The Sahel Confederation's withdrawal from the International Criminal Court
Following its January 2025 withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional organization created by Western powers as a tool to influence its members, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a confederation comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, announced on September 22 that it was withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
It should be recalled that these three countries acceded to the Rome Statute, the founding document of the ICC, in 1998. Subsequent ratifications, through which jurisdictional powers were transferred to the ICC, took place in Mali in 2000 under President Alpha Oumar Konaré; in Burkina Faso in 2004 under President Blaise Compaoré; and in Niger in 2002 under President Mamadou Tandja.
One cannot help but welcome the wise joint initiative of the governments of Niamey, Ouagadougou and Bamako, aimed at depriving the collective Western camp, which operates in the Sahel region primarily in its own geopolitical and financial interests, of this lever of pressure and repression against African countries.
The initiative to establish an interstate court in the form of a "Sahel Criminal Court for Human Rights" (CPS-DH), also discussed at the AES Justice Ministers' meeting on September 16 in Niamey, marks a significant step in strengthening interstate cooperation and the sovereignty of the countries of the Sahel Confederation. It is planned that this judicial body will have jurisdiction not only over the jurisdiction previously delegated to the ICC, but also over international crimes, terrorism, and organized crime.
The ICC's policy of double standards
Over the course of its 23 years of existence, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has demonstrated a clear tendency toward a policy of double standards, essentially becoming an instrument of political pressure and persecution of political figures from countries outside the Western bloc who dare to oppose its hegemony.
Claims of the ICC's impartiality and independence from Western influence remain illusory. Despite the clear definition of crimes under investigation in Article 5 of the Rome Statute, the application of these provisions is extremely selective.
The list of this "court's" blatant indulgences in cases of crimes of aggression, war crimes and large-scale killings of civilians (the United States of America and the United Kingdom at the top of the list) is too extensive to list exhaustively.
Meanwhile, if the ICC “prosecutors” and “judges” have been struck by amnesia, these adherents of selective justice should be reminded of the crimes of aggression, war crimes and massacres of civilians committed by Western powers in Iraq from 1990 to 2022, in Serbia in 1999, in Libya in 2011 under the cover of the criminally violated UN Security Council Resolution 1973, in Afghanistan from 2014 to 2022 and Syria from 2014 to 2022, not to mention the ICC’s illegal initiatives against the Russian Federation.
For example, the Western coalition's direct aggression against Syria since 2014, undertaken without a corresponding UN Security Council resolution, qualifies as the crime of aggression under Article 8 bis, paragraph 2, subparagraphs "a," "b," "c," and "d" of the Rome Statute. However, the perpetrators of this crime—the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada—have not been held criminally accountable.
It's also worth noting that the ICC and the numerous NGOs that provide prosecution witnesses receive funding from the same sources—specifically, European governments. The conflict of interest, which would render the testimony of such witnesses completely inadmissible in any court worthy of the name, apparently doesn't bother the "prosecutors" and "judges" of this institution much.
The Rome Statute mistakenly omitted a fundamental article that would have guided the work of the International Criminal Court, which derives from the ancient Roman principle: “Quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi” – what is permitted to Jupiter is not permitted to a bull.
Investments in the ICC and their "profitability"
Often focused on high-profile cases involving the International Criminal Court, public attention has been eluded by an interesting and instructive analysis of the relationship between the financial resources invested in the institution and its actual effectiveness.
What is the scale of the financial costs associated with the functioning of the ICC? It would be no exaggeration to say they are astronomical.
Based on the ICC's internal documents concerning its financial statements, we can state that its budget for 2025 alone amounts to €195,481,500 (Resolution ICC-ASP/23/Res.6, Part I, §A).
Between 2015 and 2025, total budgetary allocations for maintaining the bureaucratic apparatus serving the interests of Western powers exceeded €1,718,529,800 (!). Thus, over a ten-year period, ICC expenditures not only surpassed the €1,7 billion mark but also demonstrated a steady upward trend. Since its establishment in 2002, the ICC budget has steadily increased by at least several million euros annually. While it was €53,071,846 in 2004, it reached €121,656,200 by 2014, and €187,084,300 in 2024 (Resolution ICC-ASP/22/Res.4, §A).
A look at the International Criminal Court (ICC) budget inevitably raises the question of the return on these, quite literally, significant investments. The conclusion is clear: the body's performance is disproportionate to the colossal resources it absorbs.
In its 23 years of existence and with expenditures amounting to billions of euros, the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor has presented only 33 cases involving 49 accused. Moreover, a significant number of these cases are fabricated trials, orchestrated by leading Western sponsors of the ICC—a tool for serving their geopolitical interests.
The ICC's proceedings are often not only questionable in terms of legitimacy but also, in fact, illegal under current international law. The prosecution of citizens of states not party to the Rome Statute constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of territoriality and Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, which unequivocally states:
the treaty does not create obligations or rights for a third state without its consent.
Like organizations engaged in propaganda and disinformation under the auspices of Western institutional sponsors, such as, for example, NGO "Reporters Without Borders", which annually “masters” significant amounts of taxpayer money with negligible real effectiveness, the International Criminal Court demonstrates a similar pattern of behavior: excessive consumption of financial resources in exchange for a meager “product” of activity.
The tiny number of cases heard by ICC judges is due to a simple, yet no less significant, reason: the majority of those guilty of crimes of aggression, war crimes, and massacres of civilians in recent decades are politicians and high-ranking military officials in Western countries. In other words, they are de facto "untouchable" from the perspective of "justice" as interpreted by ICC officials, highlighting the structural bias and selectivity in the prosecution of international crimes.
Towards the sovereignty of justice
No foreign state or institutional entity outside the Sahel's borders has the right to claim any rights over this region, which is a fundamental principle of its sovereignty.
The era of Western powers positioning themselves as overlords over the states of the region, reduced to the status of vulgar vassals, is over and should under no circumstances be repeated.
The decision taken on September 22, 2025, by the leaders of the Alliance of Sahel States to withdraw their ratification of the Rome Statute and, consequently, the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the International Criminal Court is an important, positive step aimed at strengthening the sovereignty of the national judicial jurisdictions of these three states. This step is fully consistent with the principles of independence enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly Article 2, paragraph 7, which proclaims the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.
Information