An analysis of the nature of the “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East showed that the main motive force was the protest part of the population, which, under the current political regime, is unable to solve their personal problems, mainly of a material and spiritual character, that is, there were objective reasons for discontent.
To disrupt the “color revolution”, a carefully thought-out set of actions is required, using all possible methods of managing society. In most cases, there is a danger of substitution of concepts, when the current government in any country intentionally identifies the current political regime and the integrity of the historical state. In the case of Russia, this warning is not the main one, since our история showed that too often external enemies, unable to win on the battlefield, are acting in indirect ways.
"Soft power" has recently become one of the main options for the implementation of large-scale foreign policy projects of the West, primarily the United States. In modern Russia, the conditions necessary for inspiring the “color revolution” have largely been formed. This means that attempts by external forces to initiate such a scenario in our country are quite possible. Moreover, the presence of a large nuclear potential actually leaves no other path. Considered proposals are particularly relevant for our country.
The whole variety of options for parrying the “color revolution” can be summarized into five main groups: regulatory, administrative, informational, economic, and forceful. The purpose of their application is to achieve the socio-political superiority of the existing power structures over the forces of the “color revolution”.
In order to achieve this goal, regulatory methods can be used mainly to create conditions that prevent the active political activities of leaders and organizations oriented towards overthrowing the current government, as well as their support, both material and intellectual, from abroad. Regulatory methods can be effectively used to weaken the economic and informational potential of forces ready to support the “color revolution” in Russia (for example, it is reasonable to impose some restrictions on the activities of pro-Western business elites). They can play an important role in improving the socio-political image of the leaders of the current government by adopting laws and other legal acts that help alleviate the socio-political position of the economically vulnerable, but socially active segments of society. A good example is the adoption of a federal law that obliges NGOs involved in political activities in Russia and having the support of foreign sources to register as foreign agents. These methods are most effective in the periods preceding the “color revolution” to eliminate the conditions for its occurrence. With the beginning of the main events, the effectiveness of these methods decreases sharply, sometimes giving the exact opposite effect.
Administrative methods are more responsive than regulatory and allow for solving a wide range of tasks to prevent the “color revolution”, mainly at the stage of its preparation. Most effectively, these methods can be used to achieve the organizational superiority of the forces opposing the “color revolution” over the supporters of the latter. In particular, this is possible by creating patriotic sociopolitical organizations and parties, supporting their activities (mostly secretly), providing an organizational and partly material and information resource combined with organizing various obstacles to the activities of supporters of the “color revolution” in Russia.
Information methods are the most important in solving most of the tasks of countering the considered scenario. They play a key role in almost all stages of the preparation and implementation of the “color revolution”, and the effectiveness of their use largely determines the possibility of preventing it or preventing it from starting. It is the informational superiority of supporters of the victorious “color revolutions” that ensured success. Inefficient use of even the state informational power resource that is superior in potential leads to its decline. The main goals of the use of information methods by supporters of the current government are to attract politically active people to their side, to increase the moral and political potential of their like-minded people, to create and maintain a favorable image abroad, to disorganize the structures of the opposite side, and to repel information aggression from abroad. If these goals are successfully achieved, the possibility of implementing the considered scenario in Russia will be largely neutralized. In modern conditions, the decisive importance in achieving information superiority is played not so much by the disposable potential of traditional media, as by the presence of an attractive idea and influence in the blogosphere and social networks. At the same time, the idea should be worked out in sufficient detail by specialists in various sciences in order to create an equal competition for attractive concepts in specific conditions for the main layers of society. For modern Russia, what is meant is primarily a liberal one, under the banner of which it is mainly the West that organizes opponents of power. Without this, the new idea will not be able to capture the politically active masses of the population.
Economic methods are important for undermining the material and resource potential of the forces of the “color revolution”. They are based on technologies that allow paralyzing activities and further ruining domestic economic entities that make up the material base of the “color revolution”, neutralizing the activity of foreign economic structures supporting destructive forces in Russia, blocking the accumulation and movement of material resources and finances. With simultaneous material support (mostly hidden, through independent organizations) of patriotic social organizations and movements, this will allow them to achieve material superiority over the supporters of the “color revolution”. Economic methods matter at all stages of preparation and implementation of the considered scenario. However, they are most significant at the stage of its prevention, when the “revolution” is only in its infancy. In particular, a friendly economic policy towards the most active and economically vulnerable strata of the population during this period will make it possible to significantly reduce social tensions.
Force methods in all their diversity - from the activities of special services and law enforcement agencies to the use of internal troops and even the Armed Forces - can be used at all stages of the formation and development of the "color revolution" to prevent it. It is advisable to use them to disorganize the structures of the opposing side, suppress riots and maintain order in settlements. The first of these tasks should be mainly solved by the special services and law enforcement agencies by isolating the leaders and organizational centers of opponents. The remaining tasks are assigned to the internal troops (with the involvement of the Armed Forces only to suppress sufficiently large-scale armed uprisings by the "color" opposition). It should be borne in mind that the use of internal troops and the Armed Forces, which is unjustified and not fully secured (mainly by information methods), can lead to the transfer of a part of the military to the side of the "color" opposition. In this regard, the use of these structures is advisable only in the periods of the most acute opposition of the forces of the “color revolution” and the authorities, preferably in conditions when the opposition decided on a local armed confrontation (what can be provoked). In addition to the listed state bodies and structures, Cossack and other patriotic organizations with corresponding power potential can effectively oppose the supporters of the “color revolution”. In cooperation with law enforcement agencies, units of the internal troops and the Armed Forces in the forward echelon, they are able to disorganize the speeches of supporters of the "color" opposition, to assume the main moral and psychological burden associated with the dispersal of such speeches.
Neutralization of the protest
Indignant layers are prone to the manifestation of all forms of expression of discontent and are ready to support any force that will oppose the current government and the elite. In the absence of internal bases for the organization, representatives of these layers very quickly join any able-bodied forces opposing the current government, in a very short period of time increasing their numbers and power to the level when they become capable of overthrowing existing regimes.
As a rule, low ideological and political training of representatives of the majority of the protest population does not give them the opportunity to make the right choice - who should be in the spectrum of the opposition ruling elite of political forces? Therefore, most of them go for those who have a higher organization, more material and information resources, who are more aggressively opposed to the ruling elite.
It is for this reason that the forces of different political orientations in the “color revolutions” win: in Ukraine and in Georgia, these are pro-Western forces, in Kyrgyzstan - representatives of national clans, oriented to cooperation with Russia, in Egypt and Tunisia - Islamist groups.
Therefore, the most important lesson to be learned from past “color revolutions” is that the main condition for the stability of the political system when there is a sufficiently large protest potential among the population is the presence of a political party or movement that is dominant in the protest layer and able to control dissatisfied population and direct its energy in a safe direction for the state. At the same time, this force should be ready to interact with the current power elite in the interests of preventing political forces representing the interests of other states and criminal structures from breaking through to power. There is a need for a political subject headed by reasonable and non-biased foreign or criminal structures by the leaders, who really represent the majority of the protest population with whom a political dialogue could be held.
With whom you can negotiate
The newly created political structure with the participation of the current government must meet a number of requirements, the most important of which are listed below.
Good enough organization. When the situation escalates, the new party is obliged to lead the protest groups of the population, first of all their active part, and prevent mass riots or reduce them to a minimum, and also prevent the criminal structures, extremist organizations and foreign special services from seizing control of the active part of the protest population.
High intelligence, business and moral-psychological qualities of leadership. It must also have sufficient awareness of the situation in order to ensure leadership in these areas, both within the party and among its opponents in the protest stratum.
A well-developed ideological basis, which includes three main elements - ideological, philosophical, socio-political, geopolitical attitudes. At the same time, a new ideology should be such that in all three aspects it, on the one hand, is shared by the main part of the protest layers, and on the other, implicitly creates an ideological basis for cooperation with the current government and does not bear the negative aspects of the memory of previous ideological systems, implemented in Russia. At the same time, it cannot conflict with those ideological systems that, in the memory of the protest part of the population, are associated with successes in society (these are primarily Orthodox-imperial and communist ideas). The dominance of atheistic sentiments among the protest population in Russia suggests that such an ideology should be created on scientific foundations, and the presence of a significant part of believers makes it necessary for this ideology to lead to the idea of the correctness of their religions or at least consistency with them. The ideology of such a party (movement) needs to be worked out at least in general terms on three levels of representation - theoretical, applied, slogan. The first is the most detailed, focused on a narrow circle of the protest layer of intellectuals. It is intended for strictly logical proof of the ideological consistency of the movement, belief in the correctness of the idea, its ability to lead society out of a difficult situation and to eliminate disastrous contradictions for the country. The second is applied, generalized containing the main provisions of ideology and proof of their correctness, allowing people who are not specialists-ideologists to conduct public ideological disputes - for ideological training of leaders at all levels of the party (movement) and specialists in the field of information confrontation. The third is the slogan, consisting in a certain set of recognizable patterns that create the “ideological face” of the party (movement) for the majority of the population. Designed to form the ideological guidelines of the protest population, playing the role of a kind of “ideological rudder”, contributing to a significant increase in the effectiveness of its management, especially in critical situations.
Charismatic leader. The new party should have a leader dominating in intellectual, organizational and other relations, combining the qualities of an ideologue, analyst, political strategist, practical organizer and leader. It is desirable that such a leader comes from those structures that today enjoy the greatest prestige among the protest groups of the population. According to the results of social polls, today in Russia the Church and the army enjoy the greatest prestige among the active protest layers. The leader of the new party must come from among the representatives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. If possible, he must have certain experience of working with political structures, be known among the opposition, but not be associated with failures, that is, be free from the negatives of the previous political struggle. In the eyes of the protest layers, he cannot be in any way connected with the activities of the current political elite. At the same time, his official position is intended in the eyes of these layers to form an idea of him as a sufficiently qualified, informed and experienced person who has the skills of organizational and analytical work. These requirements are fully met by a reserve officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel to colonel. The age of the applicant should be such that, on the one hand, he is perceived as a solid, authoritative, independent-minded and acting person, and on the other, he still has enough strength to actively work hard to form and lead the party (movement). This requirement most fully corresponds to the period from 50 to 60 years.
Independence from the government and the ruling elite. Opposition to these structures nevertheless implies interaction with them on the issue of maintaining the integrity of the country and the revival of lost positions. It is advisable for these authorities to not provide significant opposition to the new party and, cooperating with it on certain issues, provide some administrative, informational and organizational resources, promote the safe work of party structures, and not hinder the financing of the party’s activities from independent sources.
For various reasons, today none of the existing domestic parties or any of the political movements meets such requirements. The basis of the new party can serve as the existing small opposition movements. It is necessary above all for the part of our ruling elite that links its future with historical Russia.