Russia Left With Nothing: Portsmouth's Shame
Russian delegation in Portsmouth. Sit S. Yu. Witte and Baron R. R. Rosen
Petersburg is leaning towards peace
The death of the 2nd Pacific Squadron (based on the Baltic fleet) in the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905 was one of the most severe humiliations of the Russian Empire. 21 ships were lost, 7 surrendered, 6 were interned. Almost 6 thousand people were killed and wounded, more than 6 thousand were captured. Japanese losses were minimal - 3 destroyers. No one expected such a defeat.
In Russia itself there was unrest, which was fueled as best they could by our Western "partners" and Japanese intelligence. Thus, in the Kingdom of Poland, unrest and a general strike in the summer grew into an armed uprising in the city of Lodz. Thousands of workers with red flags took to the streets. Polish nationalists and socialists began shooting at government officials and the military. Infantry, cavalry and Cossacks were sent against them. Hundreds of people were killed and wounded.
The empire was being "rocked". However, it was still strong - the police, Cossacks and the regular army fought the rebels. "Deep Russia" (the common people), which was called the "Black Hundreds", spoke out against the unrest that was undermining order and normal life.
After Tsushima, Emperor Nicholas II convened a meeting at which the question of a truce with Japan was raised. At the same time, new units and formations continued to move to the Far East. That same day (June 6), the Tsar granted an audience to the American ambassador George Meyer:
"So far no foreigner has set foot on Russian soil; but I know that the Japanese may land on Sakhalin at any moment. Therefore, a preliminary meeting must take place before that happens."
The chief Japanese strategist, General Kodama Gentaro, advocated peace, but believed that it was necessary to first seize some Russian territory to improve his negotiating position. The least protected part of Russia in the Far East was Sakhalin Island. On July 7, 1905, a Japanese landing force landed on Sakhalin. By the end of the month, the Russian garrison had been defeated and capitulated.
This operation, insignificant in military and strategic terms, had great political and diplomatic significance. The Japanese captured part of Russian land and could present it in negotiations.
Japan strengthened its international position. The Japanese Empire extended the Anglo-Japanese alliance for another ten years. London agreed that Korea would be transferred to Tokyo's sphere of influence. And most importantly, if the 1902 agreement had only defensive significance, then new articles were added that guaranteed military cooperation between London and Tokyo in the event of a third-party attack.
Almost simultaneously, a secret agreement was signed between Japan and the United States. In exchange for the Japanese firm refusal to lay claim to the Philippines, the Americans recognized Japan's authority over Korea.
At the same time, Russia’s opponents, with the help of the head of the Russian government Witte and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lamsdorf, torpedoed the possibility of a strategic alliance between Russia and Germany (the Björkö agreement).
Street demonstration of 1905. Artist: Vladislav Skochilyas
Japan needs peace
Despite the successes of the army and navy, diplomacy, Tokyo understood that the empire needed peace. The war had to be stopped while the army still looked like a winner. None of the victories of the Japanese army were decisive.
The Japanese military leaders were very concerned about the state of their troops. Manpower was exhausted, the army was no longer growing, there were almost no reserves. The Imperial General Staff calculated that Japan could put up another 1,5 divisions from the existing scattered units.
The army's officer and non-commissioned officer core had been wiped out in brutal battles. The regiments were led by elderly reserve officers, and the original command staff had either died or were undergoing treatment.
The Japanese army stopped its offensive in Manchuria, held on passively, de facto giving up the initiative in the war. In essence, the Japanese could no longer advance. There were no forces or resources, communications were greatly stretched. The wild and uninhabited spaces of Manchuria "dissolved" the Japanese army. And then there was even wilder Siberia. The Japanese were afraid that the Russians would go over to a "total" war, as with Napoleon. Japan did not have the resources for such a war.
More than half of the Japanese budget was spent on the war. This was ruining the empire. Russia, on the other hand, was not economically exhausted and had practically endless human reserves.
The real "brain" of the Japanese army, Kodama, arrived in Japan in the spring of 1905 and persistently promoted the idea of concluding peace. He told the Vice Chief of the Japanese General Staff, Major General Nagaoka:
"I came to Tokyo with a specific purpose - to stop the war. Why aren't you doing anything here? Don't you know that if you start a fire, you have to think about how to put it out."
Eventually, Kodama was able to influence the government. Japanese politicians, with the help of the Americans, began to look for the possibility of concluding peace.
Meanwhile, the Russian army was only getting stronger. In the summer of 1905, the Russian army already had an overwhelming advantage: 38 full-fledged divisions against 20 Japanese. We had almost a corps against each Japanese division. The quality of our troops had noticeably improved: select regiments and divisions arrived from the western military districts (where they were preparing for war with the Germans).
Russia needed a victory. Russian Commander-in-Chief Linevich could simply crush the enemy with the quantity and quality of his troops. And then throw the Japanese into the sea. Victory would immediately weaken the revolutionary forces, restore the empire's prestige and respect in the world. It is possible that in 1914 Berlin would simply not have dared to start a war.
As the Russian military historian A. A. Kersnovsky noted: “If Linevich had gone on the offensive at Sypingai, Russia would not have known the disasters of 1905, the explosion of 1914 and the catastrophe of 1917.” Unfortunately, General Linevich did not feel the enormous historical tasks that were assigned to the Manchurian armies in that summer of 1905. He was completely immersed in “housekeeping”, looked at the troops, sent telegrams to Petersburg that these troops were “burning with the desire to fight and defeat the enemy”, but, alas, he himself did not show this desire.”
As a result, all the "windows of opportunity" were missed, all the opportunities were lost. Peace negotiations only suppressed the already weak will of the Russian commanders of this period of the empire's decline.
American Mediation
Washington realized that it was time for negotiations. Time to record profits and losses. The main tasks had been solved. Further victories and strengthening of Japan at the expense of Russia and China did not suit the USA. They did not need a new competitor in the region. Also, the Americans could not allow the defeat of Japan and strengthening of Russia in the Far East, which was also possible.
As early as March 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt informed the Japanese that he was prepared to act as a mediator. At the end of May, the Japanese side asked Roosevelt whether he could arrange a meeting between the two warring parties for the purpose of direct negotiations.
In June, Roosevelt made a proposal "in his own name and on his own initiative" to organize peace negotiations. Tsar Nicholas II accepted this mediation proposal, based on the position that "internal well-being is more important than victory." Although he made the reservation that "he cannot allow even one kopeck of contribution, nor the cession of one inch of land."
It was decided to hold the negotiations on the territory of a country not involved in the military conflict. Therefore, the peace conference was held in Portsmouth, USA, and opened on August 22, 1905. The Russian plenipotentiary delegation was headed by Witte, and the Japanese delegation by Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro.
Roosevelt was effectively blackmailing Nicholas the entire time the Russians and Japanese were negotiating peace. He wrote to the Tsar that "continuing the war means losing not only Sakhalin, but also Eastern Siberia."
Portsmouth and its importance
On September 5, 1905, in the American city of Portsmouth, Witte, Rosen, Komura, and Takahira signed a peace treaty. Russia handed over the Kwantung region with Port Arthur and Dalny to Japan, ceded the southern part of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel, and gave up the South Manchurian Railway from Arthur to Changchun, 735 km long, with all its property (more than two-thirds of the entire road). The southernmost station remaining in the hands of the Russian CER was Kuanchengzi, in the northern part of Changchun. Russia recognized the predominance of Japanese interests in Korea and South Manchuria.
The Japanese demands for contributions and compensation for expenses (3 billion rubles) were rejected. Japan did not insist on them, was in a hurry to conclude peace and was afraid of the resumption of military actions under unfavorable conditions.
However, Russia was obliged to conclude a convention with Japan on fishing in the Russian territorial waters of the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea for a period of 12 years. The convention, signed on July 28, 1907 in St. Petersburg, was so advantageous for Japan that it was called a hidden contribution.
Witte also "forgot" about the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron, half-sunk in Port Arthur (the Japanese raised them, strengthening their fleet), or captured due to Nebogatov's fault. These ships could and should have been returned to Russia, but this was not done. As a result, the battleships and cruisers strengthened the fleet of the Japanese Empire and reminded Russia of the "shameful" war.
Incidentally, Japan also took advantage of another prize that few people know about. The fact is that the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) was only being designed, and on June 12, 1898, by "the highest order" of Nicholas, the "CER Society" was granted the right to maintain an ocean shipping company. In the same year of 1898, the first three steamships were purchased in England. By the Russo-Japanese War, the "CER fleet" numbered 22 large and small vessels, including such cargo-passenger ships as the "Mongolia" and "Manchuria", which cost a million rubles each.
And almost all of this wealth went to the Japanese for nothing. Some was captured by them, some was raised from the bottom after we sank it. So Japan, even without Sakhalin, without the contribution from Russia, received very large compensation from the war - already due to Russia giving it ports, cities, communications, military ships and merchant ships.
Russia lost its main strategic and economic positions in the Far East, for which it paid a huge price in blood and gold. In particular, the Pacific Fleet and the possibility of its basing in the warm sea were lost. The Japanese in South Sakhalin threatened Vladivostok and our main sea communications. The colossal funds invested in Manchuria – Yellow Russia – were mostly lost.
Witte, having surrendered his position to Russia in the Far East, received the title of “king of all diplomats” from the American press.
Stalin was able to regain these positions in 1945 (Why Stalin Started the War Against Japan).
Russia was driven out of China (Manchuria), the large Far East, and again aimed at European showdowns. The rehearsal of the First World War was successful: the USA and England successfully pitted the Japanese and Russians against each other, then used this experience in Europe (Germans against Russians).
At the same time, Japan did not really win: it was hooked on loans, there was no contribution (damage to the economy), territorial concessions to Russia were minimal. Japan was weakened and could not threaten the US and Britain, which had their own plans for hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, in particular in China.
On March 1, 1919, the former corps commander on the Northern Front and future head of the War Ministry under Kolchak, Baron Alexei Budberg, was driving through Southern Manchuria, heading to Tokyo.
This is what he later wrote about this trip:
"We passed Antung, a former Korean village, now a respectable city with stone houses, factories and plants. It is sad to think that we started this too; We were the first to awaken deserted Manchuria, brought culture into it, invested many millions of Russian money, lost hundreds of thousands of Russian people and in the end made it a source of great benefits and income, but not for ourselves; Japan made a fortune, China acquired a lot and is preparing to acquire even more, but we, out of historical habit, have only gained grief, losses and a position at a broken trough."
A good epitaph for the Far Eastern policy of the tsarist government, the foundations of which were laid by Witte and which he buried in the American resort town of Portsmouth.
Portrait of Sergei Yulievich Witte during the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty in 1905
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