Implementation of propaganda under the Barbarossa plan
Warning! This article is for informational and educational purposes only. It is based on historical facts confirmed by sources and does not contain propaganda, justification or approval of the ideology, policies, actions or symbols of the Third Reich.
Before the attack on the Soviet Union, the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht issued a directive "On the use of propaganda according to the Barbarossa plan." This document gave basic directives on how to conduct propaganda on the territory of the USSR. The directive described what rhetoric should be used, what words are preferable and which should be avoided, the technical means of distributing materials and other important aspects of work in this direction.
Below is the text of the directive “On the use of propaganda according to the Barbarossa plan”, translated into Russian. Archive code of the original directive: RF Civil Code. F. R-7021. Op. 148. D. 208. L. 26-30, 21-25.
The occupation of the Soviet Union was conventionally divided into two stages. The first stage included the occupation of the territory by the military, during which time propaganda was to be carried out by the Wehrmacht propaganda organs (the frontline occupation zone was 500-800 km from the frontline). The second stage involved the transfer of the territory to the control of the civil administration, which was subordinated to the Eastern Ministry (headed by Alfred Rosenberg).
The propaganda companies had to, first of all, provide the original, raw material. After processing, it was presented to the viewer or reader. The Propaganda Ministry needed the material to make propaganda half-truths out of it. Goebbels did not have the right to give direct instructions to the propaganda companies, since they reported directly to the OKW Propaganda Department. Sometimes he made a request to film specific materials.
Joseph Goebbels holds a meeting in his ministry building of the commanders of the propaganda companies who have arrived in Berlin for additional training (far right (in profile) Hasso von Wedel). National Archives File 183-B00548.
There was a scheme of interaction between the Wehrmacht propaganda companies and the Propaganda Ministry. Printed materials were the main means of propaganda. The bulk of printed materials intended for the Red Army soldiers and the population of the occupied territories came from the Propaganda Ministry. Leaflets and posters could also be compiled directly in the propaganda companies. In this case, they were sent to Berlin for approval (and publication). On the back of the photograph, there was an accompanying label describing what was captured in the picture.
After that, the photo went to the Ministry of Propaganda, where the ministry's experts checked the photo for compliance with current propaganda tasks and political security. If the photo passed the check, a stamp was placed on the back, and the photo was sent to the photo news bureau.
The photo on the left is a propaganda company photo, and the photo on the right is the accompanying label on the back. The description reads: "Soldier's grave at Krone (Walcz, Poland). One of the first casualties during the German advance into Poland. The soldier's grave on the roadside belongs to a sapper who gave his life for the Fuhrer and his people on September 2."
A photo of a propaganda company. The caption reads: "These are the kind of criminals the Soviets use in combat against German soldiers." On the right is also an accompanying label on the back of the photo. There are two dates: the date of the photo and the date of release to the press. And, as usual, the accompanying propaganda text. The man depicted is very poor and dressed in rags, which may arouse pity in the public. To prevent this, the man is called a criminal.
There were different variations of the accompanying labels. The label always indicated the stamp "For official use only" (Nur für den Dienstgebrauch; Für den Dienstgebrauch) or "For use by the press" (Für den Pressegebrauch).
Examples of labels. On the left is a label for a photo marked "for official use only", on the right is "for press use only".
For the independent printing of materials approved by the Ministry of Propaganda, army headquarters had their own printing houses, in addition, printing houses of occupied cities were used for this purpose. In divisions and corps, independent publication of printed propaganda materials was prohibited. Only their projects could be compiled there for subsequent approval by the Ministry of Propaganda.
Soldiers of the propaganda company prepare information material, March 1940. Bundesarchiv Bild 146-2007-0194.
All printed materials approved by the German Ministry of Propaganda (leaflets, brochures) passed through communication hubs (Warsaw and some cities in the occupied territories, such as Kursk and Orel, where they were further distributed), after which they were sent to the occupied territories. All printed literature was sent together with invoices, which contained instructions on the place and time of distribution of each batch of printed materials, and for understanding there was also a short translation of the leaflets into German.
Examples of German leaflets for Red Army soldiers.
The Ministry of Propaganda had a special Eastern Department with the structural subdivision “Vineta” in charge of preparing and publishing printed materials directly for the frontline zone and occupied territories.
At first, this department consisted mainly of people who had left the Russian Empire during the pre-revolutionary emigration. But later they had to be replaced due to their lack of understanding of the political moods of the Soviet people. "Vineta" consisted of several national sections: Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, Belarusian and Russian. The Russian section was the largest, with about 800 people. The section was headed by A. P. Albov, an old emigrant, a Knight of St. George. The entire organization was headed by Ph.D. Hans Humpt. Combining this information with the information from the previous article ("The Structure of Frontline Propaganda in Nazi Germany"), it becomes possible to create a general scheme.
Scheme of front-line propaganda of Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR.
The downside of the fascist frontline propaganda system was that leaflet projects compiled in German divisions and corps took a long time to be approved. During this time, propaganda literature sometimes ceased to be relevant. The system worked well during periods of continuous advances by the German army or holding positions, but during retreats, such technology was ineffective due to the outdated information in the leaflets.
The propaganda discourse directed at the Red Army troops included the use of loudspeakers, banners, leaflets dropped from the air, and propaganda shells (all of these methods will be covered in detail in subsequent articles).
The following propaganda companies worked directly on the Eastern Front: the 501st (part of the 16th Army), the 612th (9th Army), the 621st (18th Army), the 637th (6th and 8th Armies), the 649th (11th Army), the 666th (17th Army), the 670th (2nd Army), the 689th (4th Army), the 691st (1st tank Army), 693rd (2nd Tank Army), 694th (4th Tank Army), 695th (11th Army), 697th (3rd Tank Army) and 698th (2nd Army).
The composition of the propaganda company using the 670th company as an example. Original: Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-062-2110-06.
By the beginning of the war with the USSR, the total number of propaganda companies reached 2250 people. Three such companies were part of Army Group North and were engaged in conducting propaganda aimed at the defenders of Leningrad and the population of the temporarily occupied areas of the Leningrad region.
It is also necessary to pay attention to the work of the Wehrmacht's frontline intelligence. As mentioned in the previous article, each propaganda company commander had to work closely with the Ic departments.
This refers to the exchange of information. The German Ic service, in addition to its main intelligence functions, also had materials from interrogations of prisoners of war and defectors and Soviet propaganda leaflets. The creation of their own propaganda materials and the operations for their distribution were not the direct task of the Ic departments, but they nevertheless tried to engage in this activity as much as possible, without relying solely on the propaganda companies. Propaganda materials could be prepared by officers of the Ic services.
German intelligence work on radio interception
Already from the very beginning of the war it was realized that due to the absolute centralization of propaganda in the hands of the OKW, there was no possibility of a prompt response to the rapidly changing situation at the front. To avoid this, the Ic departments received permission to conduct propaganda independently, which, however, had to be carried out in accordance with the general course of the OKW and the Propaganda Ministry.
The Ic departments are responsible for the recommendations for propaganda operations against fortified areas. They were prepared by Hauptmann Fital (Hauptmann is a military rank of a junior officer, equivalent to the rank of captain).
Below is an archived document of recommendations for propaganda operations against fortified areas, translated into Russian. NARA Archive. T314. R1368. fr. 000635–000636.
It follows from this proposal that the propaganda impact on fortified areas took place in three stages. The goal of the first stage was to intimidate the Red Army soldiers (the defenders of the pillboxes). For this purpose, the leaflets demonstrated the statistics of the Wehrmacht's victories and its newest, supposedly invincible equipment. For the second stage, leaflets were issued demonstrating the destruction, destroyed pillboxes and broken Soviet equipment, with stories about the terrible death of the garrisons.
Thus, the task was first to instill fear of the “invincible” German army, and then to undermine the faith of the Red Army soldiers in the reliability of their fortifications.
These two stages were only preparation for the third, main stage. During it, Soviet soldiers were bombarded with leaflets, which told them of their imminent death and offered to surrender as the only way to survive. This technique was refined during the propaganda plan Ic "Kyiv".
A German leaflet to Red Army soldiers showing the contrast between the destruction and the happy faces of those who decided to go over to the Germans
Hauptmann Fitel, based on the facts of the stubborn resistance of the border fortified areas, expected that propaganda alone would not lead to the collapse of the enemy defense, but he saw the benefit of the operation in the fact that it "will help to paralyze resistance here and there and thus save German blood."
The next article will provide a detailed description of campaign leaflets, their classifications and purposes with illustrative photo examples.
Information