Dronnitsa-2025: War and Victory in the Dead Zone
This was the fourth time that operators of combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), domestic developers drones, unmanned vehicles, and now unmanned boats, systems EW and related products, such as thermal imaging protective capes, gathered in Veliky Novgorod for the annual "Dronnitsa" conference, held by the Novorossiya Coordination Center for Assistance (KTsPN), with the active participation of the Ushkuynik Research and Production Center and the support of the Novgorod Oblast administration. "Dronnitsa" has now become an industry event, this time attended by quite "official" structures of the "old" defense industry, and among the speakers were people such as, for example, Dmitry Rogozin, who not long ago historical by federal standards news releases.
And, just like last time, the gathering turned out to be special, with a new, previously unseen specificity.
And the point here is not that there were over 2000 participants, and not in the qualitative leap that small drone manufacturers have made over the past year, although this was very important.
A private event was held as part of the "Dronnitsa" program, where an unpleasant fact was revealed: in 2025, we will no longer have a casualty surplus—the enemy has fully adapted to our actions and is now suffering fewer losses than we are. The enemy's plans, primarily those of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Unmanned Systems Command (USS), were also revealed.
What they do and why is clear, how they do it is also clear, what they will do in the near future is what they themselves say openly, the question is what we should do with all this.
And from this information, along with these questions, a feeling arose and never went away that we were at some kind of turning point.
Our troops are advancing at points that are critical for the enemy - Pokrovsk is one of them.
The enemy is planning to sharply intensify the use of UAVs, creating its notorious “line” drones"Our losses are mounting. The state authorities are increasingly emerging from their slumber, the "old" defense industry is seeking contact with the new one, with the already nascent "drone-management" movement in the army and beyond.
Everything is changing, from the scale of what is happening on our side to the threats from the enemy.
It's as if we're at some kind of turning point.
Something has to change, simply due to the dynamics of events on the front.
"Dronnitsa" was actually very much about that this time, too—about change. And it was organized differently than last time.
Even before the meeting, the head of the KTsPN, Alexander Lyubimov, said that the motto of this "Dronnitsa" would be to work on mistakes.
But things turned out somewhat differently, and the de facto motto became something else—namely, the title of Alexander Lyubimov and Alexey Chadayev's speech, which, in the author's view, characterizes the event much better: War and Victory in the "Dead Zone." Although they did work on their mistakes, of course.
War and Victory in the Dead Zone
As always, everything began with an introductory speech by the founders of Dronnitsa. This time, A. Lyubimov and A. Chadayev raised the question of how the war would change in the near future and what we needed to win under the current circumstances.
It's clear that the Russian authorities will keep the war limited until the very last possible moment—which means the state won't make any extra efforts, there won't be any industrial mobilization, the bridges across the Dnieper will remain standing, and military equipment and ammunition will continue to be transported across them...
Performance by Alexander Lyubimov and Alexey Chadayev
You can talk all you want about how impossible it is to fight like this, but it's a given that can't be avoided at the moment. We can't do anything about these circumstances. We'll have to fight within them.
As A. Lyubimov called the main contradiction that we will all have to face in one form or another - you need to win in the given circumstances.
And these circumstances are exactly like that.
But it is not only our “decision makers” who dictate these circumstances – the enemy is doing the same.
War is a situation where all sides have a say.
And what matters here is what our enemies are planning.
The KCPN has recently demonstrated a high level of skill in obtaining important information from the enemy and obtaining a number of plans for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (specifically, the Madyarov Unmanned Systems Forces, UAS, which currently underpins the entire Ukrainian front).
Ukrainian troops reacted extremely painfully to the appearance of the Prince Vandal Novgorodsky UAV, KVN, which was created and put into serial production thanks to the Ushkuynik Scientific and Production Center headed by A. Chadayev.
They still don't have an adequate means to counter this. weapons.
Meanwhile, during one of the last “rolls” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region, before their withdrawal from almost all the occupied territory, eight KVN crews destroyed about 40 tanks and combat armored vehicles of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, not counting other targets.
And the Ukrainian Armed Forces' "trump card," thanks to which they had penetrated so far into our territory and held on there for so long—a super-powerful group of electronic warfare forces and assets—was powerless against the KVN.
They've learned their lesson. Unable (yet) to combat UAVs using fiber optic cables, they've set themselves the task of outmatching our forces in the depths where their unmanned weapons operate.
Madyar tasked his troops with operating at a depth that would allow them to solve operational-scale problems and support strategic-scale combat missions, such as strikes on our oil refineries. These strikes are not carried out by the SBS, but the SBS will facilitate them as well.
The Ukrainians are introducing a classification of the depths at which they operate: three tactical levels, covering depths of 0-15 kilometers from our forward edge into the depths of our defenses; an operational-tactical level of 15-50 kilometers; and an operational level of 50-150 kilometers. Further down is the strategic level, at which the SBS does not yet operate.
For each depth, there are priority and typical targets for destruction - for example, in the 0-5 kilometer zone they “level the landscape” - destroy all potential shelters, and in the 50-150 kilometer zone they destroy assets Defense (not only them, of course) to create “flight corridors” that are then used by units carrying out long-range strikes.
The goal of the SBS commander, "Madyar," is to ensure complete SBS dominance in this, as they call it, killzone—the ability to conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, and immediately, with zero delay, attack any detected target at any arbitrary moment in time, that is, always.
Madyar wants to "fly" us - even if we have "Vandals", invulnerable to anything except fire on them or interception by another "drone", but the SBS will fly many times further.
Naturally, we also want to strike the enemy to the maximum depth—and these two overlapping depths, ours and the enemy's, along with the neutral strip between the front lines and the airspace above this entire land, together make up what A. Lyubimov and A. Chadayev called the "Dead Zone"—this is the place where the outcome of the confrontation will determine the winner of this war.
To a large extent, this “Dronnitsa” was focused precisely on finding ways to achieve this victory.
The key objective that will determine the winner in the "Dead Zone" is the destruction of enemy unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operators. The SBS has made significant progress here, primarily from an organizational standpoint.
Each Ukrainian drone unit is awarded electronic points (E-points) for destroyed targets, and the more E-points a unit has, the more unmanned aerial vehicles and equipment for them it can obtain on the BRAVE1 project marketplace (you can read about the project here).
This approach has both huge advantages and serious disadvantages, but the main thing is different – priorities.
An SBS crew receives 8 E-points for a tank.
And for our calculation of UAVs - 25.
And it's working, as current casualty statistics show. The SBS are holding the front. With 2% of the total Ukrainian Armed Forces, they inflict 30% of our losses.
Unfortunately, not everyone on our side has recognized these priorities. To put it mildly.
The SBS threat, however, is only part of a growing problem. The Ukrainians are currently implementing the "drone line" project, which aims to achieve total control over the "Dead Zone," with the ability to immediately destroy any target there.
But this line, while mobile and possessing enormous offensive capabilities, is, incidentally, only a shadow of the much larger pan-European project, the "Wall of Drones," to create a gigantic robotic combat force capable of rendering uninhabitable both the potential line of contact with Russia and the terrain tens of kilometers deep into our territory.
And, of course, with the possibility of moving the “wall” to the East – the wall is mobile, it is an offensive tool, not a defensive one.
Learning to fight and win in such conditions is literally a matter of life and death. And not just for the military.
Mobilization of intelligence
It is not volunteers, not civil society, and not even the military that determine the degree of mobilization of our country to fight the enemy.
But the civil society born in and around this war can still mobilize something on its own, at the call of its heart—the intellect of people capable of creating recipes for that very “victory in the given circumstances.”
And this was done at Dronnitsa-2025.
Typically, at previous gatherings, the first two days were devoted to theory—lectures from participants who had plenty to say to the military, volunteers, and creators of new unmanned vehicles. Then came a day of practical work at the range—flights and training exercises.
This time, lectures, workshops, and practical training were held simultaneously, alongside an exhibition of UAVs and other technology. Those attending were determined by what was most important.
The advantage of this approach was that there were two exhibition days, rather than the previous one. This facilitated the work of those who most needed contacts with manufacturers and developers, as well as introducing various teams and companies to each other.
Lectures and master classes, in turn, also took place in parallel, which, by the way, had a number of costs.
The gathering featured three lecture tents—"red," "yellow," and "blue." Each tent featured parallel lectures and presentations—the number of speakers made it impossible to present them sequentially within the allotted time.
And here the event's potential was fully realized.
Svyatoslav Golikov, a veteran of combat with the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the volunteer movement, an infantry training instructor, and the author of a Telegram channel "A Philologist in Ambush" delivered a lecture entitled “Problems of Practical Implementation of the Drone Component in the Active Army.”
It's probably unnecessary to list all our weaknesses, even if the enemy is aware of them. Let's just say that having such problems in the third year of the war is very bad, and, to put it mildly, it doesn't reflect well on our military system. But it's also true that Svyatoslav managed to very clearly and concretely depict all the problems the army faces, and to show their origins and root causes.
And this makes it possible to address them someday, perhaps even faster than we think.
Dmitry Rogozin's presentation generated enormous interest. He spoke in great detail, using extensive footage from various types of UAV cameras, about the combat experience of the Bars-Sarmat unit, including combating enemy drones. The lecture was titled "Technical and Tactical Features of Using UAVs to Support Assault Units of the Dnepr Force Group," but it must be acknowledged that the material covered a broader scope. It was an extremely useful presentation, and Dmitry Olegovich himself emerged as a competent military leader, completely at odds with the image our media had once cultivated for him.
Dmitry Rogozin and Alexander Lyubimov. Photo: Telegram channel "Dronnitsa"
A video file with Dmitry Rogozin's speech can be downloaded or viewed on the Dronnitsy Telegram channel. here:.
In the future, the channel may feature other materials that are not yet ready for publication, and it is worth subscribing to.
It's impossible not to mention an organizational "blunder" here: at the same time as Dmitry Rogozin, Andrey Markin's master class, "How to Find and Kill Enemy UAV Crews?", was taking place in the neighboring tent.
Andrei Markin is the author of renowned collections of books summarizing the combat experience of the SVO, published by the KTsPN. He based his work on a completely different principle—active engagement and dialogue with the audience. This allowed him to pool the experiences and assessments of a wide range of combat-experienced individuals.
And so the content of D. Rogozin's lecture and A. Markin's master class overlapped. It would have been better to present them sequentially.
But that's how it turned out.
Of particular interest was the group presentation on the use of gaming techniques in training junior officers. The presentation, "War Games: History, Theory, and Practice. Application in the Age of Drones," contained a wealth of promising training methods for future officers, offering a glimpse into gaming from unexpected and little-known perspectives.
Just one example: the use of games in Wehrmacht officer training unified their understanding of combat organization to such an extent that they could anticipate the actions of neighboring unit commanders without communicating with them. And base their battle management on this foresight. And that's just one example.
The authors of the report are SVO participant Anton Truttse, Yulia Kubareva, Roman Krylov, and Sergey Zabelin with the game "The Best in Heaven: Commander's Time Begins," as well as Donbass combat veteran, SVO participant, and KTsPN instructor Alexey Levoshko with his tactical game "Field Commander."
In "Sky's Finest: Command Time Begins," the player must make decisions similar to those of a strike drone unit commander. While the gameplay mechanics are somewhat sketchy, they provide a fairly realistic understanding of how a drone unit commander can and should manage their limited resources. "Field Commander" immerses the player in the decision-making logic of low-level, combined-arms commanders.
Alexey Chadayev shared his experience in the creation, use, and production of the Prince Vandal Novgorodsky FPV strike drone. This was extremely useful for understanding both the role UAVs play on the battlefield today and the specifics of their mass production in Russia, especially as the number of UAVs produced continues to increase.
It was as exciting as it was educational.
A. Chadaev, one of the founders of Dronnitsa, heads the Ushkuynik Scientific and Production Center, where Vandal received his start in life, and this gave his words special weight.
Dmitry Rubinstein, CEO of the Autonomous Non-Commercial Organization "Center for Unmanned Systems and Technologies," along with colleagues and representatives of a volunteer unit engaged in counter-UAV operations in the Kursk region, discussed the issue of civilian air defense. Their report focused on the specifics of government involvement in this air defense.
Of no less interest was the report by Andrey Boyko (a theoretical physicist and scientist from the St. Petersburg National University of Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics (ITMO)) on the progress Russian scientists have already made in creating autonomous combat drone swarms.
A. Boyko already spoke at the last meeting, and this was an opportunity to assess the progress made over the year, and it is enormous.
We won't reveal any details—let this project be a surprise for both our own and others.
In total, twelve lectures, reports, and master classes were announced for Dronnitsa, not including the presentations of Dronnitsa participants, for whom there was also a free microphone.
And they all, as they say, “worked out.”
And not only them.
Technical part
As A. Lyubimov noted, "Dronnitsa" has become an industry event. In addition to the lecture portion of the gathering, as usual, there was an exhibition of unmanned and unmanned vehicles.
The "dynamic" part included FPV drones flying, including at pilot competitions, unmanned vehicles driving around the "test drive zone," and, for the first time, an unmanned boat was shown in action at the "Dronnitsa" fair.
There were some incidents: a rather large drone crashed, a balloon broke loose from its tether and flew off to an unknown destination, and a boat lost control.
But in principle, nothing happens without excesses.
Overall, the event was more than successful in terms of displaying equipment.
It must be said that the creators of many types of equipment have certain problems with goal setting.
The task of a multi-purpose unmanned transport platform has long been studied.
Roughly speaking, ammunition, stretchers, water, and some supplies go there, and the wounded and dead return. Optionally, it can act as a charging station for electrical equipment and, optionally, carry a remotely controlled module with weapons or electronic warfare systems.
Such a vehicle clearly must accommodate a prone wounded person. This requirement wasn't always met by the vehicles presented at Dronnitsa.
A test drive of one of the platforms. Photo: Telegram channel "Dronnitsa"
But, firstly, the Ministry of Defense has never issued any requirements for such equipment, nor any open version of the tactical and technical specifications. Secondly, it's impossible to demand from designers and engineers a holistic and fully formed vision of processes on the battlefield—they've mostly never been there, and without the military's leadership, they're forced to do whatever their imagination can come up with.
And the military continues to show complete passivity.
But it's important to note that, whatever the conceptual flaws of the designs on display, the potential demonstrated is immense. Any of the teams that showcased their unmanned vehicle at Dronnitsa could easily build a similar one, but one that meets different conditions and requirements. Just give them those requirements!
"Dronnitsa" demonstrated that finding developers for unmanned ground vehicles is no longer a problem. All that's needed is a customer and the resources for production.
The Impulse-BM ground robotic system from Gumich-RTK. Photo: Dronnitsa Telegram channel
But the extensive presence of ground vehicles has not harmed the familiar theme: unmanned aerial vehicles.
And here there was something to be both happy about and surprised about.
The "Key" series of drones from the Center for Unmanned Competence were a definite show-stopper. Two families of standardized FPV UAVs and hexacopters were quite up to par or even slightly better in terms of performance, yet significantly cheaper than similar products from other manufacturers showcased last year. Buying an FPV drone in 2025 at a price significantly lower than 2024 prices and at least equal in quality is well worth it, especially since the manufacturer offers ready-made control systems, repeaters, remote antennas, and a warranty.
A UAV from the Center for Unmanned Competence. Photo by the author.
This is the ready-made, complete, mass-produced solution for a small budget that the army needs, but at the same time, unlike other mass-produced solutions, it is adaptive, as the manufacturer maintains feedback from users.
Of particular interest was their AI-controlled UAV, complete with a drone port—no one had ever made such an offer before.
Incidentally, the Central Bank of Russia is the same people whose report at the last Dronnitsa led to the formation of a new branch of the armed forces in Russia – the Unmanned Systems Forces.
And after such an ideological contribution, we now have a line of products ready for combat use.
An unmanned transporter controlled via fiber optic cable. Used as a UAV carrier with the same fiber optic cable, the transporter circumvents the range limitations of the KVN and similar "drones." It is also invulnerable to electronic warfare and undetectable to enemy electronic reconnaissance. Photo by the author.
Rokot Tech delighted us with its domestic propellers. Back in 2023, they were hard to find, with China being the only source. Now, a Russian company has emerged and is simply giving them away to anyone who wants them at the exhibition.
We were equally pleased with the large copters, capable of lifting up to a hundred kilograms, and from several manufacturers.
While some developers are not yet ready for mass production, this is still a significant and important step forward, as these types of drones hold the key to future successful frontline logistics—they can deliver cargo and, potentially, evacuate people, such as the wounded. Such capabilities are already being explored in the UK, and they will soon be available in Russia as well.
Large UAVs—carriers of small FPV attack drones—also appeared at Dronnitsa. This solution, already in use in the Air Defense Forces and also used by our adversaries, was showcased at the exhibition at a new technical level, and we look forward to seeing these products in combat.
Some samples have serious potential for naval use.
There was some exoticism involved.
Among the aircraft on display was a tethered vertical takeoff aircraft using rotors, which is then held in the airflow by a complexly shaped wing, like a kite on a lifeline.
In fact, it is a kite, but it is so heavy that it needs engines to launch.
A controversial design in terms of its use in combat situations, but worthy of study.
That same curious design. Photo by the author.
Tethered aerostats, camouflage suits, and heat-insulating capes (now standard at Dronnitsa), net launchers for quadcopters, protective nets for roads and structures capable of causing premature detonation of FPV drone warheads, and transport carts were also on display. On Dronnitsa's Telegram channel, the organizers announced individual developments and companies that would soon become exhibitors, and the variety among them is so vast that it's simply impossible to cover everything in this article. But you can follow the link and begin exploring in detail.
As usual, compact electronic warfare systems of various types, including portable ones, were widely represented.
At Dronnitsa-2025, a laser weapon system debuted that had not previously been used in the army (although we will tactfully remain silent about other security agencies).
Automated laser counter-drone system (Project "Staff"). The laser cannon and power source can theoretically be mounted on a small truck. The manufacturer, a company branded as LazerBuzz, has announced plans to test the system in the NWO zone.
Laser complex. Photo by the author.
It must be said that this weapon can't knock out a tank or an armored vehicle, but the laser can fire at drones, "burning" them, and quite effectively. And while the system itself is expensive, it, like any other laser cannon, boasts a record-low cost per shot.
The complex has enormous potential for the future.
It's probably impossible to list everything we saw. Even the Dronnitsy channel only mentioned a fraction of the developers and manufacturers who presented their products. The exhibition section ended up being quite extensive.
The "water" segment was very modestly represented. And the testing of the unmanned boat, being developed by residents of the same Ushkuynik Scientific and Production Center, didn't go according to plan, so to speak.
But there's something to be said here too—as the developer points out, the boat's hull construction technology allows for hulls to be produced at near-conveyor speed, and the design allows for their assembly on-site from machine kits.
That's a plus. The downsides are also obvious, and they're being addressed.
I would like to wish the creators to pay attention to the fact that different seas have different combat conditions, and the enemy is also very different.
Furthermore, it is worth paying attention to the developments of the "big" defense industry in terms of remote control via fiber optic channels - there is much to learn from them.
And yes, for civilian use a slightly different design is still needed.
However, the boating industry is still in its infancy, and if things continue as they have with flying and driving drones, progress is inevitable in this area as well.
Cultural Front
It is necessary to talk about what the organizers were concerned about, but the commentators somehow ignored.
A concert was subsequently held on the stage where, at the beginning of the event, Alexander Lyubimov and Alexey Chadayev immersed participants in the problems of the "Dead Zone" and our near future.
Had this concert been held separately, on its own, it would have become a shining beacon in the world of contemporary Russian music, an example not just of creativity, but of Russian creativity in its attractive, even alluring version.
These songs, heard from the stage, for a person tired of the musical garbage played on television and radio, without exaggeration became a breath of fresh air in the musty world of “pop”.
It may seem like a minor issue compared to weapons and the methods used to use them, but it's not. Cultural confrontation is part of our "clinch" with the West, and it's precisely this that we're losing decisively—our people consume Western cultural products directly, while what our domestic "bohemians" produce is simply Russified versions of Western cultural "products," albeit of high quality in recent years.
But we need something that's ours. And not the cliché of dancing girls in kokoshniks that sometimes pops up at official events, but live, contemporary music and songs whose lyrics stem from current events. Songs with meaning, songs you can listen to in the car or at home, and put on repeat for enjoyment.
And on Dronnitsa it was just in the background.
It is unclear whether the KCNP will have the resources to push forward the "cultural Dronnitsa"—in war, resources are always in short supply.
But first, it wouldn't hurt to release a collection of songs from the concert, with the performers' permission, of course. This is a truly important issue, especially in the long term.
The war will end someday.
And one's own culture must always exist, including in conditions when the country is full of people who want to trample this very culture to the ground.
Time of change
For visitors, Dronnitsa was a peaceful experience, with a friendly atmosphere that is only possible when most people are like-minded and share common goals and values.
But this did not change the fact that we were approaching a turning point in this war.
The enemy is raising the stakes with its new approaches, driving us into a corner from which the only escape is over Ukrainian corpses, while we, it seems, are facing serious organizational changes in the Armed Forces.
The Molniya-2 UAV carries two FPV attack drones under its wings. And this capability has been demonstrated by more than just this drone. Photo by the author.
One can even assume that the “proposed circumstances” mentioned by Alexander Lyubimov may change somewhat, and that victory will have to be achieved under different conditions.
And there's no doubt that Dronnitsa-2025 will make a significant contribution to both this turning point and this victory. Just like the KTsPN, without which none of this would have happened, and the Ushkuynik Scientific and Production Center, without which there would have been no fiber-optic attack UAVs or the liberation of enemy-held areas in the Kursk region.
This year it became especially obvious somehow...
Let's finish with the words A. Lyubimov used to end his speeches with, but then stopped using. But it's not hard to remember.
We will win, and all our enemies will die.
Thanks in part to Dronnitsa.
P.S. If you support what the KCSPN is doing, then here You can help this organization in its good work.
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