Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in 2025
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has published its annual report on the state of Pakistan's nuclear forces, in its "Nuclear Notebook" column. The report was prepared by a team of authors led by Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Nuclear weapon Pakistan, 2025. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 81(5), 386–408.
This column looks at the state of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, reporting that the country currently has a stockpile of about 170 warheads, and at the current rate of growth, that number could rise to about 200 by the late 2020s.
Pakistan continues to gradually modernize its nuclear arsenal, introducing improved and new delivery systems, as well as developing fissile material production. Analysis of commercial satellite images of construction in missile Pakistan Air Force garrisons and bases show new launchers and facilities that could be linked to Pakistan's nuclear forces, although there is very little reliable information about Pakistan's nuclear forces.
FAS estimates that Pakistan has produced approximately 170 nuclear warheads, a total unchanged from the last estimate by the experts in 2023. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency projected in 1999 that Pakistan would have 2020 to 60 warheads by 80 (DIA (1999, 38)), but several new weapons systems have been fielded and developed since then, allowing for a higher estimate. The FAS estimate is subject to considerable uncertainty because neither Pakistan nor other countries publish detailed information about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
With several new delivery systems in development, four plutonium-producing reactors, and an expanding uranium enrichment infrastructure, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could grow over the next few years. The extent of this growth will depend on a number of factors, including the number of nuclear-capable ballistic missile and cruise missile launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, the evolution of its nuclear strategy, and the growth of India’s nuclear arsenal. Experts estimate that the country’s nuclear arsenal could reach approximately 2020 warheads by the late 200s. However, unless India expands its arsenal or continues to build up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to not grow significantly and may stabilize as its current weapons programs are completed.
Research methodology
The estimates and analyses in this Nuclear Notebook are based on a combination of open sources:
(1) data from government sources (e.g. government statements, declassified documents, budget information, and military parade data);
(2) data from non-governmental sources (e.g. media reports, think tank analysis, and industry publications);
(3) commercial satellite imagery. Because each of these sources provides different and limited information subject to varying degrees of uncertainty, we cross-check each data item using multiple sources and supplement them with personal interviews with officials whenever possible.
Analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear forces is particularly uncertain given the lack of official data provided by the state. The Pakistani government has never publicly disclosed the size of its arsenal and does not generally comment on its nuclear doctrine. Unlike some other nuclear states, Pakistan does not regularly publish any official documents explaining the basic tenets of its nuclear strategy or doctrine.
Whenever such details surface in public discourse, they usually come from retired officials commenting on them in their personal capacity. The most consistent official source of information about Pakistan's nuclear weapons is the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media arm of the Pakistan Armed Forces, which regularly issues press releases about missile launches and sometimes accompanies them with video footage of the launches.
From time to time, other countries publish official statements or analyses about Pakistan’s nuclear forces. For example, the US Air Force’s Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat Reports provide analyses of Pakistan’s missile forces. As a regional competitor to Pakistan, Indian officials also occasionally make claims about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, although such claims should be taken with a grain of salt as they are often politically motivated. Similarly, Indian media outlets often either exaggerate or downplay Pakistan’s arsenal, depending on the desired effect and audience. Pakistani media outlets also tend to frequently embellish information when describing the country’s arsenal. There are very few publications that researchers can turn to for reliable information about Pakistan’s nuclear forces, and any rumor should be carefully verified.
In the absence of reliable data, commercial satellite imagery has become a particularly important resource for analyzing Pakistan's nuclear forces. Satellite imagery allows for the identification of air bases, missile bases, and naval bases, as well as potential underground facilities. The biggest challenge in analyzing Pakistan's nuclear forces using satellite imagery is the lack of reliable data to verify the information obtained from the imagery, particularly regarding whether specific military bases are associated with nuclear, conventional, or both.
Overall, the lack of precise data on Pakistan's nuclear forces results in a lower degree of confidence in the estimates in this edition of the Nuclear Notebook than in those of most other nuclear-armed countries.
Nuclear Doctrine of Pakistan
Pakistan has historically maintained a deliberately ambiguous nuclear doctrine, including refusing to endorse or reject a no-first-use policy. When President Asif Ali Zardari was asked in 2008 whether Pakistan would adopt a no-first-use policy, he responded, “I am totally against nuclear war. Absolutely.” Although he did not say so directly, the statement was interpreted as an endorsement of such a policy, and the military opposed it (NDTV, 2011).
However, in May 2024, retired Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, former head and current adviser to Pakistan's National Command Authority, which oversees the development, doctrine and use of nuclear weapons, speaking at a seminar at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad, in what appeared to be a clear rejection of the no-first-use policy, stated:
"Pakistan does not have a no-first-use policy, and I will repeat this for emphasis. Pakistan does not have a no-first-use policy...
There should never be any doubt in anyone's mind, friend or foe, that Pakistan's operational nuclear capability gives every Pakistani leader the freedom, the dignity and the courage to look India straight in the eye without blinking an eye."
There should never be any doubt in anyone's mind, friend or foe, that Pakistan's operational nuclear capability gives every Pakistani leader the freedom, the dignity and the courage to look India straight in the eye without blinking an eye."
This apparent rejection of the no-first-use policy by a former senior Pakistani military official follows increasing debate in recent years about India's commitment to the no-first-use policy (Kristensen et al., 2024).
As part of its broader philosophy of "credible minimum deterrence," which emphasizes a defensive and limited but flexible nuclear doctrine, Pakistan operates under a nuclear doctrine it calls "full-spectrum deterrence." This doctrine is primarily aimed at deterring India, which Pakistan views as its primary adversary. The belief that Pakistan's nuclear weapons have deterred India since the mid-1990s has reinforced the importance of nuclear weapons in the national security system over the years (Kidwai 2020, 2). In May 2023, Kidwai delivered a speech at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), where he presented his description of this doctrine. According to Kidwai (2023), "full-spectrum deterrence" implies:
“Pakistan has a full range of nuclear weapons in three categories: strategic, operational and tactical, with full coverage of India’s vast territory and its outlying areas; India’s strategic weapons have nowhere to hide.
Pakistan has an arsenal of weapons with a yield measured in kilotons (kt), and these figures are highly classified to deter the enemy's declared policy of massive retaliation; therefore, Pakistan's "counter-massive retaliation" could be just as serious, if not more so.
Pakistan retains freedom to choose from a full range of targets in “target-rich India,” regardless of Indian [missile defense] or Russian S-400s, including counter-counterforce, counter-force and battlefield targets.”
Pakistan has an arsenal of weapons with a yield measured in kilotons (kt), and these figures are highly classified to deter the enemy's declared policy of massive retaliation; therefore, Pakistan's "counter-massive retaliation" could be just as serious, if not more so.
Pakistan retains freedom to choose from a full range of targets in “target-rich India,” regardless of Indian [missile defense] or Russian S-400s, including counter-counterforce, counter-force and battlefield targets.”
According to Kidwai, the “full spectrum” of Pakistan’s deterrence policy encompasses both “horizontal” and “vertical” elements. The horizontal dimension refers to Pakistan’s emerging nuclear “triad” comprising the Army Strategic Command, the Naval Strategic Command, and the Air Force Strategic Command. The vertical dimension refers to three levels of destructive power—“strategic, operational, and tactical”—and a strike range “from zero meters to 2750 kilometers,” allowing Pakistan to strike across India (Kidwai, 2023).
Kidwai and other former Pakistani officials have explained that this policy, particularly with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons, is a response to India’s alleged “Cold Start” doctrine (Kidwai 2020). The Cold Start doctrine is India’s alleged plan to potentially launch large-scale conventional strikes or incursions into Pakistani territory without provoking a nuclear retaliatory strike from Pakistan. Pakistan has responded to this alleged doctrine by fielding several short-range nuclear-capable weapons systems specifically designed to counter military threats below the strategic level.
An example of such a low-yield, short-range nuclear capability is Pakistan's Nasr ballistic missile (also known as the Hatf-9). In 2015, Kidwai stated that the Nasr was specifically "born out of the obsession I mentioned about some people on the other side toying with the idea of finding space for a conventional war despite Pakistan's nuclear weapons" (Kidwai 2015).
According to Kidwai, Pakistan's understanding of India's "cold start" strategy was that Delhi envisioned launching rapid strikes against Pakistan within two to four days by eight to nine brigades simultaneously: a striking force that would include approximately 32 to 000 troops.
"I firmly believe that by introducing tactical nuclear weapons diversity into Pakistan's arsenal and into the debate on strategic stability, we have blocked the avenues for serious military operations by the other side,"
— explained Kidwai (2015).Following Kidwai's 2015 statement, Pakistani Foreign Minister Aizaz Chaudhary publicly acknowledged Pakistan's possession of "low-yield tactical nuclear weapons," apparently the first time a senior government official had done so (India Today 2015). At that time, the tactical missiles had not yet been deployed, but their purpose was further clarified by Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja M. Asif in an interview with Geo News in September 2016:
"We are constantly pressured, time and again, that we have more tactical weapons than we need. It is internationally recognized that we have superiority, and if there is a threat to our security, or if someone sets foot on our soil, and if someone's plans pose a threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use these weapons in our defense" (Scroll, 2016).
One study argues that in developing its non-strategic nuclear strategy, Pakistan to some extent emulated NATO's flexible response strategy without necessarily understanding how it would work (Tasleem and Dalton, 2019).
Pakistan's nuclear posture, particularly its development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, has raised serious concerns in other countries, including the United States, which fears it increases the risk of escalation and lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in a military conflict with India.
Pakistani officials, for their part, dismiss concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons modernization. In 2021, then-Prime Minister Imran Khan said he was “not sure whether we are increasing the nuclear arsenal or not because, as far as I know… the only purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is non-offensive.” He added that “Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is only a deterrent, for self-defense” (Laskar 2021).
Nuclear safety, command and control, and crisis management
Over the past decade and a half, the US assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons security appears to have shifted significantly from confidence to concern, particularly with the addition of tactical nuclear weapons to Pakistan’s arsenal. This concern has even reportedly prompted the Pentagon to develop contingency plans for losing control of its nuclear weapons, despite Pakistani officials repeatedly challenging the notion that its nuclear weapons are insufficiently secure (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011; MacAskill, 2007).
Samar Mubarik Mund, former director of the country's National Defence Complex, explained in 2013 that Pakistan's nuclear warhead "is only assembled at the last moment if it is to be launched. It is stored in three or four different parts in three or four different places. If the nuclear weapon does not need to be launched, it will never be available in its assembled form" (World Bulletin, 2013).
Despite Pakistan’s recent steps to strengthen the security of military bases and installations, then US President Joe Biden said in October 2022 that Pakistan was “one of the most dangerous countries in the world” due to its lack of “cohesion” on nuclear security and command and control procedures. Pakistan quickly and forcefully rejected this statement (Z. Khan, 2022).
After years of publicly expressing concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported in 2018 that "Islamabad is taking steps to strengthen its nuclear security and is aware of the extremist threat to its program" (Stewart, 2017).
Since then, the DIA has not publicly expressed concerns about the security of Pakistan’s arsenal. The 2025 assessment predicted that Pakistan “will continue its military modernization efforts, including the development of nuclear weapons, to offset India’s conventional military advantage,” but did not mention the escalation and security risks associated with such efforts (Kruse 2025).
Nuclear policy and operational decision-making in Pakistan are under the authority of the National Command Authority (NCA), headed by the prime minister and comprising both senior military and civilian officials. Within the NCA, the primary nuclear body is the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which a former SPD director for arms control and disarmament described as "a unique organization, unmatched by any other nuclear-weapon state. From operational planning, weapons development, storage, budgeting, arms control, diplomacy, and policy related to civilian applications in energy, agriculture, medicine, and more—all are under the direction and control of the SPD."
In addition, the SPD is “responsible for nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine. It develops the strategy for the development of the tri-service strategic forces, operational planning at the joint service level, and oversees the movement and deployment of all nuclear forces. The SPD implements the NCA’s nuclear use decisions through its [nuclear command, control, and communications] systems” (FH Khan 2019).
In recent years, the National Command Council has convened several times in response to escalating tensions and crises between India and Pakistan. For example, the NCA was convened after India and Pakistan erupted in open hostilities in February 2019, when Indian fighter jets dropped bombs near the Pakistani town of Balakot in retaliation for a terrorist attack carried out by a Pakistan-based militant group. In retaliation, Pakistani jets shot down and captured an Indian pilot, returning him a week later and convening the National Command Council. Following the meeting, a senior Pakistani official made what appeared to be a thinly veiled nuclear threat:
“I hope you know what [the National Command] means and what it represents. I said we will surprise you. Expect this surprise. … You have chosen the path of war without realizing the consequences for peace and security in the region” (Abbasi 2019).
In his memoirs published in January 2023, former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo referred to the February 2019 crisis, saying that India and Pakistan were “close” to a “nuclear conflagration” (Biswas, 2023).
The Pakistani Prime Minister was reported to have convened a meeting of the National Counter-Terrorism Council (NCA) on May 10, 2025, apparently in response to India's attack on Pakistani military bases during Operation Sindoor (Reuters, 2025). However, the Pakistani Defense Minister later downplayed the significance of the meeting, telling Pakistani television, "Let's not talk about it—we should treat it as a very distant possibility, we shouldn't even discuss it in the short term," before claiming that the meeting never actually took place (ARY News, 2025).
India-Pakistan conflict 2025
In May 2025, a brief conflict erupted between India and Pakistan, during which India launched conventional missile strikes against several Pakistani military installations. The conflict, which lasted several days, included an escalation of fire on both sides following a terrorist attack on April 22 in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir.
Following the conflict, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and the Pakistan Engineering Services, which carries out construction and repair work for all branches of the Pakistani military, awarded a number of public procurement contracts for post-strike repairs at various military bases, specifying which facilities had been damaged by the conflict (Mishra 2025).
The list of bases included the Pakistan Air Force's Shahbaz, Nur Khan, and Masroor bases, home to squadrons of Pakistani F-16, JF-17, and Mirage aircraft, respectively. Notably, the list also included facilities at the Sargodha complex, which includes a missile training garrison and is located in and around the Kirana Hills—an area historically associated with Pakistan's nuclear program, which today includes underground entrances to facilities for potential weapons and missile handling. Tenders for Sargodha included runway resurfacing work, which is notable since Sargodha is also one of Pakistan's F-16 bases, previously assessed as having nuclear capabilities.
During the conflict, video footage taken by local residents showed at least one explosion in the Kirana Hills area, although no one appeared to be injured or infrastructure damaged. However, the marshal aviation India denied that the facility was the target, saying, “The Indian Air Force does not know what is there and did not strike it” (Business Today 2025). Given how India and Pakistan subsequently downplayed the incident, the explosion may have been unintentional.
One study concluded that although “mutual possession of nuclear weapons shaped much of the response on both sides” and “overt nuclear signaling was lower than in many previous crises between India and Pakistan, … the crisis highlights South Asia as one of the most likely theatres of nuclear war, even if such a prospect was not inevitable in this case” (Clary, 2025).
Fissile Materials, Warheads and Missile Production
Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile material production complex that is constantly expanding. It includes four heavy-water plutonium production reactors at the Khushab complex, three of which were completed in the past 15 years. According to one estimate, the fourth and newest reactor may have a capacity nearly twice that of the other three (Albright et al., 2018). The proposed reprocessing plant at Chasma may already be completed, although its operational status is unclear (Hyatt and Burkhard, 2020).
Highly enriched uranium production occurs at the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant east of Islamabad, and a possible second enrichment plant may have been completed at Gadwal north of Islamabad (Albright, Burkhard, and Pabian 2018). However, uncertainty about the capacity and operational status of Pakistan's uranium resources is significant (International Panel on Fissile Materials 2025).
Little is known about Pakistan's nuclear warhead production, but experts have long suspected that Pakistani weapons factories in the Wah area, northwest of Islamabad, play a role. One of the factories in Wah is located next to a unique facility with six earthen bunkers (igloos) inside a multi-layered security perimeter with armed guards.
A common simplification in estimating the quantity of Pakistani nuclear weapons is to derive the estimate directly from the amount of weapons-grade fissile material produced. The International Fissile Materials Panel estimates that, as of early 2024, Pakistan's stockpile consisted of approximately 5300 kilograms of weapons-grade (90 percent) highly enriched uranium (HEU) and approximately 580 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium (International Fissile Materials Panel, 2025).
Assuming that each first-generation implosion-type warhead uses 15–18 kg of weapon-grade HEU or 5–6 kg of plutonium in its solid core, this fissile material would theoretically be sufficient to produce a maximum of approximately 211–453 single-stage HEU ("gun-type") warheads and 96–116 single-stage highly enriched plutonium-239 ("implosion-type") warheads when the fissile material is completely consumed, or theoretically sufficient to produce a total of 308–569 warheads.
However, it is important to note that calculating the stockpile size solely based on fissile material stockpiles is incomplete and tends to overestimate the likely number of nuclear warheads. Instead, estimating the number of warheads requires taking into account a number of factors beyond the amount of fissile material produced, including the choice of warhead design and its effectiveness (Pakistan's warhead designs may have undergone some modifications and become more effective), the rate of warhead production, the number of operational nuclear-capable launchers, the number of dual-capable launchers, and nuclear doctrine. Therefore, as described above, we estimate the actual number of warheads produced to be lower—possibly around 170.
Estimates of the number of nuclear warheads must also assume that not all of Pakistan’s fissile material is used to produce weapons. Like other nuclear-armed states, Pakistan likely holds some fissile material in reserve. Furthermore, Pakistan does not have enough nuclear-capable launchers to accommodate several hundred warheads. Moreover, all of Pakistan’s launchers are believed to be dual-capable, meaning that some, particularly shorter-range systems, can perform non-nuclear missions. Finally, official statements often use the terms “warheads” and “weapons” interchangeably, leading to ambiguity as to whether they refer to the number of launchers or the warheads assigned to them.
The amount of fissile material in warheads and their size can be reduced, and their yield increased, by using tritium to "boost" the fission process. Pakistan's tritium production capacity is poorly understood due to a lack of reliable publicly available information. One study conducted in early 2021 estimated that Pakistan could produce 2020 grams of tritium by the end of 690, which is hypothetically enough to boost more than 100 nuclear weapons. The study found that warheads produced for the Babur and Ra'ad cruise missiles, as well as the Nasr and Abdali missiles, would almost certainly require small and lightweight tritium-boosted nuclear weapons (Jones, 2021).
Experts estimate that Pakistan currently produces enough fissile material to build 14-27 new warheads per year, although the actual increase in the number of warheads in the arsenal is likely to average around 5-10 warheads per year.
Nuclear-capable missiles and their mobile launchers are developed and manufactured at the National Defence Complex (sometimes called the National Development Complex), located in the Qala Chitta Dhahr mountain range west of Islamabad. The complex is divided into two sections. The western section, south of Attock, appears to be involved in the development, production and test firing of missiles and rocket engines.
Satellite images show that as of July 2025, construction of a new Missile Test Launch Complex XNUMX was underway. The eastern section north of Fateh Jang is used to manufacture and assemble mobile transporter-launchers, which are used to transport and launch missiles. Satellite images regularly show the presence of vehicle chassis for a variety of ballistic and cruise missiles, including the Shaheen ballistic missile and the Babur cruise missile.
The Fateh Janga section has expanded significantly over the past 10 years, with several new launcher assembly buildings being constructed, and the complex continues to expand. Other launcher and missile production and maintenance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and Taxila.
Nuclear-capable aircraft and air-launched weapons
The aircraft most likely to perform the nuclear weapons delivery function are Pakistan's Mirage III and Mirage V fighter squadrons. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Mirage fighter-bombers are stationed at two bases. Masroor Air Base outside Karachi is home to the 32nd Wing, with three Mirage squadrons: No. 7 Squadron (Bandits), No. 8 Squadron (Haiders), and No. 22 Squadron (Ghazis). Masroor may house a high-readiness hangar with an underground nuclear weapons storage facility, although the role of this facility is uncertain. A potential nuclear weapons storage site is located 5 kilometers northwest of the base (Kristensen 2009), although its function is uncertain.
Another Mirage base is Rafiki Air Base near Shorkot, home to the 34th Wing with two Mirage squadrons: 15th (Cobras) and 27th (Zarras). On 25 February 2021, then-President of Pakistan Arif Alvi visited the base for the 50th Anniversary of the Mirage Award and the Banner of Excellence ceremony, where at least 11 Mirages were on display (President of Pakistan, 2021).
The Mirage V is expected to be used as a strike aircraft, part of Pakistan's small arsenal of free-fall nuclear bombs, while the Mirage III has been used to test-fire Pakistan's Ra'ad air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), as well as the later Ra'ad-II. The Pakistan Air Force has equipped the Mirage with an air-to-air refuelling capability, which will greatly enhance its nuclear strike missions (AFP 2018). Several Mirages displayed at an awards ceremony at Rafiqi Air Base in 2021 appeared to be fitted with air-to-air refuelling probes.
The Ra'ad dual-capable air-launched ALCM is believed to have been tested at least seven times, most recently in February 2020. The Pakistani government claims that the Ra'ad "can deliver nuclear and conventional warheads with great precision" (ISPR 2011) over a range of 350 kilometers and "complements Pakistan's deterrence capability" by achieving "a strategic standoff capability on land and at sea" (ISPR 2016).
During a military parade in 2017, Pakistan displayed what was said to be the Ra'ad-II ALCM, apparently an improved version of the original Ra'ad with a new engine inlet and tail configuration (B. Khan 2017). The Pakistani government last tested the Ra'ad-II in February 2020 and stated that the missile could reportedly reach targets as far as 600 kilometers away (ISPR 2020). Both the Ra'ad-I and Ra'ad-II systems were unveiled at the 2024 Pakistan Day parade. All test launches of the Ra'ad systems are believed to have been conducted from Mirage III aircraft, although the Ra'ad missile has also been spotted on the JF-17.
There is no evidence to suggest that any of the Ra'ad systems have been operationally deployed as of July 2025; however, one potential deployment site could eventually be Masroor Air Base outside Karachi, where several Mirage squadrons are based.
To replace the Pakistan Air Force's aging Mirage III and V aircraft, Pakistan has acquired over 100 operational JF-17 aircraft, which are co-produced with China, and plans to acquire approximately 188 more JF-17s (Aamir 2022; Gady 2020; Quwa 2021; Warnes 2020). These aircraft are continuously being upgraded with new technology "blocks." Pakistan reportedly inducted the first batch of 12 JF-17 Block III aircraft into No. 16 Squadron (Black Panthers) in March 2023 (Tiwari 2023).
In March 2023, during rehearsals for the 2023 Pakistan Day parade (which was subsequently cancelled), images surfaced of a JF-17 Thunder Block II carrying what appeared to be a Ra'ad-I ALCM, the first time such a configuration had been seen (Scramble 2023). This suggests that Pakistan has made significant progress in equipping its JF-17s with capabilities that will eventually complement, and possibly replace, the nuclear strike role of the aging Mirage III/V (Johns 2024). However, further evidence is still needed to confirm the future nuclear status of the JF-17.
The nuclear capability of the Pakistan Air Force’s aging F-16As is unclear. Although Pakistan was contractually obligated by the United States not to modify the aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, numerous credible reports subsequently emerged indicating Pakistan’s intention to do so (Associated Press, 1989). In September 2022, the Biden administration agreed to a $450 million deal to support Pakistan’s F-16 program (US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2022).
F-16A/B fighters are based with the 38th Wing at Mushaf Air Base (formerly Sargodha), located 160 kilometers northwest of Lahore in northeastern Pakistan. Organized into Nos. 9 and 11 Squadrons (Griffins and Arrows, respectively), these aircraft have a range of 1600 kilometers (increased with drop tanks) and are likely equipped to carry a single nuclear bomb on the centerline pylon. If the F-16s are tasked with a nuclear strike, the gravity-fed nuclear bombs attached to them are likely stored not at the base itself, but potentially at the Sargodha Weapons Storage Complex, located 10 kilometers to the south, or at another underground facility. In a crisis, the bombs could be quickly deployed to the base, or the F-16s could be dispersed to bases near underground storage facilities and receive the weapons there. Pakistan appears to be fortifying ammunition storage bunkers, adding new tunnels, and establishing additional security perimeters at the Sargodha complex.
The newest F-16C/Ds are based with the 39th Wing at Shahbaz Air Base outside Jacobabad in northern Pakistan. The wing upgraded from Mirages to F-2011C/Ds in 16 and currently has one squadron: No. 5 Squadron (known as the Falcons). The base has undergone significant expansion, with numerous weapons bunkers added since 2004. As for the F-16A/Bs, if the base is carrying out a nuclear mission, the weapons attached to the F-16C/Ds are likely stored elsewhere in special storage facilities. A few F-16s can also be seen at Minhas Air Base in Kamra, northwest of Islamabad, although these may be related to the aviation industry at the base. F-16Cs were on display at the 2022 Pakistan Day parade.
Despite the F-16 reports and the recent image of a Ra'ad ALCM mounted on a JF-17, there are still too many uncertainties surrounding these two aircraft to confidently assign them a special nuclear strike role. As a result, the Pakistan Air Force's F-16s are not included in the list.
In this issue of the Nuclear Notebook, the JF-17 is listed with considerable uncertainty.
Ground-launched ballistic missiles
Pakistan currently appears to have six types of solid-fuel ballistic missile systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons: the short-range Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-I/A (Hatf-4), and Nasr (Hatf-9), and the medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5) and Shaheen-II (Hatf-6). Two more nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems are currently under development: the Shaheen-III (Hatf-3) and the multiple warhead Ababiel. All Pakistani nuclear-capable missiles, except Abdali and Ghaznavi, were unveiled at Pakistan's Independence Day parade in March 2024 (HUM News 2024).
Pakistan’s dirt-road missile force has grown and expanded significantly over the past two decades. It comprises perhaps eight or nine missile garrisons, including four or five along the border with India for short-range systems (Babur, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-I, Nasr) and three or four more inland for medium-range systems (Shaheen-II and Ghauri).
The Abdali (Hatf-2) solid-fuel, single-stage, short-range ballistic missile was in development for a long time, and in 1997 the Pentagon reported that work on the missile had apparently ceased. Test launches resumed, limited to seven launches between 2002 and 2013, but were then suspended until May 3, 2025, when the Pakistani military announced it would conduct another test launch (Government of Pakistan, 2025). The test took place during the height of an armed border dispute with India. The range of the Abdali missile, which has been demonstrated several times on a four-axle mobile transporter-launcher (TMLV), was previously reported by the Pakistani government to be 180 kilometers. However, after the latest test, the government stated that the missile's range is 450 kilometers (Government of Pakistan, 2025).
The Pakistani government has repeatedly claimed that the Abdali missile is nuclear-capable. Following the 2013 test, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) stated that the Abdali “carries both nuclear and conventional warheads” and “provides operational capability to Pakistan’s Strategic Forces” (ISPR, 2013). Furthermore, the test launch “strengthens Pakistan’s deterrence capabilities at both operational and strategic levels.” Following the latest test in May 2025, the national leadership “expressed full confidence in the operational readiness and technical competence of Pakistan’s Strategic Forces to ensure credible minimum deterrence and safeguard national security against any aggression” (Government of Pakistan, 2025).
The Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) solid-fuel, short-range, single-stage missile was tested in 2019, 2020, and twice in 2021, marking the first recorded test launches since 2014. The 2019 night launch of the Ghaznavi marked a major milestone in testing Pakistan’s nuclear readiness. Following each test, the Pakistani military claimed that the Ghaznavi was “capable of delivering a variety of warhead types to a range of up to 290 kilometers” (ISPR 2019, 2020, 2021). The short range means that the Ghaznavi cannot strike Delhi from Pakistani territory, and army units equipped with the missile are likely based relatively close to the Indian border (Kristensen 2016).
The Shaheen-I (Hatf-4) is a single-stage, solid-fueled, short-range, dual-capable ballistic missile with a maximum range of 650 kilometers, in service since 2003. The Shaheen-I is mounted on a four-axle mobile launcher similar to that used for the Ghaznavi. Since 2012, many Shaheen-I test launches have included an extended-range version, commonly known as the Shaheen-IA. The Pakistani government, which claims the Shaheen-IA has a range of 900 kilometers, has used both designations. Pakistan last test-launched the Shaheen-I in November 2019, and the Shaheen-IA in March and November 2021 (ISPR 2019, 2021). Potential deployment sites for the Shaheen-1 include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Akil. The Shaheen-I was displayed at the 2021 Pakistan Day parade, but was replaced by the Shaheen-IA for the 2022 and 2024 parades and has not been displayed since, suggesting the possible adoption of the latter system (ISPR 2021, 2022).
One of the most controversial new nuclear-capable missiles in Pakistan’s arsenal is the Nasr (Hatf-9), a short-range solid-fuel missile with an initial range of only 60 kilometers, which has been increased to 70 kilometers (ISPR 2017). However, since its range is too short to attack strategic targets inside India, the Nasr appears to be intended solely for defensive use on the battlefield against invading Indian forces. According to the Pakistani government, the Nasr “carries nuclear warheads of adequate yield with high precision, firing and diversion characteristics” and was developed as a “rapid response system” to “add deterrent value” to Pakistan’s program to develop strategic weapons “at shorter ranges to deter emerging threats,” including, apparently, India’s so-called cold start doctrine (ISPR 2011, 2017). Later tests of the Nasr system, including two tests conducted in the same week in January 2019, were intended to demonstrate the multiple launch capabilities of the system as well as the maneuverability of the missiles in flight (ISPR 2019).
The Nasr system's four-axle mobile launcher is equipped with a four-carrier launcher. The US intelligence community listed the Nasr system as a deployed system in 2013 (National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2013), and based on reports of 15 test flights, the system appears to be well-developed. Potential deployment sites include Gujranwala, Okar, and Pano Akil.
The Shaheen-II (Hatf-6) two-stage, solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile appears to be operational after years of development. Pakistan’s National Defense Complex has been assembling Shaheen-II launchers since at least 2004 or 2005 (Kristensen, 2007), and a 2020 U.S. intelligence community report stated that Pakistan has deployed “fewer than 50” Shaheen-II launchers (National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2020). Following a test launch in May 2019, the Pakistani government reported a range of only 1500 kilometers, but the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) continues to claim the Shaheen-II has a range of 2000 kilometers (ISPR, 2019a; National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2020).
The last test launch took place in August 2024. According to the Pakistani government, it was "for the purpose of training troops, validating various technical parameters, and evaluating the effectiveness of various subsystems incorporated to enhance accuracy and improve survivability" (ISPR, 2024). The Shaheen-II is mounted on a six-axle road-mobile chassis and can carry a single conventional or nuclear warhead. The Shaheen-II launcher chassis can occasionally be seen in garrisons, including Dera Ghazi Khan Garrison and Sargodha Training Garrison.
Pakistan's latest medium-range missile, the Shaheen-III, a two-stage, solid-fueled missile, was first unveiled to the public at the Pakistan Day parade in 2015. Following its third test launch in January 2021, the Pakistani government stated that the missile could deliver either a single nuclear or conventional warhead to a range of 2750 kilometers, making it the longest-range system Pakistan has tested (ISPR 2021a). Its most recent test launch took place in April 2022 and, according to the Pakistani government, was "aimed at re-validating various design and technical parameters of the weapon system" (ISPR 2022). The system will likely require additional test launches before becoming operational.
The Shaheen-III is transported on an eight-axle lifting platform, believed to be supplied by China (Panda 2016). Satellite images show the Shaheen-III at the National Development Complex, and the launchers were displayed at a 2024 parade. In September 2024, the US State Department announced sanctions against a Beijing-based automation company for helping Pakistan procure testing equipment for the Shaheen-III and Ababeel intermediate-range ballistic missiles (US State Department, 2024).
The Shaheen-III missile's range is sufficient to strike all of mainland India from positions located across most of Pakistan south of Islamabad. However, the missile was apparently designed with greater capabilities. According to General Kidwai, the 2750-kilometer range was dictated by the need to strike the Nicobar and Andaman Islands in the eastern Indian Ocean, which are "being developed as strategic bases" where "India may consider deploying its weapons." However, for the Shaheen-III missile, with its 2750-kilometer range, to reach the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, it would need to be launched from positions in the easternmost regions of Pakistan, near the Indian border.
Pakistan's oldest nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile, the road-mobile, single-stage, liquid-fueled Ghauri (Hatf-5), was last tested in October 2023 (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Pakistan, 2023). The Ghauri is based on the North Korean Nodong medium-range ballistic missile. The Pakistani government claims the Ghauri can carry a single conventional or nuclear warhead to a range of 1300 kilometers. However, NASIC puts its range slightly lower at 1250 kilometers and suggests that "fewer than 50" Ghauri launchers have been deployed (National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2020).
The additional time required to fuel the missile before launch makes the Ghauri more vulnerable to attack than Pakistan's newer solid-fuel missiles. Therefore, it is possible that longer-range versions of the Shaheen could eventually replace the Ghauri. Potential deployment areas for the Ghauri include the Sargodha Central Ammunition Depot area and the Khuzdar Garrison, which expanded its perimeter in late 2017 to include three additional mobile launcher bays.
On 24 January 2017, Pakistan test-fired a new medium-range ballistic missile called Ababeel, which the government said was “capable of carrying multiple warheads using Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology” (ISPR 2017). The three-stage, solid-fueled, nuclear-capable missile, currently under development by the National Defence Complex, appears to be based on the Shaheen-III airframe and solid-fuel motor and has a range of 2200 kilometres (ISPR 2017; National Air and Space Intelligence Centre 2020).
Following the test launch, the Pakistani government stated that Ababeel "aims to ensure the survivability of Pakistan's ballistic missiles in the growing regional missile defense (MD) environment, … further strengthening deterrence" (ISPR 2017b). The development of a multiple-warhead system is apparently seen as a countermeasure to India's planned missile defense system (Tasleem 2017).
In October 2023, the Pakistani government announced another successful test launch of the Ababil missile, which was “aimed at re-validating various design, technical parameters and evaluating the performance of various subsystems of the weapon system” (Radio Pakistan 2023). The missile was first unveiled to the public at the Pakistan Independence Day parade in March 2024 on an eight-axle transporter and launcher. As of July 2025, the Ababil missile was not ready for deployment.
US officials have recently expressed concern about Pakistan’s alleged pursuit of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In December 2024, the US State Department announced sanctions on four entities involved in “Pakistan’s long-range missile development,” including the state-owned National Development Complex, which develops Pakistan’s solid-fuel ballistic missiles (US State Department, 2024).
Just a day after this statement, then-Deputy National Security Advisor John Finer described Pakistan's efforts to develop "increasingly sophisticated missile technology." Finer warned that "if this trend continues, Pakistan will have the ability to strike targets far beyond South Asia, including in the United States." Senior US officials reportedly confirmed at a briefing for non-governmental experts on January 3 that it would take Pakistan "years to a decade" to develop long-range ballistic missiles (Davenport and Kimball, 2025).
Further evidence would be needed to confirm Pakistan’s intent to build an ICBM; however, there is already ample evidence to support US claims: Chinese companies sanctioned for their involvement in Pakistan’s missile program specialize in lightweight composite materials that are commonly used in the bodies of longer-range solid rocket motors used on ICBMs (Wright, 2025). In addition, between 2021 and 2023, Pakistan built a new horizontal test facility for high-power solid rocket motors at its missile complex near Attock, which could potentially be used to test longer-range missile motors (Eveleth, 2023).
Missile bases
The total number and location of Pakistan's nuclear-armed missile bases and facilities remains unknown. It is particularly difficult to distinguish Pakistani military bases designed exclusively for conventional strikes from those designed for dual-use or nuclear strikes. Analysis of commercial satellite imagery suggests that Pakistan possesses at least six missile bases that could potentially be used in Pakistan's nuclear forces, although this estimate is highly uncertain. Some of these bases have been modernized over the past decade. A description of each base is provided below:
Garrison Acre (25,5483°N, 68,3343°E)
Acro Garrison is located approximately 18 kilometers north of Hyderabad, in the southern part of Sindh province, and approximately 145 kilometers from the Indian border. The garrison covers an area of approximately 6,9 square kilometers and has been gradually expanded since 2004. Acro Garrison consists of six missile launcher hangars, apparently designed to accommodate 12 missile launchers (MLRS) each. Beneath the hangar complex is a unique underground structure, the design of which has been visible in satellite images from previous years. The underground structure consists of two cross-shaped sections connected by a central corridor leading to two buildings on either side via covered ramps.
Analysis of a vehicle testing site in the northeastern corner of the garrison revealed what appeared to be five-axis launchers for Babur cruise missiles.
Gujranwala Garrison (32,2410ºN, 74,0730ºE)
Gujranwala Garrison is one of the largest military complexes in Pakistan. It covers almost 30 square kilometers in the northeastern part of Punjab province and is located approximately 60 kilometers from the border with India. Since 2010, Gujranwala Garrison has added what appears to be a launch pad immediately to the east of a probable conventional ammunition storage site, which was commissioned in 2014 or 2015. The area consists of two identical sections, each containing several launcher bays, as well as a possible weapons loading room with fortified berms, connected by a covered walkway to what appears to be a fortified weapons storage bunker. There is also a technical area just south of the main area for servicing the launchers. The security perimeter appears to be designed to accommodate the possible addition of a third section.
Satellite images show several trucks that closely resemble the Nasr short-range missile system. While it's impossible to be certain, these trucks appear to be equipped with a twin-container launcher similar to the one seen in the Nasr test launch photos. The Nasr's estimated range is equivalent to the distance from the garrison to the Indian border.
Khuzdar Garrison (27,7222 ºN, 66,6241 ºE)
Khuzdar Garrison is located approximately 220 kilometers west of Sukkur in southeastern Balochistan province and is the farthest known missile garrison from the Indian border. The base is divided into two parts: the northern part and the southern part (where the TPUs are based). The southern part of the base expanded its perimeter in late 2017 to include three additional TPU garages, bringing the total to six. Also included in this part are two multi-story weapons handling buildings with covered ramps leading to a possible underground nuclear storage facility similar to that seen at Acro Garrison. Possible launchers for nuclear-capable missiles, possibly the Ghauri or Shaheen-II TPUs, have been spotted in commercial satellite imagery at Khuzdar. The eastern portion of the base, which appears to have been another TPU garage area, was under construction more than a decade ago; however, that expansion appears to have been cancelled.
Garrison Pano-Akil (27,8328 ºN, 69,1575 ºE)
The Pano Aqil garrison is located just 85 kilometers from the Indian border, in northern Sindh province, and is divided into several sections covering a total area of almost 20 square kilometers. The double-fenced missile bay area is located 1,8 kilometers northeast of the main garrison and includes eight bays (the last three were completed in 2017), each with space for six launchers. A ninth garage next to the others appears to have space for five vehicles. In total, this garrison could potentially contain around 50 mobile launchers with missiles; however, some of these bays are likely to also contain support vehicles. Several mobile launchers, including those for the Babur and Shaheen-I missiles, are regularly seen in this garrison on commercial satellite imagery.
Just north of the mobile launcher box, inside the same double fence, is an underground structure that looks like a weapons storage niche. This niche is connected by a covered ramp to a multi-story launcher loading hall. The design of the nuclear weapons storage facilities is almost identical to those seen in Gujranwala.
Garrison of Dera Ghazi Khan (29,9108 ºN, 70,4907 ºE)
The Dera Ghazi Khan garrison is located in central Pakistan, approximately 100 kilometers west-southwest of the city of Multan. The main base, covering an area of approximately 3 square kilometers, includes several vehicle garages, as well as a central section with two multi-story garages, added in 2013. A 2021 Maxar satellite image shows the chassis of a Shaheen-II missile launcher (without the missile compartment installed) near one of the multi-story garages. The base is located approximately 12 kilometers southwest of the Dera Ghazi Khan Nuclear Materials Complex.
Sargodha Integration and Training Garrison (31,9722 ºN, 72,6838 ºE)
The Sargodha Integration and Training Garrison is a large complex located in and around the Kiran Hills, a sub-critical nuclear test site that Pakistan used to develop its nuclear weapons program from 1983 to 1990. Immediately northwest of the likely conventional munitions storage area are what appear to be 10 dispersed potential hardened IFV bays, as well as two additional bays of varying sizes that may be used for maintenance. The bay area does not have the same layout or perimeter as other areas around the country, potentially indicating a different function, such as training and equipment integration. Babur and Shaheen-II IFVs (minus the missiles) have been recently spotted, including visible indications that at least some of the main bays may house mobile launcher trainers.
Directly to the east of the conventional munitions storage site is an underground storage facility built into the side of a mountain ridge. Commercial satellite imagery shows at least 10 entrances to the underground storage facility, as well as potential missile storage facilities.
Land- and sea-launched cruise missiles
Pakistan's family of land- and sea-launched cruise missiles is experiencing a boom in rapid scientific and technological development, with work underway on several types of missiles and improvements to existing models. The Babur (Hatf-7) is a dual-capable subsonic cruise missile, similar in appearance to the American Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile, the Chinese DH-10 land-based cruise missile, and the Russian AS-15 air-launched cruise missile. The Pakistani government describes the Babur as possessing "stealth capabilities" and "high precision," as well as a "low-altitude, terrain-following missile with high maneuverability" (ISPR (2011), 2016, 2018). The Babur is significantly thinner than Pakistan's ballistic missiles, suggesting some success by Pakistani physicists in miniaturizing a nuclear warhead based on a "boosted fission" design.
The original Babur-1 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) has been tested approximately a dozen times and is likely operational. Its mobile launcher appears to be a unique five-axis mobile platform with a three-tube launcher, distinct from the four-axis fixed launcher used for static display. The Pakistani government has variously reported ranges of 600 and 700 kilometers (ISPR 2011, 2012), but the US intelligence community places the range significantly lower at 350 kilometers (NASIC, 2020). The three-tube Babur launcher was unveiled at Pakistan's Independence Day parade in 2024.
Pakistan appears to be upgrading its Babur-1 missiles to Babur-1A missiles, replacing their avionics and navigation systems with more modern and sophisticated ones capable of engaging targets on both land and sea. Following the system's most recent test launch in February 2021, observed by the Army's Strategic Forces Command, the Pakistani military stated that the Babur-1A has a range of 450 kilometers (ISPR 2021e).
Pakistan is also developing an advanced version of the Babur, known as the Babur-2 or Babur-1B GLCM. The weapon was tested in December 2016, April 2018, and December 2021 (ISPR 2016, 2018, 2021). Indian news Media reports indicated that the Babur-2/Babur-1B had failed two other previous tests, in April 2018 and March 2020; however, this has not been confirmed by Pakistan (Gupta 2020). With a physical appearance and capabilities similar to the Babur, the Babur-2/Babur-1B appears to have an extended range of 700 kilometers and is "capable of carrying various types of warheads" (ISPR 2016, 2018, 2018). The fact that both the Babur-1 and the "improved" Babur-2/Babur-1B have a range of 700 kilometers indicates that the original Babur-1 system likely had a shorter range. NASIC has not released information about the advanced system. Following the first test in 2016, the Pakistani government noted that the system was “an important factor in enhancing Pakistan’s strategic defence capability” (ISPR 2016).
Babur launchers have been equipped at the National Development Complex for several years and have been spotted at the Acro Garrison, northeast of Karachi. The garrison includes a large site with six garages, potentially accommodating 12 launchers, and a unique underground structure, likely used for missile storage.
Pakistan is also developing a sea-launched version of the Babur missile, known as the Babur-3. The weapon is still under development and has been tested twice: on 9 January 2017 from an "underwater mobile platform" in the Indian Ocean (ISPR 2017); and on 29 March 2018 from an "underwater dynamic platform" (ISPR 2018a). The Babur-3 is reported to be a sea-launched variant of the Babur-2 GLCM with a range of 450 kilometres (ISPR 2017). Development of the Babur-3 appears to be progressing slowly; the Pakistani government has not announced any additional test launches since 2018, and the missile has yet to appear in the annual Pakistan Day parade.
The Pakistani government states that Babur-3 is “capable of delivering multiple payload types…which will provide Pakistan with a credible second-strike capability, enhancing deterrence,” and describes it as “a step towards strengthening the credible minimum deterrence policy” (ISPR 2017). Babur-3 is likely to be deployed on the Pakistan Navy’s three Agosta-90B diesel-electric submarines (FH Khan 2015; Panda and Narang 2017).
In April 2015, the Pakistani government approved the purchase of eight air-independent propulsion submarines from China, which were named the Hangor class (B. Khan 2019). The deal envisaged four of the submarines being built at the Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Group (WSIG) shipyard in China and the remaining four at the Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works in Pakistan (Sutton 2020). Two of the Chinese-built submarines, Hangor and Shushuk, were launched in April 2024 and March 2025, respectively (Ozberk 2025; Radio Pakistan 2024). Pakistan laid the keels of the first two submarines under construction at Karachi Shipyard, Hulls 5 and 6, in December 2022 and February 2024 respectively (Navy 2022, Ozberk 2024).
Hangor was originally expected to be delivered by 2023, but the deadline has been delayed and the boat is likely to enter service in the second half of 2025. The four submarines assembled in Karachi are expected to be completed by 2028 (Sutton 2020). It is possible that these new submarines will eventually be tasked with a nuclear role, as they will be equipped with the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missiles.
Once operational, Babur-3 will provide Pakistan with a triad of land-based, air-based and sea-based nuclear strike platforms. The Pakistani government has stated that the development of Babur-3 was driven by the need to accommodate India’s nuclear triad and the “nuclearization of the Indian Ocean region” (ISPR 2018). The Pakistani government has also noted that Babur-3’s stealth technology will be useful in the “emerging regional missile defense (MD) system” (ISPR 2017).
The future submarine nuclear capability is the responsibility of the Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC), which, as the government stated in 2012, will "manage the country's second-strike capability" to "strengthen Pakistan's minimum deterrence policy and ensure regional stability" (ISPR 2012). In 2015, Kidwai publicly acknowledged the need for a naval second-strike capability and stated that it would "be operational in the next few years." Kidwai may have been referring to the new Hangor-class submarines.
Pakistan is also developing a ship-launched variant of the Babur cruise missile, known as the Harba. In March 2022, Pakistan unveiled the new missile at the 11th International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference in Doha. A Pakistan Navy spokesman described the Harba as an all-weather subsonic cruise missile with anti-ship and anti-land capability and a range of approximately 290 kilometers (Vavasseur 2022). According to the spokesman, the Harba has been inducted into Pakistan Navy service and is being deployed on Azmat-class surface ships (Vavasseur 2022). It is unclear whether the Harba will have dual-mission capabilities.
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