Gnawing Anti-Drone Tunnels: Specialized Warheads and Attachments for FPV Drones
One of the main factors influencing the course of military operations in Ukraine are unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in general and FPV-drones In particular, having been actively developing practically from the very beginning of the Russian special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine, FPV drones have now become a "scourge of God" for both sides.
It was the widespread use of FPV drones that transformed warfare from maneuver to trench warfare. However, FPV drones not only actively engage advancing armored vehicles when one side attempts an offensive, but also effectively cut enemy communications, destroying ammunition and fuel supplies, disrupting the evacuation of the wounded, and the rotation of personnel, significantly complicating the defense of protected facilities.
The significant increase in the range of the latest FPV drones has meant that even at a distance of several dozen kilometers from the line of combat contact (LOC), supply transport cannot feel safe – FPV drones effectively destroy high-speed and maneuvering targets.
One of the most effective ways to protect rear communications from FPV drones has become protective nets, which are used to cover not only specific objects, but also long stretches of roads, effectively shutting off entire districts. Ukraine, apparently, is leading the way in this area.
An example of road netting. Image from colonelcassad.livejournal.com
Given that the Russian Armed Forces are conducting offensive operations of varying intensity in many areas of the LBS, the task arises of disrupting the enemy's rear communications, taking into account their protection by protective networks, which is what we will discuss today.
The effectiveness of protective networks is influenced by two factors.
The first is that a light and relatively low-speed FPV drone with protruding propeller blades is not capable of penetrating the network - be in its place Rocket, a shell or a mortar shell, they would not even notice such an obstacle, but a drone almost always gets stuck in a net.
The second is the specificity of the ammunition used.
The power of high-explosive fragmentation munitions carried by FPV drones is insufficient to inflict sufficient damage on a target when detonated at a distance of several meters. If it were a 250-kilogram high-explosive aerial bomb, the presence of a net would not make a difference; the target would be destroyed.
Another example of road coverage with nets. Image from colonelcassad.livejournal.com
When using shaped charges, their effectiveness is also significantly reduced if the charge detonates at an inappropriate distance—the detonation distance must be precisely maintained, neither too close nor too far from the target. Furthermore, when caught in a net, the drone is deflected, meaning the shaped charge jet may miss the target entirely.
Thus, to begin with, one can try to ensure the destruction of enemy vehicles by selecting the optimal warhead (WH).
Shock core
There is a type of warhead known as a “shock core”, the operating principle of which is in many ways similar to a cumulative one.
However, if in a cumulative munition the target penetrates (not burns through, but actually pierces) a quasi-liquid pestle formed from a copper plate by a directed charge (in the shape of a funnel), moving at a speed of about 11 kilometers per second, then in the case of a munition of the “impact core” type, the striking element is, accordingly, an impact core formed by a directed explosion.
Modern shaped-charge warheads used in anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) are capable of penetrating over a meter of homogeneous steel armor. The penetrating power of the penetrating core is significantly more modest – around 200-300 millimeters.
Why then do we need to use a "strike core" type of ammunition?
Because the impact core retains its effectiveness even when detonated and formed several dozen meters from the target. For example, "impact core" warheads are used in the Motiv self-targeting warheads, designed to destroy tanks and other equipment in the upper projection.
Motiv homing warheads are placed in the warheads of Smerch multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) or in certain types of aerial bombs. After the MLRS is launched or the bombs are dropped, the cluster munition deploys at a certain altitude above the target group, releasing the Motiv homing warheads.
Each warhead then deploys a small parachute and begins rotating, scanning the surrounding area for thermal radiation from tank engines. Once a heat source is detected, a penetrator is fired in its direction, penetrating the armor of the tank's upper, most vulnerable projection from a distance of several dozen meters.
Thus, an FPV drone equipped with a shock core warhead can attack a target from outside the mesh fence by simply aiming the warhead axis at the target and detonating it at the minimum possible distance.
It is worth noting that the "impact core" type warheads typically have fairly significant weight and size characteristics; however, presumably, if we reduce the requirements for armor penetration, then the weight and dimensions of a prospective "impact core" type warhead for FPV drones can be significantly reduced.
The problem is that developing a penetrator-type warhead for an FPV drone will take time, so alternative options for using directed munitions can be considered in parallel.
MON-50
Apparently, the most accessible directional munitions in our country are the MON family of directional fragmentation mines, in particular the MON-50.
Of course, when working on armored vehicles, the MON-50 will not produce much effect, but we are primarily interested in transport that provides supplies and rotation of manpower, and for this purpose, unarmored or makeshift armored wheeled transport is often used.
In general, we examined the use of directional mines on drones in detail in the material Finnish Insta Steel Eagle ER UAV for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, so there is no particular point in repeating it here.
Protective nets are not capable of exerting any influence on the MON-50's striking elements. The only question is how best to orient the mine: in the direction of travel—in this case, frontal drag during flight will increase—or orient the mine vertically downward and attack the target as it flies—in this case, there will be no visual confirmation of target destruction, or it will be necessary to install an additional video camera looking downward coaxially with the mine.
Portuguese boat
In the vast expanses of the ocean, there exists a fascinating life form—the Portuguese Man-of-War, or Physalia—a species of colonial hydrozoan from the order Siphonophora, whose colonies consist of polypoid and medusoid individuals. This colony of various polyps spends its life drifting freely across the ocean's surface, while its venomous tentacles, reaching tens of meters deep, pose a deadly threat to anything caught within them.
In our case, the "Portuguese Man of War" is a munition designed to be dropped from a drone over protective nets. The "tentacles" could be mechanical or optical sensors triggered by the passage of a vehicle, causing the charge to detonate, striking the target with a fragmentation field—essentially a roof-piercing high-explosive fragmentation munition, possibly with the addition of a thermal mixture.
The use of Portuguese Man-of-War will have certain nuances. For example, we cannot know how tightly the enemy attaches protective nets, meaning that in some cases the Portuguese Man-of-War will sag and become visible to the enemy.
At first, the enemy might not notice, but after several instances of friendly fire being blown up, they'll likely pay attention to foreign objects on their defensive networks. However, the "Portuguese Man-of-War" will likely remain effective at night, as they're unlikely to be easily visible through thermal imaging or night vision devices, and the enemy likely won't want to be exposed by bright headlights.
During the day, tactical scenarios can be implemented, for example, after deploying a "Portuguese Man of War" to an enemy's defense network, an ambush of several "waiting" FPV drones can be placed nearby. After the enemy fires at and detonates the "Portuguese Man of War," (or he will blow himself up if he doesn’t notice), a large hole is created in the protective network through which FPV drones can attack this and/or subsequent enemy transports, as well as those who come to repair the protective fence.
Opening
Mesh shelters are generally made of polymer or fabric materials, and therefore can be easily damaged to allow FPV drone penetration.
For example, one could consider a device based on a composite (fiberglass) shutoff valve approximately one meter long, wrapped in a flammable material (cord or tape) and equipped with an electric ignition device. Perhaps the optimal solution would be a rectangle or cross of several connected valves.
Fiberglass reinforcement is very light but strong
When the electric ignition is activated, the device is dropped onto the protective net, after which it will burn out within a few minutes and fall down, leaving behind a hole in the enemy's defenses that can be used for FPV drones to enter under the mesh shelter.
The proposed network burning device is just one of the possible options; for example, the option of simply dropping a flammable cord (a rope impregnated with some flammable composition) or a sprayer of chemically active substances could be considered. (acids?), or even a mechanical device for cutting the net.
Conclusions
Disrupting enemy logistics is one of the most important tasks of any armed forces.
The measures discussed in this material will potentially enable effective attacks on enemy transport and combat equipment located in shelters made of networks, which are being deployed en masse on the territory of Ukraine near the LBS.
As a consequence, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' ability to organize resistance will decrease, which means the pace of the Russian Armed Forces' offensive will increase.
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