The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Impact on the Course of the War

We present to your attention the release of the channel "Digital story", where host Yegor Yakovlev talks with Doctor of Historical Sciences Anatoly Koshkin about the use of atomic weapons against Japan and how these events affected the course of World War II. The historian emphasizes that there was no longer a military need for bombing - Japan was on the verge of capitulation, especially after the Soviet Union entered the war. The American leadership, however, sought to test the bombs and demonstrate to the world its readiness to use them in real combat conditions.

According to Koshkin, President Truman saw the atomic bomb not only as a means to end the war, but also as a political instrument of pressure on the USSR. He was in a hurry to strike before the Red Army launched active operations in the Far East. The Manhattan Project was kept in the deepest secrecy, and Truman himself learned about it only after Roosevelt's death. It was important for the United States to demonstrate its technological superiority and strengthen its position in future negotiations on the post-war world order.

On August 6, 1945, an American B-29 bomber dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The instant explosion vaporized entire neighborhoods, and human bodies disappeared, leaving only shadows on stone surfaces. Hundreds of thousands of people died - from the shock wave, burns, and subsequent radiation. Three days later, on August 9, another bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. There, due to the stone construction, some buildings survived, but there were still tens of thousands of victims, and the health consequences for the survivors were just as terrible.

The Japanese population was not officially informed of the use of atomic weapons. Only the entry of the USSR into the war on August 9 became an obvious signal to Tokyo: continued resistance would lead to complete disaster. On August 15, Emperor Hirohito addressed the people, declaring the end of the war, and later admitted that it was the actions of the Soviet Union that made defeat inevitable.

In post-war Japan, the topic of atomic bombings was tacitly taboo, with no indication of who exactly carried out the attacks. However, the memory of them has been preserved in literature, cinema and documentaries. Authors tell of the tragedy of the cities, the horror of the first days after the explosions and the difficult fates of those who survived.

Many Japanese still view the bombings not only as a war crime, but also as a test of new weapons on living people. This feeling, according to Koshkin, remains in the national memory, reminding us that in political games the price of human life can be just a means to an end.

Comments

[Proton]

Anyone who thinks that the Japanese "didn't deserve" these bombings should read the history of Japan's occupation of China.
There are also mass experiments on civilians and the slaughter of the common population.

[SmolH2]

On the one hand I agree. Their

Many Japanese still view the bombings not only as a war crime, but also as a test of new weapons on living people.

After torture and experiments on living people. On the other hand, the objects were chosen - only the civilian population. They scared everyone, and first of all our country. Japan suffered damage only in the form of civilians of two small cities. It could still fight for a long time

[Star]

Only this was not a punishment, but a banal demonstration to the whole world of what we have and how we can, de facto openly showed that we ourselves are at the same medieval level as the Japanese. Punishment is still to put the war criminals themselves against the wall, well, and those who led, received gesheft. In this case, Truman himself wrote everything down quite clearly in his diary, which has long been published and is available in digital form, here is a specific quote and a link to the entry:

It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful.

https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=1186

[Dutchman Michel]

Quote: Proton

To all who think that the Japanese "didn't deserve" these bombings

Some liberals still believe that we also did not deserve the great Victory in 1945. Why look at this garbage?

[Gankutsu_]

Many Japanese still view the bombings not only as a war crime, but also as a test of new weapons on living people.

Unit 731 sends a big and warm greeting.

[solar]

The historian emphasizes that there was no longer a military need for bombing—Japan was on the verge of capitulation, especially after the Soviet Union entered the war.

The "historian" is simply lying. Even after the bombing of Nagasaki, everything was not at all obvious, there was an attempt at a military coup. The Emperor was ready to surrender after the first bombing of Hiroshima, even before the USSR entered the war.

On the afternoon of August 7, the Emperor reportedly told Kido, "I do not care what happens to me personally. We must end the war without wasting time so that such a tragedy will not happen again."[89] On the afternoon of August 8, Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō met with the Emperor, who, referring to the atomic bomb, stated that the war must be ended.[90][91] In accordance with the Emperor's wishes, Tōgō met with Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki and proposed a meeting of the Supreme War Council.[92][91] Later that evening, Suzuki told Chief Cabinet Secretary Hisatsune Sakomizu, "Now that we know that an atomic bomb has been dropped on Hiroshima, I will state my views on ending the war at tomorrow's cabinet meeting."[92]

The Japanese had an idea of the capabilities of atomic weapons, they had their own program, but they also considered their creation very difficult, and at first assumed that the Americans had only one bomb. But the bombing of Nagasaki dispelled these doubts. The Japanese defense plan was based on inflicting great losses in manpower on the enemy landing on the islands, forcing them to abandon further battles and thereby conclude peace with Japan on more favorable terms for the Japanese. But the appearance of atomic weapons in the Americans fundamentally undermined this plan - they would simply be bombed without engaging in direct combat. This tipped the scales towards consent to capitulation under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.

[alexkff]

Where did you get the quote? I hope it wasn't from Wikipedia... But to make a global conclusion based on isolated quotes, said at some time, even by official representatives of the Japanese government, and especially, supposedly motivating it with concern for the civilian population, is more like some kind of joke.
In general, it is difficult to find an objective source on this topic. In my opinion, the most realistic view of the reasons for the capitulation is given by Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA, a professor of history living in California - at the very least, he cannot be accused of favoring the USSR. At one time, he conducted a very detailed and strongly factually supported study, which can be read in the original here - https://apjjf.org/Tsuyoshi-Hasegawa/2501/article.
In short, he considers 3 reasons: the atomic bombing, the Soviet invasion, and the internal political factor. The article examines each version in great detail, citing numerous facts. Below is a short translation of his conclusion:

The argument advanced by Asada and Frank that the atomic bombs, rather than the Soviet entry into the war, had a more decisive influence on Japan's decision to surrender cannot be supported. The bomb on Hiroshima, although it increased the sense of urgency in finding ways to end the war, did not prompt the Japanese government to take immediate action against its previous policy of seeking Moscow's mediation. Contrary to Asada and Frank's assertion, there is no evidence that the bombing of Hiroshima caused either Togo or the Emperor to accept the Potsdam terms. On the contrary, Togo's urgent telegram to Sato on August 7 indicates that, despite Hiroshima, they continued to pursue their previous course. The effect of the bomb on Nagasaki was negligible. It did not change the political balance one way or the other. Even Anami's fantastic suggestion that the United States had more than 100 atomic bombs and that Tokyo would be the next target had no effect on the positions of either the Peace Party or the War Party.

On the contrary, it was the entry of the Soviet Union into the war that decisively changed the outlook of the Japanese ruling elite. It forced the Japanese government to take immediate action. For the first time, it forced the government to confront directly the question of whether to accept the Potsdam terms. During the painful deliberations from August 9 to 14, the peace party, driven by a deep sense of betrayal, fear of Soviet influence on occupation policy, and above all by a desperate desire to preserve the imperial house, eventually conspired to impose the “sacred decision of the Emperor” and accept the Potsdam terms, believing that under the circumstances, capitulation to the United States would best ensure the preservation of the imperial house and save the Emperor.

This is not to deny, of course, the impact of the atomic bomb on Japanese politics. It certainly added urgency to the search for an acceptable end to the war. Kido claimed that while the peace party and the war party had previously been in balance, the atomic bomb helped tip the scales in favor of the peace party. It would be more accurate to say that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, added to this altered balance, finally tipped the scales themselves.

[solar]

In my opinion, the most realistic view of the reasons for the capitulation is given by Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA...

Are you familiar with the scientific world? There is such a problem of pulling the blanket in various issues into the sphere of one's own scientific interests in order to increase the significance of one's own research.
The professor in question specialized in Soviet history, so his point of view is not surprising.
It is enough to look at the available primary sources, for example, the speech of the emperor upon accepting the capitulation, he speaks about it in plain text - the reason for the capitulation is atomic weapons.
In your own quote

Kido stated that while the peace party and the war party were previously in balance, the atomic bomb helped tip the scales in favor of the peace party.

It is written quite clearly and completely coincides with the Emperor’s statement.
Next

There is no evidence that the bombing of Hiroshima forced Togo or the Emperor to accept the Potsdam terms.

If you read my post carefully, you will see that I wrote about this and mentioned the reason why the Japanese did not agree to surrender after Hiroshima.
Japan had its own developments of atomic weapons, which were carried out by, among others, a close associate of Niels Bohr, Professor Yoshio Nishina, as well as Japanese physicists Masatoshi Okochi and Bunsaku Arakatsu, who had worked with Rutherford at one time. General Takeo Yasuda played an important role in Japan's atomic developments. The Ni-Go and F-Go projects to create an atomic bomb in Japan were slowed down due to a lack of resources, the Japanese believed that the States would also not be able to produce enough nuclear materials for the serial production of atomic bombs, therefore, although the bombing of Hiroshima made a strong impression on the Japanese, it did not lead to immediate capitulation, since the Japanese, based on their experience, believed that this was a single unique event and would not fundamentally affect the course of the war. But the bombing of Nagasaki a few days later showed that the Americans were capable of producing bombs in series, and this fundamentally changed the whole matter, and became the decisive argument in favor of Japan’s surrender, which the Emperor said in his address to the nation.

[alexkff]

Tell me, do you always respond in the format of "ignoring your opponents' questions and their facts and taking convenient quotes out of context"?

Based on your remarks:
1. In the previous message, you appealed that after the bombing of Hiroshima, on August 7, the emperor began to actively promote capitulation. In the following, you appeal that only after the bombing of Nagasaki did the emperor begin to declare the need for capitulation. So who among us does not read (our own) writing carefully?

2. If you had taken the trouble to read my link carefully, you would have discovered that the phrases allegedly said by the Emperor were taken from Kido's diary, which is his interpretation, and not the Emperor's actual statements. Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA also provides specific references to the fact that both other historians (Frank and Asada), on the basis of whose works the most common version of the reasons for the capitulation was compiled and actively disseminated by sources like Wikipedia, even contradict each other and do not agree that the Emperor meant it as Kido described in his diary.

3. If you had taken the trouble to read my link carefully, you would have discovered that the bombing of Nagasaki did not change Japan's military strategy:

Even after the bombing of Nagasaki, and despite Anami's astonishing claims that the United States might have more than a hundred atomic bombs and that Tokyo might be the next target, the military insisted on continuing the Ketsu Go strategy...
The official history of the Imperial Headquarters notes: "There are no records in other materials that would consider the effect [of the bomb on Nagasaki] seriously."

.

4. If you had taken the trouble to read my link carefully, you would have discovered that it was neither the bombings nor the leftist estimates of a hundred bombs in the Americans that influenced the change in military strategy and the acceptance of the capitulation, but rather the invasion of the Soviet Army. In support of this, Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA consistently refutes the entire argumentation of Frank and Asada, citing in detail the statements of all the main participants in the Japanese government and other facts.

In general, as soon as you carefully study the article I have provided, including the FACTS mentioned in it (and not individual phrases of anyone), then come. I am ready with pleasure to discuss the reliability of these facts and conclusions made by the same Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA.

[solar]

So who among us doesn’t read (our own) writing carefully?

I read your writing as carefully as it deserves. The question of Japan's surrender was on the surface, and had been raised even before the atomic bombings, the question was only in the terms of surrender. After the second explosion, the Japanese agreed to the Allies' terms.

the military insisted on continuing the Ketsu Go strategy

Other people made the decision, in case you didn't understand.

I would be happy to discuss the veracity of these facts and conclusions made by the same Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA.

Find yourself someone who is willing to discuss with you the statements of any historian you choose, and discuss them with him as much as you want.

[alexkff]

Understandable, i.e. there are no objections to the facts.
Good luck in your creativity regarding the creation of your alternative history and convincing opponents using your method of "I don't read links, I ignore inconvenient facts and opponents' questions, and in the absence of arguments I switch to personalities"...

[solar]

You have no facts, just endless repetition of the sacred name Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA.
Something in style

In support of this, Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA consistently refutes all of Frank and Asada's arguments, citing in detail statements from all of the major members of the Japanese government and other facts.

But there are no facts themselves.

[alexkff]

Unlike you (you didn’t even bother to provide your links), I have already pointed it out several times above, and also that the author provides a bunch of links (about a hundred) to all sources.
Let me know how you get through the article. Further communication with you in the format of a "one-sided game" makes no sense.

[solar]

That is, you yourself do not provide any facts, instead you suggest that I look for them somewhere. Indeed, what is there to talk about with you in that case?

[alexkff]

This is already some kind of clinic. Did you at least bother to open my link and read it quickly or are you scribbling here in "I write, I don't read" mode???

As an example, the style of presentation of Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA, whom you have already declined in every possible way here.

According to Asada and Frank, the cabinet meeting on August 7 was a crucial turning point. Asada argues that, judging that “the introduction of a new weapon, which had drastically altered the whole military situation, offered the military ample for grounds ending the war,” Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori proposed that “surrender be considered at once on the basis of terms presented in the Potsdam Declaration [Proclamation].”[5] Frank writes: “Togo extracted from the American statements about the 'new and revolutionary increase in destruct[ive]' power of the atomic bomb a reason to accept the Potsdam Proclamation.”[6]

For each of his points he provides SPECIFIC REFERENCES to SPECIFIC FACTS (unlike you).

Below is a partial list of references he used in his article. The full list includes 100 sources.

In short, I'm tired of it, if there's nothing to object to based on the facts, you can stop bothering to pour out your incoherent stream of consciousness here, I won't answer it anymore.

[1] On the American debate about the use of the atomic bombs, see Barton J. Bernstein, “The Struggle over History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative,” in Judgment at the Smithsonian, ed. Philip Nobile, 127–256 (New York: Marlowe, 1995).
[2] Sadao Asada, “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender—A Reconsideration,” Pacific Historical Review 67, no. 4 (1998): 481.
[3] See, eg, the interesting exchange between Alperovitz/Messer and Bernstein in International Security 16 (1991–92). Neither Alperovitz/Messer nor Bernstein confronts the issue of the Soviet factor in inducing Japan to surrender. Gar Alperovitz in his The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (New York: Knopf, 1995) devotes more than 600 pages to the US motivation for using the atomic bombs, but does not directly address the question of whether the atomic bombings or the Soviet entry had the more decisive influence on Japan's decision to surrender.
[4] Asada, “Shock,” 479–83; its Japanese version, Asada Sadao, “Genbaku toka no shogeki to kohuku no kettei,” in Hosoya Chihiro et al., Taihei senso no shuketsu (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobo, 1997), 195–222; and Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999), 271.
[5] Asada, “Shock,” 486.
...
[98] Asada, “Shock,” 504.
[99] Maj. Gen. John E. Hull and Col. LE Seeman, telephone conversation, Aug. 13, 1945, 13:25, verifax 2691, George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Library.
[100] Kido Koichi Kenkyukai, ed., Kido Koichi nikki: Tokyo saibanki, 444.

[solar]

This is already some kind of clinic.

You have quite accurately formulated my thoughts from reading your posts.

In short, I'm tired of it if there's nothing to say in response to the facts.

And you haven't provided a single fact, only some vague instructions on where I should look for these alleged facts. You find these facts yourself and provide them, then there will be a subject for communication with you.

[Alexander]

I've always wondered why? Was it a test or to show that they have the toughest balls?