The Golden Dome and Strategic Nuclear Arms Control: A New Treaty, Cunning, and Deception?
The B-52H is the only carrier of the AGM-86B ALCM-B nuclear cruise missile in the US Air Force.
Part 1.
Speaking to reporters on February 13, President Trump expressed concern about the amount of money the United States, Russia and China are spending on nuclear weapon, stating, "We have no reason to build entirely new nuclear weapons; we already have plenty of them" and "Here we are building new nuclear weapons, and they are building nuclear weapons," referring to Russia and China (Miller and Price 2025). He then indicated that one of the first meetings he would like to hold would be with Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping to discuss nuclear weapons and "cut our military budget in half" (Miller and Price 2025).
With the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the US and Russia set to expire in February 2026, and with Russia updating and China expanding its nuclear arsenals with new munitions and new delivery systems, the Trump administration's intense focus on strategic arms control is an acknowledgement that the US is at least 35 years behind technologically, and has no prospect of "catching up and surpassing" the Russians and Chinese, despite a trillion dollars in planned investment in the nuclear industry and "new" weapons systems over the next 10 years.
During one of his visits to Moscow back in 2001 (yes, there was a time when high-ranking US officials were frequent guests), former Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld gave an interview to a Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent, in which he noted:
...Furthermore, problems with the reliability and safety of weapons could arise. Both the US and Russia have faced this problem. I can say that in the US, there are currently practically no people left who are capable of producing nuclear weapons. They have retired, and if our weapons are found to be unreliable now, it will take a long time before we can create new ones. This is a real problem.
Rumsfeld made this statement after the "last of the Mohicans" had retired - the 77-year-old head of the Livermore National Laboratory Seymour Sack - a talented physicist, the developer of the majority of those now in service in the army and on navy US nuclear charges, participant in 85 nuclear tests.
In September 1991, the US Congress dealt a crushing blow to its own nuclear defense industry by passing a law banning the development and production of new types of nuclear charges, as well as nuclear weapons testing.
All previous programs for the development and production of new munitions have been immediately terminated. Specifically, the law prohibits the development and production of nuclear warhead components—kernels made of Pu-239 (95%), U-233 (90-95%), and U-235 (90-95%) for primary modules; U-233 and U-235 elements for secondary modules; and U-238 elements for the third stage (sleeve).
The plutonium core production and shaping facilities at Savannah River Nuclear Solutions LLC (SRNS), the uranium core production facilities at Y-12 National Security Complex (equipment dismantled, workshop and storage buildings demolished) and the Hanford Site (equipment partially dismantled, the building converted into a museum of “US Nuclear Energy”) have been closed.
The law only allows for repairs to nuclear warheads, including replacement of the "non-nuclear components" of the warhead (high explosives, electronics, wiring, automation units, etc.), known as life extension projects (LEP). Essentially, for all this time, 35 years—almost an eternity—the Americans have stood still. But it's not as if they did absolutely nothing.
The New START Treaty is essential for the United States to deter the growing and sophisticated strategic nuclear forces of Russia and China. However, the existing New START Treaty expires in February 2026, and if a new agreement is not signed, Russia could potentially increase its deployed nuclear arsenal beyond the New START limit of 1,550 warheads/700 deployed delivery vehicles/800 deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles by loading several hundred stored reserve warheads onto its launchers and deploying additional advanced delivery vehicles—ICBMs and SLBMs.
Theoretically, absent treaty limitations, the United States could also load each of its deployed Trident II SLBMs with a full complement of eight W-88/Mk-5 warheads (4,840 kg throw-weight) or up to 12 W-76-1/Mk-4A warheads (4,180 kg throw-weight), but currently, on average, missiles Carry four to five warheads: either five W-76-1/Mk-4A, four W-88/Mk-5, or two W-76-1/Mk-4A and two W-88/Mk-5. Some SSBNs carry one or two missiles with one or two W76-2/Mk4A warheads. On average, each Ohio-class SSBN carries 90 warheads. Overall, the warheads at the two SSBN bases account for approximately 70% of all warheads assigned to U.S. strategic ICBM and SLBM launchers deployed under the New START Treaty.
American SLBMs deploy three types of warheads: the 90-kiloton W76–1/Mk4A, the 6–8-kiloton "tactical" W76–2/Mk4A, and the 455-kiloton LEP-trained W88 Alt 370/Mk5A. The W76–1/Mk4A is an updated version of the older W76–0/Mk4 warhead, which was used on the older UGM-96A Trident-1 SLBMs. It is obviously slightly less powerful, but has improved safety features.
In January 2019, the NNSA completed a 10-year, high-volume production run of approximately 700 W76–1/Mk4A warheads (Department of Energy, 2019). A total of 600 W76–1/Mk4A warheads, 324 W88 Alt 370/Mk5A warheads, and 25 W76–2/Mk4A warheads are deployed on SSBNs, with an additional 100 W76–1/Mk4A warheads, 60 W88 Alt 370/Mk5A warheads, and 2 W76–2/Mk4A warheads in the “active reserve.” With 14 operational SSBNs, the United States could theoretically double the number of warheads deployed on its SLBMs from 950 to 360. But do they have that much?
The W-76-1/Mk-4A warhead undergoes maintenance.
In accordance with the requirements of the new National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, the NNSA established an ambitious course of action "to recover plutonium cores and achieve reprocessing rates of at least 80 plutonium cores per year" by 2030 to meet the planned deployment schedule of new strategic launch vehicles: the LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM, the UGM-133B Trident II SLBM, and the AGM-181A LRSO cruise missile. It is important to clarify here: this refers specifically to the reprocessing of existing plutonium cores, not the production and formation of new ones stored in Department of Energy warehouses.
These are, first of all, 2700 SCUA 9 plutonium cores of the primary modules of the two-stage W-76 nuclear reactors, the number 9 being the weight of the core in pounds – 4086 grams, 384 cores of the primary modules of the Komodo three-stage W88 nuclear reactors developed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory have already completed the LEP Alt 370 program and returned to service.
Another 500 cores from Los Alamos National Laboratory's W-80-1 primary modules and 525 cores from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's W-87-0 primary modules are still to be reprocessed. However, due to the agency's persistent failure to meet project deadlines and its lack of latent large-scale plutonium core reprocessing capabilities, NNSA notified Congress in 2021—and independent analysts had long predicted—that the agency would be unable to meet the 80-core requirement at all (Demarest 2021; Government Accountability Office 2020; Institute for Defense Analyses 2019).
The UGM-133A Trident-2 SLBM dispensing unit: in the center is the body of the X-853 Hercules third-stage turbojet engine, which also serves as the dispensing unit's propulsion system. Around the engine is a ring-shaped platform with cells and W-76-0/Mk-4 warheads attached to them. The image shows the squibs, one under each warhead.
The photo shows two W80 nuclear warheads, in the foreground is a W80-0 for BGM-109A Tomahawk missiles, it is distinguished by a 100-pound titanium ring with beryllium coating around the primary module to protect the crew members of the Los Angeles-class submarine of the first (torpedo) compartment from radiation, their berths were located under the capsules with missiles, the second warhead is a W80-1 for the AGM-86B ALCM-B air-launched missile
To closely meet the annual plutonium core reprocessing requirement, the Savannah River Plutonium Core Reprocessing Plant was tasked with supplying 50 plutonium cores per year, while the remaining 30 would be purified and prepared directly at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The repurposed, never completed, mixed oxide fuel fabrication plant at the Savannah River site was originally planned to begin operation in 2030 to produce 50 cores per year, but the completion date was pushed back to 2032 to 2035 (National Nuclear Security Administration, 2021).
However, President Trump's interest and hopes for new arms control negotiations may be further complicated by one of his other priorities: expanding the nation's missile defense. On January 27, 2025, a week after taking office for a second term, President Trump issued an executive order entitled "Iron Dome for America" (later renamed by Trump "Gold Dome"), containing sweeping directives for the Department of Defense to develop proposals for a comprehensive missile and air defense system for the United States (White House, 2025).
In May, he confirmed plans to complete the project during his second term, calling the Golden Dome "the architecture for a modern system that will deploy next-generation technologies on land, at sea, and in space, including space-based sensors and interceptors" (Trump, 2025). Russia and China oppose the expansion of US missile defense; each views the untapped technological potential of American interceptors as a threat to their assured second-strike capability, and not without reason, and now Trump is proposing strategic nuclear arms reductions for both China and Russia.
Russia's position on US missile defense has only hardened since the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, as Moscow continues to view the link between strategic offensive and defensive measures as inextricable. China also views the deployment of US national missile defense with suspicion and apprehension, viewing it as a threat to strategic stability that requires a buildup of China's strategic military capabilities. Although Beijing has been less forthright in its assertion that the lack of progress on missile defense limitations is hindering arms control negotiations (Zhao and Stefanovic, 2023).
Notably, both countries are developing their own technologically advanced air and missile defense systems. These defense systems themselves possess high potential and, over time, may require greater attention from American policymakers and military officials when assessing the qualitative and quantitative adequacy of US offensive nuclear potential. However, Chinese and Russian missile defense systems are currently limited and, even in the near future, will not reduce the US ability to inflict unacceptable damage on either country, which is a crucial standard of US nuclear strategy for deterring a large-scale nuclear attack (Weaver and Wolfe, 2024).
Based on the original context and historical Given the current positions of the United States, Russia, and China, the prospect of attempts to renew strategic arms control appears bleak. However, the American administration still hopes that a new arms control agreement that serves exclusively U.S. interests, including a highly conditional balance of strategic potentials between all three nuclear powers, is possible. As the Trump administration's arms control strategy develops, American officials will need to decide how much they value limiting Russia's and China's strategic offensive weapons and how they can address Russian and Chinese concerns about U.S. missile defense.
The president's prioritization of the Golden Dome could become the necessary leverage to initiate productive discussions with CPC Chairman Xi Jinping and Russian President Putin, who are currently unwilling to engage in offensive arms limitation, regarding their shared concerns about US missile defense capabilities. President Trump's top-down, leader-to-leader approach also suggests that he can influence our side's position and attempt to soften it without sacrificing anything, while at the same time convincing the Russians to abandon what he considers the most "odious" strategic weapons. Clearly, this fate awaits the Burevestnik and Poseidon.
We absolutely must not give in on this issue. The 9M730 Burevestnik missile system, the 2M39 Poseidon supertorpedo, and the RS-28 (15A28) Sarmat ICBM must enter service and be deployed in sufficient numbers. He hopes to persuade President Putin to get rid of these weapons using satanic methods: promising in exchange to lift economic sanctions and grant Russia special preferences in promising large-scale joint economic projects, to achieve his goals in arms control negotiations. Just as US President Ronald Reagan used the same methods in 1986-87: personal charm, flattery, and the promise of all sorts of preferences, he easily deceived the extremely naive and foreign policy-inexperienced Mikhail Gorbachev to resolve pressing diplomatic issues. However, finding an agreement that meets US interests while addressing Russian and Chinese concerns about US missile defense will be challenging for the Americans.
To be continued in the next part...
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