What is our current situation with “nuclear counterforce potential”?

Part 4
Part three: Will Trump be able to combine offensive and defensive capabilities in one treaty?
Of the medium-range assets, there are 30 Tu-22M3 bombers (40 years ago there were 330 units) + two squadrons of MiG-31K fighters armed with Kinzhal air-launched missiles, and that’s all, there are no other medium-range assets.
Operational-tactical assets (up to 1000 km) – one brigade – 152nd Guards rocket The Brest-Warsaw Order of Lenin, Red Banner, and Order of Kutuzov Brigade is stationed near the city of Chernyakhovsk in the Kaliningrad Region. Since February 5, 2018, the brigade has been armed with the Iskander (SS-26 Stone) operational-tactical missile system, including 12 9P78-1 SPUs with 24 missiles. Another brigade in the European part of Russia, the 26th Missile Brigade, is stationed near the city of Luga in the Leningrad Region, with another 12 9P78-1 SPUs with 24 missiles. The 465th Missile Brigade is stationed in Belarus at the Osipovichi base, with another 12 9P78-1 SPUs with 24 missiles. The 465th Missile Brigade of the Ground Forces of the Republic of Belarus received the modern Russian 9K720 Iskander system instead of the OTR-21 Tochka-U systems in 2023.
All brigades are armed with 9M723 Iskander ballistic missiles, which can be equipped with four types of nuclear warheads: 9N39 with an AA-60 variable yield 10-100 kt, 9N64 with an AA-86 variable yield 5-50 kt, and 9N64 with an AA-92 variable yield 100-200 kt. With a lightweight 9N64 nuclear warhead with an AA-75 nuclear warhead (weight 372 kg, yield 1-10 kt), the 9M723K1 missile can reach a maximum range of over 600 km (627 km during tests). The brigades are also armed with Iskander-K 9M728 (SS-C-7 Southpaw) and 9M729 (SS-C-8 Screwdriver) cruise missiles, which can also be equipped with TK-66-02 nuclear warheads with a yield of 200 kt and TK-66-05 nuclear warheads with a yield of 250 kt.
History of the INF Treaty
During the Soviet-American summit in Vienna (June 15-18, 1979), the Soviet side expressed the view that the signed SALT II Treaty paved the way for progress toward SALT III. However, achieving SALT III was apparently an impossible task, as it would have required consideration of a number of significant strategic, geographic, and other factors that remain, so to speak, outside the scope of the negotiations. This applied primarily to American, French, and British forward-deployed medium-range and tactical-range weapons.
On the eve of the December 1979 NATO Council session, the West deliberately inflated its data on Soviet medium-range missiles. The West German Ministry of Defense's 1979 White Paper claimed that the Soviet Union possessed 600 medium-range missiles as of 1979, including 500 SS-4s and 100 SS-20s. The London-based Institute for Strategic Studies, in its publication "The Military Balance 1979-1980," went even further: the Soviet Union, the brochure noted, possessed 500 SS-4s, 90 SS-5s, and 120 SS-20s. Both publications, however, indicated that the rate of SS-20 missile buildup in subsequent years would be approximately 50 missiles per year.
On December 12, 1979, the NATO commander made a decision to "rearm," deploying 572 new nuclear missiles in Western Europe. This decision was also known as the "NATO dual-use solution." The US Army planned to replace the Pershing 1A with the 56th. artillery brigade deployed in West Germany with the Pershing II in 1983, while the German Air Force would retain its Pershing 1a.
A total of 108 Pershing II missile launchers and 464 BGM-109G Gryphon ground-launched cruise missile launchers were planned. Of the cruise missiles, 160 were to be deployed in England, 96 in West Germany, 112 in Italy (Sicily), 48 in the Netherlands, and 48 in Belgium. All 108 Pershing II missiles were to be deployed in West Germany, replacing the outdated Pershing 1a missiles.
The German Air Force also planned to replace its 72 Pershing 1a missiles with the new short-range Pershing 1b, but the Americans refused without explanation. After the NATO Council's decision on "rearmament," the propaganda need to so blatantly inflate the number of Soviet medium-range missiles became less pressing. The US Secretary of Defense's annual budget for fiscal year 1981 noted that the total number of Soviet SS-20 missiles was not 150–170, as suggested by the data published in Bonn and London, but only 60—half or even a third of the figures reported in the West on the eve of the December 1979 NATO session.
Nuclear in Europe weapon There were no regulations anywhere, ever. They deployed as much as they wanted, either their own, like the British and French, or American, like the West Germans, Italians, Turks, Belgians, and Dutch. Here's what Tom Gervasi, a prominent military expert at the time, wrote 40 years ago in his article "Let's Count All the Guns" in The New York Times on December 7, 1981:
But if he added to this 64 British Polaris A-3 missiles, 18 land-based S-3 missiles and 80 M-20 missiles launched from French submarines, as well as 637 NATO aircraft and 75 French Mirage-4, it would turn out that the West has a total of 1470 nuclear delivery vehicles.
If he hadn't exaggerated the number of Soviet carriers, it would have turned out that the Warsaw Pact countries possessed a total of 1650 such carriers. A comparison of the warhead counts on all these carriers shows that NATO and France possess approximately 3150 warheads, while the Warsaw Pact countries possess 2240.
At that time, President Reagan refrained from comparing shorter (tactical and operational-tactical) nuclear weapons. And if we recall the 108 Pershing-1A missiles we have? Or the 72 Pershing-1A missiles and 91 Honest John missiles in service with the West German army?
What about the 32 French Pluton missiles? What about the 78 Lance missiles and 515 M-109 and M-110 self-propelled howitzers? Where do we place the other 1,192 such howitzers and 550 Lance launchers in other NATO armies? They are armed with an additional 6,000 warheads. They provide NATO and France with 4,070 delivery vehicles, compared to the Warsaw Pact's 3,445 delivery vehicles, and approximately 9,165 tactical nuclear warheads, compared to the Warsaw Pact's 4,330 warheads...
Does the Soviet SS-20 missile pose any new threat? No! All the European cities mentioned by the president have been within range of Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles since 1959.
In September 1983, Marshal Agarkov held a press conference in the USSR, broadcast on national television channels. For the first time in the USSR, tables, graphs, and figures previously considered secret were publicly displayed.
Thus, as of September 1, 1983, the Soviet Union possessed 938 medium-range nuclear weapons carriers—473 missiles and 465 aircraft (the Ministry of Defense likely counted all the Tu-22M, Tu-22, and Tu-16 ADD missile-carrying bombers currently in service with heavy bomber regiments based in the European USSR). Of these 473 missiles, 243 were the then-new RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20), which was the source of the West's greatest concern. The balance between NATO and the USSR in medium-range nuclear weapons (from 1000 to 5500 km) existed throughout the Cold War.
Soviet-American talks on limiting nuclear arms in Europe began less than a year later, in October 1980, in Geneva, and were immediately suspended by the United States. At the outset of the talks, the Soviet Union proposed a mutual moratorium on the further deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and the replacement of existing ones. It was also intended that the parties cease all preparations for the deployment of additional nuclear weapons. This proposal was not supported by the West.
Nevertheless, in order to create a favorable political environment for the negotiations, which resumed in November 1981, the Soviet leadership decided in March 1982 to cease further deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR. The replacement of old SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the new SS-20 was suspended. On May 17, 1982, the USSR announced the beginning of a significant reduction in the number of its intermediate-range missiles and the end of construction of launch sites for such missiles in the European part of the USSR. The Soviet Union declared that no additional intermediate-range missiles would be deployed where they would be within range of Western European countries.
In the summer of 1982, the so-called "Nitze Initiative," or, as the media dubbed it, the "walk in the woods" option, gained widespread traction in the West. According to Western media reports, Paul Nitze, the head of the US delegation at the Geneva talks, proposed a formula during informal discussions that would allow for the partial deployment of new American missiles in exchange for a significant reduction in Soviet SS-20 missiles. According to media reports, this formula allowed the US to deploy 300 cruise missiles in Europe but not Pershing II IRBMs. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, would be obligated to reduce the number of SS-20 missile launchers, each carrying three warheads, to 75.
The difference in warhead numbers, favorable to the United States, was supposed to compensate for the advantage of Soviet ballistic missiles, which had significantly higher flight speeds than cruise missiles. In December 1982, the Soviet Union, taking into account the wishes of the Western side, put forward a compromise proposal: within the overall level of 300 missiles, a sublevel for missiles was expressed, and an agreement was concluded on the following terms: the USSR was prepared to retain in the European part of the country only the number of missiles possessed by Britain and France at that time—162 missiles—and to reduce to equal levels—to 138 missiles—the total number of all aircraft carrying intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the European region or assigned to the region, both in the USSR and NATO countries.
In addition to previously proposed reductions in nuclear weapons in Europe to equal levels for both sides, including carriers, missiles, and aircraft, as well as warheads, the Soviet Union declared in October 1983 its willingness to maintain only 140 SS-20 missile launchers in Europe, in order to ensure parity in warheads on the USSR's missiles, on the one hand, and those of Britain and France, on the other. Despite the Soviet Union's radical proposals, the American side continued to insist on its arguments.
On March 30, 1983, Ronald Reagan presented further proposals, dubbed the "interim option," which included a number of so-called "new" criteria. The criteria outlined by Reagan included a proposal for "equality of rights and limits," a refusal to compensate the Soviet Union for French nuclear forces, an agreement limiting Soviet intermediate-range missiles not only in the European zone but also in the Asian part of the USSR, and verification and control of the agreements.
Specifically, the US administration stated that it could offer the USSR a temporary, equal "global" warhead ceiling. This would amount to 300 American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe versus 100 Soviet SS-20 missiles in the European part of the USSR, as well as in the Far East. If NATO fully deployed 572 new American missiles, the USSR would retain no more than 200 SS-20 missiles. The futility of solving the problem based on such a proposal was obvious even to the president's closest associates. For example, National Security Advisor D. Maifarlane noted with considerable skepticism that "the main point of the current proposal is simply that... the 'zero option' is not the only solution."
The "interim" option, like the "zero" option, was rejected by the Soviet Union. This option, again, envisioned a reduction in existing Soviet missile systems not only in Europe but also in the Asian part of the USSR, while simultaneously deploying new US medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. It still didn't take into account British and French nuclear weapons, nor the many hundreds of American nuclear-capable aircraft based in Western Europe and on aircraft carriers. But then came March 10, 1985, and everything changed... Changed dramatically, for the worse.
What to do?
Conduct all necessary measures to deploy a counterforce potential in the European part of Russia consisting of medium-range missile forces, similar to what we had 40 years ago, in order to relieve the burden on strategic intercontinental forces – ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
1. Good news — the RS-26 Rubezh/Oreshnik ballistic missile system with a limited intercontinental range has been adopted into service, with the 15Zh67 (SS-X-31) missile entering serial production. It is necessary to deploy at least 10 to an optimal 20 missile regiments armed with these systems (90–180 launchers) in the European part of Russia.
2. Another piece of good news: a new modification of the Iskander, the Iskander-1000, has been accepted into service and is already being produced and delivered to the troops. It has a launch range of 1,000 km. Three brigades will be equipped with it: the 152nd Kaliningrad, the 465th Belarusian, and the 26th Missile Brigade.
3. Arm the Tu-22M3 KR X-101/102 bombers.
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