This is the kind of fleet we have...
Today, in some internet forums, especially where there is no fear of censorship, there are very active discussions about why everything on the Black Sea looks as sad as it did in 1942. And what fleet We need it to defeat everyone and everything.
The article became epic, in which the author called for the abolition of corvettes and frigates and the churning out of submarines, unmanned boats, and missile carriers based on dry cargo ships. And while I completely agree with him on the submarines, I disagree on the missile carriers and unmanned boats. This led to the previous article, which seemed to draw a line between a normal ship and an unmanned boat.
But this immediately raises the question: why don't our normal ships behave as they should when stationed in ports? Many today draw parallels with 1943, when Soviet admirals, in poorly planned and even worse executed operations, destroyed many men and ships while causing minimal damage to the enemy. Stalin then banned the use of ships larger than destroyers, stationing them in Poti and other ports.
Joseph Vissarionovich was a wise man, after all. And one didn't need to be an expert to understand that, for the sake of a few dozen shells fired at the enemy (which is precisely how Soviet artillerymen fired during raids), destroying a destroyer leader, or a destroyer leader and two destroyers (as happened near Yalta in October 1943), was an unaffordable luxury. And if Soviet admirals were incapable of planning and executing a combat operation properly, then there was no point in even trying.
By the way, Hitler in the same year 1943, after the battle at North Cape, behaved in exactly the same way.
If we take in stories If we consider the losses of the Black Sea Fleet during the Great Patriotic War in terms of large ships (minesweepers and above), then we get the following picture:
- German aviation: 9 ships, including 1 cruiser, 2 leaders, 5 destroyers;
- minefields (own): 3 destroyers;
- enemy minefields: 1 leader, 1 destroyer, 1 minelayer;
- torpedo attacks on enemy boats and submarines: 4 minesweepers.
Let the minesweepers not confuse anyone, the Soviet minesweeper of the Fugas type was in no way weaker in terms of armament than the Romanian destroyers, with which our minesweepers had several combat clashes, and even stronger: the 100-mm and 76-mm guns of our ship clearly looked preferable to the two 66-mm guns of the Romanian ships.
The whole problem with the Soviet fleet's ships (aside from the incompetent admirals) was that they were unprepared for the kind of war that had begun. That is, one with the massive use of air power.
In general about Defense A lot has already been said about Soviet ships, I'll just remind you. It looked like this:
Battleship Sevastopol: 6 x 76 mm guns, 16 x 37 mm guns, 12 x 12,7 mm machine guns.
Cruiser Molotov: 12 x 37 mm guns, 4 x 12,7 mm machine guns.
Leader "Tashkent": 1 x 2 x 76 mm artillery mount, 6 x 37 mm guns, 6 x 12,7 mm machine guns.
Destroyer "Soobrazitelny": 1 x 2 x 76 mm artillery mount, 7 x 37 mm guns, 8 x 12,7 mm machine guns.
For comparison, here are a couple of ships from the same year 1943.
Destroyer Z31 (Germany): 2 x 2 x 37mm mounts, 9 x 20mm.
Destroyer Mahan (USA): 2 x 2 x 40mm mounts, 4 x 20mm.
Cruiser Wichita (USA): 24 (4x4 and 4x2) x 40 mm, 18 x 20 mm.
Battleship Bismarck (Germany): 16 (8x2) x 105 mm, 16 (8x2) x 37 mm, 20 x 20 mm.
Yes, the Bismarck's 105mm guns weren't universal, but specifically anti-aircraft. However, as we know, this didn't help her much.
We're deliberately ignoring general-purpose guns, as their effectiveness wasn't particularly high. However, it's worth noting that Soviet 76mm and 45mm anti-aircraft guns were semiautomatic, meaning their rate of fire in combat was horribly low, in practice never exceeding 10 rounds per minute. Furthermore, the 45mm guns' shells lacked remote fuses, meaning they had to fire with the expectation of a direct hit.
Overall, it can be said that, compared to other countries' ships, the Soviet ships were no match for the legendary heroes of the past when faced with enemy air power. They had air defenses, but they were designed according to the standards of the 30s and, by 1942, were completely inadequate.
The only modernization the Soviet Navy underwent during the war was replacing the 45mm 21-K guns with 37mm automatic guns. This certainly increased their capabilities, but not enough to make the ships feel secure.
The battle on October 6, 1943, between a detachment of Soviet ships consisting of the leader Kharkov (2 x 76 mm, 4 x 37 mm, 4 x 12,7 mm), the destroyer Sposobny (2 x 76 mm, 7 x 37 mm, 8 x 12,7 mm), and the destroyer Beshposhchadny (2 x 76 mm, 4 x 37 mm, 4 x 12,7 mm) against German aircraft is the best proof of this. All three ships were sunk, over 700 officers and sailors perished, while German losses were solely due to air cover provided by our ships. According to dispatches and reports, not a single German aircraft was shot down by the crews of the sunken ships.
It turned out that the best way to combat German aviation was to divert Soviet warships to Georgian ports, which were then out of reach of the Luftwaffe.
And, returning to our time, we can see roughly the same situation. Russian warships are scattered far from that very Crimea, which just ten years ago was called an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." No, Crimea is perfectly fine; sinking it remains unrealistic, which is not the case with the ships.
Let's take a look at the Black Sea Fleet's fleet composition, specifically from the point of view of the time of the ship's creation and its air defense.
Patrol ships of the project 1135
The Ladny-class vessel is the oldest combat ship in the Black Sea Fleet, in service since 1980. The ship's only anti-aircraft armament is two twin-boom Osa-M SAM launchers, which date back to the 70s. The Osa-MA-2 version is armed with quite decent weapons. missiles, capable of engaging enemy anti-ship missiles at extremely low altitudes (5 meters), with a range of up to 15 km. The system fires two rounds per minute, with a reload time of 16–24 seconds. It carries 40 missiles.
There is nothing to comment on.
Project 11356R frigates "Burevestnik"
This is a new class, both in essence and in terms of time, the frigates entered service after 2015. The Admiral Makarov, as a representative, is armed with two 30-mm artillery AK-630M mounts and a 3S90M vertical launch system with 24 cells of the Shtil-1 system. This is the naval version of the Buk-3M air defense system.
The AK-630M, if used together with the MP-123 Bagheera, is very good for flying and floating low-observable targets. weapon, because the weak point of the Shtil-1 missile system is its semi-active radar homing head, meaning that the target is supposed to be illuminated by the carrier's radar, which is somewhat difficult in the case of low-contrast UAVs and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Project 20380 Steregushchiy-class corvettes
These are the newest ships to enter service. Corvettes, which are considered frigates worldwide, and rightly so, because such a corvette is quite capable of making life difficult even for a destroyer. The armament is interesting here.
Taking the Mercury, the only representative of this class in the Black Sea Fleet, as an example, is armed with the same two AK-630M mounts. They also have a Redut air defense system, a 12-cell variant of the S-300. The Poliment-Redut is a very dangerous weapon against aircraft but useless against UAVs, solely due to the missiles' size.
Corvette Project 20160
The most criticized class of Black Sea modular corvettes. Taking the Sergei Kotov, the standard armament of one 76mm AK-176MA mount, two 14,5mm MTPU Zhalo mounts, and two 12,7mm Kord mounts was supplemented by the Gibka system, a turret with an automated control system, equipped with an optronic detection and tracking system, and launchers for Igla and Verba missiles or Ataka ATGMs. It is reported that the Kotov also had a Shtil-1 system, but it is unclear where it was installed on this ship.
In any case, of all the ships already mentioned, 20160 was the most powerfully armed against BEKs. And the fact that the Sergei Kotov was only recovered on the third attempt speaks volumes.
Project 1124 small anti-submarine ships
Standard for the 80s of the last century: AK-630 and Osa-MA with half (20 pcs.) of the ammunition from the frigate.
Small missile ships of project 21631 Buyan-M
New ships from 2018–2020. As a representative of the class, we'll take the most recent one from the Black Sea Fleet, "Grayvoron."
1 x 30 mm AK-630M-2 Duet, 2 x 14,5 mm MTPU Zhalo, 3 x 7,62 mm machine guns, 2 3M-47 Gibka launchers with Verba or Igla-S SAMs.
Here it is very difficult to work on aircraft, but there is something to fight off smaller targets with.
Project 22800 Karakurt small missile ships
This is also a new class of ship, difficult to determine whether it's a small corvette or a small missile ship. In addition to its strike missile armament, the Askold carries one 76,2mm AK-176MA, two 12,7mm Kord machine gun mounts, and one Pantsir-ME anti-aircraft missile and gun system (SAM) (two 30mm cannons and six launchers).
We won't talk about the landing ships, everything there is simply sad.
So, we could go on and on, but what conclusion can we draw from all this? The same as in the first part: the Russian Navy was unprepared for a war that began with the use of UAVs and unmanned aerial vehicles.
There are no complaints here at all; no one was prepared for this war, especially not for ships built using designs 20 years old. It turns out that the most effective weapon on Russian ships against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is the 30mm AO-18 multi-barrel cannon, created by the great designers Gryazev and Shipunov back in 1964. Questions have already surfaced on many pages about why ships even need this anachronism, but it turns out that some of our ships can only rely on the AK-630 for defense against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Yes, the newest ships have started to see the return of the previously useless MTPU "Zhalo" (Sting) cannons, which now have something to sting, and the 12,7mm "Kord" cannons, which are excellent weapons in principle, and can work wonders on board a ship: they can be easily concentrated where needed and deliver dense fire.
It turns out that the 12,7mm to 30mm range is precisely the right range to destroy enemy unmanned submarines. The problem is that not all previously built ships have the capacity to install additional weapons systems in sufficient quantities. After all, installing a pair of MTPUs on a frigate won't solve the problem, and ideally, the problem should be solved, not just pretended to be.
So, withdrawing ships from Sevastopol, which has proven to be a less-than-welcoming place since the arrival of the BEKs, is a perfectly logical decision. Moreover, it may be the only correct one, because while it's possible to say that a surveillance and protection service for the waterway needs to be established, doing so is much more difficult than declaring it publicly.
Dozens of observation posts equipped with the appropriate equipment are more complex than a network of radar posts. But radars aren't very helpful here; even the Magura radar is very difficult to detect, as its plastic construction isn't ideal for radar.
And to shoot with the help of an optical device like an “eye”...
That's how our ancestors fired that October on the Kharkov and the destroyers. And the answer to the question of why three ships, armed with a total of 38 anti-aircraft guns, failed to shoot down a single aircraft is simple: the Red Navy sailors lacked the necessary skills and technical support. True, at that time the Black Sea Fleet had ONE ship equipped with a radar—the cruiser Molotov. For the rest, everything depended on the keen eyes of the signalmen and the experience of the gunners.
Nowadays, when these unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are barely detectable by radar, the human factor is once again entering the fray. This raises the question of proper personnel training, but that's a whole other topic.
The question remains to be answered: as the song goes, what kind of ships do we need at sea? Which ones will the naval command be thinking about where to dump them? To the Caspian or the North, it doesn't matter, the main thing is to keep them far away from the enemy, who can sink them with minimal cost?
Well, that's all you can think about when it comes to ships that are only fit for needles. There's confidence that the Project 22350/22350M ships will remain the crown jewel of Russian shipbuilding and the foundation of the Russian Navy. These are truly excellent ships; moreover, it makes sense to consider copying the American approach.
Let's look at the US Navy. There are two types of aircraft carriers, one old and one new. There are one type of cruisers. There are two types of destroyers, but the Zumwalt-class destroyers are a no-brainer – they'll be sunk. There are two types of littoral ships. There are one type of patrol ships. There are four types of submarines, but one (the Seawolf) is closed. And this is much more justified than what we're doing, churning out ships similar in mission and armament but completely different in design. Just like the Soviet Union did with nuclear submarines.
So what kind of fleet do we need?
Modern and versatile. Surface and underwater.
A few words about the submarine fleet. The two new types of submarines, the Borei and the Yasen, are excellent. These are modern boats, in no way inferior, and in some ways superior, to anything being built elsewhere. They are capable of solving any task that might be assigned to the crews of such ships. And building such boats in sufficient numbers is the most important task and direction for development, not wasting resources on aircraft carrier projects.
We're worse off with diesel-electric boats, but their intended use isn't the oceans, but the Black and Baltic Seas. And there are more than enough of them for those seas.
The surface fleet is becoming more complex.
Frigates simply must form the backbone of the fleet, at least in the northern and eastern directions. The Baltic and Black Seas can easily be handled by corvettes.
So, the ships of the far and near sea zone are clearly Project 22350.
Near-sea zone ship - corvette 20380.
Patrol ship - minesweeper of project 266M.
We must bid farewell to the Project 22160, 21631, and even 22800 ships. There's little point in building these ships, which are patently unsuitable for combat. The Vasily Bykov series is finished, and the Buyan-M and Karakurt-class small missile ships are about to be condemned, as these ships, contrary to their creators' intentions, have more negative aspects than positive ones.
Of course, the fact that they can be transferred along inland rivers from the Baltic to the Caspian or Black Sea is interesting, but a ship that cannot be used effectively in 5-point waves is nonsense.
Tomorrow, the "mosquito" fleet could indeed be replaced by unmanned vessels. They are, at least, cheaper than small missile ships, less stealthy, and can carry, albeit in smaller numbers, missiles or torpedoes. Incidentally, a torpedo on a small unmanned vessel is even more interesting than a missile. Approaching the enemy undetected and launching a torpedo at range could be just as effective as a submarine, and far cheaper.
The idea of a torpedo boat from the 1940s or a missile boat from the 1970s, embodied in unmanned vessels 6-10 meters long and of corresponding displacement—why not? Yes, these ships will need to be protected from air and underwater attacks, but that will be the primary mission of corvettes and frigates when deploying unmanned boats. And such a tactic could prove quite effective.
The primary objective is to reduce the plethora of ships of various designs, which dazzles the eye, retain the best, and upgrade them to reflect the changing situation. Ships must be capable of performing combat missions in any situation, not hiding in dark corners because they are unable to repel the enemy.
What about cruisers and aircraft carriers?
One cruiser is certainly needed as a symbol. Especially in the North, where it would make a truly magnificent floating air defense battery with an insane range. And if such a battery were accompanied by a security force of modern ships capable of giving any submarine a headache, it would look simply magnificent on the waves.
Aircraft carriers... Honestly, I'd legislate against even talking about the need for these ships for the Russian Navy (let alone publishing them). Even enforcing an article in the Russian Criminal Code. If anyone starts pontificating that the Navy needs an aircraft carrier, that the Russian Navy is incomplete without one, they should be caught by the gills, because they're either looking to cash in on yet another gimmick or mentally deficient. In the first case, they should be mercilessly fined for the benefit of the Russian Navy; in the second, they should be treated.
There will, of course, still be cries for an aircraft carrier. But smart people have long since realized and are keeping quiet about the fact that we have nothing in our country to build a new aircraft carrier. Nothing at all. There are no designers who can develop a sensible design that won't be relegated to the now-defunct "Army..." forum. There are no production facilities capable of building such ships. There are no people with the experience of building such ships. There aren't enough escort ships for aircraft carriers. There are no carrier-based aircraft, and the MiG-29K is a joke.
But the main thing is that the country doesn't have the funds to painlessly spend on building such ships. And finally, there's no need for these ships.
This is the kind of fleet we have, this is the kind of fleet we could have.
And it must be honestly acknowledged that many mistakes have been made over the past decades. We've gotten too carried away with flirting with the West, which happily wooed Russia and then deprived us of many things we'd grown accustomed to, like MAN diesel engines.
However, among the chaff, there are certainly some successful projects that could be further developed in light of the changed situation. And then there will be no need to hide truly combat ships in the secluded corners of the Caspian, Volga, and Lake Ladoga.
Information