Soviet experience to the rescue: the US proposes switching to mobile nuclear missiles

According to the findings of the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Pentagon, by failing to meet all deadlines and budgets, has effectively derailed the modernization program for the land-based component of the nuclear triad, failing to transition to the new silo-based Sentinel ICBM. To address this issue, the US proposes seeking assistance from foreign experience offering a viable alternative.

As reported by the American publication Interesting Engineering, at the last military parade held in September, China unveiled the Dongfeng-61 ICBM, mounted on an impressive 8-axle platform:

A number of experts are calling for a new look at mobile ICBMs as a way to reduce costs and increase survivability.

In their opinion, the transition to mobile launchers will eliminate the need to build new expensive stationary silos and will complicate the enemy's task of defeating American missiles ground-based.

As noted, this is a well-tested concept: in the 1980s, the Soviet Union deployed wheeled Topol launchers and rail-mounted Molodets missile systems. Similar concepts were also developed in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s—as part of the Midgetman and Peacekeeper projects, respectively—but they were scrapped due to budget constraints and nuclear weapons reductions.

Comments

[tralflot1832]

The Americans had some kind of flimsy trailer in the 80s. Clearly a reserve until the budget was reached.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: tralflot1832

The Americans had some kind of flimsy trailer in the 80s.

The rocket weighs only 14 tons, not 45 tons like the Topol. Therefore, the trailer is smaller and the system has high cross-country ability, and, unlike the Topol, it can navigate off-road.

[Vladimir Vladimirovich Vorontsov]

❝ Soviet experience to the rescue ❞ —

— The Soviet experience, both positive and negative, will remain an object of study for a long time to come, both for us and for our enemies...

[Same lech]

If only we could restore the railway missile systems.
It would be nice to put Iskanders on them with Oreshnik... dreams, dreams.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

If only we could restore the railway missile systems.

Nonsense. Expensive and ineffective. The entire budget will go toward compensating Russian Railways for track wear and tear.

[Same lech]

Quote: Puncher

Nonsense. Expensive and ineffective. The entire budget will go toward compensating Russian Railways for track wear and tear.

It's economics... and militarily, central Russia has a vast railway network, making it impossible to locate the BZhRKs... the system is too mobile... it can move endlessly among thousands of trains across Russia... it's no wonder the US was the first to demand its destruction from Gorbachev.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

It is impossible to determine where the BZhRK will be located...

"It's like a binomial theorem..." - "I can see everything from above, just so you know!"

[Good Evil]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

And militarily, central Russia has a vast railway network, making it impossible to locate the BZhRKs...

This was previously impossible. Now, even in orbit, every piece of debris is accounted for and constantly tracked. And a railway-based missile system can now be easily identified from space by a number of characteristics, especially since it doesn't roam all over Rus', but only along specially prepared terrain. And, as the SVO has demonstrated, we have more than enough enemy agents.

[Boa kaa]

Quote: Good evil

It is now very easy to identify from space by a number of signs, especially since it does not roam all over Rus', but only along a specially prepared canvas.

1. We've seen them before, because the special wagon (the BZhRD had dual bogies and varied in length) was pulled by two diesel locomotives, each with a fuel tank, and the train was short—6-8 wagons. Moreover, all the wagons were freshly painted (of course! They maintained military order by flouting camouflage measures to conceal the signs of the protected facility). And the cargo dimensions were different from those of civilian transport.
Now, however, the R-30 Bulava, weighing 38 (!) tons, plus the RK equipment, is being installed, and the whole thing weighs no more than 50-60 tons. (Bulk tanks weigh 60 tons) and fits comfortably in a 40-foot container. They'll paint it a rusty color, just so it looks like everyone else's, and off we go. As for the security team cars and a second "steam locomotive," they can make them fit the same container. And no excessive wear and tear on the track is expected. The Barguzin is not the Molodets with its monstrous R-100UTTH platforms. And an 8300-ton Bulava would be enough from Siberia, for example, to tear apart Alsk and the T/O coast of the United States, and then drive to Vladivostok-Blagoveshchensk-Novosibirsk. But the Yankees couldn't pinpoint exactly where the BZhRK would be located between the ISS-R missile launchers. The area, yes, but not the missile train itself. Besides, a second line of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAMA) is being built, the railway is branching radially toward the great Siberian rivers, and there are also tunnels...where extensions of the tracks could be built to shelter the BZhRK. But there wasn't enough money. They had to choose between the Sarmat and the Burguzin. They chose the Sarmat, since the heavy Voyevodas' tenure was ending...
Somehow, however.

[bayard]

Well, those special cars were identical to the refrigerated cars used to transport frozen fish from the North and the Far East to feed the Soviet people. And besides, similar-looking cars were used to transport the coupled first two stages of the Typhoons, and a lot of other things—the cars are long, you can fit a lot of stuff. And from a satellite, it's hard to count the wheel sets. And extra cars (usually empty) were attached to such trains.
But the issue here isn't about our problems (which don't exist in this regard), nor about the US railway-based missile system. They want a road-based system on a wheeled chassis for a fairly heavy ICBM. About the same launch weight as the Chinese 85-ton system. And that's a non-trivial problem. It's hard to tell how long it would take to develop and test it, and whether it would even be possible for those who've never done anything like that. UN does have such a road-based system, but he certainly won't share it. So they have problems. Both with the development of the missile itself and with the launch systems for them. And that's a serious problem. A very serious one for the modern US. So serious that Trump (like Obama before him) has started talking about wanting to drastically reduce strategic nuclear forces "all together."
China doesn't even want to hear about this; it has plans to achieve parity. By 2030, 1000 nuclear warheads on strategic carriers, and by 2035, complete parity in strategic nuclear forces. It's busy.
It would be a sin for us to even consider such a thing – we're at war with NATO in Ukraine. And there's a strategic nuclear forces imbalance with NATO. A whopping 128 SLBMs with MIRVs. And that's a very serious imbalance under these circumstances.
The condition of the American Minuteman fleet is certainly somewhat comforting, but it's no reason to address the imbalance. At least by deploying an appropriate number of heavy Oreshnik IRBMs in the European direction. So, for the coming years, too—we're busy.
So the US is scrambling for a solution. Either build new missile sites with new silos for ICBMs, or revise their new ICBM design to trim the Osetra's specifications so it can fit into the silo and launch from the old Minuteman missiles... or revisit previous rail-mobile missile systems (they were planning one for the MKh)... or invent a dirt track and fly them through deserts and inland spaces... but they don't know how to do that... Here, with the sweat of their brow and an unlimited budget, any of these options could be resolved and implemented in at least 10-15 years...
...And then there are the problems and delays with the construction of new SSBNs... and the old Ohio-class submarines are already asking for retirement and disposal, and they are lining up for it...
Yes, that's a problem.
But not with us.

[Hole puncher]

The transition to mobile launchers will eliminate the need to build new, expensive, stationary silos.

As far as I remember, they did not plan to build new silos; according to the instructions, the new ICBM was to be installed in an existing silo.

will make it more difficult for the enemy to destroy American land-based missiles

In the US, ICBM silos are protected by missile defense systems, and, conversely, it would be easier to destroy a mobile ICBM.

[tralflot1832]

And in general, ICBMs on the ground, whether mobile or disposable in silos, won't allow you to reload. Just like submarines with ICBMs.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: tralflot1832

And in general, ICBMs on the ground, whether mobile or disposable in silos, won't allow you to reload. Just like submarines with ICBMs.

Considering the fact that the number of targets has not decreased significantly since the Cold War, and arsenals have been reduced several times, there will be nothing to reload with.

[nik-mazur]

Quote: Puncher

In the US, ICBM silos are protected by missile defense systems... destroying a mobile ICBM will be easier.

It's funny... American ICBMs are hard to destroy because they're stationary, but American HI-Mars missiles are harder to destroy because they're mobile. Because American means better.

[Hole puncher]

Quote from: nik-mazur

It's funny... American ICBMs are difficult to destroy because they are stationary, but American Himars are harder to destroy because they are mobile.

If the ICBM silos were located within easy reach of tactical weapons and aircraft, the likelihood of their damage would be very high.

[nik-mazur]

Quote: Puncher

If

It's difficult to comment on something that begins with the words "if only."

[storm]

Let Trump turn to Putin and Lukashenko; they'll help out of old friendship, one with missiles, the other with tractors...))

[bayard]

Don't give me hints. Otherwise, they will rush to the Respected Partner with commercial proposals.

[orionvitt]

in the US – respectively, within the framework of the Midgetman and Peacekeeper projects, but they were curtailed due to budget constraints and the reduction of nuclear weapons

It's unclear what the budget situation was, but the fact is they tried and failed miserably. Which, by the way, proves that while they were shouting about the "Soviet threat," they themselves didn't believe it. Mobile complexes, unlike stationary ones (whose coordinates are known), are primarily a means of retaliatory strikes. And since they were confident that no one was going to attack them, no one developed mobile complexes (which, incidentally, were also quite expensive). And why? Unlike the USSR, which was perfectly aware that all this could be expected, and that the threat from the West was not an empty phrase. Incidentally, we are seeing this in full force today.