War for Southern and Western Rus'. Battle of Drozha Field

"Streltsy" by Viktor Vasnetsov
prehistory
The beginning of the war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the campaign of 1654, was extremely successful for the tsarist army (Russian revenge; Russian army attacks; The siege and assault of Vitebsk). Poland was largely tied to the national liberation war in Southern (Little, Western) Rus', where the Russian resistance was led by the talented military leader and politician Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The Poles suffered a number of heavy defeats, but the Cossacks, too, were unable to achieve a decisive victory.
The enemy didn't expect a powerful offensive in the Smolensk direction. The Polish-Lithuanian command was counting on the fortresses to tie down the Russian troops, weakening them, and then allowing fresh Polish-Lithuanian regiments to arrive and crush the "Muscovites."
This plan failed. Some fortresses were unprepared for a siege (due to negligence and theft on the part of their commanders), while others simply surrendered, as they were inhabited by Russians, and the garrisons were dominated by Russians who preferred to negotiate with the tsar's commanders and open the gates, saving their "zhivoty" (lives and property). Only a minority fought, but this proved insufficient.
As a result, the Russian army occupied Nevel, Vitebsk, Usvyat, and Rezekne in the northwest, and Dorogobuzh, Smolensk, Orsha, Gomel, and Novy Bykhov in the west. Mogilev, Mstislavl, Roslavl, and Shklov were captured in the southwest. A total of 33 cities were liberated during the 1654 campaign.
In the southern front, Cossack and tsarist regiments repelled the Polish offensive. The mobilized forces of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were weak (many nobles did not contribute soldiers) and suffered defeat.
It was a strategic success. In October 1654, the Russian advance was halted. First, a severe epidemic broke out in Russia itself, literally devastating a number of cities, including Moscow. The situation was dire. The human and material losses were severe. But most of the population managed to survive, hiding in locked courtyards or fleeing into forests and fields. Quarantine measures and barriers prevented the spread of the epidemic to the army.
Secondly, they tried to avoid fighting in winter; troops went into winter quarters. Troops lost more men from bad weather, cold, disease, and supply problems than in battle.
Therefore, the Russian command relied on consolidating the captured lines, which was in line with the operational and tactical situation. It was necessary to give the troops rest, replenish them, and prepare for a new campaign. Garrisons were established in the captured cities, the remaining regiments were withdrawn to winter quarters, and the nobles and boyars' children were dispersed to their estates until spring.
The success, compared to the previous Russo-Lithuanian and Polish wars, was simply stunning. Warsaw, Vienna, and Rome were in shock. The Dutch, Swedes, and Danes, former enemies of the Catholics, sent congratulations to Moscow.

Polish counteroffensive
The Russian command had counted on a winter operational pause, but the situation at the front suddenly deteriorated. The Polish King Jan Kazimierz had summoned the pospolite rusz (a general gentry militia) as early as the spring of 1654, but the lords and gentry only assembled in time for the winter. Warsaw also formed an alliance with Bakhchisarai, which was concerned about the successes of the Dnieper Cossacks and Moscow. The Crimean Horde came to Poland's aid.
In the autumn of 1654, a 45-strong Lithuanian army under the command of Grand Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł launched an offensive into White Rus' (Lithuanian Rus'). It's worth remembering that the "Lithuanians-Litvins" of this period were, for the most part, Russians who found themselves under the rule of Lithuanian and Polish feudal lords. The Russian nobility in Lithuanian Rus' had already been largely assimilated, converted to Catholicism, and Polonized (language and culture).
In September, the Lithuanians recaptured Babruisk and Svisloch. In December, Radziwill, with the help of local residents, occupied Orsha. From there, the Grand Hetman of Lithuania captured Kopys and Dubrovna. Residents of such towns on the left bank of the Dnieper as Mstislav, Gory, Gorki, Radom, Krichev, and Chausy voluntarily defected to his side.
On January 2, 1655, Radziwill besieged Novy Bykhov, whose defense was led by Ivan Zolotarenko. The city was defended by a strong 6-strong Cossack garrison, and the hetman decided against an assault. The army was based on noble cavalry; there was little infantry and few cannons. Cities were taken only by those with weak defenses, or their gates were simply opened without a fight. They paused, conferred, and decided to march on Mogilev.
Polish-Lithuanian cavalry units attempted to attack in the northwest, near Vitebsk, Polotsk, Disna, and Nevel. In January 1655, Polish colonels Samuel Lukomski and Karol Lisowski conducted a raid that devastated the Polotsk and Disna counties. In Ozerishchi, the townspeople rebelled, killing 36 Russian soldiers and capturing the local commander.
On February 19, Lukomsky's detachment stormed Vitebsk, but was unsuccessful. Voivode Matvey Sheremetev routed the enemy force. Lukomsky was wounded, and his 300-cart convoy was captured by the Russians. Further enemy attacks were repelled by Russian forces. In particular, attempts to take the fortresses of Disna and Nevel were repelled. In April, Russian commanders laid siege to Dinaburg but failed to take it.

Józef Brandt. "Rider of the Polish Armored Cavalry." 1890.
Southern Front. Battle of Tremor Field
In the south, Polish-Crimean forces were advancing. The Poles—the army of Grand Crown Hetman Stanisław Rivera Potocki and Full Crown Hetman Stanisław Lanckoroński—were 30 strong. The Crimeans—the army of the Crimean Khan Mehmed IV Giray—were 30 strong, led by Kamambet-Murza (since March, Kalga-Sultan, or heir to the throne). The Polish command planned, with the help of the Crimean Horde, to defeat the Cossacks and reoccupy Little Russia (Southern Rus').
In November 1654, Polish troops entered the lands of the Bratslav Regiment. The Polish Crown Army, led by Crown Wagon Master S. Czarnecki, raided Bratslav. In battles in late November and early December, the Poles were repelled from Bratslav by a large force of Cossacks (over 10 men) led by the army captain V. Tomilenko and, after his death, by Colonel Ya. Voronchenko. However, in the face of the approaching Polish-Tatar forces, the Cossacks abandoned Bratslav and retreated to Uman.
The Polish lords, awaiting the Crimeans, camped on the Southern Bug. In December, the Crimean Tatars of Kamambet-Murza approached the Poles. The Polish lords acted as butchers and punitive forces, as before, trying to crush the rebellion of their "khlops" (slaves) in blood. The town of Busha refused to surrender. It was stormed. The Poles carried out a massacre, impaling and disemboweling thousands of people. The same fate befell local towns and villages.
On January 14, 1655, the Poles besieged Uman and unsuccessfully attempted to take it until the 19th. The Tatars and Crimeans also besieged Colonel Pushkarenko in Akhmatovo (Okhmatov).
Hetman Khmelnytsky advanced from Fastiv to Korsun. But Bohdan had with him only those Cossacks who could be quickly assembled; the rest had dispersed to their towns and farmsteads for the winter. Lacking the strength to assist the Bratslav Regiment, the hetman requested assistance from the Russian commanders.
At the end of 1654, the tsar's army, led by the voivodes Vasily Sheremetev and Andrei Buturlin, arrived in Little Rus' to reinforce the Cossacks. Fyodor Kurakin's garrison was stationed in Kyiv.
On January 13, Sheremetev's regiments joined forces with Hetman Khmelnytsky at Korsun. The troops then advanced to Stavishchi. On January 19 (29), the Russian army (approximately 50 men – Sheremetev's 9-12 infantry and 38 Cossacks) under the command of Khmelnytsky and Sheremetev met the Polish-Crimean army at Akhmatov (Okhmatov).
The clash with the Polish Crown Army took place between Okhmatov and Zhashkov, and the battlefield became known as “Trembling Field” – from the roar artillery and from the freezing weather during the battle. The battle lasted from January 19 to 22 (January 29 – February 1). Initially, the superior forces of the Polish-Crimean cavalry routed the Cossack cavalry.
However, the Cossacks and the Tsar's infantry dug in at the gulyai-pole (a mobile fortification made up of wagons and reinforced with field positions—ditches, ramparts, and trenches). Ivan Bohun's regiment broke through to the hetman's aid.
The Poles, having lost most of their infantry in fierce assaults, were forced to retreat. The proud Polish nobles were unwilling to dismount and face certain death. The Crimeans, however, preferred to plunder villages, unwilling to die in fruitless attacks. However, their presence ensured the numerical superiority and mobility of the Polish-Crimean army. In the battle near Akhmatov, approximately 15 men on both sides were killed.
The Poles lifted the siege of Uman and Akhmatov. Having suffered setbacks at Akhmatov, the Polish hetmans sent the remnants of their infantry and artillery to Shargorod and Kamenets-Podolsky, and abandoned their forces, handing over command to K. Tyszkiewicz and S. Czarnecki.
The Crimean Murzas did not support Czarniecki's plan to launch a "small war" with cavalry against the Russian-Cossack forces and instead focused solely on plundering the Bratslav region and carrying off thousands of prisoners. In March, the Kalga-Sultan's main forces joined the advance Crimean army, driving away the remnants of the population, forcing the Poles to besiege and capture the remaining towns and villages. They also managed to destroy the Cossack ships prepared for the march to Crimea.
At the end of March, most of the Crimeans returned to Crimea with the "yasyr." Contemporaries estimated the loss of life among the southern Russian population at 300–400 people, with hundreds of villages and towns destroyed.
The troops of Khmelnitsky and Sheremetev were only able to defend the Dnieper and Left Bank regions, positioned near Uman, Stavishchi and Bila Tserkva, preparing for the summer campaign of 1655.
Thus, the Poles, in alliance with the Crimean Horde, were unable to turn the tide in their favor in the southern direction and reclaim Ruthenia. In the decisive Battle of Drozha-Pole, the Polish forces were stopped. Furthermore, Poland's main forces were seriously weakened in anticipation of the summer campaign of 1655.
At the same time, the failure of Potocki's army's offensive in the south had a negative impact on the operations of the Lithuanian hetman Radziwill in Lithuania, who was now unable to interact with the main forces of the Polish king.
The Crimean Horde received the main benefit: minimal losses during the devastation of the Bratlov region and part of the Kiev region, and enormous booty.
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