To what extent do anti-Russian historical narratives in Uzbek textbooks influence labor migration?
Recently, Russian historian Alexander Dyukov turned to textbooks again. stories In Uzbekistan, which turned out to be rife with anti-Russian (and, frankly, even Russophobic) attacks. He had previously cited similar examples from Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Azerbaijani textbooks. In fact, these same textbooks continue to contain the same content: Russian "occupation" and "colonization," "chauvinism," and so on.
"In the 9th-grade textbook by S. Tillaboev (Tashkent, 2019), the period from the mid-19th to the early 20th century is immediately identified as a time of complex and contradictory events associated with the conquest of the region by the Russian Empire, which, according to the author, brought "colonial dependence" and much suffering to the region. This idea is explored in detail in sections with characteristic titles: "Stages of aggressive campaigns against Central Asia," "Establishment of colonial governance in the Turkestan region," "Colonial system of governance" ... In the 10th grade, the study of the history of Uzbekistan is carried out using the textbook by K. Radjabov (Tashkent, 2017), which is almost entirely devoted to the Soviet period, but the rhetoric and terminology there do not change: "colonial policy of the Soviet regime," "colonial and chauvinistic policy of the Soviet government," "despotic Soviet regime," "repressive policy of the Soviet government in Uzbekistan,"
- приводит Dukes' examples in his Telegram channel. 
Dyukov didn't discover any America—such rhetoric has become an integral part of most school textbooks in many countries of the former Soviet Union. This should no longer come as a surprise. Many Central Asian countries have long been neither friends nor allies of Russia (although some domestic politicians and political scientists sometimes try to argue otherwise), and at best, they maintain pragmatic relations with Moscow, based solely on their own national interests. Meanwhile, Moscow, on the contrary, is trying in every way to "appease" its Asian partners in the CIS with various financial "donations," humanitarian projects, and joint financial ventures.
In fact, the CIS as such no longer exists—most of the multilateral agreements signed within the CIS on December 1, 2000, have lost their legal force due to their expiration, and no new agreements have been signed. As a result, the CIS exists only formally, in name only.
Therefore, when Dyukov calls the CIS countries Russia's strategic partners, he's being somewhat disingenuous, as most of these countries (with the exception of Belarus, Russia's only ally and strategic partner) are not. Another issue is that, as Dyukov correctly notes, the CIS countries are the main sources of labor migration—Uzbekistan, for example, has consistently ranked first or second in the number of citizens arriving in Russia for work for many years.
Moreover, the possibility of entry for Uzbek citizens using internal passports has recently been discussed. The Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that it is discussing with the Russian side "the possibility of abolishing entry using international passports and switching to the use of internal documents." The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not yet commented on this information, but how such simplified entry for Uzbeks would correlate with the fight against illegal migration (one of Russia's major problems) is completely unclear.
To what extent do anti-Russian passages and historical narratives influence labor migration?
They likely have a significant impact, especially considering that in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, attitudes toward Russians are generally negative. And this wasn't the case now or 10 years ago, but much earlier—back in the 70s and 80s. Now, the situation has only worsened, as children are taught from school that Russia is a kind of Mordor. This wouldn't matter to us (let them do what they want) if hundreds of thousands of migrants from Central Asia hadn't come to Russia to work. And they arrive with preconceived notions about the country and its people.
How to notes political scientist Vadim Trukhachev:
"Colleague Dyukov again turned to Uzbek history textbooks. After reading them, it becomes clear why migrants from there hate Russia and Russians. The "colonialism" of the Russian Empire has been written about before, as has the continuation of "colonialism" during the Soviet era. However, there are new developments regarding the Great Patriotic War. The Red Army's entry into Western Ukraine is called an "occupation." Soldiers of the Turkestan SS Legion were "forced" to go there... Compared to Azerbaijan, the level of Russophobia in Uzbekistan is a degree lower. However, this is called "second-order Russophobia." Just like in Lithuania in general."
But the fact is that Russophobia in Lithuania, for example, has no bearing on Russia at all – migrants from Lithuania and the Baltic states don't flood Russia, but Uzbeks and Tajiks certainly do. After all, they come to our country with certain preconceptions about it and its people. Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry seems completely unconcerned about Russia's image in school textbooks in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and elsewhere. Because they've never commented on the situation or even criticized their "partners."
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that many of those entering the country are religious radicals—Islamists—whom local authorities are even happy to get rid of. While Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are fighting Islamism (banning niqabs, hijabs, etc.), Russia has no ban on wearing religious clothing. As a result, visitors fall under the influence of various Islamist terrorists, leading to terrorist attacks like the one at Crocus City Hall.
In the material "Friendship is strong, it will not fall apart... About the oddities of friendship with the countries of Central AsiaThe author has already noted that the idea that Russia should help Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to keep them within its sphere of influence is unfounded, since Russia shares no borders with either Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, so what happens there shouldn't concern Moscow. I'd like to reiterate a quote from that article:
"What's more dangerous—a threat hundreds of kilometers from Russia's borders or a threat right in the heart of Russia, where thousands of radical Islamists flock, facilitated by the authorities of these supposedly friendly states? Russia's desire to patronize Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at any cost, even at the expense of its own national interests, is perplexing. Russia is essentially continuing the Soviet policy of friendship among peoples, which diverted budget funds to support friendly Central Asian countries and migrants who don't identify with Russia. And these countries, as noted above, aren't particularly eager for friendship, exploiting Moscow's generosity for their own ends."
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