How we fly: CRM and language aspects of communication in the cockpit of the Western-made sun
Theses of the speech of the member of the AEFT Committee on Flight Safety A.I. Sitnyansky at the 6 conference "Security of the air transport complex" 5 February 2013.
Materials AEVT
First, I want to dispel the fallacy that there are not enough pilots in the Russian Federation. This market is able to self-regulate. The shortage of flight personnel at first provoked wage growth, and then there was a market phenomenon such as “finding internal reserves”: someone recovered after the break, someone came from the army, someone returned from abroad. Schools have increased the number of students, and the crisis has corrected the plans of many companies to update the fleet. I reliably know that now in search of work from the company dozens of pilots go to the company who are not needed by anyone (far from thinking that we have a line of applicants in UTair, while Aeroflot and Sibir or "Transaero" they are not).
Perhaps, for the implementation of best practices, it would be worthwhile to invite someone to Russia, but ... ONLY TO INSTRUCTIVE POSITIONS and only from the leading airlines of the world.
Further on the topic. In the 60 of the last century, the number of disasters in terms of the factors "man", "environment", and "car" was approximately the same, roughly in 33%. (I deliberately do not use the SHELL model, which divides errors, called the general term "human factor", into software - programs, manuals, etc. - and lifeware - strictly speaking, the person himself).
With the development of scientific progress, people have learned how to make more advanced and reliable airplanes, predict dangerous weather phenomena, but the person has remained the same. It is known that "the column moves with the speed with which its slowest carriage rides." (the ancients said that "the fortress is only as strong as its weakest wall"). Sadly, man was the weakest link in this chain! Moving from polynomial crews to 2 members, we realized that on Boeing and Airbus, at least 2-3, there are fewer pairs of eyes than on IL-86 or Tu-154.
The man was wrong and will be wrong! Our task is, firstly, to do everything so that the pilot (crew member) makes mistakes as little as possible, and secondly, if this happens, his mistake was promptly detected and localized. The whole organization of flight work is aimed only at this.
Let me remind you that in the 60-ies in the world of technology, a standard was introduced that is called in Japanese as poke-eke or foolproof (protection from stupid actions).
Roughly speaking, clicking on all the buttons on your TV remote at the same time will not break it. Similarly, the system does not allow the pilot to do an unequivocally wrong action, for example, to apply a reverse in the air or sit down with braked wheels on some types of aircraft. However, the incorrect operation of automation can lead to sad consequences. It is worth thinking about the right relationship between man and computer. To insure, but not block, the actions of the pilot, because such a system saves only in case of pilot error (which happens extremely rarely), and it hurts if the automation fails at ANY moment.
Returning to the statistics, we can say that we have found a NARROW PLACE. 80% of all accidents and disasters occur due to the BSF. DO YOU SOMETHING TO DO WITH THIS BAD? Of course yes"!
To be honest, I first heard the mathematical substantiation of the need for the "cross-check" procedure from our Director General and in many respects have to retell his considerations on this matter:
The capabilities of the human body are such that even when performing simple, routine operations, having done approximately 50000 actions, according to statistics, a person makes a mistake at least once. The possibilities of modern technology are several orders of magnitude better. However, if you conscientiously perform the work technology in the cockpit, the probability of error can be reduced by several orders of magnitude, due to the cross-check procedure, because the probability of a SIMULTANEOUS error of two different people is as small as the probability of a simultaneous failure of 2 engines.
If ANY pilot in the cockpit of the aircraft controls ANY action, then the crew’s reliability statistics can be brought to acceptable performance, at about the same level as the aircraft’s reliability.
Aviation Transport today is one of the safest in the world. About 50 people die from donkey kicks a year, 000 on the roads of Russia, and only 35 people a year in commercial aircraft throughout the WORLD. In absolute terms, even Russia looks good, but in relative terms ... we are clearly inferior to many.
How to manage the resources of the crew (and this is now the whole 2 person), how much and what specifically to say - the operator himself decides, although Boeing and Airbus give standard recommendations. Curiously, in the 3's crew member, the crews of the “LH” used the principle of “quiet cockpit”, as if considering that if everything goes according to plan, then it is not necessary to say anything. However, with the transition to the two-member crew of conversations in the cockpit, even they clearly increased.
Most of all "talking shop" in the cockpit of the Armed Forces of the main world low-cost "RYAN AIR". He asked personally about the reasons, the answer was quite logical. "When you have pilots fly from around the world (the instructor used the term rabble), it is more reliable."
The concepts of the “fixed” and “loose” crew also have their advantages and disadvantages; we have already discussed this issue more than once.
So now, theoretically, all the wagons in our column will move at the same speed. On paper, mathematically everything fits, but ... the "reliability of the crew" did not equal the reliability of technology. What prevented? There are factors that our theory cannot take into account.
You certainly heard the term "Buridan donkey". If a computer is always looking for a rational, logical action or a sequence of actions, so it’s easy to calculate, then a person often does not act logically. In Jean Buridan, this is demonstrated by the example of a donkey, in front of which there are two absolutely identical mounds of hay, to which the same distance. To guess what a donkey will approach at first is ABSOLUTELY impossible. If a computer were in its place, it would “overheat”, solving an unsolvable problem: “how to do it more rationally”, but a donkey can do as you please! Also man. Sometimes this is his strength, sometimes - weakness! In addition, there are frankly negative factors:
1) Youth
Amazing statistics was given by one American inspector. He analyzed aviation events that occurred due to the "human factor" in recent years, tens of thousands of aviation events. It turned out that the average indicators for pilots at the age of 65-60, 60-55, 55-50, 50-45, 45-40, 40-35, 35-30 are about the same and average 2,6 events X100000-30 In the case when the captain was from 25-3 for years, this coefficient increases by about 6,1 times, to the value of 100000 aviation event on XNUMX r.
He asked the audience what is the coefficient for captains younger than 25 years? The result was shocking - 60 aviation events (in 23 times worse than for the main category of pilots).
In Afghanistan, the Americans tried to send pilots at the age of 30-35 years. This age was considered optimal for the mission. Younger - the pilots are prone to excessive risk, those who are older - too careful.
I am afraid of young commanders. Knowledge and experience, things are not identical. If you try, then knowledge can be obtained quickly, and only few of completed flights bring us experience. I have such flights that teach something, 1-2 happen for a year, all the rest are just a routine. Ordinary and standard.
The question of shortening the pilot training period is now being widely discussed. Of course, this is worth thinking about, but it is important not to forget about such a characteristic feature of the Russian character as NIGILISM. Russians were often lied to and they used to not trust anyone. Remember that anecdote: "How to make people of different nationalities jump from a bridge? For the Russian there was a phrase:" Comrade, but you can't jump from a bridge! "
If it is enough for an American to write to FCOM "is not recommended", then even the words "BESTLY PROHIBITED" are not valid for OUR pilot. He needs to tell the physical nature of the ban, write 3 formulas from the strength of materials and 2 from aerodynamics, explain why it is impossible to do this and what consequences this may lead to. Colorful, with pictures, up to the funeral ... :)))
2) Poor knowledge of English
I have repeatedly expressed skepticism about the current level of English proficiency in Russian pilots. I do not have a diploma of a rider, so when applying for a job I am not obliged to adhere to any programs and rules. I ask applicants any simple question, for example, how to say "I did not buy anything" ... or "Take me home"? Depending on the delirium that I hear in response, I conclude about an approximate level. The best candidates are sent to the Tyumen Center for Training Program, where the certified teachers will determine the exact level. But once again I draw the attention of the aviation authorities: NO ONE LEADING COMPANY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION DOES NOT TRUST CERTIFICATES issued by third-party certified organizations. In all, a procedure for the recheck of knowledge.
I had the impression that today tuition is a necessary and sufficient condition for obtaining the desired certificate of the 4 level. The "semi-pilots", graduates of flight schools, have no other trumps, but these too often turn out to be false.
The teachers “train” the trainees for the correct answers so that they sound on the tape. The list of questions on the exams is obviously small, as a result, I practically don’t meet pilots with whom you can talk in English about their employment, and this is exactly what the certificate on the 4 level implies.
When the AEVT published my opinion on this issue, a lot of insults were heard from officials. Do not be offended, gentlemen. The truth can not be offended. Knowledge of English is a factor affecting flight safety, especially if you are flying foreign cars. Sometimes I hear a question: why not Russian pilots in the cockpit speak Russian? Absurd. Check-lists are often called by the name of the emergency panel that was triggered, all controls in manuals are called as appropriate, and in the event of a crisis there is no time for transfers. In the end, there is global experience, even Asian pilots speak English, and it is much more difficult for them to learn the language. I do not know how in other regions, but as recently as yesterday we received an order from the head of the Tyumen MTU about revoking approximately 50 of falsified certificates issued by one of the training organizations. It's good news.
3) Indiscipline.
But ... if the manager, having heard the words "undisciplined", starts to grab the revolver, using the terms "hot iron", "toughen", "demand" - then he will not succeed. In my opinion, there are only two effective methods of strengthening discipline that can cope with this trouble:
• a) creating a collective atmosphere of intolerance for violations (when the aviation community itself rejects incorrect behavior within itself).
• b) a culture of voluntary communications (that allows the supervisor to adjust the work of the system).
I know for sure that in ANY airlines of the Russian Federation such voluntary reports in 1000 are less than those of our foreign colleagues (somewhere the situation is better, somewhere worse), which means we do not have enough information for early detection of violations (after all, managing the process, not having reliable information about him is impossible!) This question requires the most serious study.
I would like to remind you that in Europe and the USA no one is turning off the screws, does not carry out punitive measures, and the safety of flights there is at exorbitant levels for us.
Separately, I emphasize: “Voluntary messages are a matter of trust of drugs to your MANUAL (this does not apply to potential snitchers and gossips, people are bad rather than useful). This is a matter of trust in the system in which the employee works, it is a question of“ safety culture ”.
Of course, it is assumed that the management will react in any way to the report, because if the employees' attempts to change something for the better remain several times unanswered, the initiative will "stall"
4) Fatigue
We create flight plans and on paper they look perfect, but life makes its own adjustments. Traffic jams in Moscow. Reinsured, pilots sometimes arrive at the airport for 4-5 hours before departure, and not for 1,5 hours, as required by RPP. The time allotted for rest between flights can also be spent in a traffic jam when returning home. Rest conditions at intermediate airports of the Russian Federation are much worse than those of our colleagues in Europe. Young people save money to buy a new apartment and instead of going on vacation to the resort, they are engaged in repairs.
Formal accounting of working time leads to the accumulation of fatigue, which is cumulative. To increase production efficiency, employers are trying to increase the maximum allowable load on the flight personnel to the level of the Irish discount airline "Ryan Air" - 100 hours per month, not realizing that the conditions of life, work and leisure in Europe are completely different. Stress, health, life, "flashers" - when you're in a hurry to take off, etc. I remember that the FAC of the plane crashed in Perm had a small child, it seems, a studio apartment and the third night shift in a row. And yet, our European colleagues come to a fully operational aircraft for 30 minutes before departure, and Russian pilots participate in refueling, loading, checking systems and solving any problematic issues ...
English physiologists argue that driving behind the wheel (flying) drunk is no less dangerous than riding tired. In 2011, ICAO issued the DOC 9966, the most useful document on fatigue management, included in the 6 Appendix with the 8 Appendix.
In some European Airlines, there is a practice: once a year, a bungalow is taken off somewhere in the Maldives for a vacationer and the entire family of the pilot is given free tickets. You can not go to rest, but money for this vacation can not be obtained.
5) Power
Once again, I cannot fail to mention the imperfection of the concept of lawmaking in Russia. The authorities must share responsibility with the pilots for many of the catastrophes that biased investigators attributed to the "human factor". Constantly late for years or even decades, our aviation authorities, remembering themselves, demand that everything be done immediately "here and now." Remember how the BP Management System was introduced into the GA of the Russian Federation. It was ordered to create and implement an SMS for 3 of the month. The condition of people who understood what they were talking about was then rated as “laughter through tears”, because our foreign colleagues spent years on this work. Let me remind you, "the race is won not by the one who runs fast, but by the one who started earlier."
In order to control the BP proactively, you need to know the real situation in the production teams, know the challenges faced by people who perform real work. What happens if you do not communicate with practitioners? Here are some examples:
• We joined the RVSM program LAST on planet Earth, along with such aviation powers as Afghanistan and Mongolia.
• In 2002, the FAA issued the AU - 120 76, which marked the beginning of the introduction of the EFB (electronic flight bag), after 10 years we are just starting to develop this document, while Aeroflot and Volga-Dnepr already fly with EFB one-time permissions.
• We missed the 40-year era of VOR beacons, and when the concept of GNSS & RNP is being introduced all over the world, our colleagues from aeronautical navigation complain that Russian developments, our know-how GBAS (ground based augmentation station), are cheap and effective. it is not necessary and that the VOR lighthouses decommissioned in Europe will be installed in the Moscow air hub. I would like to believe that this is not so, but doubts remain, because according to the requirements of the IAC, it is necessary to install as many as 21 ARCs on new aircraft of the 2st century, despite the fact that for the third year already NDBs are being decommissioned absolutely in all countries of the world, and in In 3, they will remain only in Russia and Africa. Despite the fact that according to the MEL ARC is not needed at all for flight, in the Master MEL opposite the ADF there is a number - 2015. You would also require to carry an astrolabe or a sextant with you!
I happened to distill the aircraft from the first batch of Boeing-737 NG aircraft purchased by UTair in the USA from the Boeing Field (Seattle) airfield. Our American partners complained about the "mysterious Russian soul." They reported that they had received a letter from one of the managers, where he asked to make sure that the Boeing navigation system could receive GLONASS signals. Boeing agreed and offered to send the terms of reference for this work. So, the answer from our side at that time was not about 1,5 years ... The guys were surprised, and they can be understood.
I hope that something has already changed for the better, I just do not have actual information on this topic. But this is a very important question.
I advocate that the dialogue between practitioners and the aviation administration take place more often and on a wider range of issues. As a communicator, I have long been proposing to the AETT, where not the most important, but the most knowledgeable people in the GA are gathering: flight directors of airlines, heads of UPS, aksakals of Russian aviation. They can talk about the challenges that practitioners face every day. Something has already been done - but much remains to be done ...
I have claims and wishes for the government.
“Problems should not be solved - they should be financed” (Ronald Reagan). It is possible for the average person who is watching the “zombie box” and it seems that the state is doing something to ensure flight safety, but it seems to me that from the cockpit of the plane it is not so.
1) Over the past 20, the number of airfields in the Russian Federation has been reduced from 1400 to 300. Looking through the information on the BP in the world every day, I cannot help but note how often the pilots of European companies decide to stop their flight mission and land at the NEAR aerodrome.
By European standards, the “nearest” airport is the one to which there is less than 100 km, by Russian it is obvious - 500 km? Or, again, to look for some Izhmu?
2) Runways are state property. Their length and condition do not meet the requirements of the 21 century. If desired, it is not difficult to find out at which airfields aircraft of various airlines periodically roll out (for example, Rostov), and pilots are ALWAYS blamed for this. Designers around the world are looking for ways to increase the commercial efficiency of new aircraft. The most common narrow-body Boeing-737 classic was replaced by the Boeing-737 NG, which also has a higher landing weight of 10 tons, plus in order to realize the possibility of leaving an inert, heavier aircraft called CAT III A, from the height of 2 meters, the designers made a fairly large "approach idle" - "small gas for landing". All this makes other demands on the length of the runway, but I know a few instances when work in this direction is underway, and in fact 15% of all aviation events in the world are connected with rolling out aircraft.
3) Navigation equipment and approach systems. If there are no alternate aerodromes for hundreds of kilometers around, the question of the presence of an accurate approach system at the aerodrome - ILS and a low minimum becomes extremely important. Here, without the help of the state is necessary.
4) A fully operational aircraft is also an important factor, especially for a two-member crew. It is necessary to make changes to the Customs Code so that spare parts for foreign aircraft would get on the aircraft in the shortest possible time, according to a simplified procedure. This will dramatically improve the health of the fleet, the regularity of flight, and increase safety. It is possible to encourage our Western colleagues to create warehouses with customs cleared parts in the territory of the Russian Federation. Now, spare parts for a month are in customs warehouses, and airplanes fly with "deferred" defects. First you need to install a serviceable unit on the plane, and then you can draw up your own pieces of paper, as much as you like (of course, if you really care about the power supply). Well what the most bad can happen in this case? - The operator will not pay you the customs duty, but so what? The next time, take revenge on him, but the sun will go on a flight fully operational.
5) Many Airlines continue to send their pilots abroad for training simulators, from which the quality of training suffers. It means that something is wrong with the legislative base in Russia, something is wrong with customs duties on the FFS (full flight simulator).
Again, this may be necessary, but then stop pretending that you are interested in flight safety.
Materials AEVT
First, I want to dispel the fallacy that there are not enough pilots in the Russian Federation. This market is able to self-regulate. The shortage of flight personnel at first provoked wage growth, and then there was a market phenomenon such as “finding internal reserves”: someone recovered after the break, someone came from the army, someone returned from abroad. Schools have increased the number of students, and the crisis has corrected the plans of many companies to update the fleet. I reliably know that now in search of work from the company dozens of pilots go to the company who are not needed by anyone (far from thinking that we have a line of applicants in UTair, while Aeroflot and Sibir or "Transaero" they are not).Perhaps, for the implementation of best practices, it would be worthwhile to invite someone to Russia, but ... ONLY TO INSTRUCTIVE POSITIONS and only from the leading airlines of the world.
Further on the topic. In the 60 of the last century, the number of disasters in terms of the factors "man", "environment", and "car" was approximately the same, roughly in 33%. (I deliberately do not use the SHELL model, which divides errors, called the general term "human factor", into software - programs, manuals, etc. - and lifeware - strictly speaking, the person himself).
With the development of scientific progress, people have learned how to make more advanced and reliable airplanes, predict dangerous weather phenomena, but the person has remained the same. It is known that "the column moves with the speed with which its slowest carriage rides." (the ancients said that "the fortress is only as strong as its weakest wall"). Sadly, man was the weakest link in this chain! Moving from polynomial crews to 2 members, we realized that on Boeing and Airbus, at least 2-3, there are fewer pairs of eyes than on IL-86 or Tu-154.
The man was wrong and will be wrong! Our task is, firstly, to do everything so that the pilot (crew member) makes mistakes as little as possible, and secondly, if this happens, his mistake was promptly detected and localized. The whole organization of flight work is aimed only at this.
Let me remind you that in the 60-ies in the world of technology, a standard was introduced that is called in Japanese as poke-eke or foolproof (protection from stupid actions).
Roughly speaking, clicking on all the buttons on your TV remote at the same time will not break it. Similarly, the system does not allow the pilot to do an unequivocally wrong action, for example, to apply a reverse in the air or sit down with braked wheels on some types of aircraft. However, the incorrect operation of automation can lead to sad consequences. It is worth thinking about the right relationship between man and computer. To insure, but not block, the actions of the pilot, because such a system saves only in case of pilot error (which happens extremely rarely), and it hurts if the automation fails at ANY moment.
Returning to the statistics, we can say that we have found a NARROW PLACE. 80% of all accidents and disasters occur due to the BSF. DO YOU SOMETHING TO DO WITH THIS BAD? Of course yes"!
To be honest, I first heard the mathematical substantiation of the need for the "cross-check" procedure from our Director General and in many respects have to retell his considerations on this matter:
The capabilities of the human body are such that even when performing simple, routine operations, having done approximately 50000 actions, according to statistics, a person makes a mistake at least once. The possibilities of modern technology are several orders of magnitude better. However, if you conscientiously perform the work technology in the cockpit, the probability of error can be reduced by several orders of magnitude, due to the cross-check procedure, because the probability of a SIMULTANEOUS error of two different people is as small as the probability of a simultaneous failure of 2 engines.
If ANY pilot in the cockpit of the aircraft controls ANY action, then the crew’s reliability statistics can be brought to acceptable performance, at about the same level as the aircraft’s reliability.
Aviation Transport today is one of the safest in the world. About 50 people die from donkey kicks a year, 000 on the roads of Russia, and only 35 people a year in commercial aircraft throughout the WORLD. In absolute terms, even Russia looks good, but in relative terms ... we are clearly inferior to many.
How to manage the resources of the crew (and this is now the whole 2 person), how much and what specifically to say - the operator himself decides, although Boeing and Airbus give standard recommendations. Curiously, in the 3's crew member, the crews of the “LH” used the principle of “quiet cockpit”, as if considering that if everything goes according to plan, then it is not necessary to say anything. However, with the transition to the two-member crew of conversations in the cockpit, even they clearly increased.
Most of all "talking shop" in the cockpit of the Armed Forces of the main world low-cost "RYAN AIR". He asked personally about the reasons, the answer was quite logical. "When you have pilots fly from around the world (the instructor used the term rabble), it is more reliable."
The concepts of the “fixed” and “loose” crew also have their advantages and disadvantages; we have already discussed this issue more than once.
So now, theoretically, all the wagons in our column will move at the same speed. On paper, mathematically everything fits, but ... the "reliability of the crew" did not equal the reliability of technology. What prevented? There are factors that our theory cannot take into account.
You certainly heard the term "Buridan donkey". If a computer is always looking for a rational, logical action or a sequence of actions, so it’s easy to calculate, then a person often does not act logically. In Jean Buridan, this is demonstrated by the example of a donkey, in front of which there are two absolutely identical mounds of hay, to which the same distance. To guess what a donkey will approach at first is ABSOLUTELY impossible. If a computer were in its place, it would “overheat”, solving an unsolvable problem: “how to do it more rationally”, but a donkey can do as you please! Also man. Sometimes this is his strength, sometimes - weakness! In addition, there are frankly negative factors:
1) Youth
Amazing statistics was given by one American inspector. He analyzed aviation events that occurred due to the "human factor" in recent years, tens of thousands of aviation events. It turned out that the average indicators for pilots at the age of 65-60, 60-55, 55-50, 50-45, 45-40, 40-35, 35-30 are about the same and average 2,6 events X100000-30 In the case when the captain was from 25-3 for years, this coefficient increases by about 6,1 times, to the value of 100000 aviation event on XNUMX r.
He asked the audience what is the coefficient for captains younger than 25 years? The result was shocking - 60 aviation events (in 23 times worse than for the main category of pilots).
In Afghanistan, the Americans tried to send pilots at the age of 30-35 years. This age was considered optimal for the mission. Younger - the pilots are prone to excessive risk, those who are older - too careful.
I am afraid of young commanders. Knowledge and experience, things are not identical. If you try, then knowledge can be obtained quickly, and only few of completed flights bring us experience. I have such flights that teach something, 1-2 happen for a year, all the rest are just a routine. Ordinary and standard.
The question of shortening the pilot training period is now being widely discussed. Of course, this is worth thinking about, but it is important not to forget about such a characteristic feature of the Russian character as NIGILISM. Russians were often lied to and they used to not trust anyone. Remember that anecdote: "How to make people of different nationalities jump from a bridge? For the Russian there was a phrase:" Comrade, but you can't jump from a bridge! "
If it is enough for an American to write to FCOM "is not recommended", then even the words "BESTLY PROHIBITED" are not valid for OUR pilot. He needs to tell the physical nature of the ban, write 3 formulas from the strength of materials and 2 from aerodynamics, explain why it is impossible to do this and what consequences this may lead to. Colorful, with pictures, up to the funeral ... :)))
2) Poor knowledge of English
I have repeatedly expressed skepticism about the current level of English proficiency in Russian pilots. I do not have a diploma of a rider, so when applying for a job I am not obliged to adhere to any programs and rules. I ask applicants any simple question, for example, how to say "I did not buy anything" ... or "Take me home"? Depending on the delirium that I hear in response, I conclude about an approximate level. The best candidates are sent to the Tyumen Center for Training Program, where the certified teachers will determine the exact level. But once again I draw the attention of the aviation authorities: NO ONE LEADING COMPANY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION DOES NOT TRUST CERTIFICATES issued by third-party certified organizations. In all, a procedure for the recheck of knowledge.
I had the impression that today tuition is a necessary and sufficient condition for obtaining the desired certificate of the 4 level. The "semi-pilots", graduates of flight schools, have no other trumps, but these too often turn out to be false.
The teachers “train” the trainees for the correct answers so that they sound on the tape. The list of questions on the exams is obviously small, as a result, I practically don’t meet pilots with whom you can talk in English about their employment, and this is exactly what the certificate on the 4 level implies.
When the AEVT published my opinion on this issue, a lot of insults were heard from officials. Do not be offended, gentlemen. The truth can not be offended. Knowledge of English is a factor affecting flight safety, especially if you are flying foreign cars. Sometimes I hear a question: why not Russian pilots in the cockpit speak Russian? Absurd. Check-lists are often called by the name of the emergency panel that was triggered, all controls in manuals are called as appropriate, and in the event of a crisis there is no time for transfers. In the end, there is global experience, even Asian pilots speak English, and it is much more difficult for them to learn the language. I do not know how in other regions, but as recently as yesterday we received an order from the head of the Tyumen MTU about revoking approximately 50 of falsified certificates issued by one of the training organizations. It's good news.
3) Indiscipline.
But ... if the manager, having heard the words "undisciplined", starts to grab the revolver, using the terms "hot iron", "toughen", "demand" - then he will not succeed. In my opinion, there are only two effective methods of strengthening discipline that can cope with this trouble:
• a) creating a collective atmosphere of intolerance for violations (when the aviation community itself rejects incorrect behavior within itself).
• b) a culture of voluntary communications (that allows the supervisor to adjust the work of the system).
I know for sure that in ANY airlines of the Russian Federation such voluntary reports in 1000 are less than those of our foreign colleagues (somewhere the situation is better, somewhere worse), which means we do not have enough information for early detection of violations (after all, managing the process, not having reliable information about him is impossible!) This question requires the most serious study.
I would like to remind you that in Europe and the USA no one is turning off the screws, does not carry out punitive measures, and the safety of flights there is at exorbitant levels for us.
Separately, I emphasize: “Voluntary messages are a matter of trust of drugs to your MANUAL (this does not apply to potential snitchers and gossips, people are bad rather than useful). This is a matter of trust in the system in which the employee works, it is a question of“ safety culture ”.
Of course, it is assumed that the management will react in any way to the report, because if the employees' attempts to change something for the better remain several times unanswered, the initiative will "stall"
4) Fatigue
We create flight plans and on paper they look perfect, but life makes its own adjustments. Traffic jams in Moscow. Reinsured, pilots sometimes arrive at the airport for 4-5 hours before departure, and not for 1,5 hours, as required by RPP. The time allotted for rest between flights can also be spent in a traffic jam when returning home. Rest conditions at intermediate airports of the Russian Federation are much worse than those of our colleagues in Europe. Young people save money to buy a new apartment and instead of going on vacation to the resort, they are engaged in repairs.
Formal accounting of working time leads to the accumulation of fatigue, which is cumulative. To increase production efficiency, employers are trying to increase the maximum allowable load on the flight personnel to the level of the Irish discount airline "Ryan Air" - 100 hours per month, not realizing that the conditions of life, work and leisure in Europe are completely different. Stress, health, life, "flashers" - when you're in a hurry to take off, etc. I remember that the FAC of the plane crashed in Perm had a small child, it seems, a studio apartment and the third night shift in a row. And yet, our European colleagues come to a fully operational aircraft for 30 minutes before departure, and Russian pilots participate in refueling, loading, checking systems and solving any problematic issues ...
English physiologists argue that driving behind the wheel (flying) drunk is no less dangerous than riding tired. In 2011, ICAO issued the DOC 9966, the most useful document on fatigue management, included in the 6 Appendix with the 8 Appendix.
In some European Airlines, there is a practice: once a year, a bungalow is taken off somewhere in the Maldives for a vacationer and the entire family of the pilot is given free tickets. You can not go to rest, but money for this vacation can not be obtained.
5) Power
Once again, I cannot fail to mention the imperfection of the concept of lawmaking in Russia. The authorities must share responsibility with the pilots for many of the catastrophes that biased investigators attributed to the "human factor". Constantly late for years or even decades, our aviation authorities, remembering themselves, demand that everything be done immediately "here and now." Remember how the BP Management System was introduced into the GA of the Russian Federation. It was ordered to create and implement an SMS for 3 of the month. The condition of people who understood what they were talking about was then rated as “laughter through tears”, because our foreign colleagues spent years on this work. Let me remind you, "the race is won not by the one who runs fast, but by the one who started earlier."
In order to control the BP proactively, you need to know the real situation in the production teams, know the challenges faced by people who perform real work. What happens if you do not communicate with practitioners? Here are some examples:
• We joined the RVSM program LAST on planet Earth, along with such aviation powers as Afghanistan and Mongolia.
• In 2002, the FAA issued the AU - 120 76, which marked the beginning of the introduction of the EFB (electronic flight bag), after 10 years we are just starting to develop this document, while Aeroflot and Volga-Dnepr already fly with EFB one-time permissions.
• We missed the 40-year era of VOR beacons, and when the concept of GNSS & RNP is being introduced all over the world, our colleagues from aeronautical navigation complain that Russian developments, our know-how GBAS (ground based augmentation station), are cheap and effective. it is not necessary and that the VOR lighthouses decommissioned in Europe will be installed in the Moscow air hub. I would like to believe that this is not so, but doubts remain, because according to the requirements of the IAC, it is necessary to install as many as 21 ARCs on new aircraft of the 2st century, despite the fact that for the third year already NDBs are being decommissioned absolutely in all countries of the world, and in In 3, they will remain only in Russia and Africa. Despite the fact that according to the MEL ARC is not needed at all for flight, in the Master MEL opposite the ADF there is a number - 2015. You would also require to carry an astrolabe or a sextant with you!
I happened to distill the aircraft from the first batch of Boeing-737 NG aircraft purchased by UTair in the USA from the Boeing Field (Seattle) airfield. Our American partners complained about the "mysterious Russian soul." They reported that they had received a letter from one of the managers, where he asked to make sure that the Boeing navigation system could receive GLONASS signals. Boeing agreed and offered to send the terms of reference for this work. So, the answer from our side at that time was not about 1,5 years ... The guys were surprised, and they can be understood.
I hope that something has already changed for the better, I just do not have actual information on this topic. But this is a very important question.
I advocate that the dialogue between practitioners and the aviation administration take place more often and on a wider range of issues. As a communicator, I have long been proposing to the AETT, where not the most important, but the most knowledgeable people in the GA are gathering: flight directors of airlines, heads of UPS, aksakals of Russian aviation. They can talk about the challenges that practitioners face every day. Something has already been done - but much remains to be done ...
I have claims and wishes for the government.
“Problems should not be solved - they should be financed” (Ronald Reagan). It is possible for the average person who is watching the “zombie box” and it seems that the state is doing something to ensure flight safety, but it seems to me that from the cockpit of the plane it is not so.
1) Over the past 20, the number of airfields in the Russian Federation has been reduced from 1400 to 300. Looking through the information on the BP in the world every day, I cannot help but note how often the pilots of European companies decide to stop their flight mission and land at the NEAR aerodrome.
By European standards, the “nearest” airport is the one to which there is less than 100 km, by Russian it is obvious - 500 km? Or, again, to look for some Izhmu?
2) Runways are state property. Their length and condition do not meet the requirements of the 21 century. If desired, it is not difficult to find out at which airfields aircraft of various airlines periodically roll out (for example, Rostov), and pilots are ALWAYS blamed for this. Designers around the world are looking for ways to increase the commercial efficiency of new aircraft. The most common narrow-body Boeing-737 classic was replaced by the Boeing-737 NG, which also has a higher landing weight of 10 tons, plus in order to realize the possibility of leaving an inert, heavier aircraft called CAT III A, from the height of 2 meters, the designers made a fairly large "approach idle" - "small gas for landing". All this makes other demands on the length of the runway, but I know a few instances when work in this direction is underway, and in fact 15% of all aviation events in the world are connected with rolling out aircraft.
3) Navigation equipment and approach systems. If there are no alternate aerodromes for hundreds of kilometers around, the question of the presence of an accurate approach system at the aerodrome - ILS and a low minimum becomes extremely important. Here, without the help of the state is necessary.
4) A fully operational aircraft is also an important factor, especially for a two-member crew. It is necessary to make changes to the Customs Code so that spare parts for foreign aircraft would get on the aircraft in the shortest possible time, according to a simplified procedure. This will dramatically improve the health of the fleet, the regularity of flight, and increase safety. It is possible to encourage our Western colleagues to create warehouses with customs cleared parts in the territory of the Russian Federation. Now, spare parts for a month are in customs warehouses, and airplanes fly with "deferred" defects. First you need to install a serviceable unit on the plane, and then you can draw up your own pieces of paper, as much as you like (of course, if you really care about the power supply). Well what the most bad can happen in this case? - The operator will not pay you the customs duty, but so what? The next time, take revenge on him, but the sun will go on a flight fully operational.
5) Many Airlines continue to send their pilots abroad for training simulators, from which the quality of training suffers. It means that something is wrong with the legislative base in Russia, something is wrong with customs duties on the FFS (full flight simulator).
Again, this may be necessary, but then stop pretending that you are interested in flight safety.
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