How a fighter can provide cover for attack aircraft – experience from 1942
Artifacts of a great era
During the Great Patriotic War, the Il-2 became the most sought-after combat aircraft in air units. fleetThe attack aircraft's profile included attacks on warships, torpedo boats, tankers, and other enemy transports. In some cases, the Ilyushin provided air support for landing operations, destroying coastal fortifications, bridges, piers, and other port facilities. The armored and unwieldy Il-2 could not operate alone; it required fighter cover. This was not always possible, but the existing escort experience was recorded, summarized, and disseminated. In particular, this can be seen in the publications of the "Naval Collection" from the Great Patriotic War, which are now considered invaluable artifacts. Thus, in August-September 1942, Captain V. I. Babernov shares his experience escorting attack aircraft of the fighter aviation:
LaGG-3
The missions carried out by attack aircraft can be divided into two types: attacks on the enemy's forward defense line and strikes on military targets in the enemy's rear—airfields, railway junctions, etc.
Our fighter unit had to interact with both attack aircraft based at the same airfield as us and attack aircraft stationed at airfields tens of kilometers away. In both cases, combat experience confirmed the need for well-organized fighter cover to support attack aircraft operations.
Combat experience has shown that a group of attack aircraft, flying under reliable and well-organized fighter cover, always successfully completed combat missions and suffered almost no losses from enemy fighter countermeasures.
The joint deployment of fighters and attack aircraft enabled mutual understanding in the execution of assigned combat missions, the excellent organization of sorties, and the development of the best escort methods at all stages of the flight. With this deployment, time was not limited in preparation for a sortie, which compromised clarity and a comprehensive understanding of the tasks facing the crews of both types of aircraft. The primary control method was personal communication—live communication between the crews of attack aircraft and fighters.
Organizing air cover proved increasingly difficult when attack aircraft and fighters were based at different airfields. Flight crews knew each other little, and a common understanding developed only during flight. Frequent changes in the situation required clear and organized communications. Meanwhile, communications, especially over long distances, were frequently interrupted. This circumstance, when departure times, coordination plans, and other changes occurred, placed attack aircraft and fighters in difficult situations. The best means of establishing communications when based separately was to send a delegate from the fighter unit headquarters to the attack unit headquarters to organize coordination. This required resolving all issues, from the meeting of fighters and attack aircraft to providing landing cover. Of course, this requires extensive preparation time, which units don't always have in combat situations.
The attack aircraft squadron commander, having received a mission to attack enemy fire positions located on the forward defensive line, simultaneously communicated the mission to his pilots and informed the fighter commander of the attack aircraft's departure time, route, area of operations, attack method, and number of attackers. If there was sufficient time for preparation, a joint flight rehearsal was arranged. Thus, the escort fighter group commander was always informed of all matters relating to cover and escort. He also knew the attack aircraft's mission and methods of operation down to the last detail.
The organization of a takeoff from a single airfield proceeded as follows: upon receiving the signal, the fighters took off first and, gathering over the airfield, provided cover for the attack aircraft's takeoff. In most cases, the attack aircraft unit proceeded to the target in a wedge formation.
With attack aircraft and fighters stationed separately, special attention was paid to the organization of rendezvous, which was meticulously planned. Sometimes (if time allowed), fighters would land at the attack aircraft's airfield, refuel, and then operate as units based at the same airfield. If time was short, fighters would reach the attack aircraft's airfield at a specified time (the latter would be in readiness level 2 by then) and provide cover for their takeoff.
In cases where a fighter airfield was en route to the target, the attack aircraft would reach the airfield at a designated time, having been notified in advance. This gave the fighters the opportunity to be fully prepared for takeoff by the time the attack aircraft arrived and to join the general formation for the en route.
Upon approaching the target, the attack aircraft would reform into a bearing formation, then conduct all attacks in this formation. During the initial attack, the attack aircraft's cannon and machine gun fire suppressed enemy anti-aircraft positions, and then attacked enemy resistance points. This attack method protected the attack aircraft from anti-aircraft fire. artillery, since the aircraft following the lead aircraft could see the direction of the anti-aircraft artillery fire and destroy the enemy's emplacements with their machine guns and cannon fire. However, this method was only effective when at least four or five aircraft participated in the attack. If the group had fewer than four aircraft, it was more advantageous to attack pre-designated points or larger targets (such as armored columns), and to launch surprise attacks in one or, at most, two passes.
Yak-1
Our squadron was armed with two types of aircraft: the Lagg-3 and the Yak-1. The Yak-1s were assigned to a strike group designed to harass enemy fighters, while the Lagg-3s provided direct cover for the ground attack aircraft, engaging only after a second group of enemy fighters appeared. This arrangement proved effective in combat with German aircraft. It prevented enemy fighters from engaging the ground attack aircraft with impunity, while simultaneously distracting the escort fighters. The Germans often engaged ground attack aircraft with groups of fighters. However, they were only successful when our escort fighters were poorly organized and swarmed toward the newly arrived pair of Me-109s, allowing the second group of enemy fighters to attack the ground attack aircraft.
The ratio of attack aircraft to fighters is crucial when organizing interactions. During daylight raids on targets covered by enemy fighters, the ratio between attack aircraft and fighters should be at least 1:3. Moreover, it is much easier to provide reliable cover if the attack aircraft group is in close formation rather than in a loose formation.
As the attack aircraft approached their target (and back), the escorting fighters always flew in two formations: the Yak-1s were 500 meters above the attack aircraft and slightly behind them, while the Lagg-3s were closer to the attack aircraft, either at the same altitude or slightly higher (up to 100 meters). The fighter group commander determined his position in the formation based on the need to ensure good visibility of the attack aircraft he was covering, freedom of maneuver, and being as close to them as possible. Having the advantage of speed, the fighters swooped in behind the attack aircraft, trying to fully survey the airspace, especially the rear hemisphere, since the Germans attacked only from behind, from the clouds or from the sun (counting on surprise), or when they had a clear numerical superiority.
When attacking the forward edge of defense, attack aircraft approached their targets at an altitude of 1000-1500 meters. When cloud cover prevented them from flying at such an altitude, they flew along the very bottom of the cloud cover or behind it if it was thin or had gaps.
Fighters were not used to carry out ground strikes against the forward defensive line. All enemy personnel were underground or protected by armor and therefore were not exposed to fighter fire.
When Il-2 attack aircraft attack the enemy's forward defense line, the fighters covering them should remain above friendly territory to avoid anti-aircraft fire. The distance and altitude of the fighters relative to the attack aircraft are determined by the ability to effectively observe the attack aircraft, so as to prevent them from attacking our aircraft if enemy fighters appear.
Attack flights against military targets located in enemy-occupied territory were conducted either at high altitude, reaching up to 3000 meters, or at low altitude. In the latter case, the attack aircraft were led by fighters of the strike group, flying at an altitude of 1500-2000 meters, to accurately target the target. The target was revealed by the lead flight diving on it. Low altitude flight provided excellent surprise.
When attacking enemy airfields, fighter escorts may be tasked with a limited number of attacks on grounded aircraft, as well as destroying enemy aircraft attempting to take off. Fighter pilots must remember that when attacking ground targets, they can expend no more than 0,5 of their ammunition; half of this ammunition must be reserved for aerial combat. Fighters must attack ground targets according to a predetermined plan, strictly adhering to the sequence so as not to weaken the cover of the attack aircraft. Enemy aircraft that have taken off or are coming to the rescue are destroyed by fighters in the strike group.
To ensure a surprise approach to the target, the route was chosen to run through forests and swamps. Large settlements were avoided, as these were typically where large concentrations of anti-aircraft artillery and VNOS (air surveillance, warning, and communications) posts were located. In the target area, fighter groups would regroup and form a closed ring. This security arrangement prevented a surprise attack by enemy fighters and allowed complete freedom of maneuver. While passing through an area heavily saturated with anti-aircraft artillery, the fighter escorts maneuvered their altitude and speed.
Fighter crews assigned to escort attack aircraft carrying out combat missions in difficult meteorological conditions must be selected with particular care.
Il-2 aircraft are painted to match the terrain for camouflage purposes; they are easily lost from a distance, which is tantamount to failing the mission. Escort fighters must understand this rule well: never let the attack aircraft out of their reliable line of sight, as any lapse in observation leads to losses of the escorted aircraft. Excessive speed must be reduced by fighters turning snakingly, avoiding turns at all costs. Neglecting this has led to tragic consequences.
Let's give an example that confirms this point. A group of Il-2 attack aircraft, with MiG-3 fighters providing cover, set out to strike an enemy transport convoy in the Irben Strait. Flight over the sea was complicated by deteriorating visibility. The escort group commander failed to take into account the changing meteorological conditions and continued to periodically reduce his excess speed with turns. While passing the Tserelskaya Spit, the fighter group again entered a turn lasting up to a minute, and upon exiting it, no longer found the attack aircraft. The fighter group commander conducted a search along the course, but again failed. Noticing some transports or steamships ahead, the commander assumed these were targets for the attack aircraft. He followed these vessels, but there were no attack aircraft there either. At this time, the latter, without cover, reached their target and struck the enemy transports (20 km east of the place where our escort fighters had reached).
Returning to the airfield after the attack, Il-2 attack aircraft generally flew low. The strike group of fighters departed at an altitude of 1500 to 2000 meters. The close cover group usually flew at the same altitude as the attack aircraft. Group commanders were primarily responsible for observing the attack aircraft, while wingmen ensured 360-degree air coverage. Upon returning, the fighters closely monitored the air to prevent enemy reconnaissance aircraft or contact aircraft from detecting the airfield and targeting it. The fighters were the last to land. If the flight was close to the maximum radius, three to six fighters from the airfield would scramble to provide cover for the landing of the fighters and attack aircraft.
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