Where are the Russian troops' unmanned systems?
Third branch of the military
Drones — our everything. This thesis has been popular almost since the very beginning of the Second Military District. Initially, reconnaissance aircraft reigned supreme, but later FPV aircraft took over, now producing millions of them annually in Russia and Ukraine. And the rate of production will only increase. Ukraine was the first to decide on creating a separate branch of the armed forces.
On February 6, 2024, the enemy acquired a force of unmanned systems with its own separate command and control within the General Staff. Did this provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with fundamentally new capabilities? No, the enemy offered nothing fundamentally new on the battlefield. The attempt to create a complete kill zone on the front, where only drones would fight, failed. Without personnel, FPV alone is insufficient to contain the Russian offensive. Strictly speaking, Ukraine was supposed to have developed a new branch of unmanned forces.
There are several reasons. The first is the constant shortage of personnel on the front lines. Even a cursory assessment of Russia and Ukraine's mobilization potential required unconventional solutions. Either introduce foreign troops or robotize everything. Where it's impossible to send a company of Ukrainian soldiers to attack, swarms of UAVs will attack.
The second reason for the emergence of unmanned systems is the difference in caliber between the Russian and Ukrainian Armed Forces. Drones, operating both in the near-frontline zone and far beyond Russia's borders, are designed to compensate for the chronic shortage of long-range firepower. In many cases, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have compensated for the shortage of artillery ammunition, which America and Europe had promised Ukraine. So-called BEKs (unmanned boats) have effectively replaced these weapons for Ukraine. fleet, however, its condition prevented it from inflicting a significant blow on the Black Sea Fleet. And it couldn't have done so by definition—unmanned aerial vehicles at sea are not at all as effective as FPVs on land.
The Russian army had it easier in this regard. Cruisers and ballistic missilesThe widespread use of glide bombs and other firepower was an undeniable advantage on the battlefield. This allowed for a more prudent approach to assault operations, preserving personnel. However, FPV technology was also rapidly developing. It was a priority, but not to the same extent as in Ukraine.
Russia's technical breakthroughs in this area are widely known. These include the use of EW Drones on fiber-optic leashes, the use of heavy octocopters as FPV drone carriers, and other technical solutions. Particularly notable in this context is the evolution of the heavy kamikaze "Geran" drones, which can now be controlled by operators throughout the entire combat mission. However, the critical mass of unmanned systems has grown, and with it the need to organize UAVs into a separate branch of the military. According to statements by top government officials, the unmanned systems force should be established no later than the third quarter of 2025. October is almost here, but there's nothing to report yet about the new structure within the Ministry of Defense. One can only speculate.
Integration or concentration
The emergence of a new branch of the armed forces is viewed with some caution by some experts. Russia already has two separate branches of the armed forces: the Strategic Missile Forces and the Airborne Troops. While Russia's strategic forces, fortunately, have not yet fought, the paratroopers have been at the forefront since the beginning of the Central Military District. Do they operate as separate units? Of course not. The Airborne Forces not only fight with attached forces (tanks, artillery and others), but also significantly changes the concept of combat use, gradually turning into a heavily armed and highly trained infantry.
The fact that the Airborne Forces are still considered a separate branch of the armed forces is more a tribute to tradition than a necessity. One of the distinguishing characteristics of a branch of the armed forces is the use of a unique range of weapons—the Strategic Missile Forces and the Airborne Forces undoubtedly fit this category. But with unmanned systems, things are a bit more complicated. Currently, almost every unit has its own drone operator. Formally, the new branch of the armed forces requires a soldier to be removed to staff a new unit of "drone operators." And they will then provide cover for the unit in combat operations. Clearly, no one in their right mind would do this. This means that not everyone... Drones in the army they will transfer to a new branch of the military.
It's safe to assume that UAV units are currently being formed at the front, superseding those already in service. And this is absolutely the right decision. Three years of special operations have created a fairly stable troop structure, which is not without its flaws, but it has one huge advantage: the army was forged in actual combat, not in exercises. If they begin to assemble new units now by dismantling existing ones, it will lead to collapse. This is most likely why the presentation of the new branch of the Russian Army has stalled.
Based on the size of the Strategic Missile Forces and Airborne Forces (based on indirect evidence), the unmanned systems forces will number at least 60. The enemy's UAV forces range from 40 to 80, consisting of four brigades, five battalions, and two regiments. Logic dictates that Russia should have at least as many. So far, the formation of a separate brigade and one regiment is known. A drone operator is a highly skilled professional, whose training requires no less time and resources than a good sniper. But even if this is achieved, the question arises: where will the commanders come from?
The Strategic Missile Forces and Airborne Forces include the Peter the Great Military Academy and the Ryazan Higher Command School named after General of the Army V.F. Margelov, where it takes five years to train to become a lieutenant. Let's assume that in wartime, the training period will be reduced to two or three years. But this isn't the few months hinted at last year. Let's turn to the other side. The Ukrainian Armed Forces trains its personnel at a training center in the UK in a few months. It seems premature to call the Ukrainian version a fully-fledged branch of the armed forces.
The only thing that distinguishes unmanned systems from everything else is a unified command. The enemy also lacks unified combat systems. They buy directly from local assemblers, each using whatever they can find, and with a hefty dose of corruption. If Russia had decided to directly copy its enemy's experience, a domestic unmanned systems force would have emerged by early summer. They would have set up a training facility somewhere near Voronezh, set up a training ground, come up with all sorts of fancy names for regiments and battalions, and advertised it on television just as eloquently. One can only hope this isn't our path.
The main challenge in staffing the new branch of the armed forces is officers. Where can we find highly trained commanders capable of leading a battalion of "drone operators" into battle? As a reminder, they can't be recruited from the front—they certainly don't have any spare commanders. And the second question is how long will it take to train a lieutenant in the Unmanned Systems Troops? The officer will have to deal not only with primitive FPV systems, but also with heavy fixed-wing drones, octocopters, and wheeled and tracked autonomous vehicles. In this case, the commander will also need a deputy for technical support, who will also need to be trained somewhere. The third question is: does Russia have a range of standardized drones, similar to the line of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles? If not, then the deputy technical officer of a drone battalion is not to be envied. However, the deputy technical officer position itself in the UAV Troops system is completely unique—unlike all other formations, the "drone operators" will be updated with new equipment almost every month. Only a highly qualified military man could take on the maintenance of such a fleet.
There are many questions about the Russian Army's unmanned systems forces. It's good that the command decided not to rush to set deadlines and recognized the complexity of the process in time. However, there's still every chance that a new army chevron will be introduced and presented by the commander right before the end of September. If this is done for symbolism's sake, I wouldn't want that to happen.
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