught to ask questions. They are demanded of paper, and they report that everything has already been done. But this is not what is necessary.
The current situation is not only unfavorable - it is extraordinary. At one time, the Academy of Sciences and the Bauman Institute proposed a monitoring system for the same dams. Each ruble invested in the forecast and warning allows you to save from 10 to one thousand rubles, which have to be invested in eliminating the troubles that have already occurred. But not for nothing that they say that the miser pays twice. Until now, RusHydro, for example, has not begun such work. Although we are talking about flood zones and people's lives. We were lucky that the dam of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric station at the time of the last emergency resisted. But if a war happens, the first thing the enemy will do is strike a blow at our dams. In the flooded area of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, there will be 300 thousand people, the Volga Hydroelectric Station - 1,1 million, Krasnoyarsk - 1,1 million, Saratov - 1,2 million, Cheboksary - 1,4 million, and Zhiguli - 1,6 million. This is comparable to a nuclear strike. Therefore, the Federal Security Service, the Russian Emergencies Ministry, RusHydro should consider this problem as one of the most important. But so far, what has been done for this at the Academy of Sciences, our institute, still in the top ten institutions, has not been claimed.
We completely ignore the risks of tomorrow. But the huge uranium enrichment plant in Iran was disabled by a single computer virus. Honestly, we are defenseless in this area too. The last report of Mr. Kaspersky shows: when a separate state does not inflict a computer attack, but a whole state, then this simply has nothing to oppose.
Now in Russia the strategic course is changing. We turn to planning at the state level, declaring that we will have a defense order on a new basis. But there are a lot of inconsistencies, a lot of expensive unnecessary weaponswhich will never be claimed. We need to talk about how to save these 20 trillions of rubles, because it is already visible: the mass of expenses is expected to be extremely inefficient. And a mechanism that would allow to hear experts, to find alternative solutions, simply does not exist.
In which areas are cognitive centers vital for us? First, it is the management of the regions. We currently have no mechanism for coordinating the interests of the objects of management. That is, we make decisions, but we do not foresee what will happen in 5 – 10 – 15 years. And cognitive centers will allow to see the consequences of decision-making, to seek a compromise at the levels of the region - the Federation, the region - the region, the region - the region.
The second. No goal setting. We are going to execute something, to carry out some orders, but, for example, the General Staff does not explain what the 2030 war of the year will be. That is, goal setting lags far behind specific accomplishments. A simple example: almost two and a half times more money is allocated for the fleet for the GOZH than for the Ground Forces, although we are a land country.
On the territory of Russia 50 thousands of dangerous objects and five thousand especially dangerous. The threat of acts of terrorism and catastrophes is great. In order for this not to happen, you need to monitor these objects in real time. OJSC RKS has created a system that allows it to be done through the space segment. But as already noted, no agency is willing to give their information. In addition, we do not have any organization that could collect and synthesize information of such a degree of importance. Each department, including the Federal Security Service of Russia, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defense, says that it will not give this information to the wrong hands. Although each of them is trying to do something separately, without having any cognitive centers or sufficient scientific studies. This is one of the most important problems to be addressed and where the attention of researchers should be focused, to develop developmental works.
Legislation is also needed to end the privatization of information now available. According to Russian laws, we have the right to coordinate the activities of several ministries only three people: the president, vice-president, prime minister. All the others, for example, the Minister of Emergency Situations or, say, the Minister of Defense, simply carry out their tasks, often without a general picture. And here is a full legal vacuum.
Head of Sector, Institute of Applied Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Technical Sciences
There is no main thing - “brains”
I propose to look at the analytical support of management and control in the field of defense and security in a broader, conceptual terms.
For more than 20 years I have been a supporter and implementer of the idea of enhancing analytics in Russia. The main misfortune of the country is not in the lack of resources, but in the lack of “brains” - analytical support of management processes. This applies both to the sphere of state and municipal government in general, and to the military-industrial complex in particular. Millions of dollars have been spent on situational centers, and the result of most of them is very small. Not a single problem, more or less stately significant, in these centers has been either posed or solved.
Many centers were created as a tribute to fashion. The emphasis was on the technical component, and the analytical one was extremely weak everywhere. And this is at a time when there are burning problems all around that could be put and solved in them. For example, the problem of traffic jams in major cities of Russia.
A purely technocratic approach (multimedia complexes, multiscreen systems) dominates in situational centers. There is a lack of the main thing - “brains”. For the system to enter the combat analytical mode, we need training. At least once a week, people need to collect.
In the Russian economy, the resource of competent management is used sporadically, with low efficiency. And the main reason for this is the lack of a well-established attitude towards management as a creative activity. Usually, management is interpreted as strict adherence to pre-prescribed norms, regardless of actual situations. And management technologies introduced from outside, primarily from Western Europe, as well as American and Japanese, do not work in Russian reality.
Finally, many managers who are accustomed to insurance, seeing the administrative resource, are not at all inclined to make decisions for which they will have to bear personal responsibility. A significant part of managers of all ranks get used to constantly being busy with something, without accomplishing anything. Thus, it is not necessary to talk about the effectiveness of management at all levels.
I think it is necessary to assist the project “Russian Analytical School” (RASH). It has three conceptual blocks. The first is the training of analysts who no one in Russia seriously prepares. The second is research work on the analytical support of all management processes in the country, which analytical centers abroad do. The third is conducting basic research.
One of the tasks of RASH is to train analyst experts who are responsible for the security of development management. I support the idea of creating a textbook on the fundamentals of analytical work. It is also necessary to organize and conduct a contest for young analysts of Russia in the second half of 2013.
Head of the Russian Analytical School Project, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor