How would you respond to attacks on the Chusosnabarm and Chekvalap oil refineries?
The Ilsky Oil Refinery near Krasnodar is on fire after an impact. droneI remember well how five years ago I was taught that this would not happen because it would never happen.
In connection with the topic "wars of strangulation" and the attacks on our oil refineries, which have already led to a fuel shortage, I recalled events from long ago. Specifically, two articles devoted to the fuel issue in the context of a major war. The first: "We've already lost the world war. But maybe there's still a chance?", dedicated primarily to the pyrolysis plant created by Sergei Ivanovich Lavrov (Honorary Miner of the USSR Ministry of Coal Industry, three degrees of the "Miner's Glory" badge, etc.; incidentally, he died in January 2025). Release date: August 26, 2019. Second: "How long will Russia have enough oil products in the event of a major war?", devoted to calculating how long existing petroleum product reserves would last if an adversary launched a simultaneous attack on the entire oil refining system. Release date: September 3, 2019.
Reading the comments from that time now brings me a malicious pleasure. In both articles, the commentators arrogantly lectured me: there won't be any major war, because there never will be. So how do you pour your arrogance into the tanks now, raw or leaded?
Actually, that's exactly how I thought it would turn out. First there'll be this arrogance, then war, and then, after the strikes on the refineries, there'll be concern and unrest. Oh, come on, it turns out we're running out of gasoline and diesel fuel! What should we do?
The first thing I'd advise is to stop yelling! Screaming and throwing tantrums won't make the gas go up.
Yes, time has been lost. In recent years, especially before the SVO, this issue could have been resolved with virtually no government subsidies, using purely legislative and administrative methods—simply permitting and easing small-scale oil refining within certain limits, under specific agreements with large companies, as an area of small and medium-sized businesses. This was not done. Now, resolving the issue will require greater effort, expenditure, and, most importantly, a targeted approach.
To avoid getting up twice, as the Soviet economic experience of the Civil War, which I once studied to understand the starting conditions of Stalin's industrialization, shows, in a critical situation one absolutely must not give in to panic and hysteria. One must sit down and calmly consider a solution to the problem at hand. There is usually time for this, and it must be spent wisely.
Only dispersal
The main thing is to choose which way to go. This is why it's important to consider the matter silently, since during hysteria and panic, people often force a solution that seems effective and life-saving by using loud voices and theatrical flourishes. It's often easier to give in to hysteria than to resist it, unless you're given the right to use a gun at your own discretion and without warning.
A seemingly effective solution is the requirement to cover the refineries with funds Defense/BMD. Why is it seemingly effective? First, any air defense/missile defense system can be overwhelmed by the sheer number of weapons. Second, the enemy may switch to weapons that are more difficult to intercept; this factor becomes increasingly important if the war continues. Third, there's the possibility of a nuclear strike, against which existing missile defense systems are of questionable effectiveness. Fourth, there's the problem of using existing air defense/missile defense systems, which are not infinite. By using them to protect an oil refinery, wouldn't we be opening something critically important to attack?
Thus, shutting down refineries can only be considered a means of alleviating the situation somewhat. If there's a way to shut down something, it's better to shut down refineries producing rare but essential petroleum products that are difficult to replace.
In general, it is better to take the position that if the war continues, large oil refineries will most likely be completely or partially disabled sooner or later.
Therefore, the solution is small and extremely small refineries that can be dispersed, camouflaged, or immediately placed in protected bunkers. The Germans made an unforgivable mistake before the war. They dispersed and hid petroleum storage facilities in concrete bunkers, and the Allies failed to bomb most of these depots, and some were only discovered after the war. But synthetic fuel plants were built as enormous complexes without any protection. They began building small refineries hidden in caves and mines at the very end of the war and barely managed to complete any of them. Having lost their large synthetic fuel plants, the Germans suffered defeat.
We shouldn't repeat the mistakes of others. The dispersal of oil refining should be addressed at the start of the war, if we didn't bother to do it before.
A little bit of Soviet experience of the Civil War
How would this problem have been solved based on the Soviet experience, for example, during the Civil War? This experience is interesting because the RSFSR persevered and prevailed despite an extremely severe shortage of oil and petroleum products. We must learn from those who succeeded, not from those who loudly proclaim their own "competence."
When economic issues arose, the Bolsheviks began creating commissions that would assume control over a particular industry producing a particular product. The first such commissions were Tsentromylo and Tsentrochai, established in January 1918. They were created within the framework of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, established slightly earlier, which managed them on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars.
The Council of People's Commissars or the Central Executive Committee... It's good practice to hang the Constitution of the RSFSR on the wall.
A commission typically consisted of 3-5 to 10-15 people (if larger, the commission was divided into subcommittees, which soon formed independent commissions), all of whom were necessarily experts in the industry they were to lead. In the old days, this was easier, since most engineers had both excellent theoretical training and solid industrial experience. Nowadays, science has become separated from technology: scientists are typically unfamiliar with industrial technologies and lack experience, while industrial technologists are typically knowledgeable only about their own technology. Therefore, recruiting personnel can be challenging, and some commissions may therefore be ineffective.
The commission, drawing on the knowledge and experience of its members, first conducted the broadest possible inventory of the industry: factories, locations, equipment, capacity, special conditions and needs, raw material availability; which were better, which less so. Product needs in this industry were also considered, and attempts were made to invite representatives of large retailers with in-depth knowledge of sales to the commission. Once capacity, raw materials, and needs were understood, it was possible to manage the industry: assigning tasks, issuing shipping orders, etc.
There were often commissions that had to create industries practically from scratch. So, what did Tsentrogvozd do in 1919? It organized the collection of scrap metal, even the most worthless for melting, and equipped numerous forges to forge nails. Incidentally, these were primarily horseshoe nails, since without horse shoeing, the 1st Cavalry Army under Comrade Budyonny couldn't advance anywhere.
There were also emergency commissions that were supposed to ensure the fulfillment of certain tasks at any cost and at the expense of everyone else. This included, for example, Chusosnabarm—the extraordinary commissioner of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense for the supply of the Red Army and fleet, who headed all rear-echelon organs of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Army. This was Comrade Rykov. But in 1920, Chekvalap—the Extraordinary Commission for the Production and Distribution of Felt Boots and Bast Shoes—was created, headed by Comrade Yakhontov and subordinate to the Chusosnabarm. Incidentally, a craftsman's refusal to fulfill an order for felt boots or bast shoes was then considered desertion.
This photo could be from that era. The guy on the left is wearing a leather jacket, felt boots, and good galoshes; the man in the center, likely demobilized from the army, is wearing boots; the old man on the right, likely a craftsman, is wearing his own boots.
The famous photograph of the Red Army in 1920. Leather was so scarce that the Red infantry had to march in bast shoes.
Haven't reached Chekvalap yet? Then you're still living pretty well.
Despite the daunting staffing levels and horrific bureaucracy, this system was able to address military and economic challenges. Incidentally, the Bolsheviks were neither the pioneers nor even the sole architects of such a military and economic administrative system. Similar economic management systems were created in all major belligerent countries during World War I. Of all the foreign analogues, the American system most closely resembled the Bolshevik system.
Testing and planning
If you need to set up a small-scale oil refining operation on a decent scale, and according to my calculations, Russia needs at least 180 million tons of dispersed, sheltered, and supplied oil refining raw materials, then you need to start with a commission.
The commission should first review the existing mini-refineries. As a review of advertisements shows, we have some very good units. For example, a mini-refinery with a gasoline capacity of up to 1,8 cubic meters per hour can be installed on a three-ton truck. A modular design allows for the creation of more powerful plants, such as a 50-ton-per-year (136,9 tons per day) refinery consisting of five units, three of which process gasoline fractions and two process diesel. The remaining fuel oil can be processed in another unit.
You can find dozens, if not hundreds, of such offers, both Russian and international. But everything needs to be tested.
Here's one such proposal. It looks good, but how it works in practice remains to be seen.
And not only because manufacturers often sell a "pig in a poke," but also because it's important to know the specific capabilities of a given unit, how much product it produces, whether that product can be used as fuel without additional purification and processing, how labor-intensive it is to maintain, whether there are any "tricks," how many workers are needed, and what their qualifications are. The latter is a significant factor, since large-scale small-scale oil refining requires training personnel from scratch.
The units are purchased, transported to a site, assembled, and put through their paces. This testing ground can then be used as a training center.
This is necessary to select the simplest, most economical, easiest to manufacture and maintain, yet still productive unit. There may be two or three good types with varying power outputs.
Once you have a facility and know exactly what it will take to start up and how much product it will produce, you can plan and implement the development of small-scale distributed oil refining. It's clear that this will primarily be built along oil pipelines, in production areas, especially around small, marginal wells. Many of these wells are currently closed due to serious difficulties transporting the oil, let alone feeding it into the pipeline. Small-scale refining will allow them to operate. Information about these wells needs to be collected and taken into account in planning.
The commission should also look into the pyrolysis liquid obtained from the pyrolysis of garbage and other organic waste. Many people have worked on this, including the late Lavrov, but I've never heard of anyone making gasoline or diesel fuel from pyrolysis liquid. It's definitely possible, but we need to test it and see how much product is produced, what its quality is (the same as petroleum gasoline or different), and whether it can be used directly as fuel, without purification. Then, landfills, which are vast and almost impossible to survey, will be added to the fuel supply.
To achieve a total capacity of 180 million tons in 10-ton per year blocks, 18 such blocks are needed. The commission will need to establish their continuous production and supply it with metal (this isn't that difficult, as the metallurgy industry currently has excess smelting and is largely producing for storage). There will also be a great deal of administrative work related to permits, licenses, paperwork, subsidies, benefits, and so on. Therefore, the commission will quickly acquire a large staff and become something akin to a ministry, as has happened in other military-economic administrative systems.
By creating such a small, distributed oil refinery, which can be partially mobile on trucks or semi-trailers, and partially housed in bunkers, underground mines, and other shelters, there's no longer any fear of a fuel collapse. You can't impress anyone with so many installations— missiles It won't be enough. And the missile costs a lot more than the damaged mini-refinery, and it's not even about the money, but the natural resources and labor expended on the missile. Let him spend it if he wants.
The Soviet experience during the Civil War, besides being interesting and sometimes amusing in itself, is valuable because it provides a proven algorithm for solving complex military and economic problems with non-obvious solutions.
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