Passions around the tank missile. Transcript from 1962
Object 287 - the main character of the tank industry meeting in the summer of 1962
Comrade Starovoitov answers the questions asked of him
In the material "Comrade Khrushchev is concerned about the state of affairs in the field of tank technology": transcript from 1962" Archival data were cited characterizing the level of pressure exerted by N. S. Khrushchev on designers tanks. In particular, on the researchers of the specialized VNII-100. The General Secretary demanded missile tank. This idea was presented by Leonid Smirnov, Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Defense Technology in 1962.
This happened at a summer meeting of heads of specialized design bureaus and institutes dedicated to the development of the missile tank "Object 287". At the meeting, a report was presented by Vasily Stepanovich Starovoytov, candidate of technical sciences, director of VNII-100. The text of the report itself is not available, but there is a transcript of the discussion and answers to questions. In addition, transcripts of speeches by specialists on the topic of the missile tank are presented. Some of them were identified.
Discussion of the problem allows us to understand the peculiarities of decision-making in those distant times and the problems facing the defense industry. It is necessary to take into account that the stenographer recorded direct speech with the corresponding peculiarities of sentence construction. The text is published with minor edits. So, the answers to Comrade Starovoitov's questions.
Of course, there are no photographs of the secret meeting in the summer of 1962, so this atmospheric photo is enough
«How long would it take to create such a missile tank? I think that all the requirements that we have set out are real, but they require colossal efforts to deploy and open a number of R&D and R&D projects. If this is the central task of the organizations, then such a tank can be created in 3-5 years. I repeat that this all depends on the efforts of the organizations and the concentration of forces.
To what extent will the performance characteristics require confirmation by experimental work? In the appendix to the report, we have proposed a single comprehensive plan for research and development work that needs to be implemented to support this tank.
Justify the weight of the new tank at 40 tons. The American M-60 medium tank weighs 45-46 tons. If the Americans step up their work on improving the units and layout (and in this area they have always lagged and are seriously lagging behind in all units except armament, and our tanks are significantly higher in chassis units except armament), then they can, having a weight reserve (46 tons instead of 36 tons), not only reach the level of the 432 object, but also surpass it. For example, they are now, following our example, putting a diesel engine on the M-60. In addition, fulfilling the requirements that we propose is a fairly complex task, and it is necessary to have some weight reserve to solve it. On this issue, we have previously consulted with the customer, who also considers the figure of 40 tons acceptable. Of course, if a lower weight is achieved, it will be better. It seemed to us that this issue is controversial and is subject to discussion and resolution at this meeting.
Are there any calculations for unguided missiles or is this a wish? This groundless wish is not in our report. Work is underway at VNII-100. We have received models of unguided projectiles with a caliber of 85 mm. Accuracy at a thousand meters is 0,3–0,4 t.d. (groups of 7 shots). Talk that this task is impossible in terms of accuracy has been experimentally refuted by us.
Were calculations made involving return fire from the enemy?
Object 287 never went into production
We made such a calculation /T. Starovoytov shows the drawings with the corresponding explanations/. According to this drawing, it is possible to estimate the possibilities taking into account return fire weapons, the presence of rangefinders, sights, armor at different course angles against those tested and adopted by us and taking into account all the possibilities.
The 432nd object is significantly superior to the American M-60 in combat qualities. The 287th allows for even greater advantages at long distances, but lags behind in the region of km, and the 432nd - in one and a half kilometers for well-known reasons.
Igor Fedorovich asked the question: what is the expected leap in the new tank? The leap is not only in the fact that we have lowered this machine to 1700 mm, but the leap in all characteristics is a harmoniously increased combination of all the properties of the tank. For example, in terms of armament, we will compare it with the 432 object, which is currently the greatest achievement of our domestic tank building. If the new tank is stronger than the 432 object, then we need to talk about it. In terms of armament, the Molot gun on the 432 object penetrates 450 mm, we set the penetration ability of the new weapon at 600 mm at least. This cumulative projectile has an effective range of about 1 km. Here, with missile armament, we will deliver the power of a projectile that penetrates 600 mm at a distance of 3-4 km with a probability of hitting with the first or second shot at all distances. This is a breakaway. The power of the projectile and the accuracy of fire, unlike the Molot gun, do not fall over time.
Now on protection. We are currently protecting the frontal projection of the object 432 with 450-500 mm (equivalent of steel horizontally), and on the new tank we are talking about protection equal to 600-700 mm of steel (against a cumulative projectile).
If the protection against penetrating radiation of the 432 object is 15, then here there is reason to have up to 70-fold weakening of penetrating radiation. This machine will be somewhat better than the 432 object in maneuverability. Thus, here is the leap we are talking about. I think that we should be happy if we make this leap in the next three years.
How much additional weight is needed, compared to protection against penetrating radiation, to protect against projectiles? The essence of the question is that if we provide all-round protection from penetrating radiation at a distance of 800 meters, then the weight that will be spent on this will be practically sufficient to protect the frontal projection at the required course angles from cumulative projectiles. Protection from cumulative projectiles that penetrate 600-700 mm of frontal armor will not require additional weight if we provide protection from penetrating radiation.
Which tanks are intended to be modernized in terms of loading mechanization, infantry shells, etc.? We meant that serial tanks should not be discontinued, but modernized during production, as was the case with many objects, that this was done even during the war. All the latest achievements that appeared during serial production should be introduced into serial production of tanks. Moreover, these tanks should be returned from the army to the plant for their modernization. In addition, they should be equipped with cumulative shells. We are getting mechanization of loading tank guns, although this is a major job.
About the task of shooting at 15 km, and what will be the accuracy? We are told about the article by Marshal Malinovsky. This is not the most important thing for us, but such a possibility should exist. This is not precise shooting, but area shooting. Such a possibility, if it exists, is an additional property of the tank, but also in terms of assessment as an additional positive quality of the tank.
Relation to object 150 (IT-1 tank destroyer) and topic No. 2 (OKB guided tank weapons).
It seems to us, since we have spoken out quite sharply today, that even the more advanced "Lotus" does not solve the problem of creating jet tanks, and that topic No. 2 is morally obsolete, with old speed characteristics, in terms of dimensions, unacceptable for a tank. If this work is useful for accumulating experience and is necessary for creating the rocket we have spoken about, then we need to work on it.
As for object 150, it is not advisable to create it. If 1-2 have been created, then stop and continue in the context of the topic envisaged by "Svetotsentr".
Object 150, also known as the serial IT-1, is the world's first missile tank
How much crew do you need - 2 or 3 people? Earlier, at our institute, it was substantiated that a promising tank design (and now this is confirmed by experimental work at LKZ) is a design with a crew of 2 people, concentrated in the hull. This makes it possible to easily protect the crew from penetrating radiation and other means of destruction, but in order to use this proposal in practice, a number of technical issues need to be resolved in order to take this design into hand. This requires resolving the issue of the reliability of the remote control of the weapon, issues of visibility, and the issue of protection of the launcher. There are ways to solve these issues, maybe not today, but tomorrow, but without solving these issues, this design cannot be taken on the fly.
What is the need to shoot at 12-15 km? In this matter, we listen to the customers; I refer to the article by Marshal Malinovsky.
Are command tanks needed? They are necessary and must be made on the basis of the main tank, without developing special chassis units, i.e. in the usual manner.
Tactical nuclear tank weapon
Regarding the attitude of the institute to the prospects of heavy tank development. This question is quite difficult and complex. There are heavy tanks abroad, and no one has yet abandoned them. We also have them and are in serial production.
Technical capabilities can be used to the fullest extent if our armament is tested on a chassis with a significantly greater load-carrying capacity than that of a medium tank. For example, tactical nuclear tank weapons will apparently require a chassis with a greater load-carrying capacity. We are already faced with the need for a chassis with a greater load-carrying capacity for the installation of GRAU missiles.
In general, the terminology “heavy tank” needs to be clarified, because it will be a special-purpose tank.
At the same time, we have now looked at the units that can be installed on this chassis and cannot be installed on the chassis of a medium tank.
Two circumstances: according to the military, heavy tanks did not play a decisive role in the last war. They made up 1-5% of the army in total. The question is "for" and "against". Perhaps they are only discussed if their increased characteristics can be realized. If this can be realized in a medium tank, then a heavy tank is not needed. And additional discussion and decisions, in our opinion, are the technical side of the issue. It is necessary to develop a chassis with increased load capacity for the army to create the ultimate capabilities for a tank.
Vl. Ilyich Lenin said that you shouldn't give up the weapons that the enemy has in order to have an antidote. Technically, we think we should have them. These will be special machines.
This issue should be discussed specifically at a section meeting or at a separate conference.
Does the control system need radar? It is absolutely necessary, and TsNII-173 proposes it absolutely correctly, based on quantum mechanics.
The BMP is an important vehicle that needs to be boosted using mass cheapness and on this basis to organize a large family of these vehicles using all components.
How can we justify the thickness of 750 mm, while the mass product penetrates 500 mm?
Mass production means today 500, tomorrow 700. We have a targeted development of armor protection.
What is the justification for the speed of 80 km/h?
It seemed to us a certain leap. In a future war, the question of maneuver is very important. Today 65 km/h, and tomorrow 75 km/h; 65 km/h is already a small progress, 80 km/h is caused by necessity. In order to provide a high speed of 40-80 km/h per hour, an average specific power of 23 hp per ton is needed. For these 80 km/h maximum speed, additional engine power will not be needed, which is determined by the necessary average speeds and specific powers.
Why are we now proposing a maximum range of 3-4 km both day and night? Of course, the question is clear that, having the ability to shoot accurately at 3-4 km, we will have an advantage over the enemy. This expands the tactical capabilities of the weapon.
In a future war, tanks must work at night as well as during the day. Therefore, to increase the firepower, it is advantageous in all cases to have the ability to shoot at 3-4 km, and later further, up to 5 km.
Why should a light amphibious tank be based on an IFV? The IFV is the most common and cheapest vehicle, and therefore it should be the main one, and the amphibious tank should be a derivative vehicle.
When proposing to remove the T-10M, was the possibility of upgrading the weapon taken into account? Over time, the firepower will increase, but now the T-10M cannon is significantly weaker than the "Hammer" that is installed on the serial T-62 tank. When cumulative and subcaliber shells for this cannon are introduced into production, the firepower of the T-10M will increase significantly. This is what needs to be done. Considering that we are entering production of Object 432, which in all characteristics is not comparable to a heavy tank, it is higher than it even after the T-10M modernization, therefore we propose to stop production of the T-10M after putting Object 432 into production.
Is a low-power engine needed for the tank's electrical equipment for the on-board network? Yes I need it.
A serious question was asked about self-propelled artillery units. First of all, we must say the following: the study of this issue shows that if tanks are used as self-propelled weapons, it turns out that the ammunition consumption of tank guns of a smaller caliber should be significantly greater than that of self-propelled artillery units of the same class, which have a large caliber weapon. If self-propelled artillery units are armed with rocket weapons, then 5-8 times fewer self-propelled guns will be needed than tanks to process the same area with artillery preparation.
We have worked out the use of unguided ones for self-propelled units on the 241 (ISU-152) object. The amount of ammunition is spent significantly less. So, it turns out that it is not profitable to use tanks for military self-propelled units. In addition, self-propelled units compared to the number of tanks of the same class are 20-21. We will be told that this is all tactics. But it is wrong that we have abandoned self-propelled units and are not using them for their intended purpose.
Do we agree that a special charge (atomic warhead) is in order to set up the work? We need to work on small caliber ammunition.
Protection against a 30-kiloton bomb, but why not against a small bomb? We are calculating from medium bombs. Protection is the most important thing now. We provide protection without additional expenditure of funds. We are not chasing the thickness of protection from penetrating radiation.
Is the tank's transfer resistance taken into account when we set the resistance against pressure at 4,5 atmospheres? This figure provides for the specific resistance of the tank.
What are the dust requirements? There are such requirements. These should be fast-acting curtains, and there should also be some protection against glare. Such devices are not complicated.
Rockets - a fad or a necessity? N. S. Khrushchev raised the issue of having missiles in tanks. We checked these issues technically and tactically. This is an exceptionally correct proposal, which makes it possible to make a leap. And no unit, no matter how we improve it, does not give such a fundamental leap in the overall quality of a tank as the use of jet weapons. We are convinced of this, and this proposal is correct. An urgent need. We put forward this requirement somewhat earlier, and during this time the arms industry has not moved forward and has not dealt with this issue.
Is there a difference between the impact of an atomic bomb and an atomic shell? According to our data, no.
Can the crew operate at speeds of 45-50 km/h? The crew will feel no worse than at speeds of 15 km/h, for this purpose new suspensions with increased potential energy, increased roller travel and powerful shock absorbers have been developed.
Suggestions for stabilizing the tank hull as a whole? We are going to check this question, see. Most likely, the answer will be negative.
Next, we say that the machines must shoot up to 5 km, and the height of the machine must be lower. Of course, if the machine itself is lower, the line of sight will also be lower. However, these requirements are correct.
At the first stage, this semi-automatic system will provide superiority over gun tanks, including the 432nd object. The means of controlling fire of an unguided projectile are similar to the means of controlling guns.
Is it possible to increase the dead zone of the URS? In my opinion, it is impossible. The dead zone of guided missiles must be reduced. A guided missile is stronger, and most importantly, more accurate.
Is it even physically possible to observe at 3-5 km? This ability is limited in a person without a device and is expanded with the presence of such. This issue needs to be worked on.
What volume should be allocated for conditioning? It is possible to make it in a volume of 20-30 liters. This work must be carried out, but not to say in advance that we will solve this problem. It is impossible for the driver to be in the tank, when working at the lever, the latter loses 3 kg.
Is there a contradiction: 5 rounds per minute and 0,9 confidence (probability of hitting the target)? Comrades Shavyrin and Rozanov will speak here and will say. This is a real requirement, maybe 4-5 shots per minute. I mentioned 0,8-0,9 - these are also real figures, which the above-mentioned comrades will confirm in their speeches.
Comrade Belinkiy answers.
What requirements should be made for the engine, which is intended for the promising tank, which Comrade Starovoitov reported on? We started from this tank, the power of which is 800 hp in object conditions or 900 hp in test bed conditions.
Obviously, if the prospective requirements for a tank are to reduce its dimensions, reduce its height and increase the power-to-weight ratio of the tank so that it is more maneuverable, these similar requirements are also put forward for engines. The engine must have minimal dimensions, minimal height, must be highly economical and must have a low specific gravity.
Different types of engines cannot solve this problem unambiguously; some engines will have better overall dimensions and worse efficiency, while other engines will have higher efficiency at the expense of worse overall dimensions.
The engines we have considered are different from each other. Rotary engines, which have a larger overall power and a minimum height of 330 mm, have worse efficiency compared to diesel engines and are close in efficiency to gas turbine engines.
Experimental calculation data of tank engines show that it will be difficult to create such a promising engine based on serial engines. There is no serial engine with a capacity of 900 hp.
If we talk about the ways to solve the problem of a small-sized engine, they come down to reducing the number of cylinders and increasing the boost pressure. Our experimental engines 5-TD and UTD meet these requirements. These engines surpass foreign engines in their overall dimensions. This jump in overall dimensions is expressed by about 2. There are no gas-turbine tank engines, and only design work is being done.
It is worth noting the difference in the approach to solving this problem. If abroad today the task is to create 600-horsepower gas turbine tank engines with savings of 182 grams per hp/hour. Foreign engines have a low overall power of about 600 hp per cubic meter. At the same time, the gas turbine, which is being developed by the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant together with the institute, is more powerful, and the parameters and dimensions are much better. The power is determined at 800 hp. In the future, gas turbines will exceed diesel units in their qualities.
The Ford engine is 400 hp, the designed capacity is 600 hp. Our perspective is proposed for a capacity of 800 hp. The Ford provides a consumption of 220 g. hp/hour, then in our perspective we will also be able to have 220 g. hp/hour.
The combination of such an engine is small-sized, with increased fuel consumption, there is no radiator system. It is necessary to note one of the methods of progress - the engine of the installation and the increased temperature of the cooling water. In our perspective, the water temperature is 140 °, which in combination with the increased power against existing medium tanks to reduce the hours of consumption will reduce by 15-20%, despite the increased power.
We have been working on what we represent as a “Bayan” based on the 5-TD, in which the dimensions are reduced: now – 580 mm, we propose – 550 mm.
The reduction in size is due to the following: the starter-generator, which is on the 5TD engine, is quite large and weighs 100 kg. These things require that the auxiliary units be smaller in size.
We must put forward a number of requirements to third-party organizations that are necessary to solve the problem of gas turbine engines and diesel engines - this is the issue of increasing the heat resistance of materials for turbine blades at a temperature of 1100-1150 °C. Moreover, it must be said that the figures that I cite are high, but quite realistic, because in our preliminary calculations we relied on experience aviation industry. I repeat that obtaining this data will certainly require great efforts in order to meet the deadline that comrade Starovoitov mentioned - 3-5 years.
The transition from piston engines to gas turbine engines in tanks is more difficult than in aviation, since an aviation gas turbine engine is single-mode, while a tank gas turbine engine must operate in a wide range of loads. A rotary engine is being developed abroad as a carburetor engine with a low compression ratio. Complex problems of reliable rotor sealing at high flash pressures will need to be solved. The efficiency of a rotary engine will be 210–215 g/hp per hour under bench conditions. A rotary engine has an advantage — its small size. A rotary engine with a height of 360 mm has an overall power exceeding the overall power in gas turbine units. At the same time, it is necessary to note the disadvantage of a rotary engine: it requires increased cooling more than a diesel engine, by 1,3–1,4 times. The issue of its layout qualities will be revealed in the tank as a whole during the layout of the motor units. This should be the subject of discussion in the section.
In order to achieve the leap that has been reported here, a lot of work needs to be done in both diesel and gas turbine engines.
What issues need to be resolved with the involvement of related companies? Automatic programmable power plants. In the future, tanks should be controlled in such a way as to relieve 2 people from many functions; issues of tank cooling supply; development of heat-resistant materials; creation of heat-resistant materials, light heat-resistant alloys for pistons.
In conclusion, it is necessary to consider sufficient leaps in tank power plants, which can be obtained both on the basis of experimental diesel engines, and in the future, as a result of new tasks on the creation of gas-turbine engines with the named data. The solution of this problem requires a wide front of work both on diesel engines and on gas-turbine engines. Comrade Makhonin: this issue should be discussed at the technical council.
Report of Comrade Barykov
Reference: Barykov Nikolai Vsevolodovich, Head of the Scientific Research and Testing Armored Vehicle Range in Kubinka.
Comrades, we must begin with the following situation: to see whether there is a serious situation now that forces us to be very concerned about the situation with tanks. There is only one answer: there are all the grounds for this concern.
What are the difficulties in further development, the leap that is necessary in order to obtain new qualities from tanks? The tasks facing tanks have not changed. We need a tank that could wage war in new combat conditions, when missile and nuclear weapons are used, when a large number of ATGMs have appeared, when the accuracy of anti-tank weapons has increased.
Is it worth abandoning the turret and cannon armament under these conditions? The answer must be unambiguous, that it is necessary to refuse. The gun together with the turret and the projectile of the medium tank of the serial weighs 8,5 tons, and if we do not remove these 8,5 tons, not to mention the height and dimensions, from the tank, then we will not be able to increase the protection and maneuverability of the tank. The most important thing is that no increase in the tank's protection, maneuverability of the tank with turrets and guns is possible.
Barykov Nikolay Vsevolodovich
We need to see why things are going so badly with missile armament for tanks? We have had a government decree since May 1957, a long time has already passed. Here it is necessary to say about the attention to tank armament. Here the tank crews are not doing very well. The issue of tank armament moving requires concentrated attention to tank armament, that no adaptations of ATGMs and other shells, and especially ballistic missiles, are applicable to the tank. We must develop these shells based on the conditions of their use in the tank, in conditions of rough terrain, in conditions of low tank dimensions, in conditions of a certain distance and in conditions of a large number of interferences that exist when using the tank.
The work we did on the tank shells issue had some positive effects, we found out what needed to be done and what didn't, but we don't have any positive decisions yet. That's why Starovoitov's first thesis was that it was necessary to create a powerful organization that would work on a special tank shell and special devices. Here, during a break, I accidentally overheard a conversation between a colonel and the chairman, Comrade Smirnov, he said that tank devices didn't have any authority, they were in disrepair. I must say that he was right in saying that these tank devices, as we always did, were leftovers from the auto-tractor industry, from the aviation industry, but no one was working on special devices for tanks and tank weapons.
So, this question should be put differently. A machine should be created that, together with the development of the projectile, should provide the projectile with work. We considered a promising tank. The author is here. He allocated the minimum dimensions for the armament, the rest was occupied by liquids for protection from radiation. We should reconsider our layout, because it is promising and advantageous in relation to the barrel. So that the projectile comes out ready to fire, but to protect the barrel, which causes the height in relation to the weight, is wrong. We should reconsider the tank, using new weapons. Do not be embarrassed to say that the tank is no longer like a tank. In Sevastopol, ships with jet weapons also do not look like beautiful ships; they do not look the same. Apparently, you just need to get used to it. The layout needs to be broken.
Comments on the report: Comrade Starovoytov referred to Comrade Malinovsky's article - this is about the need to shoot from closed positions. I am not authorized, but I think that this article is forced, because we have nothing to shoot from closed positions with. If we had self-propelled gun bases with rocket weapons for shooting at 5-15 km, would we really insist on transferring these functions to the tank? We deprive the tank of maneuverability if it shoots from closed positions.
The arrangement of two types of weapons on a prospective tank is also incorrect.
It is necessary to separate the functions. The machine that will shoot at 5-15 km does not necessarily have to have all the qualities that a tank needs. All the relatively large shortcomings in tank building are relative to the backlog of research and development work, t. Starovoytov avoided this issue.
If you look at what we have in reserve. Very little. I do not agree that topic #2 should be closed or made underground, we started many works - there were 33 of them, only one real one remains - this is #2. It seems to me that topic #2 successfully solves a very important issue for a semi-automatic tank. We tried to shoot this shell and saw - semi-automaticity helps a lot. Topic #2 should be accelerated, not closed.
Now issues are being resolved to apply this accumulated experience. The experience is good, although no one took it into account in the decisions of the 3 committees. The layout of the tanks was known here. Electronics resolved issues more or less comprehensively.
Comrade Makhonin: Tell me, should tanks be protected or can we go with thinly armored vehicles?
Mr. Barykov's answer:
Since the main means of combating tanks is penetrating radiation, then in order to protect the crew from penetrating radiation, we need to not only reduce, but increase protection. We get this opportunity to increase protection due to the fact that we refuse both the turret and the cannon armament.
Regarding ATGMs: we can create one that cannot be penetrated. And a whole range of active protection methods. It is too early to talk about this. There are such positive signs that we can move the issue of active protection of ATGMs forward.
Speech by Comrade Ierusalimsky
Reference: Vsevolod Vasilyevich Ierusalimsky, Deputy Director for Research at the Moscow branch of VNII-100, leading developer of the T-64 tank armor.
As was stated in the report of comrade Starovoitov, one of the main means of attack on tank troops is an atomic bomb, a nuclear explosion, nuclear ammunition. The main goal of creating tank protection is to combat the consequences of a nuclear explosion. The fact is that steel provides satisfactory protection from radiation alone, but poor protection from an electron flow. In order to combat this radiation, it was necessary to use various hydrogen-containing materials, light metals and other compounds. Only a combination of different types makes it possible to protect the tank crew from radiation penetration.
What do we have and to what level can we bring protection? If medium and heavy tanks weaken radiation penetration by 3 times compared to the dose received by infantrymen, then the following machines, released taking into account the need for protection, will increase to 15. Object 432 - protection is 5 times better than a medium tank. Object 279 of the Leningrad plant - is protected 4 times better than Object 432.
What are the prospects for the future, what are the challenges? Without increasing the weight and dimensions of the complex protection, the effect is doubled, the multiplicity is increased twofold compared to the achieved level.
In this case, we make such a leap, which is required from us for the protection of the atomic radiation itself. The multiplicity of 70 and more times must develop as a mandatory requirement for our new promising machines.
The easiest way, given the strict limits, is to place the crew in one compartment or ampoule against radiation penetration protection. The poster shows such an ampoule, very close to what was done at facility 287.
This is a leap in the field of protection against atomic radiation. I must stipulate that the thickness of the steel armor should not increase compared to serial vehicles, and there is no need to increase it. The dimensions and weight increase due to other materials specially designed for protection against radiation.
These materials must be light and highly effective. The total weight of the vehicle must be within 35, maximum 40 tons. It should be noted that boron-containing glass, resins, which are part of fiberglass, protect not only from radiation, but also have a high jet-extinguishing ability when fired by cumulative projectiles. This made it possible to protect objects 432 and 287 from cumulative projectiles.
Object 432, aka T-64
Protection against cumulative projectiles should not require additional weight compared to the weight that is necessary for protection against radiation. If it is necessary to protect against more powerful and less common projectiles, then the development of active protection methods will come to the rescue. We will examine this issue in detail in the section.
Fundamental ways of destroying ammunition with a chamber with explosives have been found. This filling can be detonated in such a way that the shell will not explode on the armor, but will explode as it approaches the tank, and the cumulative effect will either not appear at all, or will appear very weakly. In principle, the possibility of creating such protection has been proven, but much work remains to be done to ensure that this protection operates reliably when a tank is hit by several shells in one battle.
The fact is that the armor of the frontal projection of the hull and turret is now significantly reinforced, so there is not enough weight for all-round protection of the tank from cumulative shells. The prospects here are great, but this issue requires detailed study and coordinated work of several institutes.
As for protection against armor-piercing and sub-caliber projectiles, it should be implemented using the same measures that have been used up to now, i.e., by using armor made of heavy metals.
Our studies have shown that this task will not require increasing the tank's weight beyond the specified values. Armor-piercing and subcaliber projectiles are less effective than cumulative projectiles and, in particular, nuclear weapons.
The main losses in tank forces will be caused by atomic radiation, and we must cope with this type of weapon as best we can. The figure of 70 (referring to the multiplicity of reduction of penetrating radiation) given in the report is not an exaggeration.
In this regard, I would like to dwell especially on protection from atomic radiation, for example, of amphibious tanks, infantry fighting vehicles. This issue has not been resolved at all. The multiplicity that we achieve does not satisfy us now. A promising tank will be protected from radiation, and designers will have to do a lot of work on the armored personnel carrier in order to create a vehicle in which the manpower is reliably hidden. Let it be protected from dust. Such a vehicle will be heavier than any infantry vehicle. We have a compromise solution in order to minimize losses in manpower. The industry - materials science - is very young, it is several years old. These are our first steps. We will need great efforts to fully solve the main and important task - understanding the qualitative leap. This will require a lot of resources; if we talk about the current state of affairs, then in order to hit tanks, we spend thousands of rubles.
Comrade Yavorsky is speaking.
Comrades, I will first of all begin with the fact that I received an unsatisfactory answer to the two questions I asked, and therefore I will touch upon these questions first. One of the questions concerned the probable assessment of the proposed tank armament. Since Comrade Starovoitov explained to us on this graph how the probable assessment was made, it must be said that this graph, at the very least, misleads us.
It was not by chance that the question was asked here: is the transition to jet weapons a tribute to fashion or a necessity? The answer should be that it is a necessity, not a tribute to fashion, but this necessity must be strictly and competently justified, and there is no such justification in the report or in the presented graphs.
If we look at the graph, we can see that at a range of 3 km, the superiority of jet weapons over cannon weapons is approximately 20 times, since the probability of an initial duel in favor of jet weapons is approximately 95 percent, while we know that the probability of a tank with cannon weapons at such distances is about 20-30 percent. Can this be and is it compatible? Obviously, the graph is inaccurate either because of idealization or because the initial data were chosen incorrectly. Idealization, for example, in the issue of target visibility at 3 km and in the absolute value of the probability of hitting it with jet weapons.
Ultimately, it was not so important to evaluate in this case with scrupulous precision what is better and what is worse, but if we do not attach serious importance to the issues of probabilistic assessment, then we can fall into error when choosing the main characteristics of guided missiles.
What do I think would be the right thing to do in this regard, so as not to make mistakes? It is necessary to carry out this probabilistic assessment in parallel with 203 organizations, so that later they can be compared with each other, controlled, then there will be no disputes. In this case, it is necessary to choose the same initial data. The results of the calculations will open our eyes to many things and will tell us what characteristics guided rocket weapons should have in order to significantly surpass cannon weapons.
I will repeat that it would be correct to write down in the decision that the questions of probabilistic assessment would be put more broadly and seriously, that 2-3 organizations would deal with this issue, and not one interested organization. In GRAU there is Research Institute-3, we have Research Institute-61, which can competently carry out this work when there is a different result.
Perhaps it will turn out that to some extent, jet weapons begin to prevail over cannon weapons. This will be a weighty argument.
ATGM 2K4 "Dragon"
When I asked about the desired or actual 152mm unguided projectile, the speaker replied that this was being worked out by the organization and the data was reliable.
I must say that we have a lot to do with this. In terms of armor penetration, there is no doubt about it - 5-6 calibers, rotation speed of about 35-40 thousand revolutions, armor penetration of 200-250 mm maximum, not 500 mm.
It is recommended to show a characteristic that can be achieved and agreed upon with the development organizations.
Recommended in the barrel section artillery work on the rifled part. Why is that? Maybe there was an analysis of what we have in the Soviet Union, but apparently such an analysis was not done. We have the best results on armored moving targets. The Americans do not have this yet. Why is it recommended to work on rifled artillery? In terms of probabilistic assessment for unguided projectiles, it would be necessary to work out in more detail and then give reliable recommendations.
Comrade Makhonin: Before issuing a regulation, it must be agreed upon with the developers. That is why we gathered, to discuss and put forward suggestions.
Yarovsky continues: Before speaking, I asked the question: was it agreed or not? They answered: yes. But it turns out - no.
My technical proposal: according to this variant it would be reasonable to have a tank armed with guided missiles, and along with this a tank with high characteristics. Such tanks would complement each other and compensate for the shortcomings.
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