Tajikistan, or the Thorny Path to Maintaining Peace
A Turbulent Half-Year, or the Tajik Shoulder for Russia
We are concluding a series dedicated to the challenges facing the leadership of Tajikistan and the republic as a whole.
The topic is relevant against the backdrop of the victory of the Taliban and the easy success of terrorists in Syria, which inspired jihadists from Xinjiang to the Maghreb, and the escalation of international conflicts in the first half of 2025, plunging the world into a period of instability.
Central Asia and Transcaucasia are among them, and destabilization in Transcaucasia is occurring due to the weakening of Russia's position there. At the same time, its influence in Transcaucasia has not been reduced to zero due to the presence of a military base in Armenia, and because of the interest of business circles in Yerevan and Baku in economic cooperation with Moscow.
However, a dangerous precedent for Russia of losing influence in strategically important regions has been created. And our only allies in the post-Soviet South, where a military presence, along with Armenia, remains, are Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
201-I military base
Kazakhstan, despite its membership in the CSTO and Russian military facilities in the country, can hardly be called an ally, as discussed in the article: About Kazakhstan, the center of peacekeeping operations and the inappropriateness of emotions in politics.
Accordingly, a conversation about the political future of Tajikistan is identical to a conversation about the prospects of Russia’s presence in the republic, the fate of the 201st military base and the optical-electronic complex “Window” located in the Pamirs.
On Both Sides of the Caspian, or Connected by One Chain
Tajikistan's future depends not only on its internal stability, but also on the stability of its neighbors. The states that emerged in the post-Soviet Central Asian space resemble an assembled cabinet with poorly tightened screws - push and it will collapse.
Uzbekistan is the most stable of them, but its problem is an excess of young people who need employment and are combustible material with minimal social tension in society. Plus, the Fergana Valley is a poor and overpopulated region, partly belonging to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Relations between Tashkent, Bishkek and Dushanbe were tense ten years ago.
The borders between the countries, writes orientalist S. Pritchin, were closed, and in some places even mined. The railway connecting Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was dismantled, and a visa regime was in effect.
This was compounded by an interethnic problem: there are about 1,2 million Uzbeks living in Tajikistan, and about 6 million Tajiks in Uzbekistan, who consider Bukhara and Samarkand to be their spiritual, cultural and historical centers.
A step towards stabilizing Tajik-Uzbek relations was taken by Sh. Mirziyoyev, who established a constructive dialogue with E. Rahmon.
But the latter's relationship with Bishkek is more complicated. Kyrgyzstan is poor, criminalized, and corrupt. Until recently, the establishment of interstate dialogue was hampered by unresolved border problems, rooted in the USSR.
They are beyond the scope of the narrative. Let us only note that the gradual
the transition of the conflict to a completely different stage, - notes S. Pritchin, - occurred at the end of April 2021, when regular troops with heavy equipment and mortars from both sides joined the already familiar border firefight. As a result of three days of fighting, 31 people were killed and about 150 were wounded on the Kyrgyz side, while 19 people were killed and 90 wounded on the Tajik side.
Kazakhstan after 2022, with its poorly guarded and long border, cannot be called stable either, although before the January events of that year it seemed so.
Afghanistan. Tajikistan's most dangerous neighbor. Yes, the Taliban are trying to establish order in the emirate they proclaimed. But geography with isolated regions and interethnic problems, which was discussed in the Afghan cycle, plays against them.
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. Having left a bloody trail in Syria, where will the Uyghur militants head next? Some of them joined the 84th division of the regular army created by A. Ash-Shara, some formed his "presidential guard". But rebels rarely get along in armed forces built on a regular basis - let's remember N. Makhno.
Iran. Its government is cheering up and declaring victory in the recent conflict with Israel. But there is no hiding the tangle of internal problems, the collapse of the Axis of Resistance, fatal miscalculations in ensuring the safety of senior command personnel and scientists from the actions of the Air Force of a state that does not have a common border with the Islamic Republic. Plus, the problem of separatism that Tehran is facing, considering that Iranians make up half of the country. It is scary to imagine the consequences of the ayatollah's power being undermined. Collapse the building of Iranian statehood, and the debris will scatter across Central Asia.
And in the center of this unstable geopolitical plate is Tajikistan – not only our ally in the region, but also a debtor. If the 201st Motorized Rifle Division had not been deployed on its territory, the republic might not be on the map now.
Rushing to the rescue, or Saviors of Tajikistan
To be fair, not only Moscow, but also Tashkent and Kabul contributed to the preservation of the state. Tashkent, however, did this with the help of Russian soldiers and officers: it transferred the 15th GRU special forces brigade, which it inherited after the collapse of the USSR, to the republic.
The special forces liberated Kurgan-Tyube from the militants of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and helped the Popular Front, which opposed the Islamists, create a more or less combat-ready army, which allowed it to win the civil war.
Afghanistan, before the Taliban seized power in 1996, also actively participated in the settlement of the conflict between Rahmon and the UTO. In May 1995, at the initiative of the Tajiks: the then President of the Islamic Republic B. Rabbani and its Minister of Defense A. Shah Massoud, a meeting took place between President Rahmon and the leader of the UTO S. A. Nuri, which became an important step in the negotiation process.
E. Rahmon and S. A. Nuri: a step towards genuine peace or preservation of unresolved problems?
Kabul's interest was determined by the Taliban's advance and the need to have a friendly Tajikistan in the rear. And if Rabbani convinced the UTO leadership to follow the path of negotiations, the Kremlin, in turn, put pressure on Rakhmon, including by using financial levers.
The final point in the settlement of the conflict was put on June 27, 1997 in Moscow with the signing of a peace agreement, and this date became a national holiday in Tajikistan – National Unity Day.
A precarious world, or an unraveled tangle of problems
Peace has come, but problems remain. The main ones are poverty, the radicalization of public sentiment and the decline of the republic's intellectual potential. The reasons for this were discussed in previous articles.
The situation was aggravated by Rakhmon’s reduction of the opposition’s influence to zero, contrary to the agreement reached, and his pursuit of a course of strengthening his personal power, including by amending the constitution to allow him to run for another presidential term.
Let's not rush to criticize the Tajik president. In the context of the political realities of Central Asia and the Middle East, with a low level of legal culture of citizens and the absence of traditions of parliamentarism, the government naturally either has an authoritarian character or strives to become one.
However, Rakhmon's steps affected the interests of an external power - Uzbekistan. Tashkent did not just help Dushanbe resist the opposition, but counted on the formation of an elite loyal to itself and certain preferences.
The problem was as follows. The previous articles discussed the redistribution of power in Tajikistan after the collapse of the USSR from the Leninabad clan to the Kulyab clan. The former was closely linked to Uzbekistan. Against this background, the historian A. A. Kazantsev's assumption is not surprising:
Uzbekistan was behind the failed coup of Colonel Khudoyberdyev in Tajikistan.
We are talking about the events of 1998 in the north of Tajikistan.
Colonel M. Khudoiberdyev
Perhaps I. Karimov tried to use the Uzbek colonel to reshuffle the pieces on the Tajik political chessboard in order to preserve spheres of influence in the neighboring republic.
However, Khudoyberdyev failed, despite the combat experience and organizational skills he acquired in Afghanistan, and the good training of his subordinates, some of whom fought the Taliban in the ranks of the units of the Uzbek A. R. Dostum.
Tajikistan: Power and Religion, or Walking on Thin Ice
The rebellion was suppressed. Dushanbe's next step was to attempt to establish secular control over the sphere of religion, which was exerting an ever-increasing influence on social processes in the country.
In 1996, according to the results of a national public opinion poll in Tajikistan, writes political scientist S. Olimova, 97% of respondents reported that they were believers. At the same time, 90% of all respondents recognized themselves as Muslims, 4% as Orthodox, 1% as followers of other religions, 2% as atheists, and 2% found it difficult to answer.
At this stage it is difficult to say how many of the 90% were supporters of radical ideas. However, it seems possible to state that they were actively spread during the civil war, when the first Wahhabis, according to historian R. A. Ergasheva, were its veterans, commonly referred to as vovchiks.
Regarding veterans and the military. The latter, finding themselves out of work, are often prone to radicalization, adopting religious slogans, without thinking much about their theological subtleties and sometimes guided by pragmatic considerations.
Thus, the backbone of the ISIS formations, banned in Russia, was made up of former officers of the Iraqi army, and the Chechen fighters were led by yesterday's Soviet officers D. Dudayev and A. Maskhadov. And the rebellion of Khudoiberdyev was not least due to the unrealized ambitions of the colonel.
In relation to Tajikistan, the story of Colonel G. Khalimov is indicative. Having served in the Dushanbe OMON, he went over to the side of ISIS in 2015, where he became the “Minister of War” – the second person in the terrorist hierarchy.
G. Khalimov
The year in question was not an ordinary one in the religious and political life of Tajikistan, marked by the mutiny – it is still unclear whether this word should be put in quotation marks – of Deputy Minister of Defense Major General A. M. Nazarzoda and the ban of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). The disgraced and now deceased Nazarzoda was once a member of it.
Going underground, according to experts, led to the radicalization of its members and their partial exodus to the Middle East, where they joined the ranks of ISIS, hoping to eventually return to their homeland and restore “order” there, or even turn it into part of the “caliphate.”
According to official data alone, announced by the deputy head of the State Committee for National Security of Tajikistan M. Umarov, 1899 citizens of Tajikistan fought on the side of the terrorists.
That is, by banning the PIVT, Rakhmon, instead of consolidating society, took a step toward splitting it. Why? I think the reason is the aforementioned desire of the president to combine the functions of not only the political but also the religious leader of the country, having proclaimed 2009 the "Year of the Great Imam." One must assume that the president's logic was as follows: Islamization? Fine. But under my aegis.
In this sense, the Islamic scholar A. V. Malashenko compared Rakhmon with R. Kadyrov, also a secular leader, but controlling the sphere of religion, including in terms of architectural construction. The former initiated the construction of the grandiose Central Cathedral Mosque in Dushanbe, while the latter had previously built the “Heart of Chechnya.”
Central Cathedral Mosque in Dushanbe
Let us add to them N. Nazarbayev, who built the cathedral mosque in Astana, I. Aliyev, who erected the Heydar Mosque, and G. Berdimuhamedov, who last year opened a mosque in Anau, declared the cultural capital of the Turkic world.
In this case, we are not simply talking about religious buildings, but about a symbol of the patronage of secular power over religion and its institutions, embodied in stone.
However, Rakhmon found himself in a more difficult situation than his colleagues.
In Tajikistan, - noted A. V. Malashenko, - a parallel system of private religious education, not subordinate to the president, was formed; the sermons read in mosques did not always correspond to Hanafi Islam, as well as to official ideological guidelines. Not all clergy are loyal to the regime. Rakhmon soon realized that he had failed to take Islam under control, as a result of which the strengthening of the Islamic factor in society began to turn into a threat to the regime. He took measures to limit the political influence of religion.
In the same year 2009, along with the proclamation of the Hanafi madhhab as official in the republic, the Supreme Court of Tajikistan issued a ruling recognizing the activities of Salafis as extremist:
The Salafiya movement has a dangerous ideology, and the Supreme Court’s decision was motivated by the desire to protect the constitutional order of the Republic of Tajikistan, strengthen the country’s national security and prevent the incitement of interfaith strife.
Reasonable. However, extremism cannot be dealt with by decrees alone. Yes,
followers of the religious teaching, - notes R. A. Ergasheva, - face from 5 to 8 years in prison. In the country's colonies, several dozen men and women are serving sentences for Salafism, but the number of followers is only growing.
Moreover, even before the ban on the PIVT, the government had taken controversial steps in the religious sphere. We are talking about the law “On the responsibility of parents for the education and upbringing of children” adopted in 2011, which, as noted by A. V. Malashenko, prohibited persons under 18 from visiting the mosque without being accompanied by older family members.
Such actions by Dushanbe created the ground for social tension. And as a result:
Tajikistan, - journalist S. Shermatova wrote back in 2010, - having gone through stabilization, again found itself at the same crisis point as in the early 1990s, when the open struggle between the authorities and regional elites resulted in a civil war.
A new round of civil war, thank God, did not happen, partly due to events in the Middle East: Tajik militants fighting in the ranks of ISIS suffered significant losses during the battles in Syria and Iraq, Khalimov was killed. Unlike in the 1990s, Salafis in modern Afghanistan have much less influence, and the Taliban are actively fighting them. That is, the risk of destabilization from the outside has been neutralized for now.
Relations with Uzbekistan, as noted above, have been established; at least they are not deteriorating with Kyrgyzstan. The parties express their intention, with the active mediation of Russia, to settle border disputes.
Is a firm handshake between presidents the same as their willingness to resolve border issues?
The East is a delicate matter, or Will Rakhmon follow the example of his colleagues
The problem of Tajikistan's stability is hidden in the "Palace of the Nation". Rakhmon has been in the presidential chair for more than thirty years. His aforementioned colleagues, Berdimuhamedov and Nazarbayev, with varying degrees of success, but carried out the transfer of power, and the late G. Aliyev did this even earlier.
The name of the successor to the President of Tajikistan is well-known: his eldest son, Rustam Emomali. His father, to his credit, has been building Rustam's political career since he came of age, introducing him to the range of future duties of the head of the republic. Rustam is currently the head of its National Council and the mayor of Dushanbe.
Emomali Rahmon and Rustam Emomali
However, the clans mentioned in the previous article have not gone away, and their leaders are hardly happy with the control of one large family over the country’s financial flows and resources.
The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region remains a factor of tension, and a discussion of the situation there requires a separate article. Let us only note the violent suppression of protest sentiments in the region in 2022. Their causes are complex: Dushanbe's personnel policy in relation to the region, and poverty - high even by Tajikistan's standards - and the unsettled youth.
Plus, a number of problems are caused by interethnic and religious components – the Pamiri do not consider themselves Tajiks and, unlike the majority of the republic’s residents, profess Ismailism.
Today, the central government is in control of the situation, but will it be able to do so in the future, under the successor of the current president?
Tajikistan needs a significant improvement in the lives of its citizens, minimization of unemployment, access for all segments of the population to secondary and higher education, with prospects for subsequent employment and career growth. The solution to these problems will eliminate the threat of state collapse and the danger of religious extremism, aimed at the disadvantaged and uneducated masses.
For its part, Moscow actively supports Dushanbe, including in solving problems in the field of education: Tajik teachers undergo internships in Russia, our teachers go to the neighboring republic to share their experience, and Russian schools are opened there. In addition, Russia opens the doors of its universities to Tajik students - there are about 30 thousand of them studying in our country.
Moscow is interested in forming a loyal Tajik elite, including by providing access for students from the neighboring republic to Russian universities
And it is equally important that the clan structure of Tajik society does not reduce all these efforts to nothing. After all, such a model of social structure is identical to localism, when the layer of managers is formed not based on the principle of competence, but is based on family ties.
The collapse of more than one state, even more powerful than Tajikistan, began with a crisis of management personnel, with their inability to respond to external and internal challenges – let’s remember the Russian Empire and the USSR.
The defeat of ISIS, the Taliban's fight against Salafism, and Russia's assistance to Tajikistan give Rahmon and his entourage a limited time to resolve their domestic problems. Time will tell whether they will take advantage of this or not.
References
Kazantsev A.A. “The Great Game” with Unknown Rules: World Politics and Central Asia. Moscow: MGIMO Publishing House, Heritage of Eurasia, 2008
Malashenko A.V. Tajikistan: Long Echoes of Civil War
Olimova S. Youth and Islam in Tajikistan
Pritchin S. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Friendship is not a conflict
Information