Oh, and it's hard work - to drag a damaged Tiger out of a swamp

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Oh, and it's hard work - to drag a damaged Tiger out of a swamp


Problems with stars


In 1942, the Germans were already feeling the shortage tanks At the front, in June, an updated organization chart for the tank repair company was released. It consisted of three main platoons: two responsible for spare parts and repairs, and one for evacuating armored vehicles from the battlefield. Field workshops and a rear supply platoon were also provided for.



A repair company was usually assigned to a tank regiment. The unit consisted of 100-150 men, including 10-15 non-commissioned officers and one officer. The company typically handled minor and medium repairs. Tanks with severe damage to the hull and turret were sent to rear-area repair shops or even factories in Germany. These included cracks in the armor and complete breaches with simultaneous deformation of welds, complete breaches resulting in extensive damage to internal equipment, more severe damage caused by fire, and damage from flooding. Anything else was supposed to be repaired in the field.

A repair platoon restores a camouflaged tank. An 18-ton tractor is in the foreground.

Let's take a closer look at the work of the evacuation platoon, as it was the one tasked with the most intense and difficult work. The platoon evacuated vehicles directly to the repair company or, if the distance was too great, to an assembly point. These vehicles were then either evacuated further to the rear, or the repair shop moved forward and established its new work area at the assembly point.

The manual states: "Assembly points (future work areas for tank repair platoons) should be selected so that evacuation distances are not too great. During an offensive, tanks should be evacuated forward, not backward."
.


The mechanization of repair and evacuation teams seemed sufficient

If a tank couldn't free itself (for example, using a ditch-pulling beam or an S-hook), its crew and the first-line repair team had to prepare it for recovery. It was preferable if the tank was steerable and had a working brake system, or at least mobile. Different types of damage required different preparations.

When the tank had problems with the engine, steering, or transmission, the connection between them and the final drive had to be severed by removing both drive shafts. This left only the tracks and final drive, which was rigidly connected to the sprocket, moving. If the sprocket or final drive was damaged, the ten individual track links (for the Tiger) had to be removed, and the shortened track had to be connected above the first road wheel. When the damaged road wheels had to be removed, the mountings had to be protected from dirt, and the levers (torsion beams) had to be secured.

The Sd.Kfz. 9/1 wheeled and tracked tractor is used to lift the engine compartment of a Pz.Kpfw. IV. The total weight of this multi-purpose vehicle (for towing and lifting) was 21,5 tons. Its crane could handle loads of up to 4 or 6 tons.

A damaged tank was easier to recover if its weight was shifted rearward. To achieve this, turrets weighing over 30 tons were rotated backward; optionally, the tank could be recovered in reverse. To improve its cross-country ability, the drive shaft could be removed and the tracks slackened.


Schemes for evacuating an immobilized tank. 1. Winch drum. 2. Rope. 3. Shackle. 4. Connecting rope for the towing hook. 5. Towing hooks. 6. Pulley block. 7. Towing rope shackle attached to the anchor.

The manual also showed that the tank's sprocket could serve as a winch. The tracks would unhitch above the sprocket, which would then be released when the tank was in reverse. A cable could be wrapped around the sprocket to recover other tanks. Prisoner of war (lieutenant of the training battery)artillery (A reserve battalion captured in Tunisia in May 1943) stated that on hard road surfaces, any wheeled-tracked tractor could tow three times its designed load for significant distances (at least 100 km). For example, a 3-ton Sd.Kfz. 11 could tow 9 tons, etc. For rough terrain, one-third of the tractor's available capacity should always be kept in reserve. Thus, a light regimental howitzer weighing approximately 1930 kg is towed by a 3-ton tractor, and a heavy regimental howitzer weighing approximately 5 tons is towed by an 8-ton tractor.

Now about the Tigers


In the summer of 1943, the tank school in Paderborn prepared a summary of reports on the experience of operating tanks in the famous 501st, 502nd and 503rd heavy tank battalions.

The reports stated, in particular:
The evacuation platoon commander reports to the tank battalion commander. The platoon must always remain close to the tank units. Five 18-ton ZGKW18T tanks typically meet the needs of a Tiger company, which equates to fifteen tractors per battalion. Three such tractors are usually required to evacuate a Tiger, and only two if the roads are well paved. In difficult terrain, such as ice, snow, or mud, an 18-ton ZGKW18T was often required for evacuation, along with two additional vehicles attached to the rear of the tank. These brake tractors prevent the 57-ton colossus from crushing the evacuation team on a downhill slope. In the south, Tigers were often evacuated by other Tigers over distances of over 150 km. This was a necessary measure—the standard tractors broke down due to overload or were used to load trains.



Tank evacuation plans



Lifting a tank up a slope using an anchor mounted on a half-track tractor



A detachable anchor device from a German 18-ton truck. This isn't a factory-installed part—the tow trucks made it themselves.

On March 18, 1943, the commander of the 501st Heavy Tank Battalion, Major Luder, reported on the experience of military operation of Tigers in Tunisia:

On firm ground, a stationary Tiger can usually be easily towed by two tractors. The Tiger is firmly attached to the Zgkw.18t using towing bars. The power of one 18-ton tractor is sufficient to tow the Tiger a short distance. However, a single tractor is insufficient for long distances, as the Tiger pulls to the side when hitched. Therefore, a second tractor must be attached with towing cables, which allows for quick, straight-line towing. When towing a Tiger on mountain roads with steep descents and sharp turns, it is absolutely necessary to weigh the Tiger down with an additional tank—preferably a smaller Pz.Kpfw. III. Otherwise, the Tiger becomes uncontrollable on the descent and will slide to the side, despite the second tractor being attached.

If a Tiger tank to be towed has damaged tracks and they cannot be replaced before recovery, the second track must be removed and the tank driven on road wheels only. This method can tow a heavy tank for 100 km or more. To prevent damage to the transmission and steering mechanism, the final drive had to be disengaged. Damaged Tiger tanks left on soft ground can be towed off the road by being pulled by two 18-ton tractors. In some cases, a "troika" of Pz.Kpfw. III tanks could tow a Tiger for very short distances. In extreme situations, without assistance or attention to damage to the suspension or tracks, a single Pz.Kpfw. III tank was capable of towing a damaged Tiger tank out of range of fire for a distance of 1-3 km. Further towing is impossible, as the Pz.Kpfw. III transmission is severely strained by such work.

Based on the Tunisian experience, recovering a Tiger by another Tiger has still not been successfully accomplished, as the necessary rigid towing devices are unavailable, and the towing device on the Tiger's rear is unsuitable. Towing bars, especially the "Herzstück" (core) equipped on 18-ton tractors, do not fit the Tiger's rear towing device. It goes without saying that a Tiger should be used to recover another Tiger, at least over short distances, while the damaged Tiger is under enemy artillery fire. But this is not yet possible. Furthermore, the 18-ton Zgkw.18t tanks are too weak to recover Tigers in the long term. They collapse under the strain. The rear cross frame is not strong enough and is not securely attached to the side members.


The Leningrad Front experienced a somewhat different experience with heavy tank evacuation. The 502nd Tank Battalion, with its first Tiger tanks, was deployed there within five months. An excerpt from a technical report dated January 29, 1943:

"I. Time has shown that the entire towing device of the 18-ton tractor is inadequate and weak. The towing bars deform, and the bolts jam. Despite reinforcement, on a slope the jolt from the Tiger is so great that the entire towing device simply crumples. II. 18-ton tractors are too light.

It is nearly impossible to recover a single Tiger tank with three or four tractors on rough, waterlogged terrain. On a slope, the tank pushes the tractor to the side. This requires a strong external brake or weight. Tests have shown that three tractors are needed in front of the Tiger and two behind it to act as brakes on a slope. It is proposed to assign two refurbished Tiger tanks to each battalion as recovery vehicles. III. Recovering a Tiger tank with four or five tractors while on the move disrupts traffic due to the length of the column. Marching in a column is very difficult, and a sudden stop is almost impossible. Recovery over long distances is impossible at night, as each bridge must be checked for load-bearing capacity, and depressions and other obstacles are difficult to spot. IV.

Towing a Tiger tank 150 km with four tractor units resulted in clutch and transmission failure on all vehicles. One transmission was damaged to such an extent that it had to be completely replaced. V. The rubber-padded snow chains of the 18-ton tractor units are completely unsuitable for towing heavy tanks through snowy terrain. The towing cables are too weak. Recovering a Tiger tank on a 10% slope with their cables requires five tractor units. The winch bolts also break, as they are designed for a maximum load of 7,3 tons. Therefore, loading a damaged Tiger tank up the head ramp onto a rail car is nearly impossible, even with two pulley blocks and two tractor units. Stronger cables must be used and better towing devices developed. Tests have shown that towing through difficult terrain is easiest and fastest with another Tiger tank. VI.

To recover a Tiger tank, a platoon must have at least six tractors, one of which is equipped with a 6-ton crane. Since the 502nd Tank Battalion was divided into two units with one repair platoon each, our repair platoon had only three 18-ton tractors, one of which was out of order due to transmission damage. Therefore, towing the Pz.Kpfw.VI was very difficult. It is vital that each independent Tiger company be equipped with six tractors. VII. Troops are fine-tuning the coupling devices on both tanks and 18-ton tractors in the field. However, a more reliable towing device must be developed in the rear and in a form that can be supplied directly from the manufacturer with each tank. VIII.

It is proposed to design a towing device that can be mounted to the left and right of the mufflers, allowing for the immediate evacuation of a damaged Tiger tank from the danger zone by another heavy tank without the need for additional equipment and at any time. The evacuation of a Pz.Kpfw.VI tank using towing cables during combat is very difficult, as removing the cables from the tank and securing them with clamps is time-consuming, and the clamps themselves are completely inadequate. The reasons are: A. The material is too brittle and breaks; B. All clamps, including the bolts, become deformed, making them difficult to remove from the tank.

Review from the 2nd Panzer Division "Das Reich" from April 14, 1943:

"The Pz.Kpfw.VI can only be towed by three ZGKW.18Ts under very favorable conditions, and only as a temporary measure. The number of tractors needed to recover a damaged Tiger depends on the terrain and weather. However, the Tiger's 57-ton weight made every recovery a challenge. Before the Battle of Kursk, the division's recovery team was sent to the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion, where training courses on Tiger recovery were being conducted."

The Ballad of the Bergenpanther


Despite initial attempts to create a fully tracked tractor for the recovery of damaged Tiger tanks, dating back to 1942, it wasn't ready until July 1943, when the first turretless Panthers entered service. The first Bergenpanthers were deployed in August 1943.




ARV "Bergenpanther"

A laudatory report on the Bergenpanther from October 20, 1943:
"The vehicle has performed excellently. In dry weather, one Bergenpanther is sufficient to recover a Panther. Even on the worst roads, two ARVs can recover a Panther. Until now, there was one Bergenpanther for every 20 Panthers in service. A battalion is recommended to have four Bergenpanthers, even if only two 18-ton tractors are available. Equipping the ARVs with radios proved successful. During combat, they could easily be directed to the desired location by radio.




Bergenpanther ARV evacuation equipment. 1. Bergenanker. 2. Anchor with block and tackle. 3. Block and tackle on runners. 4. Part of the anchor with block and tackle. 5-9. Illustration for the evacuation unit assembly manual. 10. Bergenanker carriage. 11. Anchor in the ground. 12. Illustration of the correct cable fastening. 13. Bergenanker on a slope. 14. Removing the Bergenanker.



Schemes for using the experimental device "Bergenanker", which allows the evacuation of the heaviest German tanks by a relatively light armored recovery vehicle.


In dry conditions, two 18-ton tractors are sufficient to recover a tank, but on wet and muddy roads, even four such vehicles are not enough. The average recovery distance is 50 km. It's better to have a threadless bolt (presumably referring to the towing eye), as it will deform during the initial recovery and become unusable.

In April 1944, the Inspector General of the Wehrmacht's Panzer Troops reprimanded the troops for further limiting the use of the recovery platoon due to the situation with tractors and their spare parts. The driver, and then the first echelon repair team, were initially required to thoroughly analyze the damage. If possible, repairs were to be performed on-site, or the tank was to be restored to a conditionally roadworthy condition. Tanks were not to be towed many kilometers to a first echelon repair team or workshop if they could be repaired with just a few minor adjustments. Given the constant advance of the Soviet Army and Allied forces, the Germans were losing all ability to effectively recover tanks, which became a factor in the Wehrmacht's downfall.

Based on materials from foreign press.
32 comments
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  1. +6
    6 October 2025 05: 24
    Pz.Kpfw. IV (Panzerkampfwagen IV - Panther IV tank).
    Did the author get something wrong? Or is he simply confused by the Roman numerals?
    Panzerkampfwagen IV (Panzerkampfwagen IV; Pz.Kpfw. IV, also Pz. IV; in the USSR it was also known as "T-IV"). "Panther" (German: Panzerkampfwagen V Panther, abbreviated Pz.Kpfw. V Panther)Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausf. H - E, "Tiger" - a German heavy tank during World War II,
  2. 0
    6 October 2025 05: 31
    full of holes
    Could you please explain what this is?
    1. +6
      6 October 2025 06: 31
      Apparently there are holes all the way through. The author gets a minus for being too lazy to correct the clumsy machine translation.
      1. +4
        6 October 2025 06: 35
        Quote: papas-57
        Apparently there are holes all the way through. The author gets a minus for being too lazy to correct the clumsy machine translation.

        The whole article is clumsy. Just look at this.
        best of all for the younger Pz.Kpfw. III.
        .
  3. -1
    6 October 2025 05: 35
    Let's take a closer look at the work of the evacuation platoon, since it was they who were given the most difficult and challenging work. The platoon evacuated the vehicles
    So the platoon's task was to evacuate transport funds, or still, first of all, in evacuation armored technology?
  4. The comment was deleted.
  5. + 11
    6 October 2025 07: 41
    There are many shortcomings in the presentation of the article, but:
    The article has a big plus – it shows us how 80 years ago people approached the issue of restoring the functionality of transport/armored vehicles:
    I would also like to take a look at today's realities - the work of the ORVB...
  6. NSV
    +2
    6 October 2025 08: 05
    It was interesting to learn about this. It's a topic rarely raised.
  7. +1
    6 October 2025 09: 33
    The topic is certainly interesting, although not new.
    The author was in such a rush to introduce us to it that he didn't even reread what he'd written (I won't list the blunders). Much has been written about the organization of equipment repairs in the Wehrmacht. But how did this work in the Red Army? According to sources, in 1941, there were only 25,000, of which almost 20,000 were operational, and there was a dearth of information about the organization of repairs.
  8. 0
    6 October 2025 10: 18
    There was once an interesting book by Vil Lipatov, "Factory at the Front," which demonstrated the advantages of rear-based repairs of Red Army armored vehicles.
    1. +1
      6 October 2025 10: 37
      Quote: TermNachTER
      There was once an interesting book by Vil Lipatov, "Factory at the Front," which demonstrated the advantages of rear-based repairs of Red Army armored vehicles.

      It's true, it's artistic...
      1. 0
        6 October 2025 12: 29
        Well, I wouldn't call it fiction. The author actually worked at one of those factories, so let's say it's popular science.
        1. 0
          6 October 2025 14: 16
          Quote: TermNachTER
          The author actually served at one of these factories, so let's say it's popular science.

          Personal memories, oddly enough, don't always correspond to what actually happened. Even the same events that happened to people or where they were, each person perceives and remembers them differently. I've learned this from personal experience more than once. Therefore, personal memories are good, especially if they are supported by various documents, even if just photographs.
          1. 0
            6 October 2025 17: 00
            Well, I read the book, but as for the photographs, I don’t remember - it was a long time ago.
        2. 0
          6 October 2025 22: 55
          The author actually served at one of these factories.

          Where did you get this information? He only graduated from high school in 1944 and from teacher training college in 1947. He wasn't at the front and never worked in manufacturing.
          ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Липатов,_Виль_Владимирович
          1. 0
            6 October 2025 23: 31
            So I got the author's last name mixed up; I read the book a long time ago.
            1. 0
              6 October 2025 23: 44
              Not the last name, but the first name.
              There was such an article, the author is not indicated
              https://topwar.ru/96220-zavody-na-kolesah-nou-hau-krasnoy-armii.html
              Lipatov СFactory at the Front. Moscow: Voenizdat. 1988
              1. 0
                6 October 2025 23: 46
                Thanks, I found it too. I read it a long time ago and got the name wrong. Yes, there's a mention of it on that site too.
                1. 0
                  6 October 2025 23: 47
                  While I was searching, I found another one with similar content, author Tarasenko.
  9. +1
    6 October 2025 11: 01
    All the instructions and reports are impressively meticulous and meticulously presented. The diagrams and photos are so comprehensive that even a novice or inexperienced mechanic can figure them out. I realized the Germans repaired everything just like the Russians—"on their own."
    1. 0
      6 October 2025 12: 15
      Let's come up with another wunderwaffe and turn the lives of repairmen into a nightmare))
      I was always amazed by this German order in details and absolute chaos in strategy.
      However, with us it was exactly the opposite))
  10. The comment was deleted.
  11. 0
    6 October 2025 11: 06
    In the entire article, only one Bergenpanther BREM is pictured. All the others are BREMs based on the Pz.Kpfw.III.
  12. 0
    6 October 2025 11: 13
    Transporting a faulty Tiger tank over long distances. It suddenly became apparent that towing a Tiger tank with three or even four standard Sd.Kfz.9 tractors was practically impossible on rough terrain. To ensure reliability, five or six (!) tractors were attached, but such a procession cluttered the road and diverted a lot of equipment and troops.
  13. +1
    6 October 2025 11: 24
    I suggest we remember our history and the people who forged the Victory.
    By the end of 1942, the task of restoring armored vehicles proved no less important than their production. Moreover, the more thoroughly and closer to the front this repair was carried out, the sooner the tanks returned to combat. The importance of this task was underscored by the fact that it was assigned to a man who had made a significant contribution to the organization of production, someone familiar with the manufacturing process not from his desk work, but from working on production sites. Such a man could not be deceived or tricked. He was granted special powers as a representative of the State Defense Committee.

    Alexey Adamovich Goreglyad (March 17 (30), 1905 – March 30, 1986) was a Soviet statesman, industrial organizer, and lieutenant general of the tank engineering service.
    Some stages of Alexey Goreglyad's career:
    From October 1938, he worked as the head of the Eighth Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry (tank production), head of Glavspetsmash, and deputy people's commissar of medium mechanical engineering.
    With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, he oversaw the evacuation of tank industry factories to the Urals and Siberia, the organization and development of tank production at new locations, and the assembly line and flow assembly of tanks.
    In September 1941 he was appointed deputy to the People's Commissar of Tank Industry V. A. Malyshev, and in 1943–1945 he was first deputy.
    Managing the evacuation of tank industry factories to the Urals and Siberia, as well as the organization and development of tank production at new locations.
    Problems solved by A. A. Goreglyad during the Great Patriotic War.
    Organizing the mass production of tanks and self-propelled guns and supplying them to the Red Army. For example, by January 1942, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, where Goreglyad represented the State Defense Committee, was supplying the front with 20 new combat vehicles daily.
    Organization of serial production of heavy self-propelled guns SU-152 and development of new heavy tanks at the Kirov Tank Plant in Chelyabinsk.
    Organization of quality inspection of armored vehicle production in 1942.
    In February 1943, he was appointed head of the newly created Main Directorate for Tank Repair (GURT). He oversaw tank production and repair. From July to September 1942, he was additionally assigned as the authorized representative of the State Defense Committee for tank production and repair in the frontline zone. Until February 1943, he served as the authorized representative of the State Defense Committee in Chelyabinsk at the ChKZ during the development of mass production of the SU-152 heavy self-propelled guns and the development of new heavy tanks.
    Organizing the evacuation of damaged vehicles from the battlefield and their rapid repair. Under the direction of the Main Directorate, headed by Goreglyad, over 200 tanks were repaired between 1943 and 1945.
  14. +1
    6 October 2025 11: 36
    Recovering a Tiger tank using four or five tractors while on the move disrupts traffic due to the convoy's length. Moving in a convoy is extremely difficult, and sudden stops are nearly impossible. Recovering over long distances at night is impossible, as each bridge must be checked for load-bearing capacity, and depressions and other obstacles are difficult to spot.

    I immediately recalled how, on the "snezhki" forum, Mr. D. Shein gave an example of how, in 1941, a KV tank was evacuated using tracked agricultural tractors (the most common in the Red Army). In total, it took a day and night to tow the tank 30 km to the station. It took nine tractors. belay
    1. Alf
      0
      6 October 2025 18: 39
      Quote: Alexey RA
      I immediately recalled how, on the "snezhki" forum, Mr. D. Shein gave an example of how, in 1941, a KV tank was evacuated using tracked agricultural tractors (the most common in the Red Army). In total, it took a day to drag the tank 30 km to the station. It took nine tractors.

      Evacuation of T-28.
      1. +1
        8 October 2025 11: 02
        Quote: Alf
        Evacuation of T-28.

        Yep - the Komintern tractor and the S-65 tractor are towing a T-28.

        Remarkably, the T-28 tank could not tow the Komintern alone. State tests in 1934 revealed the following:
        The Komintern tractor can't tow a T-28 tank. The tracks slip on the highway, with or without spurs.

        But he carried the B-4 even in its entirety.
        With a B-4 artillery system mounted on tracks weighing 16.5 tons, Komintern No. 2 traveled 69 km, achieving an average speed of 12,4 km/h. Fuel consumption was 185 kg.
  15. 0
    6 October 2025 16: 41
    Well, our guys were great at towing Abrams tanks even without tracks!
  16. 0
    7 October 2025 08: 35
    Now I understand why the Tiger Battalions were almost never fully combat-ready.
    But the thing is that the same Carius wrote that it was justified - even a pair of Tigers with an experienced crew could do some damage.
    1. 0
      7 October 2025 21: 54
      ..well that's easy...so the Pz.VI Tiger took up a position in front of the advancing Red Army and...the T-34 can't take it head-on, and the ZIS-3 can't either...it's good if the terrain allows you to get to the flank and (theoretically) penetrate its side from 500m...and if not...well the Germans in 1941, when they encountered the KV-1, they pulled up "Acht-Acht", but what about us...well, maybe pulling up (for direct fire, yeah) a 122mm cannon (yeah, with a tractor in full view of the Tiger)...there was also, it's true, attack aviation where the IL-2 type received PTABs, but...this is not a pinpoint weapon at all...so the Tigers were the Kings of the battlefield throughout 1943 (and 1944) really...
      P.S. If anyone thinks otherwise, please provide some reasoning. I ask that you not use ideas like sending an assault group and pelting the Tiger with bottles of KS.
      1. -1
        8 October 2025 09: 10
        There was an incident in '44 when a single Tiger stopped the advance of an entire division, reinforced by a regiment of Su-152s. The terrain there (behind a railway embankment) was so bad that they simply couldn't deploy their guns before the Tiger destroyed them. Ultimately, it knocked out two or three Su-2s. They thought about it and played a combination where four Su-3s simultaneously moved into position for direct fire. The Tiger knocked out another Su-4, but the rest got to it.
        Overall, it remained a dangerous vehicle until the end of the war, but not so much because of its performance as because of its experienced crews. But Panthers were considered more dangerous (in my opinion, wrongly). They were faster, had a higher rate of fire, were more accurate, and their frontal armor was more reliable.
      2. 0
        8 October 2025 10: 50
        Quote: WapentakeLokki
        ..well, that's easy...so the Pz.VI Tiger took up a position in front of the advancing Red Army and...the T-34 can't take it head-on, and neither can the ZIS-3...it's good if the terrain allows you to get to the flank and (theoretically) penetrate its side from 500m...but if not

        If not, then you need to abandon the frontal attack and shift the direction of attack. As happened in the battle near Lisyanka: even a company of IS-1 tanks was lost in the frontal assault, but the T-34s outflanked and captured the village the next day.
        So, in 1943, the only thing to do was to change the direction of the attack and move on.
        Quote: WapentakeLokki
        Well, in 1941, when encountering a KV-1, the Germans would pull up "Akht-Akht"

        The Germans had it easier in 1941 - they had more than a thousand standard 50mm anti-tank guns, which could penetrate the KV's armor even with an APHE shell from 400 meters.
        50-mm anti-tank gun PaK.38, ordinary armor-piercing:
        The 75-mm sheet normal showed the back strength limit of 700 m, the through penetration limit of 400 m. That is, starting from a distance of 700 m and closer PaK.38 can penetrate unshielded HF armor, with 400 m it is guaranteed to break through.
        © D. Shein. Results of tests in 1942 of domestically produced tank armor using captured shells from the German artillery and shells from the Red Army.
  17. 0
    29 October 2025 20: 48
    The Prussians misunderstood the war experience. They went heavy, but they needed more Panthers and Series 3 and 4 tanks. Good 50/56/75mm guns, superb optics, excellent communications, and mobility. Instead, they went heavy—Tigers, Ferdinands, King Tigers—wasted a ton of resources on them, and the result? On the ground, they were crushed by the Su-85/100, and later by the IS-1/2 and Su-152, while shaped-charge bombs fell from the sky and pierced them from above with solid shells. Ours were smarter—the T-34/76, added in 1944—excellent cross-country ability, maneuverability, and mass production. That's what crushed them.
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