Evolution of Geranium: Stronger, Smarter, More Resilient
In the previous article The Geranium Revolution: Changing the Face of War we examined the phenomenon of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) kamikaze of the "Geran" family, which in many ways changed (added) to the appearance of modern high-precision weapons long-range. We discussed the current and future production volumes of these products, as well as the change in tactics for their use - moving from low to high altitudes.
However, this is far from a complete list of changes that the kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium family have undergone during their evolution, and which we will talk about today.
Let's start with the fact that they became more powerful.
Increasing the power of the BC
Based on open data, the first versions of the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV were equipped with high-explosive fragmentation (HE) warheads weighing about 50 kg. It would seem that this is not a small amount, for comparison, the mass of the warhead of the Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) is 18,4 kg (including 6,5 kg of explosive), artillery A 152mm projectile weighs 44 kg (including 7,8 kg of explosive).
However, what may be sufficient for a tactical class weapon is not always acceptable for a strategic class weapon, to which the kamikaze UAV of the Geranium family can be attributed. For comparison, the mass of the warhead of the winged missiles (KR) of the Kalibr complex is 500 kg, and the modified aviation The warhead weight of the Kh-101 cruise missile is approximately 1 ton.
During the modernization process, a high-power warhead weighing about 2-90 kilograms was installed on the Geran-100 UAV, which may have slightly reduced its flight range. Apparently, Geran family UAVs with warheads of varying power are currently being produced simultaneously.
However, the matter was not limited to simply increasing the warhead power – judging by the information posted in open sources, cluster warheads were also created for the Geranium family of kamikaze UAVs.
In the material Incendiary warheads for kamikaze UAVs of all types: an objective need of the SVO We talked about the feasibility of developing incendiary warheads for kamikaze UAVs, which could be effectively used to completely destroy enemy targets, especially when carrying out joint strikes with kamikaze UAVs equipped with HE warheads. Even an HE warhead weighing about 90-100 kg in most cases will not be able to completely destroy the target, whereas a hit by an incendiary warhead can start a fire, which will ultimately cause much greater damage.
Well, according to some data, incendiary warheads for the Geran family of kamikaze UAVs have also already been created, and they are quite "evil". The use of various types of warheads in the Geran family of UAVs allows for their flexible use to destroy various types of objects.
In a group attack, warheads of one type will complement and enhance the effect of warheads of another type. For example, an important structure may be attacked by one kamikaze UAV of the Geran-2 type with an HE warhead, followed by a kamikaze UAV with an incendiary warhead flying into the already damaged building, which will cause a fire, and a UAV with a cluster warhead will destroy and damage equipment and manpower located nearby. A delay may be set on some of the submunitions of a cluster warhead, which will require the enemy to first clear the area of mines and complicate the extinguishing of the fire.
However, in the process of their improvement, the Geraniums became not only “stronger”, but also “smarter”.
On-board intelligence
Initially, the kamikaze UAVs of the Geran family were designed to hit only stationary targets, and even now this task is a priority. Strikes at stationary objects with known coordinates are carried out using signals from satellite navigation systems, which can be supplemented by an inertial guidance system and optical image recognition systems at the final stage.
The Geran-2 kamikaze UAV initially used control based on signals from the domestic GLONASS satellite navigation system. Naturally, the enemy began to use electronic warfare equipment to jam the kamikaze UAV navigation systems (EW), both those provided by Western countries and those developed independently, as a result of which their accuracy began to decline.
Our response was to improve the Geranium navigation system, including the Kometa family of receiving modules. The confrontation between electronic warfare and navigation systems continues to this day, and there will be no end to it until fundamentally unjammable navigation systems based on new physical principles appear. (and such are already being developed).
The Kometa-M equipment block from the UMPK module
The next stage was the appearance of feedback on the kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium family – the enemy had detected fragments of the Geraniums with cellular modems and video cameras installed on them.
In this configuration, video cameras do not allow control of kamikaze UAVs in real time, like FPV-drone, but it is possible to receive reconnaissance data during the UAV's flight, as well as to understand whether the kamikaze UAV has reached its target. Also, theoretically, such kamikaze UAVs can be given / changed target designation in flight.
There are modifications of the kamikaze UAVs of the Geran family that can be controlled as FPV drones; they are used near the combat contact line (CCL), within the range of radio control channels. According to enemy resources, communication antennas are installed on their wingtips – such Geraniums can effectively hit even moving objects.
And finally, there was information about the Geraniums equipped with satellite terminals of the Starlink system. Such products can be controlled as FPV drones throughout Ukraine and pose a particular danger to the enemy, for example, the operator can direct such a drone directly into the open door of a hangar in which an F-16 fighter is located.
The problem is that the increased damage from the Geranium family of kamikaze UAVs has led to the enemy actively hunting them down, using all the resources at their disposal.
Increased security
In the previous article we already talked about the fact that in order to protect themselves from Ukrainian mobile patrols armed with powerful searchlights and machine guns with thermal imaging sights, the Geraniums began flying at the highest possible altitude, which is about three to four kilometers.
Additionally, measures were taken to reduce the visual visibility of the drones - if in the first years all the "Geraniums" were white, now they are painted with a special paint that absorbs over 90% of the incident light - it is much more difficult to visually detect such a UAV in the dark.
According to information published in a number of Telegram channels, Russian long-range kamikaze UAVs have received a mass-produced and installed system for evading attacks by enemy FPV interceptors. The essence of this system is that upon detection of a video signal coming from an enemy FPV interceptor, the Russian UAV automatically performs an evasive maneuver, sharply changing the direction and altitude of its flight.
The range and flight time of FPV drones are quite limited, especially at high altitudes, so the enemy operator only has a few attempts. Such systems have previously appeared on our reconnaissance drones.
There are also other ways to increase the security of the long-range kamikaze UAVs of the Geran family.
For example, in the material Towed decoys for the Geran-2 UAV will reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defense systems by 1,5–2 times We talked about the possibility of using light towed decoys, which are essentially a corner reflector placed in a plastic fairing, to protect the Geranium kamikaze UAV from radar-guided anti-aircraft missiles (SAMs).
With minimal cost, weight and volume of changes made to the design of kamikaze UAVs, towed decoys could significantly reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's most complex anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), multiplying the consumption of their expensive and few SAMs.
We looked at another method in the material Increasing the protection of reconnaissance UAVs from FPV interceptors, where it was proposed to install small onboard self-defense systems on reconnaissance UAVs to protect them, providing functional suppression of video cameras of attacking enemy FPV drones using commercially available laser emitters with a power of several watts. Such an onboard self-defense system can be integrated with the evasion system we discussed above.
At the moment, there is no information in open sources about UAVs of any type with towed false targets or on-board self-defense systems against FPV drones, but who knows, maybe they will appear again, after all, the Geraniums did not immediately start flying at high altitudes. And if the implementation of an on-board self-defense system is a fairly complex task, then installing a towed false target is a simple and inexpensive way to protect our drones.
It is also potentially possible to significantly reduce the visibility of the kamikaze UAV of the Geranium family by placing the engine and propeller under an annular fairing - an impeller. Impeller or fenestron (trade name of the company "Eurocopter") somewhat reduces the efficiency of the propeller, but in this case the hot zones of the piston engine will be almost completely shielded, and the reflection of radio signals from the rotating propeller will reach the antennas of the enemy's air defense missile system radar stations only at limited observation angles, from the front and rear hemispheres.
Of course, all the above solutions will somewhat reduce the range of the Geranium family kamikaze UAV or the weight of the warhead. However, if our current range is 1000-1500 kilometers, and we need to work at a range of up to 500-700 kilometers, then wouldn't it be better to trade range for protection?
By the way, information periodically appears about more radical ways to increase the protection of the Geran family of kamikaze UAVs, namely, equipping them with air-to-air missiles. The topic is quite controversial for several reasons. Firstly, air-to-air missiles have a fairly large mass. Secondly, the question arises of how to determine the moment of attack and give the missile target designation?
However, there are possible solutions, for example, not air-to-air missiles, but a “tube” of a portable anti-aircraft missile system (MANPADS), and they can only be installed on those modifications of the Geranium family of kamikaze UAVs that are equipped with feedback devices, such as Starlink terminals.
Conclusions
It is hardly correct to say "kamikaze UAV "Geran"" now, no matter whether it is "Geran-2" or some other designation. The reality is that the correct formulation, apparently, remains only "kamikaze UAV of the "Geran" family".
And within this family there will be various Geraniums – guided by coordinates, by radio channel and by satellite communication, with different flight ranges, different types of warheads and body colors, with means of increasing survivability and without them. Together, a swarm of Geraniums of various types will provide the most effective impact on the enemy, taking into account the types of targets attacked and the tasks to be solved.
However, this is not the end yet stories – in the next article we will consider various methods of radically increasing the speed of the Geran family of kamikaze UAVs, which brings them closer in characteristics to “real” cruise missiles, as well as the specifics of launching the Geran kamikaze UAV from various platforms.
Information