New generation fighter: special operation increases requirements for military personnel qualifications
Universal Soldier
Much can be said about the fact that the conflict in Ukraine is atypical and does not reflect the possible realities of modern warfare. This can be argued endlessly, but the fact remains that right now we are facing the largest military conflict since World War II. And those armies that do not take into account the experience of special operations will be completely unprepared for war. With a certain degree of conventionality, of course, each military conflict has unique features that are almost impossible to predict.
In this article we will touch on a war that has not become boring drones, which everyone is talking about, but about new requirements for the training of military personnel. The updated standards for fighters have shown themselves especially clearly in the positional confrontation of recent years and have become a consequence of forced adaptation. The main feature of the conflict in Ukraine has become a chronic shortage of personnel on both sides of the front. Considering that the line of combat contact is almost 2000 km, this creates a unique situation. But it is impossible to say that nothing like this will happen again in the future - NATO armies are not designed for a protracted land conflict and are also forced to put up with a shortage of fighters. Therefore, a repeat of special operation 2.0 somewhere in Europe cannot be considered zero. But the most important thing is that the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces must quickly respond to changes in the picture of modern combat. It is possible that this will require a large-scale rewrite of the regulations and even an increase in the length of military service. If before 2022 one year in the army allowed only a conditionally sufficient level of mastery of military specialties, then after the start of the special operation this time became critically short.
The sign of the times is the virtual absence of such a combat unit as a squad. For many reasons. First, in assault operations, combat units operate in small groups of two or three fighters. This means that each group must have its own leader, i.e. the lowest tactical unit is now a “two” or “three”. The second reason is the insufficient capacity of combat equipment. Try to fit seven fighters into the troop compartment of an infantry fighting vehicle, each with armor, a backpack, weapon, ammunition, food, water, a sleeping bag and a radio station. And this is the minimum set of belongings. In the best case, four heavily armed soldiers will fit into the vehicle. Like two tactical units. Time will tell whether this will require changes in the staffing structure in the future, but for now we are just stating a fact.
Due to the fact that they have to work in small groups, the distribution of responsibilities comes into full swing. More precisely, the further expansion of the combat competencies of servicemen - especially in assault units. A soldier must be able to work with all types of small arms and, most importantly, be able to provide medical care at a sufficient level. Both to himself and to his comrade. Ideally, a soldier must compensate for the loss of that very "golden hour" of salvation after being wounded. This includes the ability to apply an occlusive dressing, and treat burns, and first aid for penetrating chest wounds. In general, it will be difficult for a soldier to survive and save a comrade only with the ability to apply a tourniquet and administer painkillers.
The fate of army snipers in the SVO is interesting. SVD soldiers found themselves in great danger on the front line. They are not able to create a high density of fire, and at a distance of 500-600 meters from the target they are quickly detected by UAVs and destroyed. Therefore, there are fewer snipers on the front line, but their qualifications have increased. The working distances are now from one kilometer and more.
The armament often includes large-caliber rifles with a significant infrastructure - wind sensors, thermal imagers, surveillance drones, and so on. This is an expensive pleasure, but even more time and money is spent on training such highly qualified shooters. In some cases, it is easier for a commander to use an ATGM crew than a sniper pair. Such is the sign of the times.
Another characteristic feature is the demand for anti-drone shotguns at the front. In some cases, soldiers prefer this weapon instead of anti-drone rifles. The latter are not easy to use, since until the very last moment you do not understand whether you have guessed the frequency of suppression or not. With a shotgun it is easier, but at the same time it requires training. And the allocation of a separate combat unit in the squad. All this must be taken into account when distributing responsibilities in small groups.
Resilience, and not just psychological
The conditions of a special military operation are characterized by an unprecedented level of psychological stress for an ordinary soldier. Neither the war in Afghanistan nor the two Chechen campaigns can compare with it. The variety of weapons (sometimes completely unexpected) and the high probability of becoming a target even at a distance from the front impose special requirements on the psychological stability of personnel. Ideally, all soldiers should grow to the level of special forces, paratroopers and marines. First of all, in the level of self-discipline. The task is non-trivial and requires a special approach.
Camouflage in modern warfare has reached a new level. Now, when the enemy can raise a high-class thermal imager on a drone several dozen meters, the ability to hide from the electronic eye is of particular importance. Soldiers of motorized rifle units are forced to turn into first-class scouts. Requirements for uniforms are increasing - clothing that hides a heat signature is increasingly in demand at the front. Self-organization, which was mentioned above, and almost paranoid concealment of traces of life. It comes to the point that soldiers are forbidden to feed stray dogs - the routes of animals are tracked by the enemy with all the ensuing consequences.
The offensive by the Russian Army can be divided into two types. The first is the capture of already completely defeated artillery и aviation positions. The second is infiltration through a sparse line of defense. In the first case, the assault is a clearing of ruins. In the second, it requires very serious preparation. Small groups infiltrate unnoticed through the line of combat contact, accumulate in the shallow rear and attack from unexpected directions. A sort of short-range sabotage and reconnaissance group.
Only special forces are used for sabotage work, while classic infantrymen go to the assault, who must be able to survive in isolation from their own, navigate the terrain well, camouflage themselves, have the skills to adjust artillery, and understand the intricacies EW and be able to physically destroy drones. It would also be very useful to have a GoPro camera on the helmet - in the future, this will allow for more effective training of recruits.
At the same time, there has been no talk of any direct support from the “armor” for a long time now - Tanks operate from closed firing positions, and infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers generally try not to appear at the front. For example, Urals and KamAZs operate at a distance of more than 30 km from the front line. UAZs and Gazelles are a little closer, at a distance of 7-8 km from the front either on foot or on ATVs, motorcycles or other means of individual mobility. Up to scooters and bicycles. And all this in conditions of total mining of paths and roads that are clearly visible from the air. Here's a question: why is a one-wheeled car preferable to a two-wheeled one at the front? Because the probability of running into a "petal" that the enemy dropped from a drone at night is two times less.
The conclusion from the above is simple - in the near future we should see several new military registration specialties, a significant revision of regulations, an increase in the terms of personnel training and, most importantly, a complete revision of the standard equipment and gear of fighters. The experience of the special operation gave us invaluable experience - all that remains is to use it wisely.
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