Who was Rokossovsky in Operation Baikal-79?

In the spring of 1979, dramatic events began to occur in Afghanistan, which was friendly to the Soviet Union, which later forced the Soviet leadership to introduce troops into this state and, ultimately, get involved in a civil war.

On March 15, 1979, an anti-government rebellion broke out in Herat in western Afghanistan, near the border with Iran. At least 15 people took part in the rebellion. Afghan leader Taraki appealed to the USSR leadership for military assistance.

1978. Vnukovo Airport. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev meets the head of Afghanistan Nur Mohammad Taraki. Accompanying the Afghan leader is the Chief of the General Staff of the DRA Mohammad Yaqub (he stands behind Taraki)

A year before these events, in April 1978, the so-called Saur Revolution took place in Afghanistan.

Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov recalls:

"The coup took place quickly, in just two days, and without much bloodshed. Once again, the truth was confirmed that it is much easier to take power than to hold on to it.

The 60-year-old Nur Muhammad Taraki, a prominent public and political figure, poet, and writer, was proclaimed president, and Hafizullah Amin, a careerist, a man of an exceptionally adventurous nature, cruel, and not shy about the means to achieve his ambitious goals, was proclaimed prime minister.

It should be noted that the April (or, according to the Afghan name of the month, Saur) revolution of 1978 in Afghanistan took place without any initiative or support from the Soviet Union, moreover, despite its position. The Afghan revolutionaries presented us with a fait accompli, experiencing a genuine sense of pride from this. Look, they said, how brave, independent and smart we are! Throughout 1978 and 1979, they trumpeted to the whole world about the victory of the Afghan revolution and were obsessed with the illusion of a quick, victorious march of socialism across Afghan soil."

It would seem that this was a good thing for the Soviet Union. news: another state has emerged in Asia that has taken a course towards socialism. But was it really so?

Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov

Let's return to the memories of Vladimir Kryuchkov:

"The Saur revolution in Afghanistan immediately presented Moscow with many problems. What is actually happening in Afghanistan? What are the true goals of the new leadership of this country for the near future and in the long term? How to build Soviet-Afghan relations in the new conditions, who to rely on?

We didn't know each other at all, so these first negotiations were characterized by mutual wariness, a reluctance to reveal all the cards. We were unaware of the plans and intentions of the new authorities. And the Afghans, apparently, did not know how we would react to the overthrow of Daoud, with whom the Soviet Union had maintained good relations until recently."

That is, the Soviet leadership was not happy about the overthrow of Daoud. Is this the reason for the thoughts about a change of power in Kabul? Already in the spring of 1979, options were being considered for eliminating the leadership of Afghanistan and replacing it with one loyal to Moscow.

Throughout 1979, preparations for these events were underway in the 105th and 103rd airborne divisions. A battalion, which would later be called Muslim, was formed and trained, consisting of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens, for dispatch to Afghanistan. And the command staff of the Fergana and Vitebsk airborne divisions, disguised as tourists, made an "excursion" to Kabul.

Vladimir Shulga, an operational officer of the 357th regiment of the 103rd Airborne Division, recalls this “excursion”:

"They were driven around the streets of Kabul for a long time along peculiar routes. For the uninitiated, the words of the "guide" conducting this excursion might have seemed no less strange. However, it is unlikely that an uninitiated person would have found himself here. The event was carefully classified and covered up by military intelligence agencies.

"Here is the Ministry building. This is your target," the escort said to one of the officers present. "Remember all the details. Battalion Commander of the 317th Regiment, get ready, we are going to your target now."

The bus with the Soviet delegation circled the city for a long time, passing by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the General Staff, Amin’s residence, the military academy, the post office, the telegraph office and other buildings… The newly minted tourists were strictly forbidden to tell anyone about everything that happened here.”

The result of all these preparations was the operation to change power in Afghanistan - "Baikal-79", which some individuals with maniacal stubbornness continue to call "Storm-333". In December 1979, the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, which was to become the main striking force in this operation, landed on the airfields of Kabul and Bagram.

In two days, 7700 paratroopers, 894 combat vehicles, guns and automobiles, 1062 tons of ammunition, fuel and food were redeployed.

Deputy Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Lieutenant General V. A. Kirpichenko:

"After the airborne division landed at the Kabul airfield, I went there together with the senior reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the Cascade to assign them to the division. This was on December 26, 1979. When meeting the division commander, the latter introduced himself to us formally: "Commander of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, Major General Ryabchenko." After that, we went into the headquarters tent, pitched right there at the airfield, and distributed the Cascade groups among the units and subdivisions of the 103rd Division. Ryabchenko called his commanders, I introduced them to the senior groups, and together we clarified and set the task. During the movement to the facilities and at the moment of their occupation, the senior groups of the Cascade were ordered to report by radio to the KGB office (in the embassy building) on ​​how the operation was developing. B. S. Ivanov and I had to coordinate their actions and inform Moscow about the development of events via a special telephone.”

According to the plan, the combined group (about 10 thousand people), consisting of the Airborne Forces (103rd Guards Airborne Division, units of the 345th Guards OPDP), special groups of the KGB ("Thunder"), the KUOS ("Zenith"), a company of border guards and special forces of the GRU General Staff ("Muslim" battalion), was to seize the Taj-Bek Palace, the General Staff, the Central Army Corps, the Dar-ul-Aman Palace, the intelligence and counterintelligence service, the Air Force headquarters, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Tsarandoy), the Pul-i-Charkhi prison for political prisoners, the television center and a number of other facilities, as well as block the 30-thousand-strong Kabul garrison.

All assigned tasks were successfully accomplished by such a seemingly motley army, but the question always arose: who carried out the overall command of the combat actions in the operation? Who was that Rokossovsky who was responsible for the execution of the entire combat mission?

Representatives of the KGB and GRU will definitely talk about General Drozdov or Colonel Kolesnik, or someone else from the KGB or GRU, forgetting, and perhaps not understanding, that the first, and the second, and the third, and the fifth were themselves only executors and carried out the task assigned to them, like the other colonels and generals who took part in the December operation.

In addition to KGB officers, fighters from the 345th separate parachute regiment sometimes talk about their peculiarity. According to them, the regiment was subordinate to the commander of the USSR Airborne Forces, since the regiment was separate. Such statements come from ignorance stories even his own regiment. Almost on the very first day of the transfer of the Vitebsk Airborne Division to Afghanistan, namely on December 26, 1979, the Deputy Commander of the USSR Airborne Forces for combat training, Lieutenant General V. N. Kostylev, gave the order to include the 345th Regiment in the 103rd Airborne Division.

This is recalled by the deputy commander of the Vitebsk division, Guards Colonel Dvugroshev, who took command of all available forces in Bagram, where the ZKP - the reserve command post of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division - was located. Here, in Bagram, at the end of December 1979, was the first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Army General S. F. Akhromeyev.

In such a large-scale operation, which took place in late December 1979 in Kabul, it could not have been like in Krylov's fable "The Swan, the Crayfish and the Pike." There is some kind of single decision-making center, and commands from above descend down the chain: it cannot be otherwise.

In various articles, books and memoirs about the December 1979 events in Kabul, it is most often said something like this: "They set a task, received an order, the battalion was instructed," etc. But who set this task? Who gave the order? Who instructed? Who was the one who led the entire combat operation?

In the 90s, publications began to focus on special forces about the events in Kabul, about the change of power in Afghanistan, about Operation Baikal-79, which led to a distorted perception of history.

The duty officer at the operation control point, Colonel E. V. Chernyshev, spoke about this:

"In the 90s, the December events in Kabul were covered narrowly and one-sidedly. Publications devoted to the heroic actions of special forces prevailed... With each passing year, their actions were praised more and more highly. Both the paratrooper units and military advisers were undeservedly forgotten. This injustice resulted from the poor awareness of the press and the modesty of the paratroopers and advisers. Society developed an incorrect, distorted idea of ​​their role and merits."

General Kirpichenko continues this thought in his memoirs:

"After the change of power in Kabul on December 27, 1979, all participants in this operation were advised to forget everything and destroy operational documents. I also destroyed my service notes, where not only by day and hour, but also by minute, were written down how events in Afghanistan developed in December 1979. Years passed, power changed, and those bosses who called for silence began to write memoirs on the Afghan topic, appear on television, and give interviews. Moreover, for some reason, former KGB employees were at the forefront of telling stories about the events in Afghanistan..."

In recent years, people who have absolutely nothing to do with those events and are only superficially familiar with the topic have begun to write about the change of power in Kabul; they do not study the material sufficiently, and as a result, a huge amount of information has been piled up, sometimes completely contradictory, and this simply amazes the imagination of such "historians". They draw information mainly from the very publications that Colonel Chernyshev and General Kirpichenko spoke about. Accordingly, in their works, all attention is focused on the actions of state security officers and the main intelligence department: these are the people, according to the fantasies of pseudo-historians, who developed, carried out and led the December operation in Kabul.

This is questionable, since the KGB and GRU special forces commanders are faced with somewhat different tasks than commanding a ten-thousand-strong army in a combined arms battle behind enemy lines; rather, this is a task for an airborne general.

Chief of Intelligence of the USSR Airborne Forces, Guards Colonel Kukushkin

The head of intelligence of the USSR Airborne Forces, Guards Colonel Kukushkin, recalls:

“The operation was controlled from our command post. The troops’ actions were mainly controlled by Nikolai Nikitich Guskov (Deputy Commander of the USSR Airborne Forces. Author’s note). Right there, Lieutenant Colonel Markov kept a combat log, in which he wrote down verbatim all the commands, orders, and reports received. The importance of such shorthand was obvious, since it gave us the opportunity to subsequently documentarily confirm or refute any claims and accusations regarding the essence of the decisions taken and the orders given to the troops. Generals Magometov and Ivanov were in the same room with us, but did not interfere with the control.” (Colonel General Magometov is the chief military adviser; Lieutenant General Ivanov is the head of the KGB operational group in the DRA. Author’s note)

Of course, enemies may say that the head of the Airborne Forces intelligence writes this way out of corporate solidarity, exalting his friend, General Guskov, in his memoirs.

But we can turn to a number of other recollections of the operation's participants that have nothing to do with the Airborne Forces. Initially, the operation was planned to be carried out in mid-December 1979, and the tasks were set by Lieutenant General Guskov.

The commander of the Zenit group, Yakov Semenov, recalls this:

"On December 12, a car with two officers arrives at the villa, who convey a verbal order from Polyakov to proceed to the Bagram military airfield. I arrive in Bagram. Yura Chekulaev, an employee of the 8th department of the "S" Directorate, is already there - he is also the deputy commander of the detachment with whom we held a reservist training camp in Fergana in July. Most of the officers of the "Zenit" detachment were already here in Bagram."

Yura Chekulaev announced to me that I was the group commander, with 20 officers under my command. And I had to report to the Deputy Commander of the USSR Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Nikolai Nikitich Guskov. Well, I thought, here we go... Although it was very strange. What did the Airborne Forces have to do with it?! What report?! About what?!

I walk in and see the same general who was on the parade ground in Fergana inspecting the Muslim battalion. I report: "Major Semenov has arrived as per your order." He replies: "Report the action plan for the "Oak" facility." Well, that's it. My jaw dropped in amazement! What "Oak"?! The first time I've heard of it. I answer the question with a question: "What is the "Oak" facility?!" Now the general's jaw dropped in amazement. "Oak" is the code name for the palace in the center of Kabul where Amin's residence is located! " the general snapped loudly and sharply and fell silent, thinking that I knew everything perfectly well and was just pretending and didn't want to talk. Casting aside my shyness, I put the question point-blank: "In order to report the action plan, I need detailed information about the palace and what forces are being directly assigned to me." Only after that did N.N. Guskov realize that I really wasn't in the know...

On December 14 at 15:30 the order to advance was received. I brought the task to the subgroups. …Around 16:00 all the officers were distributed among the combat vehicles and had already begun to advance, when the order to "stand down" was given. As we later learned, it turns out that General of the Army Varennikov called N.N. Guskov and gave the order to return all units to their original position. A little later the order was received from the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces to cancel the entire operation."

From Semenov's memoirs it becomes clear that the so-called Muslim battalion was supervised by the Deputy Commander of the USSR Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Guskov. Moreover, this was long before the battalion was sent to Afghanistan - in July 1979. This is confirmed by just one sentence of Yakov Semenov when he arrived to report to Guskov: "I go in and see the same general who was on the parade ground in Fergana and inspected the Muslim battalion. I report: "Major Semenov has arrived as per your order."

Who conducts the inspection? The inspection of troops is conducted by direct superiors or persons appointed to lead the inspection (check). General Guskov was appointed by the General Staff, since he will be in charge of the upcoming operation.

One could argue that there was a GRU representative in the battalion, Colonel Kolesnik, who was the senior. However, for some reason it was not he who conducted the drill review, but General Guskov. Kolesnik was given tasks in the same way as all the other participants in the operation. The colonel did not come up with these tasks for himself, but received them from the person who was appointed by the General Staff to carry out the operation.

Yakov Semenov:

"On December 14 at 15:30 the order to advance was received. ...Around 16:00 all officers were distributed among combat vehicles and had already begun to advance when the order "stand down" was given. ...General of the Army Varennikov called N.N. Guskov and gave the order to return all units to their original position. A little later the order was received from the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces to cancel the entire operation."

That is, the tasks on the ground in Afghanistan for all units, regardless of their affiliation, were set by Lieutenant General Guskov, receiving orders from Moscow from the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and his first deputy, General Varennikov.

Of course, General Ivanov set operational tasks for the KGB groups through his subordinates. What exactly? The elimination of target number one – Hafizullah Amin; the elimination of target number two – Muhammad Yakub; the arrest of members of the Afghan government; the seizure of documents, etc. Such tasks have always and at all times been carried out by special agents, not by the army. However, these specific tasks were carried out in December 1979 as part of a general operation.

KGB Lieutenant General Boris Ivanov

Sometimes, in articles about the December 1979 operation in Kabul, photographs of a drawing by Colonel Kolesnik are published, which is loudly called the plan of the operation. However, this is not an operation plan, but an action plan for the units entrusted to him in accordance with the task assigned to these units. This is also mentioned in the memoirs of Yakov Semenov: “Major Semenov arrived at your order. He responded: - Report the action plan for the “Oak” facility. Well, what! My jaw dropped in surprise! What “Oak”?!” Guskov demands that Semenov report on the action plan for the “Oak” facility - this is the Arg Palace, where Amin was stationed in mid-December. But it turned out that at that moment Semenov did not know at all why he and his group had arrived in Afghanistan.

The general plan for the operation was prepared by the Deputy Director of Foreign Intelligence, Lieutenant General Kirpichenko, together with the Deputy Commander of the USSR Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Guskov, as V. A. Kirpichenko wrote in his memoirs:

“The deputy chief of the airborne forces and I, together with a small group from the Ministry of Defense, began to draw up a plan of combat operations.

Eight facilities were identified that were to be occupied by combat groups of the 8rd Guards Air Division first, and KGB and MVD officers, together with the “Parchamists,” were ordered to carry out preliminary work at these facilities in order to persuade the people working there to take a calm attitude toward the change of power.

I will cite these objects from memory: 1) Amin’s palace; 2) General Staff of the Afghan army; 3) prison for political prisoners in Pul-i-Charkhi; 4) Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service; 5) Ministry of Internal Affairs; 6) Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 7) radio and television center; 8) telephone station. Amin’s palace was assigned to be taken by an army airborne assault unit and Yu. I. Drozdov’s detachment.”

Having received the task, General Drozdov and Colonel Kolesnik drew up a plan of action for their units, and the KGB special group fighters conducted reconnaissance, going up to the Flying Saucer restaurant, from where the entire area around the palace was clearly visible.

All battalion and regiment commanders, and sometimes even platoon commanders who had received their tasks, acted in a similar manner: they drew up diagrams of objects and made plans of action for their units in accordance with the tasks assigned to them.

Sergeant of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment Sergei Odinets

Sergeant Sergei Odinets of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment recalls:

"After landing in Kabul on December 26, on the orders of Georgy Ivanovich Shpak (the regiment commander), two platoons of paratroopers from our regiment went to the saboteurs' villa: the Zenit men lived in a building on the outskirts of Kabul. After some time, our officers changed into civilian clothes and, disguised as embassy employees, went out into the city. They headed for the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - Tsarandoy: this was our task in the upcoming operation. While the officers were conducting reconnaissance, we were preparing for combat operations. Towards evening, the officers returned, drew a diagram of the Ministry of Internal Affairs building, the entrances and approaches to it, conducted a briefing and explained how we would act."

All units had a uniform approach: receiving a task, reconnaissance, drawing up an action plan.

On the evening of December 27, 1979, the historic action began. Deputy Commander of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, Guards Colonel Dvugroshev recalls:

"At 19:30 the ZAS telephone rang. I was urgently called to the device. The call came from the Airborne Forces Operational Group. It was headed by the Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General N. N. Guskov, who commanded all available forces in Afghanistan during the overthrow of Amin's regime. The operational group was in Kabul. The expected signal "Storm-333" was transmitted. The airfield immediately came to life."

(On December 29, 1979, Guard Colonel Dvugroshev was appointed commandant of Kabul and held this position until March 28, 1982. Author's note).

Guards Colonel Dvugroshev

By the morning of December 28, Kabul was completely under the control of the paratroopers. The duty officer at the command post, Colonel E. V. Chernyshev, recalls:

"We drove past the checkpoint. On the road adjacent to the territory of the control point, there was a column of combat vehicles of the airborne battalion. It was surrounded by enthusiastic Afghan children who climbed onto the vehicles. The paratroopers helped them, showed them everything, and let the bravest ones inside.

It is relatively calm in Kabul. The city lives its normal life. There is no unrest in the garrison units, with the exception of the 26th airborne regiment. 80 people deserted from there in one day. Weapon isolated from the personnel of the Kabul garrison. Portraits of Amin are enthusiastically torn up everywhere. Portraits of Taraki, previously hidden, have been retrieved from hiding places. Two regiments of the 103rd Airborne Division are on patrol duty in Kabul. One regiment (345th Airborne Regiment) is guarding the Bagram airfield. The 108th Motorized Rifle Division occupies the designated locations."

So who led the fighting in Kabul in December 1979? Who was Rokossovsky in Operation Baikal-79?

Deputy Commander of the USSR Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General N. N. Guskov

Not all the secrets and details of that distant operation are known to the general public - there is a lot of information, but it is contradictory. From what is known, we can conclude that the operation was carried out by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. The tasks on the spot were set by Lieutenant General N. N. Guskov, who received orders from the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, and his deputy, General of the Army V. V. Varennikov.

Comments

[Alexander_Makedonskov]

Victory has a thousand fathers...

[Doctor]

Two troubles of the ordinary - extreme secrecy and a bunch of departments with different subordination in one line. Also a lot of pompous special forces)).

They were lucky that it was the Grom special group and not the Grom special forces of the Federal Drug Control Service, but who can guarantee that Amin didn’t smoke weed?

[Vladimir_Kuznetsov]

This is exactly what Babrak Karmal was guilty of - he turned out to be a drug addict and alcoholic. He died of liver cirrhosis in the 1st city hospital in Moscow.

[3x3zsave]

"In my life I have never liked fools, slackers or drunkards. But here all these qualities are concentrated in one person. And this person is the leader of the party and the head of state!"
Army General A. Mayorov about Karmal.

[Vladimir_Kuznetsov]

When former KGB officers began to appear on television and give interviews, as General Kirpichenko recalls, ordinary people who did not have information and did not know the general situation formed the opinion that small groups of officers from the special forces of the KGB of the USSR were in Kabul and that it was these groups that carried out the task of removing H. Amin from power. From here various "myths" and "legends" grew.

[Doctor]

When former KGB officers began to appear on television and give interviews, as General Kirpichenko recalls, ordinary people who did not have information and did not know the general situation formed the opinion that small groups of officers from the special forces of the KGB of the USSR were in Kabul and that it was these groups that carried out the task of removing H. Amin from power. From here various "myths" and "legends" grew.

At the same time, forgetting to clarify where this very ease and relative “exemplary” nature of the operation came from.
How did they even get to Kabul, and how did 7000 paratroopers get there, why weren’t the IL-76s shot down over the mountains as they were entering, and why weren’t the roads in front of the columns mined?

Because Amin considered us ALLIES and the troops were brought in AT HIS REQUEST. This same "Muslim battalion" was stationed at Taj-Bek with the initial task of GUARDING the palace.

So the Afghans did not expect this, to put it mildly. , "a trick" from us. And this left its mark on all subsequent relations with the Shuravi. There was never again any trust in us, including among the socialists.

[3x3zsave]

Why weren't the IL-76s shot down over the mountains?
Was there anything to shoot it down with?

[Doctor]

Was there anything to shoot it down with?

Nobody even tried, that's the thing. Not even from machine guns.
Our pilots wrote in their memoirs that at the time of the introduction of the Stingers there were no, but they were warned that perhaps there was an old version of the "Redeye" and even our "Strela", supposedly the mujahideen bought it in Egypt through "parallel import" .

[3x3zsave]

There was a series here on VO by Sergei "Bongo" Linnik about the armament of military formations in Afghanistan at that time. I need to reread it.

[Doctor]

To understand the situation globally, we need to remember that commands come from the top down. Guskov commanded in Kabul, but how did he end up there and why Guskov and the Airborne Forces?

The starting point is the task set by Ustinov to Ivan Grigorievich Pavlovsky, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. In August 1979, he flew to Afghanistan with an operational group for reconnaissance. Based on the results, he gave a negative opinion on the introduction of troops, but by that time the decision had already been made and, as a result, he was removed from his post, and the Main Command was effectively removed from the operation.
So there were paratroopers there.

Pavlovsky's seven arguments AGAINST the introduction:

Firstly, the April (Saur) Revolution of April 27, 1978 was not a mass revolutionary movement, but another military palace coup, to which the people of the country had become accustomed, and these coups did not affect their position and the Muslim faith.

Secondly, the PDPA leadership that came to power was split into the Khalq and Parcham factions, between which a struggle for power began. And this led to the expulsion and arrests of the Parchamists. But the Khalq faction was not united either. As a result of the struggle for power, H. Amin won, having destroyed his "teacher" Taraki. Consequently, in Afghanistan there was not a struggle between parties and factions, ideologies and opinions, but a battle for personal power in the country.

Thirdly, there is practically no working class in Afghanistan, and the peasantry is completely illiterate, subordinate to feudal and tribal leaders who are ready to put up with palace coups, but will never agree with the government that has declared social transformations, land reform and democratization of society. The overwhelming majority of the population professes Islam. There are 40 thousand mosques in the country and, consequently, more than 300 thousand ministers of religion who will not support the government of Kabul, which has declared freedom of religion in the country.

In every Afghan yard, every nomad has a rifle, which not only men, but also women and children over 10 years old can shoot very well. And when troops loyal to Kabul approach a village, then, having resisted, the entire population goes abroad and returns to their mountains after the government troops leave. It is simply impossible to place troops in all the cities and villages, in all the provinces.

Fourthly, in the army the former officer corps, which has now been replaced by members of the PDPA Khalq faction, emigrated to Pakistan or Iran and form the basis of counter-revolutionary units. And the rank and file - illiterate soldiers - do not understand what is happening in the country, and their worldview is entirely dependent on personal loyalty to their commander or feudal lord, or tribal leader.

The PDPA leaders believed that it was enough to overthrow and kill their political opponents, and all the local authorities and the entire population would submit to them unconditionally. And since they had declared that they had carried out a democratic revolution, they should be protected by the troops of their great northern neighbor, and these same troops should advance the revolution in the provinces and protect them in Kabul itself.

Fifthly, there is no border guard in the country, all borders are transparent, which allows opponents of the Kabul regime to penetrate the country unhindered. The countries surrounding Afghanistan on three sides and supporting the mujahideen, with the support of the United States and Muslim countries of the world, have great wealth and the ability to supply the country with virtually any amount of weapons and military equipment, thereby fanning the flames of the "cold war".

Sixthly, the introduction of Soviet troops may lead to the people's hatred being directed against our army even if it does not conduct active combat operations. It is impossible to make a revolution in another country with the bayonets of regular troops and the machine guns of paratroopers. Apparently, the leadership of the CPSU has forgotten the teaching of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin that revolution cannot be brought to another country by military force.

And finally, seventhly, the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan will worsen our relations with the United States and NATO, which will never agree with our army occupying strategically advantageous positions in the center of Asia, near India and Pakistan.

https://archive.fo/20130126124919/www.istrodina.com/rodina_articul.php3#selection-369.0-427.202

[Vladimir_Kuznetsov]

Vasily Filippovich Margelov was also against sending troops to Afghanistan. He later gave the highest rating to the actions of the paratroopers in the Kabul events, but he considered the very sending and use of troops in these events an adventure. There are those who believe that it was his opinion that led to his dismissal from the post of Airborne Forces commander. This is not true, of course: Vasily Filippovich turned 70 years old - the maximum age for service, and he was transferred to the so-called "paradise group" of inspectors.

[Doctor]

Vasily Filippovich Margelov was also against sending troops to Afghanistan. He later gave the highest rating to the actions of the paratroopers in the Kabul events, but he considered the very sending and use of troops in these events an adventure. There are those who believe that it was his opinion that led to his dismissal from the post of Airborne Forces commander. This is not true, of course: Vasily Filippovich turned 70 years old - the maximum age for service, and he was transferred to the so-called "paradise group" of inspectors.

And he thought correctly. Amin himself insisted on a meeting with Brezhnev and was ready to go to Moscow, no storming of the palace was needed at all, he could have been left in Moscow.

In essence, everything that happened there was a showdown within the socialists, like the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, while in Afghanistan it would have been possible to limit themselves to the SVO, leave military advisers there and simply feed their troops with equipment and other things.
But someone really needed us to get in there with our whole paw.
To someone here, with us, at the very top.

[Aviator_]

Kryuchkov is certainly an authority. He is competent in the presented issues related to Afghanistan. And in his memoirs (2 volumes, the first one is an autobiography, the second one, which is longer, is whining about "why didn't I do anything to save the USSR"), well, by the end of the 80s he had turned into an ordinary slug. He received information that A.N. Yakovlev was a traitor, reported it to Gorby, who took no action. It is logical that Gorby was the same kind of traitor, but Kryuchkov didn't have the brains for that.

[Vladimir_Kuznetsov]

There is an opinion that it was the state security generals who worked on the collapse of the Union and wanted to join the ranks of the capitalists. One of the most famous is General Pitovranov.

[Marrr]

It should be noted that the April (or, according to the Afghan name of the month, Saur) revolution of 1978 in Afghanistan took place without any initiative or support from the Soviet Union.

I would be very surprised if Kryuchkov said that it was our employees who planned and supervised the implementation of this “revolution”.

The result of all these preparations was the operation to change power in Afghanistan - "Baikal-79", which some individuals with manic stubbornness continue to call "Storm-333".

And who are these mysterious figures?
In my opinion, everyone who has studied this topic in depth knows that “Storm-333” is the code name of a special operation to seize the residence of the head of the DRA, Amin, with the aim of eliminating him, and “Baikal-79” is the code name of an operation to change the government in the DRA, where “Storm-333” is one of its stages.
At least, this is what is commonly believed, since documents on special operations have not been made public to this day, and the authors describe these events based on someone else’s words.

The title of the article is ridiculous, the author brought Rokossovsky in at the wrong time, he never did such nonsense

[Vladimir_Kuznetsov]

"And who are these mysterious individuals?" You are one of them, if you continue to call the signal to begin military operations "Storm-333" an operation. From what documents did you learn this, what kind of in-depth study of this topic you conducted? Indeed, it has long been known that the liquidation of Amin had the code name "Agat" and it was carried out within the framework of the general operation "Baikal-79". Doctor of Historical Sciences Dmitry Samorodov constantly writes about this in his articles. By the way, the participants in the operation themselves have already disowned this. In an article dedicated to the events of December 27, 1979, I spoke about this: "...an article on this topic was published by me two years ago. Before that, there were short videos and notes on social networks on the same topic. They argued with me: they claimed that I was wrong; someone was sarcastic, someone anathematized me. Although, in addition to my memoirs, I cited arguments from the works of a researcher of the Afghan war, Doctor of Historical Sciences Dmitry Samorodov. But before the New Year, on December 28, 2024, a film about those events was shown on TVC. Another film. Former employees of the KGB groups who took part in the December 1979 events in Kabul, unexpectedly for everyone, stated in this film that the name "Storm-333" was an invention of journalists. That's it! For several decades, they talked about the operation "Storm-333", books were written, films were made and demonstrated... And suddenly - we don’t know anything, the journalists made it up."

[Doctor]

"And who are these mysterious individuals?" You are one of them, if you continue to call the signal to begin military operations "Storm-333" an operation. From what documents did you learn this, what kind of in-depth study of this topic you conducted? Indeed, it has long been known that the liquidation of Amin had the code name "Agat" and it was carried out within the framework of the general operation "Baikal-79". Doctor of Historical Sciences Dmitry Samorodov constantly writes about this in his articles. By the way, the participants in the operation themselves have already disowned this. In an article dedicated to the events of December 27, 1979, I spoke about this: "...an article on this topic was published by me two years ago. Before that, there were short videos and notes on social networks on the same topic. They argued with me: they claimed that I was wrong; someone was sarcastic, someone anathematized me. Although, in addition to my memoirs, I cited arguments from the works of a researcher of the Afghan war, Doctor of Historical Sciences Dmitry Samorodov. But before the New Year, on December 28, 2024, a film about those events was shown on TVC. Another film. Former employees of the KGB groups who took part in the December 1979 events in Kabul, unexpectedly for everyone, stated in this film that the name "Storm-333" was an invention of journalists. That's it! For several decades, they talked about the operation "Storm-333", books were written, films were made and demonstrated... And suddenly - we don’t know anything, the journalists made it up."

Not surprising.
The Americans played up the situation with Amin to the maximum among the leaders of the socialist countries and sympathizers in the style: "You see what happens to those who get involved with the Soviets? Stupid Hafizullah invited the Russians to his country and even to be his security, and they screwed him over, poisoned him, staged a massacre in the presidential palace, finished him off and buried him in an unknown place according to non-Muslim laws. He won't get into heaven now. "

Within the country, they played the national card: the Russians will come, they will cut out the Pashtuns, and they will install the Tajiks.

After such antics, even Fidel and Kim Il Sung began to think.
At least a cooling off has occurred among many allies.

That's where the secrecy comes from.

[Marrr]

"And who are these mysterious individuals?" You are one of them, if you continue to call the signal to begin military operations "Storm-333" an operation.

To begin with, it would be a good idea to remember that this name is mentioned in the books of Drozdov "Fiction is excluded", the commander of group "A" Zaitsev "Alpha - my fate" and in the book of Lyakhovsky.
So the version that this is a conditional name for a special operation plan is quite probable.
The version that "Storm-333" was a signal to begin the assault was first launched by Ya.F. Semenov in his memoirs.

Besides, you are missing the fact that the signal "storm-333" is unlikely in such a combination - either "Storm" (voice), or "333" (Morse code). This is a well-known rule of encryption.

I spoke about this in an article dedicated to the events of December 27, 1979.

I don't follow your publications because you are retelling stories. There is zero documentary basis in your articles.

[Vladimir_Kuznetsov]

On a stake, a bast shoe - start over? I don't need to list the memoirs on this topic, I've read them all. What is meant by documentary basis: the memoirs of the participants? Oddly enough, I am one of them, as are my friends, as are my former commanding officers, for example, Colonel General Shpak or Lieutenant General Yevtukhovich, Colonel Savitsky. Quite a large number of the operation's participants are still alive and well. Those who went to heaven, fortunately, left their books. This includes the Airborne Forces Intelligence Chief Colonel Kukushkin, and the first commandant of Kabul, deputy commander of the 103rd Airborne Division Colonel Dvugroshev. By the way, perhaps this will seem strange, but former KGB special forces fighters are also in my circle of friends. Your communication style is really exactly like that very lion. Well, go for it. I repeat: the dog barks, the caravan moves on.

[Marrr]

What is meant by documentary basis: the memories of the participants?

This refers to primary source DOCUMENTS: plans, combat orders, combat logs, operational files, etc.
After the Great Patriotic War, many memoirs of very famous people with high epaulettes were published. Then, in the 21st century, many documents of the Red Army and NKVD military units were declassified, and it was discovered that many events took place exactly differently than the respected veterans had told.
If you were familiar with the methodology of assessing information used by British intelligence and the Abwehr, but I'm not going in that direction, forget it

Your communication style is really exactly the same as that very lion.

perhaps we studied at the same high school or in the same special courses

People's memories, especially those from 10 years ago, usually have a very low degree of historical reliability, and therefore require careful verification - take this as a given

Let me repeat: the dog barks, but the caravan moves on.

and the wind blows, and the trees sway

[Vladimir_Kuznetsov]

Apparently, this special school is not so great - this is evident from the style of communication. Although, there are special schools with different biases... if so, then there is nothing strange. And the fact that inconsistencies are found in the memoirs of military leaders, well, that is exactly what I am trying to talk about and even give examples in my book. And General Lyakhovsky screws up in his memoirs, and General Drozdov, for example. I am talking about what I know, what I myself took part in, and not from rumors or from someone else's stories. And the head of intelligence of the USSR Airborne Forces, Colonel Kukushkin, says exactly that a combat diary was kept, that is, he did not write his memoirs entirely from memory, but there was something to refer to: "The operation was controlled from our command post. The actions of the troops were mainly controlled by Nikolai Nikitich Guskov. Right there, Lieutenant Colonel Markov kept a combat log, in which he wrote down verbatim all the commands, orders, and reports received. The importance of such stenography was obvious, since it gave us the opportunity to subsequently documentarily confirm or refute any claims and accusations regarding the essence of the decisions taken and the orders given to the troops."

[Marrr]

I am talking about what I know, what I myself took part in,

And were you personally involved in the shelling of Amin's Mercedes?

Right there, Lieutenant Colonel Markov kept a combat log, in which he wrote down verbatim all the commands given, orders, and reports received.

Did you use the entries from this JBD when writing your publications?

The actions of the troops were mainly controlled by Nikolai Nikitich Guskov.

perhaps

By the way, I still haven't seen the answer to the question you asked:

Sometimes in articles on the December 1979 operation in Kabul, photographs of Colonel Kolesnik's drawing are published

Where is it published, in what sources exactly?

Or did you make a typo, and the author of this plan (scheme) was Ya.F. Semenov?

[Marrr]

KGB special groups ("Thunder"), KUOS ("Zenith")

Gibberish, the correct spelling is "KGB USSR operational groups "Thunder" (employees of group "A") and "Zenith" (KUOS listeners)"

A battalion, which would later be called Muslim, was formed and trained, consisting of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens...

and Ukrainians

According to plan

which is known only from someone's words, but nevertheless all the authors of the publications are well aware of its contents

Sometimes in articles on the December 1979 operation in Kabul, photographs of Colonel Kolesnik's drawing are published

Where is it published? The author got something mixed up.
Let the author not be offended by the criticism, he wrote it just for fun and to think about how sometimes a bunch of information can be born out of nothing

[Vladimir_Kuznetsov]

"Where is it published?" Well, if you have done a deep research on this topic, you should know where. As for the author, he does what he should do, and he does it well. Articles are written and published, books are released both in paper and electronic versions: at the moment there are two, the third edition is being prepared. The author does not use rumors. So: the dog barks, the caravan moves on. And the fact that entire works are written on this topic by people far from those events, gives rise to a bunch of nonsense, creating various "myths" and "legends". Here, on the site, there was one expert involved in the GRU, named Lev, whose task was to tear me into a thousand little bears, like those monkeys tried to tear the bear from the cartoon "Mowgli". But he disappeared somewhere. Or, perhaps, he appeared under a new name.

[Marrr]

"Where is it published?" Well, if you have done any in-depth research on the topic, you should know where.

I haven't done a deep dive, so I'll be curious again:
In what sources are "photographs of Colonel Kolesnik's drawing published"?
Will you answer or have you passed?

Here on the site there was one expert involved in the GRU, named Lev, whose task was to tear me into a thousand little bears

I seriously doubt that anyone could set themselves such a global task
And don't take critical comments as a personal insult - it's not productive.

Waiting for an answer to the question about "the drawing of Colonel Kolesnik"

[solar]

“The coup took place quickly, in just two days, and without much bloodshed.

Daoud's rule was so rotten that there were no people willing to defend it.
On April 17, 1978, PDPA activist Mir Akbar Khaibar, former editor-in-chief of an opposition newspaper, was shot dead. On April 19, his funeral turned into a demonstration against the regime of President Mohammed Daoud, as there were rumors that Daoud had ordered the assassination of the oppositionist. In response, Daoud threw all the prominent oppositionists into prison - Taraki, Karmal, Amin and others. The oppositionists, knowing the customs of those places, had no illusions about their fate, so it was Amin who transmitted the signal to his comrades in the army to begin the uprising.

Amin, with the help of his son, transmitted to the military units loyal to the PDPA an order prepared in March to begin an armed uprising. After this, PDPA supporters among the armed forces carried out an armed action to change the government[4].

This is the kind of revolution that happens when someone shoots the other person first. Tanks and aircraft did their job - the next morning they shot Daud and his family, just in case. The revolution, which was very similar to a regular military coup, won.

[Marrr]

Quote from solar

Daoud's rule was so rotten that there were no people willing to defend it.

It was not rotten, it was not strong enough for this state, which was constantly torn apart by internal contradictions.
But this is not the main reason for Daoud's fall.

By the time he came to power, the USSR had invested too much money and resources in Afghanistan. By 1978, loans received from the USSR alone had accumulated to about 1,3 billion dollars.
Therefore, the government of the USSR reasonably believed that in response to the assistance provided, the government of Afghanistan would repay with gratitude and demonstrate complete loyalty to the policies of the USSR.
And Daoud began to gradually lean towards the United States in his sympathies, which was fraught with Afghanistan’s departure from the socialist camp with all the negative consequences that ensued for the USSR.

Accordingly, the government of the USSR had to quickly take the most decisive steps to keep Afghanistan among its loyal allies. Which, apparently, was done through the Soviet intelligence officers (political and military), who had agents (including agents of influence) in the PDPA, initiating the coup d'etat that took place and the coming to power of the leaders of the "socialist forces"

Something like this in my understanding, if we analyze events from the aspect of “who benefits from this?”

[Igor]

The article is old, but your comment caught my attention...
If the USSR had introduced troops into all the countries where it had driven a billion people, and after that they had turned their heads to the USA, then the USSR would not have had enough troops.
It was a time when countries like Afghanistan were alternately milked by the USSR and the USA.
It was the usual policy of playing on contradictions.

[Marrr]

I can add: if the USSR had not poured billions into countries with a "socialist orientation" to support this so-called "socialist camp," then perhaps the union would not have collapsed.
I recall the brilliant witticism of M.A. Bulgakov:

"You can't serve two gods! You can't sweep the tram tracks and arrange the fates of some Spanish ragamuffins at the same time!

[Fedka]

Volodya Hello. I haven't been online for a long time, the topic is not in the article... Here you write that the BMD broke through the gate and fell somewhere else. I couldn't find this article and decided to write it here. I'm just a reader, not a commentator. Served 1981-83. 7th division, 119th airborne regiment.

[Fedka]

We had BMDs only in the boxes and we only wiped the dust for two years. There can't be ammunition in the boxes. During the service, I only went out on alert twice. 1) When Brezhnev died, we stood for three days and only then found out that LB had died, they didn't tell us. 2) We stood on the parade ground for a week waiting for the order to go to Poland. In the morning, breakfast and on the parade ground, lunch, dinner, and then lights out...

[Vladimir_Kuznetsov]

I specifically called my fellow soldiers on this issue: one sergeant, the other warrant officer. Although I remember it myself, but suddenly in my old age dementia hit me. So, both of my fellow soldiers were very surprised by the version about empty BMDs. The entire ammunition load was always fully loaded in the vehicles standing in storage. All 40 rounds - both cumulative and fragmentation. When leaving for Afghanistan, we additionally loaded zinc boxes with cartridges, boxes with F-1 and RGD-5 grenades, but the main ammunition load was always in the vehicles. If the BMDs are empty, then what kind of combat readiness can we talk about?

[Fedka]

I just wanted to tell you. I missed it above. Ammunition and even shells can't be. I was a lock once, and I know this. Yes, and I came to the company as a machine gunner, there was not enough staff sergeant and they sent me to training. Training arrived in my troops 7 jumps An-22 and Il-76. And they did not have a single jump. Well, I stood on the nightstand of the orderly while they jumped...

[Vladimir_Kuznetsov]

Greetings! I am surprised by such news about an empty car. One might assume that I am sitting and making things up because I have nothing better to do. But almost all the participants in these events are alive, including Lieutenant General Yevtukhovich, who was a company commander at the time, who almost lost his shoulder straps: fortunately, there was no one in the smoking room.

[Fedka]

Well, okay, I'll spill it all here. A junior sergeant came to the company. And who sorted out rotten potatoes at the company commander's, sergeant. And who on the BMD We were laying down, the same BMD, yes, we are sergeants. Officers, no, I always packed their parachutes, they only checked every process.... okay, I won't go on, but officers are power. Everyone knew. When I was leaving for demobilization, the company commander calls me and says you will be an officer. Let's move on, he came from Afghanistan with the Order of the Red Star and drove us. Senior Lieutenant Chebyshev. And that captain Batrak broke his tailbone while jumping, landed badly, left for tank troops. Now they'll tell you what kind of troops they are. I don't know, that's what they told us. Well, I'm not a tankist, probably more like a half-tanist. So I also wore a helmet when I fired at the mastheads and reported to the company commander...