The Geranium Revolution: Changing the Face of War

It is no secret to regular readers of "Military Review" that the author has long been a staunch supporter of the massive use of high-precision weapons long-range drones in general and kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in particular as one of the most effective tools for breaking the enemy's military machine.

In a sense, this is reminiscent of the doctrine of Giulio Douhet, but implemented at a new technological level, where the target is not the civilian population as such, but the industry and infrastructure of the enemy. For this purpose, according to the author, it is necessary to create a separate structure, or rather a branch of the Armed Forces of Russia - Strategic Conventional Forces (SCF).

The main task of the SCS is to inflict damage on the enemy, significantly reducing his organizational, industrial and military capabilities, from a distance that minimizes or eliminates the likelihood of direct combat with the enemy's armed forces.

However, today we will not talk about the SCS as a whole, but about one of the types of weapons – kamikaze UAVs, or more precisely, kamikaze UAVs of the Geran/Geran-2 family, which have had and continue to have a significant impact on the course of the Russian special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine.

Here we should make a reservation - the name "Geranium" / "Geranium-2" is commonly used, in documents this product may have a completely different designation, or there are many modifications of "Geranium-3", "Geranium-4", etc., but since we do not know them, then from now on we will operate with the concepts of "Geranium" and "Geranium-2".

How did it happen that such highly effective weapons (as it now turns out) were created not by the defense industry complexes (DIC) of the leading powers of the planet like the USA or Russia, but by the Iranian DIC, which has very limited capabilities, including due to the sanctions imposed on it?

It is possible that it was precisely the existing limitations that led to the emergence of the Shahed 136 kamikaze UAV, since, as is well known, "necessity is the mother of invention." After the end of World War II, Soviet developers also lagged behind the United States in many areas of technical progress, which had to be compensated for by ingenuity and non-standard solutions, as a result of which domestic weapons were not inferior to Western ones, and often surpassed them.

Kamikaze UAV Shahed 136

The appearance of the kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium family was an unpleasant surprise for the enemy. On the one hand, there was talk about the fact that there were no “real” winged missiles Russia had "two or three days" left, so it had to switch to "under-missiles." On the other hand, the damage from strikes inflicted by the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV was quite real, so the enemy had to urgently come up with countermeasures.

There must be a lot of them

Initially, the number of kamikaze UAVs of the Geran family used against the enemy was counted in units. According to a number of open sources, the first kamikaze UAVs of the Geran family were delivered directly from Iran, in fact being repainted kamikaze UAVs Shahed-136, and later the production of these UAVs was established in Russia.

Based on open data, most likely, at the first stage there was a "screwdriver assembly", when the final products were assembled from the supplied machine kits. In parallel, work was carried out to localize the production of individual components, as well as to make changes to the design of the kamikaze UAV of the Geran family, increasing their efficiency.

Apparently, at the moment, the production of "Geraniums" in Russia is completely localized, and their design already differs significantly from the original Iranian prototype. Currently, open sources say that the Russian industry is capable of producing about 3000 kamikaze UAVs of the "Geranium" family per month, which are supplemented by other products, such as decoy UAVs of the "Gerbera" type.

Serial production of kamikaze UAVs of the Geran family in Russia. Image from the TG channel SolovievLive

Some resources, including those of the enemy, indicate that in the near future the production volumes of Geraniums will increase to 6000 units per month, that is, to 72 units per year. There are also more optimistic forecasts, according to which the total production of kamikaze UAVs and decoy UAVs of various types may amount to several hundred thousand units per year. Here it is necessary to clarify that in the process of evolution, kamikaze UAVs may turn into sophisticated decoys for air defense systems (Defense), and decoy UAVs are equipped with a warhead.

In January 2023 in the material "UAV Storm Rises" We talked about the fact that potentially kamikaze UAVs like the Geranium-2 could be produced in quantities of about a million units per year.

Now, less than three years later, such volumes no longer seem unattainable, do they? Even Russian industry could easily produce hundreds of thousands of kamikaze UAVs per year, and China is even capable of producing Geranium-like UAVs by the millions.

Serial production of kamikaze UAVs of the Geran family in Russia. Image from the TG channel SolovievLive

Gain altitude

From the beginning of their use and for a fairly long period of time, the Geraniums' routes were laid at low altitudes, which made it difficult for them to be hit by anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM). At the same time, the low thermal signature of the piston engine of the Geranium-2 kamikaze UAV made it difficult for them to be captured by infrared homing heads (IR homing heads) of man-portable air defense missile systems (MANPADS).

At the beginning of the war, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) mainly had long- and medium-range SAM systems of the S-200, S-300PS/PU and Buk-M1 type, produced in the USSR, whose anti-aircraft guided missiles carry warheads weighing several hundred kilograms. In the event of a miss and hitting buildings and structures, such SAMs caused greater damage than the kamikaze UAVs themselves. In addition, the high intensity of the conflict led to the AFU quickly developing a shortage of SAMs, as a result of which the SAMs were mainly used in ambush mode to hunt for Aviation The Russian Air Force (VVS), and not to protect attacked objects.

Ukraine's allies tried to fix the situation with the shortage of SAMs and SAMs, but several more problems were revealed here. Firstly, the Western defense industry, which has been focused on participation in local wars over the past few decades, could not provide SAM supplies in the volumes required by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, even with the availability of funding - the "allies" had to scrape together their own arsenals.

Secondly, the cost of even the cheapest SAMs produced in Western countries was several times higher than the cost of the Geranium family of kamikaze UAVs they shot down, and for the most expensive SAMs used by the Patriot SAM system, the cost increase was not several times higher, but orders of magnitude higher.

Hunting for the Geranium-2 kamikaze UAVs from fighters also did not lead to anything good. Apparently, there were problems with capturing the air-to-air missile seeker against the background of the ground, and attempts to shoot down these low-speed, low-flying targets with aircraft cannons quickly led to the loss of fighters due to fragments from the Geraniums they shot down hitting them.

By the way, after the loss of the first Soviet-made fighters, the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not abandon their experiments in intercepting Geraniums with fighters, as a result of which they lost an F-16, as they say, a small thing, but nice!

At first, the main and quite effective means of countering the Geran-2 family of kamikaze UAVs were mobile groups armed with searchlights and rapid-fire machine guns with thermal imagers. By the way, for some reason, based on open data, such mobile patrols are used quite rarely in Russia, despite the fact that the threats from Ukrainian low-flying kamikaze UAVs are only increasing.

Ukrainian mobile groups hunting for our "Geraniums"

It would seem that the solution is quite simple - to increase the flight altitude of the kamikaze UAV of the Geran family to the maximum, presumably about four kilometers. In this case, the small arms and guns of the mobile groups would become practically ineffective, and the number of SAMs of the enemy was and will be limited.

Moreover, each use of SAMs produced by Western countries’ defense industry complexes against the Geranium is an example of monstrous inefficiency, based on the ratio of the cost of the SAM used to the cost of the target hit.

We discussed the necessity and feasibility of increasing the flight altitude of the Geranium family of kamikaze UAVs back in May 2023 in the article “Climb: new tactics for using the Geran-2 UAV will make it possible to deplete Ukrainian air defense as much as possible».

And eventually, the Geranium routes began to be laid at high altitudes, although, according to open data, this only happened somewhere starting in March of this year. Why this tactic could not have been adopted earlier is unclear.

View from the Geranium camera flying at high altitude (top) and footage of the Geranium diving from high altitude

Well, better late than never. Apparently, it was not mobile groups with small arms and cannons that pushed the Geraniums to high altitudes, but FPV-drones, which have become quite effective in the Ukrainian Armed Forces as anti-aircraft weapons for hitting relatively low-speed targets. Of course, technically FPV drones can climb to altitudes of up to five kilometers, but their time there is extremely limited, so the Geraniums have a much better chance of getting through.

It is worth noting another point: the enemy’s mobile groups are trying to attack our Geran-2 kamikaze UAVs at the moment when they dive from high altitudes onto the target, detecting them by their characteristic sound.

Of course, the sounds of diving Geraniums probably cause the enemy some discomfort, but from a practical point of view, it would most likely be more effective to stop the engine at the moment of transition to a dive, then it would be much more difficult for the mobile groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to detect and shoot down the attacking UAV.

Conclusions

The importance and influence of the Geranium family of kamikaze UAVs on the course of the air defense war is difficult to overestimate – the number of objects destroyed by them deep in enemy territory is difficult to calculate.

No cruise or ballistic missiles would have been able to achieve such a result due to their high cost and, accordingly, limited production volumes. At the same time, the lack of strategic air superiority would not have allowed the Russian Armed Forces to ensure the destruction of targets deep in enemy territory without significant losses.

However, this is not the end, but only the beginning. stories, because the Geraniums become faster, smarter, stronger, but we will talk about this in the next material.

Comments

[Kote Pan Kokhanka]

However, this is not the end, but only the beginning of the story, because the Geraniums are becoming faster, smarter, stronger, but we will talk about this in the next article.

Just a little bit more, just a little bit more, and in the sky we will see nothing other than a V-1 - essentially more of a cruise missile than a UAV.
History develops in a spiral. In the 20s of the last century, prototypes of missiles for fighters were sometimes called "air torpedoes" - the name did not stick. The New Geranium, as far as I understand, received a rocket (or jet) engine, so in my understanding as a neophyte it is not a UAV (UAV), but a cruise missile.
Have a nice day, everyone!

[Luminman]

Quote: Kote Pan Kokhanka

The new Geranium, as far as I understand, received a rocket (or jet) engine, so in my understanding as a neophyte it is not a UAV (UAV), but a cruise missile

In my opinion, there are no boundaries left between the KR and drones - it’s probably time for the generals from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff to ponder about the reclassification of this type of weapon...

[Okko777]

"Groundhog Day" in the SVO has been going on for 4 years already. A long war, inexplicable from the point of view of modern tactics, brings amazingly stupid, supposedly advanced in content, conclusions and prospects. In this insanity, delirious ideas are born, which some try to pack in the wrapper of achievements. The author of this masterpiece is one of such representatives and he is not alone. I remember a joke about a night with a woman in a spacesuit, upside down and backwards and on skis in the desert...

[Dutchman Michel]

Quote: Andrey Mitrofanov

In some ways, this is reminiscent of the doctrine of Giulio Douhet.

Good doctrine! Although wars are not won by bombing alone, they can still give the enemy a good beating. Today's war of drones of all stripes and ranks clearly proves this

[common man]

Quote: Dutchman Michel

Good doctrine! Although wars are not won by bombing alone, they can give the enemy a good beating.

In Serbia it worked, and not badly.

[Dutchman Michel]

Quote: man in the street

In Serbia it worked, and not badly.

It only worked halfway! Until the foot of an infantryman is on the desired territory, this territory will always be undefeated. The Anglo-American bombing of Germany during WWII also worked halfway. But only halfway

[Netl]

Quote: Dutchman Michel

The Anglo-American bombings also worked half-way.

Much less than half. Nazi Germany's military production hardly dropped until they physically lost access to the necessary deposits and other resources. Physically - this means they were occupied by the troops of the anti-Hitler coalition.

And in the current situation, when the main production facilities are located outside Nazi Ukraine, the purpose of strategic strikes is not entirely clear. Moreover, many tasty targets even in Ukraine are not subjected to strikes for political reasons. Given the above, it would be too optimistic to expect any significant results from Geranium and others.

[Same lech]

It would be good for Geranium to create search systems with the capture of a specific target at the final site.
Well, for example... a reconnaissance UAV has identified a dugout with some ASU soldiers who have jumped in there... on command, a photo with the target coordinates is immediately transmitted to the attack UAV's guidance system, and then it's a matter of technology... it's like setting up a CNC machine... you enter the data and start the automated process of the device's operation.

[sagitovich]

It was written well on paper.
Oh, they forgot about the ravines!

[Billy Bones1972]

I think a helicopter, plus a small Doppler radar, plus a cheap missile with radio command control based on some Nursa missile

[agond]

On the issue of protection, of course, intercepting an aircraft-type UAV somewhere along its route is not an easy task, and destroying it on approach to the target at the moment of a dive is a completely solvable task, a ZU based on a four-barreled machine gun GShG-7.62 with a probability close to 100% will shoot it down at a short distance, but this ZU must be completely autonomous, i.e. it can be aimed and fired without an operator. , , and if we take, say, a shot blasting machine for cleaning metal (the shot throwing speed of 60 m / s can be increased to 100 m / s), then at a distance of up to 10-20 m in a split second it will erase the blades of any quadcopter, the method can be used somewhere, for example, to protect a tank

[Owl]

It would also be possible to develop a warhead with self-aiming ammunition that hits targets with a shock core, cumulative high-explosive, fragmentation high-explosive with air detonation.

[BAI]

From all of the above, only one conclusion can be made - there is enough electricity in Ukraine.

View from Geranium's camera flying at high altitude (top)

In villages in the liberated territories the picture is much worse

[cpls22]

At first, the main and quite effective means of countering the Geran-2 family of kamikaze UAVs were mobile groups armed with searchlights and rapid-fire machine guns with thermal imagers. By the way, for some reason, based on open data, such mobile patrols are used quite rarely in Russia

Based on the photos provided in the article, their mobile group consists of the shooters themselves, searchlight operators who illuminate the target for them, and a person with a laser who points the searchlight operators in the direction of the target. But how does a laser operator know the direction of the target? That's where you need to look to understand their work.

[rosomaha]

there was information that these mobile groups are being transferred to the infantry...maybe they are being captured...filtered out in the camp...and interrogated well

[Netl]

Quote: rosomaha

interrogate well

What is there to interrogate, everything has long been known. There is at least one tablet in the group, which displays radar reconnaissance data in real time, including that received from NATO.

[balabol]

The Giulio Douhet Doctrine is a concept developed by the Italian military theorist and strategist Giulio Douhet (1884–1976), which played a significant role in the development of Italian military strategy and ideology between the world wars and during World War II. It is associated with the ideas of the "new war" and "total war", as well as the use of propaganda and psychological influence as essential tools in military operations.

The main principles of the doctrine of Giulio Douhet
Total war
Douhet emphasized that modern war is not only a clash of armed forces, but also a struggle for the minds and hearts of the population.
War covers all spheres of society: economics, politics, culture and morality.
It is necessary to mobilize all resources of the state and society to achieve victory.
Propaganda and psychological warfare
Douhet believed that propaganda was the most important weapon in war.
The use of information and psychological methods to undermine the enemy's morale and strengthen one's own combat readiness.
The war of ideas and beliefs is seen as an integral part of military action.
Hybridity of warfare methods
A combination of traditional military operations with political, economic and psychological measures.
Emphasis on guerrilla warfare, sabotage, subversion and other forms of unconventional warfare.
Mobilization of society
Douhet advocated the complete mobilization of the population - not only the army, but also civilians.
War must become the business of the whole people, not just professional soldiers.
The role of the leader and ideology
The importance of a strong leader who can unite the nation and direct its efforts in war.
Ideological motivation and nationalism are key factors for success.
Features of the doctrine
Integration of propaganda into military strategy - Douhet was one of the first to systematically consider propaganda as a combat tool.
The emphasis is on psychological impact - understanding that the morale and spirit of troops and the population can be decisive.
The total character of war is the expansion of the concept of war beyond the battlefield.
The influence of the fascist regime on Italian military doctrine - Douhet's ideas were reflected in the practice and ideology of Italy in the 1920s-1940s.
Douhet considered aviation not an auxiliary means, but an independent force capable of deciding the outcome of a war independently of land and naval operations.

The strategic role of aviation:

Aviation must be used to strike deep into the enemy's rear, destroying infrastructure, industry and communications.
Emphasis on bombers as the primary weapon to suppress the enemy's economy and logistics, thereby weakening its ability to resist.
Psychological warfare through aviation:

Bombing is not only a means of physical destruction, but also a means of demoralizing the population and troops. Douhet emphasized that the fear and chaos of air attacks can break the will to resist faster than ground combat.
Aviation as a propaganda tool: distributing leaflets, psychological pressure and creating panic to undermine morale.
Independent Air Force:

Douhet proposed the creation of a separate "air army" (aeronautics), not subordinate to the army or navy, with its own command and strategy.
This would allow efforts to be focused on air superiority rather than on supporting ground operations.
Integration into total war:

Aviation must mobilize all resources: from aircraft production to pilot training and civil support.
Combined with propaganda to enhance the effect - for example, air raids as a demonstration of power and the inevitability of victory.
Features of the Douhet Doctrine in terms of aviation
Pioneering focus on strategic bombing: Unlike earlier theories that saw air power as reconnaissance or tactical support, Douhet was the first to systematically describe it as a weapon of mass destruction capable of winning a war without ground invasion. This anticipated Giulio Douhet's ideas of "air supremacy" (though Douhet focused on bombing rather than fighters).

Psychological focus: Douhet emphasized that air power was not only physically effective, but also morally effective—bombing cities should instill terror, leading to capitulation. This made his doctrine more "total" than traditional strategies.

Influence on Fascist Italy: Douhet's ideas influenced the Italian Air Force in the 1920s and 1930s, where aircraft were used for propaganda for Mussolini's regime and in colonial wars (such as in Ethiopia). However, in practice, Italy lagged behind in implementation due to technical limitations.

Criticism and limitations: The Douhet doctrine has been criticized for overemphasizing the role of air power (especially after the experience of World War II, where air strikes did not always lead to quick victories). It was more theoretical than practical, and did not take into account defense against enemy air power.
In Il dominio dell'aria, Douhet emphasizes that air raids serve not only to cause physical destruction, but also to undermine the enemy's morale, influence the population, and shape public opinion. He sees aviation as a means of total war, where propaganda becomes an important tool - for example, through the distribution of leaflets from the air or the demonstration of the force of air strikes to intimidate and demoralize.
The role of chemical weapons in doctrine
Integration with aviation: Douhet proposed using aircraft to deliver chemicals (gases) over enemy territory. This would allow attacks on the rear, cities and troops, combining bombing with chemical attacks. He referred to the experience of World War I, where chemical weapons (such as mustard gas) demonstrated their effectiveness in demoralization.

Psychological effects: Chemical attacks, according to Douhet, increase fear and chaos among the population, undermining morale and the will to resist. He believed that such weapons create "total" terror, making war more effective without the need for ground invasions. For example, Douhet wrote about the possibility of "contaminating" the air over enemy cities to paralyze the economy and society.

A few quotes
On demoralization through air raids
"L'aviazione può colpire il morale del nemico più efficacemente di qualsiasi altra arma, perché essa porta la guerra direttamente nel cuore delle popolazioni civili, seminando terrore e confusione."
(Translation: "Aircraft can strike at enemy morale more effectively than any other weapon because it carries the war directly into the heart of the civilian population, sowing terror and confusion.")
Douhet here emphasizes how the bombing of cities causes psychological shock, leading to capitulation without direct confrontation.

Psychological warfare as a target of aviation
"Il dominio dell'aria non è solo una questione di superiorità tecnica, ma soprattutto di dominio psicologico: l'aereo che sorvola le città nemiche incute paura e demoralizza le truppe e la popolazione."
(Translation: "Power over the air is not only a question of technical superiority, but above all of psychological dominance: an aircraft flying over enemy cities instills fear and demoralizes the troops and the population.")
Douhet links air superiority with propaganda and moral suppression, anticipating ideas of psychological warfare.

Impact on the enemy rear
"Gli attacchi aerei contro le retrovie non distruggono solo le fabbriche, ma spezzano lo spirito di resistenza del popolo, rendendo la guerra insostenibile."
(Translation: "Air attacks on the rear not only destroy factories, but also break the people's spirit of resistance, making the war unbearable.")
Here Douhet illustrates how air power combines physical destruction with psychological pressure, undermining the economy and morale at the same time.

[acetophenone]

I read about "massive use" and sighed. There are a lot of geraniums, but they also cost a lot. You can't stamp out a million of them. And they are used according to the principle "to each sister an earring". They bombed bridges. Then factories. Then energy. Then railways. They hit the oil industry. They hit ports. They hit warehouses. They hit military units' locations. They hit airports. They hit... Everything.
The result is that the Ukrainians are unhappy, but everything works more or less for them.
F...! Take out ALL the electric power and power supply. ALL. 1-2-3 power plants can be repaired (which is what they did!). All - cannot. If the ENTIRE energy system is destroyed, it is impossible to fight at all. Because it is impossible to power all the supplies and equipment for the troops from mobile diesel generators.
Without supplies, the war ends with the end of the BC and dry rations. But this is apparently not necessary. What is necessary? I don't know...

[Zaurbek]

The future is in real-time targeting and instantaneous attack on targets.

[Plowman]

The Geraniums were delivered directly from Iran. So, at the start of the Central Military District, we didn't have such equipment. I wonder how Shoigu and his generals are sleeping.